{ "id": 126421, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. SHELLY R. ROCKEY, Defendant-Appellee", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Rockey", "decision_date": "2001-06-20", "docket_number": "No. 2 \u2014 00\u20140349", "first_page": "832", "last_page": "841", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "322 Ill. App. 3d 832" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "125 Ill. App. 3d 938", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3631917 ], "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "963" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/125/0938-01" ] }, { "cite": "163 Ill. App. 3d 256", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3546617 ], "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "260" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/163/0256-01" ] }, { "cite": "97 Ill. 2d 151", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5515129 ], "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "158" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/97/0151-01" ] }, { "cite": "439 F. Supp. 515", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F. Supp.", "case_ids": [ 5735829 ], "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "absent reasonable suspicion that suspect was armed and dangerous, officer, who recognized defendant's name on license as that of ex-convict, violated fourth amendment in searching defendant" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f-supp/439/0515-01" ] }, { "cite": "118 Ill. 2d 389", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3188237 ], "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "401" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/118/0389-01" ] }, { "cite": "145 Ill. App. 3d 19", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3535015 ], "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/145/0019-01" ] }, { "cite": "158 Ill. App. 3d 178", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3577719 ], "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "police lacked reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal activity where car was driven down residential street at slow rate of speed at 2:30 a.m., stopped, and changed direction in apartment complex where there had been numerous car thefts" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/158/0178-01" ] }, { "cite": "295 Ill. App. 3d 110", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 45753 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "absent particularized suspicion that defendant-passenger had committed a crime, officer had no authority to request and run a warrant check on identification of defendant" }, { "page": "114", "parenthetical": "absent reason to suspect that backseat passenger was committing a crime, officer did not have authority to request identification and exceeded the scope of the detention of driver that had terminated" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/295/0110-01" ] }, { "cite": "185 Ill. App. 3d 536", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2648358 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "539", "parenthetical": "seizure occurred when officer required defendant to return to his car while officer ran computer check" }, { "page": "539" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/185/0536-01" ] }, { "cite": "186 Ill. 2d 501", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 243856 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "517" }, { "page": "518" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/186/0501-01" ] }, { "cite": "184 Ill. App. 3d 671", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2638292 ], "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "674" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/184/0671-01" ] }, { "cite": "292 Ill. App. 3d 863", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1725111 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "868" }, { "page": "868" }, { "page": "868" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/292/0863-01" ] }, { "cite": "528 U.S. 119", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 9476180 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "124" }, { "page": "576" }, { "page": "676" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/528/0119-01" ] }, { "cite": "191 Ill. 2d 37", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 229707 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "46-50", "parenthetical": "contrasting deferential manifest error standard applicable to factual findings with de nova standard applicable to ultimate questions involving reasonable suspicion and probable cause" }, { "page": "50" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/191/0037-01" ] }, { "cite": "192 Ill. 2d 592", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 453265 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "615" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/192/0592-01" ] }, { "cite": "292 