{ "id": 171641, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. DOUGLAS R. PONCAR, Defendant-Appellee", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Poncar", "decision_date": "2001-07-30", "docket_number": "No. 2\u201400\u20140311", "first_page": "702", "last_page": "707", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "323 Ill. App. 3d 702" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "116 Ill. 2d 29", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5543054 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "38" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/116/0029-01" ] }, { "cite": "210 Ill. App. 3d 961", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2534143 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "964" }, { "page": "965" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/210/0961-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 692, "char_count": 13822, "ocr_confidence": 0.778, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.643594115661138e-08, "percentile": 0.2906011122656186 }, "sha256": "787298cd97643ce2bb6397ce41c42704933b58f49ab4a89ff33c5532a50afa5d", "simhash": "1:9ec89bb451eb20fb", "word_count": 2295 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:00:03.625992+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. DOUGLAS R. PONCAR, