{ "id": 126407, "name": "BEVERLY D. ELLIS, Special Adm'x of the Estate of Shaun J. Ellis, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. AMERICAN FAMILY MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant-Appellee", "name_abbreviation": "Ellis v. American Family Mutual Insurance", "decision_date": "2001-06-20", "docket_number": "No. 4 \u2014 00\u20141008", "first_page": "1006", "last_page": "1011", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "322 Ill. App. 3d 1006" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "652 N.E.2d 275", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "276", "parenthetical": "despite the language of Rule 216 that a request is admitted unless a specific denial or objection is served within 28 days, under Rule 183 (134 Ill. 2d R. 183" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "166 Ill. 2d 204", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 198894 ], "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "207", "parenthetical": "despite the language of Rule 216 that a request is admitted unless a specific denial or objection is served within 28 days, under Rule 183 (134 Ill. 2d R. 183" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/166/0204-01" ] }, { "cite": "371 N.E.2d 121", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "123-24", "parenthetical": "\"In order to reach a just result in this case it is imperative that we not treat the technical admission of lack of maternity to operate against the best interests of the minor child\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "55 Ill. App. 3d 248", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3405451 ], "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "251", "parenthetical": "\"In order to reach a just result in this case it is imperative that we not treat the technical admission of lack of maternity to operate against the best interests of the minor child\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/55/0248-01" ] }, { "cite": "15 N.E.2d 491", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1938, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "492" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "368 Ill. 607", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 2571965 ], "year": 1938, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "609-10" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/368/0607-01" ] }, { "cite": "617 N.E.2d 873", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "875", "parenthetical": "verified pleading not binding if amended pleading discloses that admissions were made through mistake or inadvertence" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "247 Ill. App. 3d 745", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2928167 ], "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "749", "parenthetical": "verified pleading not binding if amended pleading discloses that admissions were made through mistake or inadvertence" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/247/0745-01" ] }, { "cite": "625 N.E.2d 835", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "839" }, { "page": "840" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "253 Ill. App. 3d 792", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5424225 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "797" }, { "page": "798" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/253/0792-01" ] }, { "cite": "703 N.E.2d 71", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "77", "parenthetical": "requests for admission of legal conclusions are improper" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "184 Ill. 2d 224", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 926969 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "237", "parenthetical": "requests for admission of legal conclusions are improper" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/184/0224-01" ] }, { "cite": "675 N.E.2d 1031", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1033-34", "parenthetical": "foster child under one-year placement agreement a \"resident of the household\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "286 Ill. App. 3d 356", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1544434 ], "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "359-60", "parenthetical": "foster child under one-year placement agreement a \"resident of the household\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/286/0356-01" ] }, { "cite": "683 N.E.2d 536", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "538", "parenthetical": "liability coverage exclusion for bodily injury or property damage arising out of use of any vehicle owned by any \"resident of the household\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "291 Ill. App. 3d 139", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 456100 ], "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "142", "parenthetical": "liability coverage exclusion for bodily injury or property damage arising out of use of any vehicle owned by any \"resident of the household\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/291/0139-01" ] }, { "cite": "592 N.E.2d 332", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "334-35", "parenthetical": "child who dropped out of school and had his own apartment not a related person who lived with his parents" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "227 Ill. App. 3d 913", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5794785 ], "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "916", "parenthetical": "child who dropped out of school and had his own apartment not a related person who lived with his parents" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/227/0913-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 626, "char_count": 10156, "ocr_confidence": 0.762, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.0890537874568355e-07, "percentile": 0.5651592042624879 }, "sha256": "9bb11571aaec9d14fab7cf45eb31ba6512991f889dd193285f54e70aed748e56", "simhash": "1:0a2f1cc66dc48431", "word_count": 1670 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:05:07.459628+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "BEVERLY D. ELLIS, Special Adm\u2019x of the Estate of Shaun J. Ellis, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. AMERICAN FAMILY MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant-Appellee." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE COOK\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nPlaintiff Beverly D. Ellis appeals from the trial court\u2019s grant of summary judgment in favor of defendant American Family Mutual Insurance Company (American Family). We affirm.\nAmerican Family issued a motor vehicle insurance policy to Ellis effective from December 12, 1991, to June 12, 1992. The policy contained an endorsement, the \u201cAutomobile Accidental Death and Specific Dismemberment Benefits Coverage Endorsement.\u201d On May 15, 1992, Ellis\u2019s son Shaun was killed in an automobile accident while driving Ellis\u2019s car. Ellis sought benefits under the endorsement but American Family denied coverage.\nOn January 17, 1995, Ellis filed a complaint for declaratory judgment; American Family filed an answer and a counterclaim for declaratory judgment. The parties next filed cross-motions for summary judgment. Each was denied. The case languished for two years. Ellis then filed a second motion for summary judgment; American Family filed a response and cross-motion for summary judgment. Ellis\u2019s motion was denied, American Family\u2019s was granted. From this ruling, Ellis appeals.\nThree pertinent provisions of the policy are at issue. The first two provisions are found in the endorsement:\n\u201cDeath Benefit: We will pay the maximum benefit shown in the declarations, if the insured person dies within 90 days of the accident.\n* * *\nInsured person or insured persons means you or any relative while occupying, or when struck by, a land motor vehicle or trailer.\u201d\nThe third provision is found in the base policy, in a section entitled \u201cDefinitions Used Throughout the Policy\u201d:\n\u201cRelative means a person living in your household related to you by blood, marriage!,] or adoption. *** It excludes any person who, or whose spouse, owns a motor vehicle other than an off-road motor vehicle.\u201d\nAmerican Family offers two theories in support of the trial court\u2019s ruling: (1) Shaun owned his own car, thereby coming under an exception to the policy definition of \u201crelative\u201d and (2) Shaun was not \u201cliving in [Eilis\u2019s] household\u201d at the time of his death.\nThe question whether an individual is a resident of, or living in, a household commonly arises in other automobile policy contexts. The standard automobile policy covers \u201crelatives\u201d as insureds, meaning persons living in the household and related to the insured by blood or marriage. See 625 ILCS 5/7 \u2014 317(a), (b) (West 2000); 215 ILCS 5/143.13(a) (West 2000). A number of cases consider whether a person is a \u201crelative\u201d and accordingly covered as an insured under an automobile liability policy. See, e.g., State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Taussig, 227 Ill. App. 3d 913, 916, 592 N.E.2d 332, 334-35 (1992) (child who dropped out of school and had his own apartment not a related person who lived with his parents); Kopier v. Harlow, 291 Ill. App. 3d 139, 142, 683 N.E.2d 536, 538 (1997) (liability coverage exclusion for bodily injury or property damage arising out of use of any vehicle owned by any \u201cresident of the household\u201d). Other cases have considered whether a person is a relative \u201cresident of the household\u201d and accordingly excluded from receiving benefits under a homeowner\u2019s or automobile liability policy. See, e.g., Country Mutual Insurance Co. v. Peoples Bank, 286 Ill. App. 3d 356, 359-60, 675 N.E.2d 1031, 1033-34 (1997) (foster child under one-year placement agreement a \u201cresident of the household\u201d). Different factors may apply in cases interpreting coverage clauses than in cases involving exclusion clauses. The endorsement here, providing accidental death benefits, appears to be somewhat unusual, even though it employs language previously interpreted in the cases. Why should a relative, traveling in an insured vehicle, be covered under the endorsement if he does not own a motor vehicle, but not be covered if he does?\nThe policy definition of \u201cinsured persons\u201d includes the policyholder\u2019s relatives. The policy definition of \u201crelative\u201d specifically excludes individuals who own their own vehicles. American Family states that Shaun owned his own vehicle and therefore was not an insured person.\nAmerican Family mainly relies upon Ellis\u2019s response to a request for admission tendered pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 216 (134 111. 2d R. 216). American Family\u2019s request No. 7 stated:\n\u201c7. That on May 15, 1992, the decedent, SHAUN J. ELLIS, was the owner of his own vehicle and it was not the 1982 Oldsmobile 88 Royale which was involved in this accident.\u201d\nEllis\u2019s response to the request did indeed explicitly admit the truth of this fact. On appeal, Ellis refers to a portion of her discovery deposition wherein she contradicts her admission:\n\u201cDEFENSE COUNSEL: In May of 1992 did Shaun own his own vehicle?\nPLAINTIFF: No, not at the time of the accident.\nDEFENSE COUNSEL: In your answers to the [r]equest for [a]dmission of [flacts you were asked whether Shaun was the owner of his own vehicle on May 15th of \u201992, and you admitted that. Was that wrong? He didn\u2019t have his own car?