Ill. App. 3d 763", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1725091 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "768" }, { "page": "768", "parenthetical": "trial court's ultimate determination regarding reasonableness of warrantless search is subject to de nova review" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/292/0763-01" ] }, { "cite": "322 Ill. App. 3d 169", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 126389 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "173" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/322/0169-01" ] }, { "cite": "187 Ill. 2d 144", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 1131032 ], "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "204" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/187/0144-01" ] }, { "cite": "249 Ill. App. 3d 597", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5409608 ], "weight": 6, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "601" }, { "page": "601" }, { "page": "603" }, { "page": "603" }, { "page": "601" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/249/0597-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 929, "char_count": 22297, "ocr_confidence": 0.785, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.3031303181407888e-07, "percentile": 0.622631280819847 }, "sha256": "f5b8aa5dfcb43d426fe47d81b834d31849f04bf3fe1aa25ab5bda5106990604d", "simhash": "1:c68db09643405471", "word_count": 3644 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:05:07.459628+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. SHELLY R. ROCKEY, Defendant-Appellee." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE CALLUM\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nDefendant, Shelly R. Rockey, was charged with driving under the influence of alcohol (DUI) (625 ILCS 5/11 \u2014 501(a)(2) (West 1998)) as the result of an incident on April 15, 1999. Because she refused or failed to complete blood-alcohol testing, defendant, who qualified as a first-time offender, received a statutory summary suspension of her driving privilege for six months. Defendant petitioned to rescind the suspension, alleging that there was no probable cause (reasonable ground) or constitutional basis to stop or detain defendant or her vehicle. After an evidentiary hearing, the trial court granted defendant\u2019s petition to rescind on July 7, 1999. The State filed a motion to reconsider.\nDefendant also filed a motion to suppress evidence. The parties apparently agreed that no further evidence would be taken, and arguments were presented to the court based on the same evidence received during the rescission hearing. In March 2000, the court granted defendant\u2019s motion to suppress evidence and denied both the State\u2019s motion to reconsider the rescission order and its motion to reconsider the suppression order.\nThe State timely appeals, arguing that the trial court erred in granting defendant\u2019s petition and motion because the \u201cevidence adequately supported an articulable and reasonable basis\u201d for a Terry or investigative stop that led to defendant\u2019s subsequent arrest for DUI. We affirm the trial court\u2019s orders.\nAt the suspension hearing, Deputy Sheriff Pamela Wilson testified that, between 12 and 1 a.m., she was driving an unmarked vehicle in Cedarville, a residential village having a population of about 400. She was wearing a shirt marked \u201cPolice\u201d on the front of it, and she had a badge. Driving south on Route 26 (Stephenson Street), she passed Oak Street, an east-west street, when she observed on her right what looked like a pickup truck with its lights on parked in the north-south alley that runs between Stephenson Street and Harrison Street. She went around the block by going down to Cherry Street, then Harrison Street, and turned onto Oak Street, heading east toward Stephenson. She then observed the vehicle turning right from Oak south onto Stephenson. When Wilson got to Stephenson, she saw the vehicle turn west onto Cherry. In effect, Wilson followed the vehicle around the block so that both vehicles were going west on Cherry Street. Defendant\u2019s vehicle turned northbound onto Harrison and then turned into a driveway off of Harrison Street. Wilson pulled onto Harrison and stopped in the street \u201cjust prior\u201d to the driveway.\nWhen asked what was suspicious about this vehicle, Wilson noted the time of morning and the proximity of the alley to Barkau\u2019s auto dealership, which had been burglarized \u201cnumerous times before,\u201d and she said her suspicion was raised because in the prior 10 days there had been a lot of business burglaries. When asked what facts Wilson had that might lead her to believe defendant was breaking into any cars since she was not on the lot, Wilson replied that she had none but felt she had a duty to check out the situation.\nWilson said she did not stop the vehicle. Defendant got out of her vehicle and started walking toward Wilson\u2019s car as Wilson called in her location to the dispatch office. Wilson got out and met defendant about \u201chalf way\u201d near the end of the short driveway. Wilson asked defendant if she lived at the address where she pulled into the driveway. Wilson \u201cfelt\u201d that defendant was trying to avoid having a vehicle behind her for some reason. Wilson thought it was unusual for a vehicle to go around the block. Defendant said she did not live at that address, but her ex-boyfriend lived there. Defendant walked from the driver\u2019s door to the back end of her truck. While speaking with defendant, Wilson could smell a \u201cvery strong odor of [an] alcoholic beverage\u201d on her breath, and as she walked back, Wilson noticed that she \u201cstaggered somewhat.\u201d Defendant was not under arrest. Wilson asked her for identification because of her suspicion regarding her presence in the alley, the odor of the alcoholic beverage, and the staggering. Wilson stated that this was her \u201cprobable cause to believe that possibly she might be under the influence of alcohol.\u201d Wilson was asked to explain her statement and the term \u201cpossibly.\u201d When asked whether she had probable cause to believe defendant had committed a crime at that time, Wilson replied, \u201cNo.\u201d\nAfter obtaining defendant\u2019s driver\u2019s license, Wilson told defendant to wait. Wilson detained defendant while Wilson went to her police car, made a call for assistance, and ran a record check. When asked what the basis was for making defendant stay in place while she ran a record check and defendant was not arrested for anything, Wilson answered, \u201cI had known [defendant] in the past to have had a suspended driver\u2019s license, so to run a check to see if she was suspended any longer, and *** the fact that at that time, due to the odor of alcohol and her staggering, I \u2014 to see if she was okay to drive.\u201d\nWhen asked what defendant had done wrong to be detained, Wilson answered, \u201cAt that point she hadn\u2019t done anything wrong.\u201d When defendant handed over her driver\u2019s license and Wilson saw her name, she remembered that defendant had been suspended, but Wilson did not remember how many years before this had occurred; Wilson wanted to know if defendant was still suspended.\nOn cross-examination, Wilson further testified that there were numerous burglaries in the prior 10 days throughout the county, but none were in Cedarville. Wilson stated that the license came back \u201cvalid.\u201d Wilson was suspicious that defendant had not taken the most direct route to the driveway.\nOn redirect examination, Wilson agreed that, if defendant had backed out of the driveway and gone around the block, Wilson would have let her go, but then Wilson acknowledged that defendant would not have been free to go until Wilson had detained her to make the driver\u2019s license check.\nDefendant argued that a seizure took place in the driveway for fourth amendment purposes and that there was no probable cause to believe that an offense had been committed and no articulable facts to warrant a Terry detention. The State argued that the officer had reasonable suspicion because the vehicle was stopped in the alley at night, there had been numerous burglaries in the county, circuitous driving led the officer to believe that there was an attempt to evade, and a valid investigatory stop was made. The State concluded that \u201ctogether with all the facts, that certainly the officer did have reason to stop the vehicle and therefore thereafter, once upon smelling the alcohol and observing the walking, to proceed with the questioning [sic] arrest therefrom.\u201d In granting defendant\u2019s petition, the court stated, \u201cThe Court does not believe that the officer\u2019s suspicion in this instance was reasonable.\u201d The court later granted defendant\u2019s motion to suppress.\nA ruling on a petition to rescind or a motion to suppress has generally been reviewed applying a manifest error standard. See People v. Scott, 249 Ill. App. 3d 597, 601 (1993). Thus, in reviewing the lawfulness of a search or seizure, when the trial court\u2019s ruling involves factual determinations and credibility assessments, the decision will be reversed on appeal only if it is manifestly erroneous or against the manifest weight of the evidence \u2014 that is, only where an opposite conclusion is clearly evident from the record. People v. Buss, 187 Ill. 2d 144, 204 (1999); Scott, 249 Ill. App. 3d at 601. A trial court\u2019s determination regarding factual matters, including the reasonable inferences to be drawn from the witnesses\u2019 testimony, is entitled to deference by the reviewing court. People v. Robinson, 322 Ill. App. 3d 169, 173 (2001); People v. Sanchez, 292 Ill. App. 3d 763, 768 (1997). However, where there is no factual or credibility dispute and the question involves only the application of the law to the undisputed facts, our standard of review is de nova. People v. Sims, 192 Ill. 2d 592, 615 (2000); see Sanchez, 292 Ill. App. 3d at 768 (trial court\u2019s ultimate determination regarding reasonableness of warrantless search is subject to de nova review); see also In re G.O., 191 Ill. 2d 37, 46-50 (2000) (contrasting deferential manifest error standard applicable to factual findings with de nova standard applicable to ultimate questions involving reasonable suspicion and probable cause).\nThe State first argues on appeal that the officer never stopped defendant\u2019s vehicle because the officer merely approached defendant after defendant had parked her vehicle. The State concludes that the fourth amendment prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures was not implicated as this was presumably a consensual police-citizen encounter rather than a \u201cseizure.\u201d See Scott, 249 Ill. App. 3d at 603.\nWithout specifically informing this court of the precise moment when the stop did take place, the State then argues that, even assuming arguendo there was a Terry stop, it was justified because defendant\u2019s behavior was suspicious \u2014 because it was early in the morning, she was present near Barkau\u2019s car dealership, there had been a number of business burglaries in the \u201carea\u201d (i.e., the county), Barkau\u2019s had been burglarized a number of times before, and the circumstances warranted further investigation. The State concedes that an individual\u2019s presence in an area of expected criminal activity, standing alone, is not enough to support a reasonable, particularized suspicion that the person is committing a crime. Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124, 145 L. Ed. 2d 570, 576, 120 S. Ct. 673, 676, (2000). However, the State argues that defendant\u2019s \u201cevasive\u201d behavior coupled with the officer\u2019s knowledge of the area justified the officer\u2019s \u201cpreliminary investigation.\u201d\nWe first address whether and when there was a stop or seizure of defendant and whether it was lawful. A warrantless search or seizure is unreasonable per se unless it comes within a specific, well-delineated exception to the constitutional warrant requirement such as a valid, investigative Terry stop or an arrest based upon probable cause. People v. Ertl, 292 Ill. App. 3d 863, 868 (1997). An officer may make a valid investigatory stop of a person in a public place when the officer reasonably infers from all the facts and circumstances that the person is committing, has committed, or is about to commit an offense. Ertl, 292 Ill. App. 3d at 868. The inquiry concerns whether the officer\u2019s conduct was reasonable under the circumstances known to the officer at the time the stop was initiated, and the officer\u2019s inferences must be based on more substantial facts than would support a mere hunch. Ertl, 292 Ill. App. 3d at 868. The reasonableness of the police conduct depends upon balancing the public\u2019s interest and the individual\u2019s right to personal security free from arbitrary interference by law officers. People v. Pantoja, 184 Ill. App. 3d 671, 674 (1989).\nFirst, we agree that the initial encounter when the defendant stopped her truck in the driveway and then approached the officer was not a stop or \u201cseizure\u201d for fourth amendment purposes, because defendant\u2019s conduct appears to have been voluntary and there was no show of authority by the officer at that time. See Scott, 249 Ill. App. 3d at 603.\nThe stop occurred when the officer took defendant\u2019s facially valid driver\u2019s license and told her to wait until she could run a record check of the license. A person is \u201cseized\u201d when, by means of physical force or a show of authority, that person\u2019s freedom of movement is restrained, and a court will consider whether, in view of all the circumstances, a reasonable person would have believed he or she was not free to leave. People v. Brownlee, 186 Ill. 2d 501, 517 (1999). Furthermore, the fourth amendment applies even to seizures that involve only a brief detention short of arrest. Brownlee, 186 Ill. 2d at 518. Here, a reasonable person would not have felt free to leave once her license was taken from her, and the officer testified that defendant would not have been free to leave without being detained for the driver\u2019s license check. See People v. McVey, 185 Ill. App. 3d 536, 539 (1989) (seizure occurred when officer required defendant to return to his car while officer ran computer check); see also People v. Branch, 295 Ill. App. 3d 110 (1998) (absent particularized suspicion that defendant-passenger had committed a crime, officer had no authority to request and run a warrant check on identification of defendant).\nWe next examine whether the stop was objectively justified. A person cannot lawfully be seized unless there are reasonable, objective grounds for doing so, and, to sustain a Terry stop, the officer must be able to point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant the intrusion. McVey, 185 Ill. App. 3d at 539.\nThe State argues that, to the extent there was a stop, the officer\u2019s suspicion was justified because defendant was present early in the morning in an area that had been known to have burglaries (at some undetermined time in the past) and defendant was \u201cevasive.\u201d However, the officer testified that she had no facts leading her to believe that defendant was breaking into any cars; the officer later conceded that there were burglaries in the county in the previous 10 days, but none were in Cedarville. Furthermore, although the officer \u201cfelt\u201d that defendant was trying to avoid having a vehicle behind her \u201cfor some reason,\u201d the facts known to the officer point to no more than an impermissible hunch. There is no sound basis to believe that defendant was evading a police officer, who was driving an unmarked car, merely because defendant drove around the block. In fact, defendant stopped and voluntarily approached the officer. We simply cannot equate this conduct with the suspicious type of headlong flight of the defendant in a high-crime area known for heavy narcotics trafficking that was described in Illinois v. Wardlow. See also People v. Vanderver, 158 Ill. App. 3d 178 (1987) (police lacked reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal activity where car was driven down residential street at slow rate of speed at 2:30 a.m., stopped, and changed direction in apartment complex where there had been numerous car thefts). Thus, the stop cannot be sustained on the basis of a reasonable suspicion that an offense was being committed prior to defendant\u2019s stopping in the driveway.\nThe State then jumps to a cursory and conclusory probable cause argument, citing a case where the reviewing court was principally concerned with whether consent to submit to a blood-alcohol test was necessary to introduce evidence of the result in a DUI trial under the statute then in force. Village of Algonquin v. Ford, 145 Ill. App. 3d 19 (1986) (in ruling on whether consent was necessary for compulsory blood test, court also found that officer had \u201cprobable cause to investigate\u201d and administer field sobriety tests to a motorist whose vehicle was stopped with the motor running and the lights on and the motorist was slumped over the steering wheel and did not respond to the officer\u2019s attempts to arouse her). The State merely concludes that a \u201csimilar result should obtain here, based on the foregoing circumstances.\u201d This conclusory argument fails to explain exactly how the cited case applies to the one at bar and lacks the detailed legal analysis that would aid this court in determining whether and when defendant was also lawfully seized for DUI purposes, as the State seems to suggest. Arguing an issue in a conclusory fashion or failing to adequately brief or argue an issue results in the waiver of the issue. Spinelli v. Immanuel Lutheran Evangelical Congregation, Inc., 118 Ill. 2d 389, 401 (1987).\nEven absent waiver, we believe the State\u2019s argument fails. Ford is inapposite because there the driver\u2019s lethargic state, in a parked car that was running with the lights on, indicated the driver was severely impaired and was DUI. In the present case, although the officer\u2019s testimony notes, in passing, that field sobriety tests were later performed, there is no testimony regarding when and how the sobriety tests were administered. Thus, we do not reach the issue whether probable cause to arrest developed after the tests were administered.\nAn officer may have probable cause to arrest when the totality of the facts known to the officer are such that a reasonable, prudent person would believe that the suspect is committing or has committed a crime. Scott, 249 Ill. App. 3d at 601. In this case, the officer\u2019s testimony regarding the reason for the detention or \u201cseizure\u201d of defendant is problematic because the testimony is at times either equivocal or inconsistent. The officer testified that she asked for the identification because of her suspicion regarding defendant\u2019s presence in the alley, the strong odor of the alcoholic beverage, and because defendant \u201cstaggered somewhat.\u201d She stated that she had \u201cprobable cause\u201d to believe that \u201cpossibly\u201d defendant \u201cmight be under the influence of alcohol.\u201d However, when then asked whether she had probable cause to believe defendant had committed a crime at the time, the officer said, \u201cNo.\u201d She then testified that the reason for the license check was because she thought that defendant\u2019s license was suspended at some prior undetermined time, and she added, ambiguously, \u201cto see if she was okay to drive.\u201d However, when defense counsel asked what defendant had done wrong to be detained, the officer replied, \u201cAt that point she hadn\u2019t done anything wrong.\u201d\nThe officer then stated she wanted to know if defendant\u2019s license was still suspended. The officer further testified that she would have let defendant back out of the driveway and go \u2014 but not until she had detained defendant to make the driver\u2019s license check. The natural inference here is that the officer was concerned not about defendant\u2019s fitness to drive but whether defendant had a lawful license to drive.\nWe conclude that the testimony does not support probable cause to believe defendant had committed an offense. The State failed to further develop the DUI issue in the trial court where it could easily have done so. The officer did not observe defendant violate any laws or drive in an erratic manner, and the indicia of intoxication for probable cause to develop in the officer\u2019s presence are ordinarily far more substantial than the two mentioned in this officer\u2019s testimony. See, e.g., Scott, 249 Ill. App. 3d 597 (indicia included staggering, swaying while standing, odor of alcohol, slurred speech, and bloodshot eyes). Although the officer stated defendant was \u201cpossibly\u201d under the influence of alcohol, her reasons for the detention focus on the officer\u2019s ultimately incorrect suspicion or hunch that defendant was driving with a suspended license \u2014 a suspicion that had no reasonable, factual basis at the time of the stop and is, without more, insufficient to support a lawful Terry stop.\nTo conclude otherwise would be to approve of the detention of any driver at any time to run a license check if the officer thought the driver had committed an offense on a prior occasion. The constitutional test of reasonable and particularized suspicion does not support such a proposition. See United States v. Hairston, 439 F. Supp. 515 (N.D. Ill. 1977) (absent reasonable suspicion that suspect was armed and dangerous, officer, who recognized defendant\u2019s name on license as that of ex-convict, violated fourth amendment in searching defendant); Branch, 295 Ill. App. 3d at 114 (absent reason to suspect that backseat passenger was committing a crime, officer did not have authority to request identification and exceeded the scope of the detention of driver that had terminated).\nHere, the trial court did \u201cnot believe that the officer\u2019s suspicion in this instance was reasonable.\u201d The trial court did not make more specific findings of fact in support of its suppression order as was its statutory responsibility to do. 725 ILCS 5/114 \u2014 12(e) (West 1998); In re G.O., 191 Ill. 2d 37, 50 (2000). While the trial court should have made more specific factual findings in reaching its conclusion, a remand is not necessary in this case. Instead, we must presume that, in the absence of express findings of fact, the trial court credited only that part of the testimony that supports its ruling. People v. Winters, 97 Ill. 2d 151, 158 (1983). Here, this also means that the trial court implicitly discredited the testimony regarding the basis for the detention.\nAlthough the credibility of a witness and the weight to be given the testimony are primarily within the province of the trier of fact, a reviewing court is not precluded from considering the quality and credibility of the evidence. People v. Bierman, 163 Ill. App. 3d 256, 260 (1987). Even where several reasonable inferences are possible from the conflicting testimony, we must accept those that support the trial court\u2019s orders. Nemeth v. Banhalmi, 125 Ill. App. 3d 938, 963 (1984). To the extent that a question of fact was presented regarding the basis for the detention of defendant, we conclude that the trial court\u2019s decision that the detention was unwarranted was neither manifestly erroneous nor against the manifest weight of the evidence.\nTo the extent that the undisputed facts presented a question of law to be reviewed de nova, we conclude that the officer\u2019s stated reasons for the detention of defendant amounted to mere suspicion or hunches insufficient to support either reasonable suspicion or probable cause.\nThe judgment of the circuit court of Stephenson County is affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nGEIGER and BOWMAN, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE CALLUM" } ], "attorneys": [ "Michael P. Bald, State\u2019s Attorney, of Freeport (Martin P. Moltz and Gregory L. Slovacek, both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People.", "Alan W. Cargerman, of Fearer, Nye, Ahlberg & Chadwick, of Oregon, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. SHELLY R. ROCKEY, Defendant-Appellee.\nSecond District\nNo. 2 \u2014 00\u20140349\nOpinion filed June 20, 2001.\nMichael P. Bald, State\u2019s Attorney, of Freeport (Martin P. Moltz and Gregory L. Slovacek, both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People.\nAlan W. Cargerman, of Fearer, Nye, Ahlberg & Chadwick, of Oregon, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0832-01", "first_page_order": 850, "last_page_order": 859 }