{ "id": 171735, "name": "STANDARD FEDERAL BANK FOR SAVINGS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JOHN A. HANNO et al., Defendants-Appellants", "name_abbreviation": "Standard Federal Bank for Savings v. Hanno", "decision_date": "2001-06-22", "docket_number": "No. 1\u201400\u20140156", "first_page": "521", "last_page": "526", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "323 Ill. App. 3d 521" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "721 F.2d 848", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 6128147, 1908925 ], "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "851" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/br/35/0848-01", "/f2d/721/0848-01" ] }, { "cite": "240 B.R. 636", "category": "reporters:specialty", "reporter": "B.R.", "case_ids": [ 11565618 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "644" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/br/240/0636-01" ] }, { "cite": "435 U.S. 381", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 3069 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "384", "parenthetical": "The 'sole purpose' of the separate document requirement is 'to clarify when the time for appeal ... begins to run'" }, { "page": "1120", "parenthetical": "The 'sole purpose' of the separate document requirement is 'to clarify when the time for appeal ... begins to run'" }, { "parenthetical": "The 'sole purpose' of the separate document requirement is 'to clarify when the time for appeal ... begins to run'" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/435/0381-01" ] }, { "cite": "860 F.2d 1521", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 655819, 6486723 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1525" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/860/1521-01", "/br/92/1521-01" ] }, { "cite": "863 F.2d 428", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 10527432, 6494844 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "429" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/863/0428-01", "/br/93/0428-01" ] }, { "cite": "251 Ill. App. 3d 512", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2960785 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "515-16" }, { "page": "517" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/251/0512-01" ] }, { "cite": "171 Ill. 2d 378", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 57332 ], "year": 1996, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/171/0378-01" ] }, { "cite": "294 Ill. App. 3d 1024", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 35342 ], "year": 1998, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/294/1024-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 528, "char_count": 9960, "ocr_confidence": 0.793, "pagerank": { "raw": 5.989406066647367e-08, "percentile": 0.3721753662086091 }, "sha256": "ba9388de687c0735797aa64ac1c4b14d90371a1306afd8470c25a645ed626825", "simhash": "1:d2aebbdd1cca3320", "word_count": 1657 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:00:03.625992+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "STANDARD FEDERAL BANK FOR SAVINGS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JOHN A. HANNO et al., Defendants-Appellants." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE REID\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nJohn Hanno appeals the circuit court\u2019s order which confirmed the foreclosure sale of his former residence. On appeal, Hanno contends the order confirming the foreclosure sale is void because: (1) the appellee\u2019s motions to reinstate and to confirm the foreclosure sale were filed prior to the docketing of the dismissal order of Hanno\u2019s last bankruptcy, and (2) it was entered in violation of the automatic stay provision of Rule 6004(g) of the Federal Bankruptcy Rules. Fed. Bankr. R. 6004(g).\nOn May 22, 1992, Hanno obtained a variable rate mortgage loan from the appellee, Standard Federal Bank for Savings (Standard). Pursuant to the terms of the loan and mortgage, Standard agreed to lend the sum of $250,000 to Hanno, and Hanno executed a mortgage to Standard of his residence located at 6 North Trails in Lemont, Illinois. Hanno signed a promissory note agreeing to monthly principal, interest and tax escrow payments.\nHanno contends that he was unable to make payments under the terms of the promissory note and mortgage as a result of Standard\u2019s breach of the loan agreement. Standard disputes Hanno\u2019s contentions.