{
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  "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CHARLES BENTON, a/k/a Charles Benton-Bey, Defendant-Appellee",
  "name_abbreviation": "People v. Benton",
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  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CHARLES BENTON, a/k/a Charles Benton-Bey, Defendant-Appellee."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "PRESIDING JUSTICE HOMER\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nDefendant Charles Benton, also known as Charles Benton-Bey, was charged with operating an uninsured motor vehicle (625 ILCS 5/3 \u2014 707 (West 1998)). At defendant\u2019s first appearance, the trial court dismissed the case on its own motion, holding that Illinois\u2019s mandatory liability insurance law does not apply to vehicles registered in foreign states. The State moved for reconsideration. Upon reconsideration, the court confirmed the dismissal, and the State appeals. We affirm.\nThe record shows that defendant was arrested while driving a 1979 Buick within the City of Rock Island. The vehicle had an Iowa registration number and \u201capplied for\u201d license tag, and defendant\u2019s driver\u2019s license showed a Davenport, Iowa, home address. Based on this information on the face of the traffic citation, the trial court dismissed the insurance violation charge sua sponte. In its formal written order, the court also noted that if the mandatory liability insurance statute applied to nonresident motorists, it would violate the commerce clause of the United States Constitution (U.S. Const., art. I, \u00a7 8).\nSubsequently, at the hearing on the State\u2019s motion for reconsideration, the arresting officer testified that he asked defendant if the vehicle was insured, and defendant said that it was not. The officer then cited defendant for a violation of section 3 \u2014 707 of the Illinois Vehicle Code (625 ILCS 5/3 \u2014 707 (West 1998)). After taking the cause under advisement, the court concluded that the legislature did not intend for the mandatory liability insurance statute to apply to vehicles registered in other states. Accordingly, the court ruled that its original order dismissing the charge was proper.\nOn appeal, the State argues that (1) the trial court lacked authority to dismiss the complaint on its own motion; (2) the court\u2019s interpretation of the statute was erroneous; and (3) applying the statute to nonresident drivers does not violate the commerce clause. Defendant has not filed a brief; therefore, we consider the case on the State\u2019s brief and our independent research. See First Capitol Mortgage Corp. v. Talandis Construction Corp., 63 Ill. 2d 128, 345 N.E.2d 493 (1976).\nInitially, we reject the State\u2019s contention that the trial court lacked authority to dismiss the charge on its owm motion. Upon motion of the defendant, a trial court may dismiss a charging instrument that fails to state an offense. 725 ILCS 5/114 \u2014 1(a)(8) (West 1998). A . judge\u2019s sua sponte dismissal of a complaint may be error where no notice or opportunity to respond to the court\u2019s motion is given. See, e.g., People v. Kitchen, 189 Ill. 2d 424, 727 N.E.2d 189 (1999). However, where, as here, the State was given ample opportunity to develop a response to the court\u2019s motion and present its position at a hearing, the State cannot claim prejudice. Therefore, a reversal based on the pro se defendant\u2019s failure to file the motion on his own behalf is unwarranted. See Perry v. Minor, 319 Ill. App. 3d 703, 745 N.E.2d 113 (2001).\nNext, we consider the State\u2019s argument that the trial court erred in ruling that the mandatory liability insurance law does not apply to nonresident drivers. This is apparently an issue of first impression in Illinois.\nSection 3 \u2014 707 of the Illinois Vehicle Code provides, in relevant part, as follows:\n\u201cNo person shall operate a motor vehicle unless the motor vehicle is covered by a liability insurance policy in accordance with Section 7 \u2014 601 of this Code.\n***\nAny operator of a motor vehicle subject to registration under this Code who is convicted of violating this Section is guilty of a business offense and shall be required to pay a fine in excess of $500, but not more than $1,000.\u201d (Emphasis added.) 625 ILCS 5/3 \u2014 707 (West 1998).\nThe statute appears ambiguous in that it initially proscribes the operation of any motor vehicle without liability insurance, but it penalizes only those who operate such a vehicle if the vehicle is required to be registered in Illinois.