{ "id": 126376, "name": "MARGARITA RIVERA, Mother and Next Friend of Osvaldo Rivera, a Minor, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. ENRIQUE ARANA, Defendant-Appellee", "name_abbreviation": "Rivera v. Arana", "decision_date": "2001-05-09", "docket_number": "No. 1 \u2014 00\u20141530", "first_page": "641", "last_page": "652", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "322 Ill. App. 3d 641" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "733 N.E.2d 345", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2000, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "315 Ill. App. 3d 199", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 980691 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "210" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/315/0199-01" ] }, { "cite": "735 N.E.2d 765", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2000, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "316 Ill. App. 3d 58", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1096595 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "61" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/316/0058-01" ] }, { "cite": "742 N.E.2d 1277", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2001, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "318 Ill. App. 3d 939", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 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Rptr.", "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "6" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "204 Cal. App. 3d 1325", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Cal. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2347624 ], "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1328" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/cal-app-3d/204/1325-01" ] }, { "cite": "286 Cal. Rptr. 207", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Cal. Rptr.", "weight": 3, "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "213" }, { "page": "213" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "234 Cal. App. 3d 1329", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Cal. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2337580 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1338" }, { "page": "1337" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/cal-app-3d/234/1329-01" ] }, { "cite": "864 P.2d 839", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.2d", "case_ids": [ 10353937 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "845" }, { "page": "845" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/p2d/864/0839-01" ] }, { "cite": "595 N.E.2d 1060", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1992, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "149 Ill. 2d 265", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5599399 ], "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "277-78" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/149/0265-01" ] }, { "cite": "650 N.E.2d 547", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "272 Ill. App. 3d 516", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 251730 ], "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "520" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/272/0516-01" ] }, { "cite": "720 N.E.2d 360", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1999, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "308 Ill. App. 3d 553", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 261327 ], "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "561" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/308/0553-01" ] }, { "cite": "708 N.E.2d 539", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1999, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "303 Ill. App. 3d 609", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 511408 ], "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "613" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/303/0609-01" ] }, { "cite": "628 N.E.2d 568", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1993, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "257 Ill. App. 3d 81", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2892234 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "84" }, { "page": "92" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/257/0081-01" ] }, { "cite": "672 N.E.2d 1159", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1996, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "173 Ill. 2d 433", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 147635 ], "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "438" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/173/0433-01" ] }, { "cite": "675 N.E.2d 897", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1996, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "174 