\nOn January 10, 1994, Standard filed a complaint for mortgage foreclosure. On November 15, 1994, Hanno filed his affirmative defenses and a counterclaim against Standard. On December 7, 1995, a judgment of foreclosure was entered. The order stated that Hanno was in default under the terms of the promissory note as of November 9, 1995. The order provided for the foreclosure and sale of the property located at 6 North Trails in Lemont, Illinois. The judgment of foreclosure provided that the period of redemption would end on March 8, 1996.\nHanno then proceeded to file a series of six bankruptcy petitions. During this time, on July 23, 1998, a sheriffs sale was held and the property was sold for $431,547.39. However, on October 15, 1998, the fourth and fifth bankruptcy petitions were found to have been filed in bad faith and for the purposes of blocking confirmation of the foreclosure sale.\nOn April 1, 1999, after Hanno filed his sixth bankruptcy petition, a stipulated order was entered which provided for the terms of a settlement between Hanno and TCF National Bank Illinois (TCF), the successor in interest to Standard. The order provided that Hanno would have until December 1, 1999, to complete the sale of the property, and that if the property was not sold by December 1, 1999, the bankruptcy court would dismiss the case. Hanno was unable to sell the property and subsequently, on December 2, 1999, an order was entered dismissing Hanno\u2019s sixth bankruptcy petition. On December 6, 1999, the appellee filed motions to reinstate and to confirm the foreclosure sale. On December 7, 1999, the order entered on December 2, 1999, was docketed. On December 9, 1999, the circuit court granted TCP\u2019s motion to reinstate the foreclosure case, which was dismissed with leave to reinstate when Hanno filed his sixth bankruptcy, and entered an order that confirmed the sheriffs sale held on July 23, 1998.\nAs this matter involves a question of law, our standard of review will be de novo. Daley v. American Drug Stores, Inc., 294 Ill. App. 3d 1024 (1998). The issues presented for review in this court were not raised in the trial court. Issues presented for the first time on appeal are deemed waived. Barnett v. Zion Park District, 171 Ill. 2d 378 (1996). Hanno concedes that he is raising these issues for the first time on appeal. Hanno argues that the order which he is appealing from is void, and since a void order can be attacked at any time in any court, he therefore has not waived his arguments. We disagree.\nHanno contends that because the appellee filed its motions to reinstate the case and confirm the foreclosure sale prior to the docketing of the order regarding Hanno\u2019s sixth bankruptcy dismissal, the subsequent order reinstating and confirming the foreclosure sale is void. Hanno cites NBD Highland Park Bank, N.A. v. Wien, 251 Ill. App. 3d 512 (1993), to support his argument that the circuit court lacked jurisdiction. In Wien the bankruptcy judge gave an oral ruling from the bench to remand the case to the state court and to lift an automatic stay on October 5, 1992, but the orders were not docketed until October 14 and 15, respectively. On October 12, 1992, before the orders were docketed, the disputed property was sold at a sheriffs sale.\nThe Wien court wrote that \u201c \u2018[ojrders do not become final until they are docketed. The reasons for respecting finality of judgments do not apply to undocketed orders. They cannot be enforced. *** Hence, judges may change their decisions until they are docketed.\u2019 (In re American Precision Vibrator Co. (5th Cir. 1989), 863 F.2d 428, 429.)\u201d Wien, 251 Ill. App. 3d at 515-16. The Wien court held that the bankruptcy court retained jurisdiction until its order that lifted the stay was docketed. Since the foreclosure sale occurred prior to the docketing of the order, the circuit court lacked jurisdiction over the matter, and therefore the foreclosure sale was void. Wien, 251 Ill. App. 3d at 517.\nHanno\u2019s reliance on Wien is misplaced. The Wien court specifically distinguished its set of facts from those in Noli v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 860 F.2d 1521 (9th Cir. 1988), where the court dealt with a similar situation.\nIn Noli, the defendants filed bankruptcy petitions that automatically stayed a trial in the tax court. The government\u2019s counsel moved the bankruptcy court for relief from the automatic stay, which the court granted by an oral order. The government then immediately proceeded with the trial based upon the bankruptcy court\u2019s undocketed oral order. The defendants argued that the tax court proceedings were improper because the bankruptcy court\u2019s oral order lifting the automatic stay had not been docketed. The Noli court replied as follows:\n\u201cThis argument misperceives both the purpose of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 58, and the binding effect of an order notwithstanding the issuing court\u2019s failure to enter it on the docket. The \u2018separate document\u2019 requirement of Rule 58 was intended primarily to clear up uncertainties in determining, for purposes of appellate review, when there is a final appealable judgment. See Bankers Trust Co. v. Mallis, 435 U.S. 381, 384, 98 S. Ct. 1117, 1120, 55 L. Ed. 2d 357 (1978) (The \u2018sole purpose\u2019 of the separate document requirement is \u2018to clarify when the time for appeal ... begins to run\u2019). Similarly, the bankruptcy court\u2019s order lifting the stay was effective and binding upon the parties. *** They were present when the oral order was issued and clearly had notice of its existence and content.\u201d Noli, 860 F.2d at 1525.\nIn In re Saunders, 240 B.R. 636 (S.D. Fla. 1999), the court dealt with this same situation, and we believe its clear reasoning is instructional and should be followed. The Saunders court wrote: \u201cRather, common sense dictates that a court\u2019s order is effective when a court enters such an order. If a court orders a case dismissed, then the case is dismissed. To hold otherwise would permit the clerk\u2019s office to misplace an order and prevent the judge\u2019s order from becoming effective. Parties should be able to reasonably rely on a written order, signed by a Judge, that the party has actually received, even if this Order does not get docketed.\u201d Saunders, 240 B.R. at 644.\n\u20221 Here, Hanno clearly was not prejudiced by the order that confirmed the sale of his residence as required by Noli. Hanno was present at the hearing held on December 9, 1999, where the foreclosure case was reinstated. Also, the case at bar is distinguishable from Wien, because, here, the foreclosure sale of Hanno\u2019s residence occurred before the start of Hanno\u2019s sixth bankruptcy hearing, whereas in Wien, the foreclosure sale occurred during the stay period. We find that Hanno\u2019s sixth bankruptcy petition was dismissed when the judge\u2019s orders were entered. As such, the trial court\u2019s orders reinstating and confirming the foreclosure sale were valid, and Hanno\u2019s argument is deemed waived.\n\u20222 Hanno contends that the order reinstating and confirming the foreclosure sale was void because it was entered in violation of the automatic stay provision of Federal Bankruptcy Rule 6004(g). We disagree.\nThe appellee contends that Hanno has waived this argument because he is raising this issue for the first time on appeal. We agree. Hanno concedes that he has not raised this issue prior to this appeal, and for the foregoing reasons, we deem that he has waived this issue. However, in the alternative we would find that the order which reinstated and confirmed the foreclosure sale did not violate Rule 6004(g).\nHanno contends that Rule 6004(g) provides that an order authorizing the use, sale, or lease of property other than cash collateral is stayed until the expiration of 10 days after entry of the order, unless the court orders otherwise. Hanno argues that the order which confirmed the sale of his residence falls under the provisions of Rule 6004(g) and as such was void. We disagree.\nAn automatic stay must plainly terminate upon the dismissal of the petition giving rise to it. In re De Jesus Saez, 721 F.2d 848, 851 (1st Cir. 1983). Here, the petition giving rise to the stay was dismissed prior to the order to reinstate and confirm the foreclosure sale. As such, the foreclosure sale occurred after the stay ended. For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court.\nAffirmed.\nGREIMAN and THEIS, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE REID" } ], "attorneys": [ "Langone Law Firm, of Chicago (Christopher V. Langone, Joel D. Dabisch, and Mark T. Lavery, of counsel), for appellants.", "Davidson Mandell Menkes & Surdyk, L.L.C., of Chicago (Bruce N. Menkes and Kenneth R. Wysocki, of counsel), for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STANDARD FEDERAL BANK FOR SAVINGS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JOHN A. HANNO et al., Defendants-Appellants.\nFirst District (5th Division)\nNo. 1\u201400\u20140156\nOpinion filed June 22, 2001.\nLangone Law Firm, of Chicago (Christopher V. Langone, Joel D. Dabisch, and Mark T. Lavery, of counsel), for appellants.\nDavidson Mandell Menkes & Surdyk, L.L.C., of Chicago (Bruce N. Menkes and Kenneth R. Wysocki, of counsel), for appellee." }, "file_name": "0521-01", "first_page_order": 539, "last_page_order": 544 }