\nVehicles subject to registration and those exempt from registration in Illinois are addressed in section 3 \u2014 402. That section provides in relevant part:\n\u201cAny motor vehicle *** operated interstate need not be registered in this State, provided:\n(a) same is properly registered in another State pursuant to\nlaw ***.\u201d 625 ILCS 5/3 \u2014 402(B)(2)(a) (West 1998).\nIn construing statutes, we are guided by well-established principles. A primary rule of statutory construction is to give effect to the legislative intent. People v. Whitney, 188 Ill. 2d 91, 720 N.E.2d 225 (1999). Where the statutory language is clear and unambiguous, its plain meaning should be given effect. Whitney, 188 Ill. 2d 91, 720 N.E.2d 225. However, if the language of a statute is ambiguous, the court may consider extrinsic aids, including legislative history, to determine the legislature\u2019s intent. Whitney, 188 Ill. 2d 91, 720 N.E.2d 225. Further, statutes that relate to the same subject are deemed to be in pari materia and should be construed together. People ex rel. Daley v. Datacom Systems Corp., 146 Ill. 2d 1, 585 N.E.2d 51 (1991). A court should avoid an interpretation that would render any portion of a statute meaningless or void. McNamee v. Federated Equipment & Supply Co., 181 Ill. 2d 415, 692 N.E.2d 1157 (1998).\nApplying the foregoing principles, it is clear that the trial court properly concluded that the mandatory liability insurance statute does not apply to defendant\u2019s vehicle. Accepting the State\u2019s position that section 3 \u2014 707 applies to vehicles registered in other states would render meaningless the language \u201csubject to registration under this Code,\u201d because the registration section (625 ILCS 5/3 \u2014 402 (West 1998)) expressly exempts vehicles registered in other states. The traffic citation in this case indicated on its face that defendant\u2019s vehicle was registered in Iowa. The vehicle was not subject to registration under the Illinois Vehicle Code; therefore, defendant was not subject to a penalty under section 3 \u2014 707.\nFurther support for this conclusion may be found in the legislative history of section 3 \u2014 707. Prior to the enactment of Public Act 86\u2014 1179 (Pub. Act 86 \u2014 1179, eff. August 17, 1990), section 3 \u2014 707 provided in relevant part as follows:\n\u201cNo person shall operate a motor vehicle unless the motor vehicle is covered by a liability insurance policy in accordance with Section 7 \u2014 601 of this Code. This provision applies to operators and motor vehicles regardless of the state or jurisdiction in which they respectively are licensed or registered.\n***\nAny person convicted of violating this Section is guilty of a business offense and shall be required to pay a fine in excess of $500, but not more than $1,000.\u201d (Emphasis added.) 111. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 95x/2, par. 3 \u2014 707.\nPublic Act 86 \u2014 1179 amended the statute by deleting the above highlighted language and by adding the qualifying language in the penalty clause restricting the statute to vehicles registered under the Code. See 625 ILCS 5/3 \u2014 707 (West 1998). The only logical explanation for the amendment is that the legislature intended to confine the reach of the statute to vehicles registered in Illinois. Accordingly, we hold that the trial court properly dismissed the complaint in this case.\nFinally, the State argues that the trial court erred in ruling that the statute would violate the commerce clause if it applied to nonresident motorists. Having determined that the statute does not apply to motorists operating vehicles registered in other states, we do not reach the constitutional question. See Wolens v. American Airlines, Inc., 147 Ill. 2d 367, 589 N.E.2d 533 (1992).\nFor the reasons stated, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court of Rock Island County.\nAffirmed.\nHOLDRIDGE and SLATER, JJ., concur.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "PRESIDING JUSTICE HOMER"
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Marshall E. Douglas, State\u2019s Attorney, of Rock Island (John X. Breslin and Richard T. Leonard, both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People.",
      "No brief filed for appellee."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CHARLES BENTON, a/k/a Charles Benton-Bey, Defendant-Appellee.\nThird District\nNo. 3 \u2014 00\u20140598\nOpinion filed June 22, 2001.\nMarshall E. Douglas, State\u2019s Attorney, of Rock Island (John X. Breslin and Richard T. Leonard, both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People.\nNo brief filed for appellee."
  },
  "file_name": "0958-01",
  "first_page_order": 976,
  "last_page_order": 980
}