Ill. 2d 513", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 223621 ], "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "530" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/174/0513-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1111, "char_count": 26631, "ocr_confidence": 0.775, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.6258439138747338e-07, "percentile": 0.6880781466409818 }, "sha256": "12ba3017508781df142778af87dc4ed7daa417ef6127b3eba70a9f22a66a13f4", "simhash": "1:8efffef4a5c8ec70", "word_count": 4447 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:05:07.459628+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "MARGARITA RIVERA, Mother and Next Friend of Osvaldo Rivera, a Minor, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. ENRIQUE ARANA, Defendant-Appellee." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE BURKE\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nPlaintiff Margarita Rivera, as mother and next friend of Osvaldo Rivera, a minor, appeals from an order of the circuit court granting defendant Dr. Enrique Arana\u2019s motion for summary judgment based on the court\u2019s determination that defendant was immune from medical malpractice liability pursuant to the Good Samaritan Act (745 ILCS 49/25 (West 1998)). On appeal, plaintiff contends that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment because genuine issues of material fact existed. She also contends that the immunity provided by the Good Samaritan Act should not apply to a cause of action against a physician under the Abused and Neglected Child Reporting Act (Child Reporting Act) (325 ILCS 5/4.02 (West 1998)). For the reasons set forth below, we affirm.\nSTATEMENT OF FACTS\nOn September 20, 1994, Dr. Arana treated Osvaldo Rivera (Osvaldo), the minor child of plaintiff, for a foot infection when his aunt, Marie Baez, who was then Osvaldo\u2019s legal guardian, brought him to Arana\u2019s office. On July 3, 1997, plaintiff filed a medical malpractice complaint against Arana, alleging that he failed to take an adequate history or perform an adequate examination of Osvaldo, he failed to record signs of child abuse, and he failed to report suspected child abuse. Defendant answered and, as an affirmative defense, alleged that the Good Samaritan Act barred plaintiffs claims. Thereafter, on December 30, 1999, defendant filed a motion for summary judgment based on lack of liability pursuant to the Good Samaritan Act.\nDr. Arana presented his deposition and the depositions of Marie Baez and Gloria Miranda in support of his motion for summary judgment. Arana, in his deposition, stated that he is an anatomical and clinical pathologist as well as a general practitioner at the Pro-Health Medical Center in Chicago. In September 1994, three other doctors were working in the clinic with him and two medical assistants, one of whom was Miranda. Arana saw Osvaldo only one time on September 20, 1994. Arana\u2019s records regarding Osvaldo included an information/ consent for treatment form and his handwritten notes. Arana\u2019s notes stated that Osvaldo was brought in by his aunt, Baez. Arana was seeing one of Baez\u2019s children and Baez asked that he also examine Osvaldo for infected feet. According to Arana, Osvaldo was an add-on patient because Baez requested of his medical assistant \u201cto be seen by [Arana] as an add-on without an appointment.\u201d Arana further stated that seeing Osvaldo \u201cwas sort of a[n] emergency, because [Baez] had\u2014 she requested to be seeing [sic] the child as an emergency.\u201d Baez told Arana that she was Osvaldo\u2019s legal guardian, that she had no money, and she did not have a public aid medical card for Osvaldo. Arana told Baez that that was okay and that he would see Osvaldo. In taking a history, Baez did not know about Osvaldo\u2019s family history nor whether he had an immunization card. Baez stated that Osvaldo was living with her because his mother did not want him. She told Arana that she was in the process of getting legal guardian papers for Osvaldo and a public aid card.\nDr. Arana performed a routine examination upon Osvaldo, which he stated took 15 to 20 minutes. Osvaldo was a normal child with normal health, except that he was thin and underweight for his age (three years). It was Arana\u2019s belief that Osvaldo suffered from poor nutrition. Upon examination of Osvaldo\u2019s feet, Arana noted that the plantar surfaces of his feet were slightly infected. Both feet showed superficial ulcers on the anterior surfaces, close to the toes. There was mild inflammation, indicated by slight redness, and infection, indicated by slight yellow discoloration. There were no open wounds, no odor, and no pus. Because both feet were similar, Arana asked Baez if Osvaldo had been walking around barefoot since many children get foot infections from walking around barefoot. Baez did not know. Baez also did not know what happened to cause the foot condition and could not provide any information on how long the condition had existed. Arana gave Baez a prescription for an antibiotic and topical ointment.