{ "id": 126430, "name": "In re MARRIAGE OF DAWN A. SNOW, Petitioner-Appellent and Cross-Appellee, and WILLIAM A. SNOW Respondent-Appellee and Cross-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "In re Marriage of Snow", "decision_date": "2001-06-14", "docket_number": "No. 3 \u2014 00\u20140369", "first_page": "953", "last_page": "957", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "322 Ill. App. 3d 953" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "731 N.E.2d 942", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "946" }, { "page": "946" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "314 Ill. App. 3d 249", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 140162 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "253" }, { "page": "253" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/314/0249-01" ] }, { "cite": "553 N.E.2d 1161", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1990, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "197 Ill. App. 3d 155", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2480740 ], "year": 1990, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/197/0155-01" ] }, { "cite": "673 N.E.2d 703", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1996, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "285 Ill. App. 3d 8", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1295647 ], "year": 1996, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/285/0008-01" ] }, { "cite": "634 N.E.2d 1168", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1994, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "262 Ill. App. 3d 573", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2848494 ], "year": 1994, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/262/0573-01" ] }, { "cite": "590 N.E.2d 1027", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1992, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "227 Ill. App. 3d 154", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5796077 ], "year": 1992, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/227/0154-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 487, "char_count": 9577, "ocr_confidence": 0.783, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.716398658870722e-07, "percentile": 0.7031655127383875 }, "sha256": "3d60ea596f67eca56c702674f1bac9e4549c3c9d02ba1133d067974cddb5c885", "simhash": "1:89f8d9344b443df5", "word_count": 1590 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:05:07.459628+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "In re MARRIAGE OF DAWN A. SNOW, Petitioner-Appellent and Cross-Appellee, and WILLIAM A. SNOW Respondent-Appellee and Cross-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE SLATER\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThe petitioner, Dawn A. Snow, appeals from the order of the circuit court of Will County terminating her right to receive maintenance from the respondent, William A. Snow. On appeal, Dawn contends that the trial court erred in finding that she engaged in a continuing, conjugal relationship with another man. On cross-appeal, William argues that the trial court erred in terminating maintenance from the date of his petition rather than the date the cohabitation began. For the following reasons, we affirm the trial court\u2019s order granting William\u2019s petition. However, we remand this cause for the trial court to determine when Dawn began the cohabitation and to terminate her payments as of that date.\nThe record reflects that the judgment of dissolution was entered on February 27, 1998. In the judgment, William was ordered to pay $1,800 per month in maintenance to Dawn until May 31, 1999. Thereafter, a reduced amount of maintenance was to be paid pursuant to a schedule set forth in the marital settlement agreement. The terms of the marital settlement agreement, which were incorporated into the judgment of dissolution, also stated that \u201cmaintenance shall terminate after the above payments have been made or earlier upon order of court.\u201d\nOn May 14, 1999, William filed a petition to terminate maintenance. In the petition, William alleged that Dawn had been engaged in a continuing conjugal relationship with Jaime Littrell between August 1997 and February 1999.\nAt the hearing on the petition, Jaime Littrell testified that sometime in 1997 he was living with his mother, who was preparing to move out of state. At that time, Dawn invited him to move into her home. Jaime moved into Dawn\u2019s son\u2019s old room.\nJaime testified that when he moved into her home, Dawn told him that he did not need to initially pay rent because her husband was paying the mortgage. However, she said that in March 1998 he would have to pay her $300 per month. Jaime said that they had an agreement to split the cost of utilities and groceries. He also maintained the lawn and the pool.\nAccording to Jaime, in March 1998 he began paying rent. He paid the rent in cash because he had no checking account. He said Dawn gave him receipts for the payments, but he was unable to produce any receipts at the hearing.\nJaime also testified that he and Dawn had sexual relations three to four times a week during the year and a half that they lived together. Further, he admitted that on one occasion he secretly videotaped them having sexual relations without Dawn\u2019s consent. He described their relationship during that time as \u201csex partners.\u201d\nDawn testified that Jaime lived in her home for a year and a half. She said that she allowed Jaime to five in her home because he had no place to five after his mother moved out of state. According to Dawn, she only offered him one of her bedrooms until he got himself \u201cup on his feet.\u201d During that time, he never paid her any rent or contributed toward her mortgage payments. She said Jaime paid for his own groceries and telephone charges but sometimes he would give her money for food, gas, and chemicals for the pool. She also said Jaime did some yard work and work around the pool.\nDawn admitted that while they lived together, she and Jaime socialized about two to three times a month for dinner, a movie, or drinks. They sometimes went out with her friends, but never with his. They exchanged Christmas and birthday presents.