\nPLAINTIFF: Not at the time he did not.\nDEFENSE COUNSEL: Okay. Had he at any time prior to\u2014\nPLAINTIFF: Yes.\nDEFENSE COUNSEL: \u2014 the accident? Okay. When was the last time that he owned a vehicle prior to the accident date of May 15th, \u201992?\nPLAINTIFF: I don\u2019t honestly remember that.\n* * *\nDEFENSE COUNSEL: Do you know the reason why Shaun was using your vehicle at that time?\nPLAINTIFF: He did not have a car of his own at that time, so until he had decided what he was going to purchase he was using my car.\u201d\nEllis directs our attention to Supreme Court Rule 201(j), which states that \u201c[djisclosure of any matter obtained by discovery is not conclusive, but may be contradicted by other evidence.\u201d 166 111. 2d R. 201(j).\nRule 216(a) (134 Ill. 2d R. 216(a)) allows a party to request admission of \u201cthe truth of any specified relevant fact,\u201d including an ultimate fact. See also P.R.S. International, Inc., v. Shred Pax Corp., 184 Ill. 2d 224, 237, 703 N.E.2d 71, 77 (1998) (requests for admission of legal conclusions are improper). Requests to admit differ from other discovery devices in that requests to admit are not designed to produce evidence but to limit the issues at tri\u00e1l and withdraw admitted facts from contention. People v. Mindham, 253 Ill. App. 3d 792, 797, 625 N.E.2d 835, 839 (1993). Through the request-to-admit procedure, a party is able to determine what facts remain disputed and accordingly require further discovery. Mindham, 253 Ill. App. 3d at 798, 625 N.E.2d at 840.\n\u201cWhile these requests are designed to clarify and simplify evidentiary issues at trial rather than to further the goals of discovery, they are governed by Rule 216 and enforced in accord with the rules pertaining to discovery. Nevertheless, Rule 201(j), which provides that matter disclosed by discovery is not conclusive, should be inapplicable to these requests because their purpose is to obtain judicial admissions.\u201d 4 R. Michael, Illinois Practice \u00a7 33.9, at 152 (1989) (Civil Procedure Before Trial).\nAdmissions pursuant to requests to admit constitute judicial admissions, which are binding upon the party making them; they may not be controverted at trial or in a motion for summary judgment. M. Graham, Cleary & Graham\u2019s Handbook of Illinois Evidence \u00a7 802.11, at 779 (7th ed. 1999) (hereinafter Cleary & Graham). Only in extraordinary circumstances may a party escape the consequences of a judicial admission. See Cleary & Graham \u00a7 802.11, at 781, citing In re Marriage of O\u2019Brien, 247 Ill. App. 3d 745, 749, 617 N.E.2d 873, 875 (1993) (verified pleading not binding if amended pleading discloses that admissions were made through mistake or inadvertence). While a stipulation is ordinarily binding, the trial judge may, in her sound discretion, relieve a party from its effect upon application seasonably made and a showing that the matter is in fact untrue, violative of public policy, or the result of fraud. Cleary & Graham \u00a7 202.4, at 67, citing Brink v. Industrial Comm\u2019n, 368 Ill. 607, 609-10, 15 N.E.2d 491, 492 (1938); see also Sanders v. Sanders, 55 Ill. App. 3d 248, 251, 371 N.E.2d 121, 123-24 (1977) (\u201cIn order to reach a just result in this case it is imperative that we not treat the technical admission of lack of maternity to operate against the best interests of the minor child\u201d). A trial court has some discretion under Rule 216 (134 Ill. 2d R. 216). Bright v. Dicke, 166 Ill. 2d 204, 207, 652 N.E.2d 275, 276 (1995) (despite the language of Rule 216 that a request is admitted unless a specific denial or objection is served within 28 days, under Rule 183 (134 Ill. 2d R. 183) a trial judge has discretion to allow late service of a response to a request to admit where the delinquent party has shown good cause for the delay).\nEllis\u2019s attempt to avoid the consequences of her judicial admission cannot be allowed. Answers to requests to admit cannot be controverted at trial or in a motion for summary judgment. Even if Ellis had made a proper request to be relieved of the consequences of her admission, her equivocal answers at the deposition would not have justified such relief.\nBecause Ellis had admitted that Shaun owned a vehicle at the time of his death, Shaun was not an insured person under the provisions of the policy, and the grant of summary judgment was proper. Because of our resolution of this issue, we need not consider whether Shaun was \u201cliving in [Eilis\u2019s] household,\u201d which, if not true, would also have barred recovery under the endorsement.\nFor the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court\u2019s judgment.\nAffirmed.\nSTEIGMANN, EJ., and MYERSCOUGH, J, concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE COOK" } ], "attorneys": [ "John L. Morel (argued), of John L. Morel, P.C., of Bloomington, for appellant.", "Stephen R. Swofford and Christine L. Olson, both of Hinshaw & Culbertson, of Chicago, William P. Hardy (argued), of Hinshaw & Culbertson, of Springfield, and Edward T. Habecker, of Hinshaw & Culbertson, of Peoria, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "BEVERLY D. ELLIS, Special Adm\u2019x of the Estate of Shaun J. Ellis, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. AMERICAN FAMILY MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant-Appellee.\nFourth District\nNo. 4 \u2014 00\u20141008\nArgued May 17, 2001.\nOpinion filed June 20, 2001.\nJohn L. Morel (argued), of John L. Morel, P.C., of Bloomington, for appellant.\nStephen R. Swofford and Christine L. Olson, both of Hinshaw & Culbertson, of Chicago, William P. Hardy (argued), of Hinshaw & Culbertson, of Springfield, and Edward T. Habecker, of Hinshaw & Culbertson, of Peoria, for appellee." }, "file_name": "1006-01", "first_page_order": 1024, "last_page_order": 1029 }