\nDr. Arana further stated that he did not notice anything that appeared to be a burn. He had seen cigarette burns before and Osvaldo\u2019s feet did not have any cigarette burns on them, nor did he see any marks that appeared to be healed burns. Arana did not have any discussion with Baez about abuse at home and, when he saw Osvaldo, there were no signs of child abuse as far as medical evidence and he never considered the possibility that Osvaldo was a victim of child abuse. He learned later from his attorney that Osvaldo was a victim of child abuse. Arana further stated that he had attended many seminars on child abuse and, when he examined Osvaldo, he was aware of the statute requiring reporting of suspected child abuse.\nBecause of Osvaldo\u2019s low weight, Dr. Arana believed that Osvaldo needed a cell blood count (CBC) and a Chem 20 test to rule out anemia. He advised Baez that she should bring Osvaldo back the next week for these tests, with or without a public aid card. According to his testimony, Arana wrote on Osvaldo\u2019s chart, \u201creturn one week, and then no charge because she didn\u2019t have any money or public aid card.\u201d Arana did not charge Baez for the visit \u201c[bjecause she didn\u2019t have any money. This woman was poor, and she requested to be seen as an emergency, as an add-on-case, stating to Gloria Miranda that she didn\u2019t have a Public Aid card.\u201d Arana testified that he does a lot of charity cases.\nMarie Baez, in her deposition, stated that she was Osvaldo\u2019s aunt; her brother was the boy\u2019s father. Osvaldo lived with her most of his life, on and off. His mother, Margarita Rivera, abandoned Osvaldo when he was a couple of weeks old by leaving him on a street corner with his father. Baez further stated that her brother would often bring Osvaldo to stay at her home. Baez took Osvaldo in because her brother would leave him with everyone and anyone, \u201cdope heads, crack heads, anybody.\u201d When her brother was jailed, Osvaldo began to live with Baez permanently. Osvaldo\u2019s mother never had any contact with him during the time he was with Baez, even though Baez attempted to arrange contact between Rivera and Osvaldo.\nBaez further stated that every time Osvaldo came to her home, he had lice. She also stated that Osvaldo always had pink eye, was congested, and sick. She further stated that Osvaldo had had problems in the past with foot fungus or infection. However, she never took Osvaldo to a doctor until he began to live with her permanently. She treated him herself because she had three of her own children and knew how to take care of them. Baez also stated that she got temporary custody of Osvaldo when her brother went to jail so that she had a right to take him for medical treatment.\nBaez further stated that she first brought Osvaldo to Dr. Arana for pink eye, but she could not remember when. When she took Osvaldo, one of her own children had pink eye. According to Baez, Arana looked at Osvaldo, told her he had pink eye, but stated that he could not give her a prescription because she had no public aid card. Baez received medication for her own child, which she used for both children. Baez was not charged for this visit.\nBaez also stated that when her son had the measles in September 1994, she took him to Dr. Arana and also brought Osvaldo, who had a foot fungus, although she did not have an appointment for either child. According to Baez, Osvaldo had blisters of pus on his feet, the skin was peeling, there was cracking between the toes, the feet were sweaty, and they stank. Baez denied that there were any burns on his feet. Baez further stated that Arana simply looked at Osvaldo\u2019s feet. She denied that Arana examined Osvaldo and that Arana gave her a prescription. According to Baez, Arana simply told her to keep Osvaldo\u2019s feet dry and let them breathe. Baez subsequently used her daughter\u2019s eczema medication on Osvaldo\u2019s feet. Baez also denied that Arana advised her to return with Osvaldo the following week for other treatment.\nSometime after the September office visit, Baez was severely beaten by her husband and was hospitalized. She was comatose for 9 days and received 37 stitches in her neck. It was at this time that her husband allegedly abused Osvaldo, which abuse is the underlying basis of plaintiffs medical malpractice claim in this lawsuit. Baez was adamant that her husband had never abused any of the children prior to this time. According to her, he was a perfect father but a bad husband. Baez stated that she learned of her husband\u2019s abuse of Osvaldo from newspapers and the news while she was in the hospital. She heard that her husband had beaten up Osvaldo, burned him, or put Nair in his eyes. She also learned that her children were taken away by the Department of Children and Family Services. She vehemently denied ever discussing her husband\u2019s abuse of Osvaldo with anyone either before, during, or after her hospitalization and, in fact, denied any knowledge of it at all. Baez also reiterated that she never paid Dr. Arana for Osvaldo\u2019s treatment and that she never received a bill for his services.\nGloria Miranda, in her deposition, stated that she was Dr. Arana\u2019s medical assistant. During the time she worked for Arana, the clinic took care of many public aid patients. Miranda did not know Osvaldo . prior to September 20, 1994, but did know Baez and her children. When Baez brought Osvaldo to the clinic on September 20, she told Miranda that she had Osvaldo, who was her brother\u2019s son, because her brother was in jail and Osvaldo\u2019s mother did not want him. According to.Miranda, Baez told her that she was attempting to get a medical card for Osvaldo and that she had brought Osvaldo to the clinic because he had a foot fungus or infection.\nMiranda further stated that the visit was not a scheduled appointment. Baez just walked in, which, according to Miranda, was a typical occurrence at the clinic. Miranda had Baez fill out an information sheet for Osvaldo, and then she took Osvaldo\u2019s vital signs and reported them on his chart. Miranda also stated that she looked at Osvaldo\u2019s feet, probably when she was weighing him, and noticed that the bottom of his feet were red. With respect to payment by Baez, Miranda stated that even if Baez had returned with a medical card, the clinic may have not billed her because the card might not be retroactive for the September 20 visit. Miranda also stated that Dr. Arana took this visit as a charity case and that public aid was not billed for the visit.\nOn March 29, 2000, the trial court granted defendant\u2019s motion for summary judgment based on its determination that Dr. Arana was immune from liability under the Good Samaritan Act. In so ruling, the court considered the three factors necessary for application of the Act. The trial court first noted that plaintiff did not contest the issue of notice of injury. According to the-court, the pertinent \u201cillness or injury\u201d was the purported child abuse. The trial court then concluded that it was clear from all of the deposition testimony that Arana received no fee for his services, nor did he ever bill for them. According to the trial court, even if Arana intended to bill for them, his intention was irrelevant. With respect to whether Arana saw Osvaldo on an emergency basis, the trial court noted that both Arana and Baez characterized the visit as an emergency. Additionally, Arana testified that the infectian could spread throughout the minor\u2019s system and cause serious harm if it were not treated. The trial court then relied upon an Oklahoma case to define emergency in its broadest sense. It concluded, based on the \u201ctestimony of Dr. Arana, the Act\u2019s purpose and meaning, relevant case law and the dictates of logic,\u201d that Arana provided emergency care to Osvaldo. Because all three factors were satisfied, the trial court concluded that Arana was immune from liability. This appeal followed.\nANALYSIS\nI. Genuine Issues of Material Fact\nA motion for summary judgment is properly granted when the pleadings, depositions, admissions, and affidavits on file establish that no genuine issue as to any material fact exists and, therefore, the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 735 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 1005(c) (West 1998); Cramer v. Insurance Exchange Agency, 174 Ill. 2d 513, 530, 675 N.E.2d 897 (1996). We review the trial court\u2019s granting of such a motion de nova. McNamee v. State, 173 Ill. 2d 433, 438, 672 N.E.2d 1159 (1996).\nSection 25 of the Good Samaritan Act provides:\n\u201cAny person licensed under the Medical Practice Act of 1987 or any person licensed to practice the treatment of human ailments in any other state or territory of the United States who, in good faith, provides emergency care without fee to a person, shall not, as a result of his or her acts or omissions, except willful or wanton misconduct on the part of the person, in providing the care, be liable for civil damages.\u201d 745 ILCS 49/25 (West 1998).\nIt is the intent of the legislature that the provisions of the Good Samaritan Act be liberally construed. 