\nDawn denied any sexual relationship with Jaime. However, she admitted that they had sexual relations in January 1999 after they had been out together and she had had too much to drink. Finally, Dawn noted that during the time Jaime resided in her home he never paid for any of her personal expenses, they did not co-mingle their funds, and they owned no joint credit cards.\nAfter hearing all the evidence, the trial court found that Jaime\u2019s testimony was more credible than Dawn\u2019s. Therefore, it found that William established that Dawn engaged in a continuing conjugal relationship with Jaime within the meaning of the statute. Accordingly, it terminated William\u2019s maintenance obligation from the date he filed his petition and ordered Dawn to reimburse William for the overpayment.\nOn appeal, Dawn argues that the trial court erred in terminating her maintenance because William failed to prove that she and Jaime . engaged in a continuing, conjugal relationship.\nIllinois law provides for termination of maintenance when there is a resident, continuing, conjugal relationship between the maintenance recipient and a third party. 750 ILCS 5/510(c) (West 1998). To prove a continuing, conjugal relationship, an ex-spouse must show that the former spouse is involved in a de facto husband and wife relationship. In re Marriage of Leming, 227 Ill. App. 3d 154, 590 N.E.2d 1027 (1992). To determine if such a relationship exists, courts have examined the following factors: (1) the length of the relationship; (2) the amount of time the couple spends together; (3) the nature of activities engaged in; (4) the interrelation of their personal affairs; (5) whether they vacation together; and (6) whether they spend holidays together. In re Marriage of Herrin, 262 Ill. App. 3d 573, 634 N.E.2d 1168 (1994). A reviewing court gives great deference to the trial court\u2019s factual findings because the trial court stands in the best position to weigh the credibility of all the witnesses. In re Jones, 285 Ill. App. 3d 8, 673 N.E.2d 703 (1996). Finally, a court of review will not reverse a trial court\u2019s finding concerning the existence of a de facto, relationship unless that finding is contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence. In re Marriage of Caradonna, 197 Ill. App. 3d 155, 553 N.E.2d 1161 (1990).\nHere, Dawn and Jaime lived together for a year and a half. They socialized together frequently and engaged in such dating activities as dinners, movies, and drinks. Although Dawn testified that they did not have a sexual relationship, we defer to the trial court\u2019s finding that Jaime\u2019s account of their sexual relationship was more credible. They exchanged Christmas and birthday presents. They split household chores, and they socialized with Dawn\u2019s friends. Based upon the totality of the circumstances, we find that the trial court\u2019s finding of a de facto husband-wife relationship between Dawn and Jaime was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. Therefore, we hold that the trial court properly found a continual, conjugal relationship between Dawn and Jaime and granted William\u2019s petition to terminate maintenance.\nOn cross-appeal, William argues that the trial court erred in terminating maintenance from the date of his petition rather than the date the cohabitation began. In support of his contention, he cites to In re Marriage of Gray, 314 Ill. App. 3d 249, 731 N.E.2d 942 (2000). In Gray, the appellate court held that the triggering period for termination of maintenance is the time the conjugal cohabitation began and not when the petition to terminate maintenance is filed. Gray, 314 Ill. App. 3d at 253, 731 N.E.2d at 946. In response, Dawn argues that the term of the settlement agreement that \u201cmaintenance shall terminate after the above payments have been made or earlier upon order of the court\u201d is a separate agreement between the parties that precludes application of the \u201cconjugal cohabitation\u201d section of the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act (Act) (750 ILCS 5/510(c) (West 1998)). In the alternative, Dawn contends that the Gray case fails to follow well-settled Illinois law.\nSection 510(c) of the Act provides as follows:\n\u201cUnless otherwise agreed by the parties in a written agreement set forth in the judgment or otherwise approved by the court, the obligation to pay future maintenance is terminated upon the death of either party, or the remarriage of the party receiving maintenance, or if the party receiving maintenance cohabits with another person on a resident, continuing conjugal basis.\u201d 750 ILCS 5/510(c) (West 1998).\nWe reject Dawn\u2019s argument that the terms of the settlement agreement constitute a separate agreement that only allows maintenance to be terminated upon completion of payment or the entry of a court order. We do not read that section as limiting the termination of maintenance to only those two instances. Therefore, we find that the \u201cconjugal cohabitation\u201d section of the Act applies in this case. Further, we agree with In re Marriage of Gray that the triggering period for termination of maintenance is the time the conjugal cohabitation began and not when the petition to terminate maintenance is filed. Gray, 314 Ill. App. 3d at 253, 731 N.E.2d at 946. Therefore, we hold that the trial court erred in terminating William\u2019s maintenance obligations from the time he filed his petition. Accordingly, we remand this cause for the trial court to determine when Dawn began the cohabitation and to terminate her payments as of that date.\nThe judgment of the circuit court of Will County is affirmed in part and remanded in part.\nAffirmed in part; remanded in part.\nBRESLIN and McDADE, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE SLATER" } ], "attorneys": [ "Victoria A. Boone (argued), of Law Offices of Edward R. Jaquays, of Joliet, for appellant.", "Roy A. Sabuco (argued) and Michael Renzi, both of Snyder, Sabuco & Beck, P.C., of Joliet, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "In re MARRIAGE OF DAWN A. SNOW, Petitioner-Appellent and Cross-Appellee, and WILLIAM A. SNOW Respondent-Appellee and Cross-Appellant.\nThird District\nNo. 3 \u2014 00\u20140369\nOpinion filed June 14, 2001.\nVictoria A. Boone (argued), of Law Offices of Edward R. Jaquays, of Joliet, for appellant.\nRoy A. Sabuco (argued) and Michael Renzi, both of Snyder, Sabuco & Beck, P.C., of Joliet, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0953-01", "first_page_order": 971, "last_page_order": 975 }