745 ILCS 49/2 (West 1998). A three-part test is employed to determine whether the Good Samaritan Act applies. \u201c[Fjirst, the doctor must not have notice of the illness or injury; second, the doctor must provide emergency care; and third, the doctor must not charge a fee.\u201d Villamil v. Benages, 257 Ill. App. 3d 81, 84, 628 N.E.2d 568 (1993).\nPlaintiff contends that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment to defendant because two issues of material fact existed. Plaintiff does not contest the fact that Dr. Arana had no notice of the injury or illness for which he treated plaintiff minor prior to his treatment \u2014 in fact, plaintiff admits that Arana had no notice.\nA. Payment for Services\nPlaintiff contends that there is a dispute as to whether or not Dr. Arana would be paid for his services. Plaintiff maintains that because Osvaldo was to return the following week with a public aid card, Arana intended to be paid. Plaintiff also contends that the number of times Arana treated Osvaldo is in dispute and is material to the issue before this court because it goes to the question of whether a physician-patient relationship existed. According to plaintiff, because there was an ongoing physician-patient relationship, Arana had a reasonable expectation of being paid.\nIn Villamil, the defendant doctor\u2019s office forwarded a letter requesting the plaintiffs\u2019 public aid number following the doctor\u2019s delivery of the plaintiffs\u2019 premature infant. In concluding that the third factor required for application of the Good Samaritan Act was met, the court stated:\n\u201cAlthough a request for a public aid number was sent, nothing was ever produced to indicate that a bill was sent either to plaintiffs or public aid. The statute provides that service must be made gratuitously. Since the defendant was not paid and the plaintiffs were unable to produce anything that indicated they had received a bill, we must find that the services were rendered gratuitously. The fact that the public aid letter was sent is a red herring, the statute mentions nothing of intent, and therefore, even if the public aid letter could be construed as an intent to bill in the future, the fact that no bill was ever sent or payment provided must be controlling on this issue.\u201d Villamil, 257 Ill. App. 3d at 92.\nThe facts of the case before us are similar to those in Villamil. Baez was told to return to the doctor the following week with Osvaldo\u2019s public aid card. However, she did not. There is no evidence that a bill was ever sent to Baez, plaintiff, or public aid. Baez specifically testified that she was not billed. As in Villamil, whatever Dr. Arana\u2019s intentions were with respect to possible billing in the future for his services, they are irrelevant. Arana stated that he was never paid and this fact is controlling.\nWe also reject plaintiffs argument that the number of times Dr. Arana treated Osvaldo is material. She cites to no authority to support her position. Failure to cite to relevant authority waives the issue. Campbell v. Wagner, 303 Ill. App. 3d 609, 613, 708 N.E.2d 539 (1999). Like the issue of intent, Arana\u2019s expectations are irrelevant. As with intent, the statute mentions nothing with respect to expectations. The pertinent fact is that no fee was charged or received.\nBased on the foregoing, we conclude that there was no question of material fact precluding the trial court\u2019s decision that Dr. Arana rendered his services to Osvaldo gratuitously and received no fee. Arana sent no bill, no bill was received and, more importantly, Arana was paid nothing.\nB. Definition of Emergency Care\nPlaintiff next contends that the trial court erred in relying on an Oklahoma case to define \u201cemergency.\u201d According to her, because the trial court relied on the \u201cproposition that the phrase [\u2018emergency care\u2019] must be given the broadest possible meaning and that an emergency occurs whenever a person appears or is perceived to be ill or in need of succor,\u201d the trial court expanded the scope of \u201cemergency\u201d to include a routine examination. Plaintiff further argues that the trial court\u2019s reliance on the Oklahoma case is misplaced because the Oklahoma statute defined \u201cemergency,\u201d whereas the Illinois statute does not. It is plaintiffs position that Osvaldo\u2019s foot fungus did not present an emergency situation. Plaintiff urges us to adopt, as a matter of law, the definition of \u201cemergency\u201d in Black\u2019s Law Dictionary and to limit the conditions to those defined in medical literature, such as Merck\u2019s Manual.\nDefendant contends that it was proper for the trial court to rely upon the Oklahoma case because Illinois courts, in construing the Good Samaritan Act, take a broad approach to interpretation, which was the approach taken in Oklahoma. Defendant also maintains that routine examinations can be a part of emergency care.\nNo Illinois case, addressing the Good Samaritan Act, has defined \u201cemergency\u201d or \u201cemergency care.\u201d In fact, our independent research has revealed only three Illinois cases that define \u201cemergency,\u201d although in unrelated contexts. In Young v. Forgas, 308 Ill. App. 3d 553, 561, 720 N.E.2d 360 (1999), the issue was what constituted an emergency call for purposes of the Tort Immunity Act. The court defined \u201cemergency\u201d as an \u201curgent need for assistance or relief,\u201d quoting Merriam-Webster Collegiate Dictionary 377 (10th ed. 1998). In Nagel v. Gerald Dennen & Co., 272 Ill. App. 3d 516, 520, 650 N.E.2d 547 (1995), in interpreting what was an emergency motion, the court defined \u201cemergency\u201d as:\n\u201c \u2018A sudden unexpected happening; an unforeseen occurrence or condition; perplexing contingency or complication of circumstances; a sudden or unexpected occasion for action; exigency; pressing necessity. Emergency is an unforeseen combination of circumstances that calls for immediate action without time for full deliberation.\u2019 Black\u2019s Law Dictionary 522-23 (6th ed. 1990).\u201d\nThe last Illinois case to define \u201cemergency\u201d was Opyt\u2019s Amoco, Inc. v. Village of South Holland, 149 Ill. 2d 265, 277-78, 595 N.E.2d 1060 (1992). The court, in interpreting the constitutionality of a village Sunday closing ordinance, quoted Black\u2019s Law Dictionary, giving the same definition quoted above.\nSeveral other jurisdictions have addressed the definition of \u201cemergency\u201d with specific reference to Good Samaritan laws. The trial court here relied upon one of them, i.e., Jackson v. Mercy Health Center, Inc., 864 P.2d 839 (Okla. 1993). In Jackson, the court stated that \u201c[kjeeping in mind that the Act\u2019s purpose is to invite medical providers to intervene, the term \u2018emergency\u2019 must be given the broadest sense possible.\u201d Jackson, 864 P.2d at 845. Accordingly, the court concluded that \u201c[w]ithin the Act\u2019s intended meaning an emergency occurs whenever a stranger appears (or may be perceived) to be ill or in need of succor.\u201d (Emphasis omitted.) Jackson, 864 P.2d at 845.\nIn Breazeal v. Henry Mayo Newhall Memorial Hospital, 234 Cal. App. 3d 1329, 286 Cal. Rptr. 207 (1991), the court provided the following explanation of \u201cemergency\u201d:\n\u201cAn emergency within the meaning of the Good Samaritan statutes exists when there is an urgent medical circumstance of so pressing a character that some kind of action must be taken. [Citations.] It would seem obvious that in determining whether a patient\u2019s condition constitutes such an emergency the trier of fact must consider the gravity, the certainty, and the immediacy of the consequences to be expected if no action is taken. However, beyond observing that these are the relevant considerations, the variety of situations that would qualify as emergencies under any reasonable set of criteria is too great to admit of anything approaching a bright line rule as to just how grave, how certain, and how immediate such consequences have to be.\u201d Breazeal, 234 Cal. App. 3d at 1338, 286 Cal. Rptr. at 213.\nThe Breazeal court concluded that the issue of whether an emergency exists is an issue of fact. Breazeal, 234 Cal. App. 3d at 1337, 286 Cal. Rptr. at 213. See also Jackson, 864 E2d at 846 (Summers, J., dissenting) (agreeing with Breazeal that a bright-line rule is not feasible and whether an emergency exists may be a question of fact for the jury). Lastly, in Kearns v. Superior Court, 204 Cal. App. 3d 1325, 1328, 252 Cal. Rptr. 4, 6 (1988), the court stated that \u201c[a]n emergency exists \u2018... where the exigency is of so pressing a character that some kind of action must be taken.\u2019 [Citation.]\u201d\nIn addition to the above definitions, we have consulted two medical dictionaries. The Attorney\u2019s Dictionary of Medicine defines \u201cemergency\u201d as \u201c[a]n urgent demand for medical or surgical action; a medical or surgical condition demanding immediate action.\u201d 2 J. Schmidt, Attorney\u2019s Dictionary of Medicine E-71 (1999). Stedman\u2019s Medical Dictionary defines \u201cemergency\u201d as \u201c[a]n unlocked for contingency or happening; a sudden demand for action.\u201d Stedman\u2019s Medical Dictionary 456 (24th ed. 1982).\nWe reject plaintiffs contention to define \u201cemergency,\u201d as a matter of law, with a bright-line rule and limit emergency care to those conditions outlined in medical journals. As the Breazeal court noted, there are a variety of situations that may qualify as emergency care under the particular facts of a case, yet may not fall within any specific definition of emergency and may not be identified in medical literature as an emergency. Accordingly, a flexible broad definition, given the purposes of the Good Samaritan Act and the need for medical providers to intervene and take care of individuals under a variety of situations without the threat of liability, is more logical. Rather than a bright-line rule, we believe that whether an emergency situation exists is to be resolved based on the unforeseen, unexpected combination of circumstances presented which require the need for immediate action, assistance, or relief. Based on this definition, we conclude that the situation that Dr. Arana was presented with was an emergency situation. Osvaldo had an inflammation and, more importantly, an infection in his feet that required immediate attention. The ulcers could have turned into a more serious and severe infection absent treatment. We therefore conclude that there was no question of fact precluding the trial court\u2019s determination that Arana rendered emergency care to Osvaldo.\nBased on the foregoing, we find that the trial court properly granted defendant\u2019s motion for summary judgment.\nII. Application of Child Reporting Act\nPlaintiff next contends that the Good Samaritan exception should not apply to a cause of action against a physician for his failure to report suspected child abuse pursuant to the Child Reporting Act. In essence, it appears that plaintiff is asking this court to recognize a private cause of action under the Child Reporting Act for a physician\u2019s failure to report suspected child abuse.\nSection 4 of the Child Reporting Act requires a physician, among others, \u201chaving reasonable cause to believe a child known to them in their professional or official capacity may be an abused child or a neglected child [to] immediately report or cause a report to be made.\u201d 325 ILCS 5/4 (West 1998). Section 4.02 provides:\n\u201cAny physician who willfully fails to report suspected child abuse or neglect as required by this Act shall be referred to the Illinois State Medical Disciplinary Board for action in accordance with paragraph 22 of Section 22 of the Medical Practice Act of 1987.\u201d 325 ILCS 5/4.02 (West 1998).\nWe conclude that plaintiff has waived this issue by failing to raise it in the trial court. In other cases reviewing the issue on appeal of whether a private cause of action exists under a particular statute, the issue had first been raised in the trial court. See, e.g., Du Page Forklift Service, Inc. v. Material Handling Services, Inc., 195 Ill. 2d 71, 76, 744 N.E.2d 845 (2001); Abbasi v. Paraskevoulakos, 187 Ill. 2d 386, 388, 718 N.E.2d 181 (1999); McNeil v. Carter, 318 Ill. App. 3d 939, 941, 742 N.E.2d 1277 (2001); Rekosh v. Parks, 316 Ill. App. 3d 58, 61, 735 N.E.2d 765 (2000); Gonzalzles v. American Express Credit Corp., 315 Ill. App. 3d 199, 210, 733 N.E.2d 345 (2000). Because plaintiff failed to plead a cause of action under the Child Reporting Act in the trial court, and thus failed to have the trial court determine the propriety of such a cause of action, she has waived the issue.\nCONCLUSION\nFor the reasons stated, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court of Cook County.\nAffirmed.\nHALL, EJ., and WOLFSON, J, concur.\nArana\u2019s findings also indicated that Osvaldo suffered from \u201c[bjilateral mild conjunctiva inflammation,\u201d an inflammation of the eyes which, according to Arana, could have occurred from crying.\nPreviously, the statute also contained the language \u201cand without prior notice of the illness or injury\u201d following \u201cgood faith.\u201d This language was deleted by Public Act 90 \u2014 742, \u00a7 40, effective August 13, 1998.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE BURKE" } ], "attorneys": [ "Dicker & Dicker, of Chicago (Steven Dicker, of counsel), and Law Offices of Robert C. Farrar, of Barrington (Robert C. Farrar, of counsel), for appellant.", "Law Offices of Ruth E. VanDemark, of Chicago (Ruth E. VanDemark and Ralph N. Glader, of counsel), for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "MARGARITA RIVERA, Mother and Next Friend of Osvaldo Rivera, a Minor, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. ENRIQUE ARANA, Defendant-Appellee.\nFirst District (3rd Division)\nNo. 1 \u2014 00\u20141530\nOpinion filed May 9, 2001.\nDicker & Dicker, of Chicago (Steven Dicker, of counsel), and Law Offices of Robert C. Farrar, of Barrington (Robert C. Farrar, of counsel), for appellant.\nLaw Offices of Ruth E. VanDemark, of Chicago (Ruth E. VanDemark and Ralph N. Glader, of counsel), for appellee." }, "file_name": "0641-01", "first_page_order": 659, "last_page_order": 670 }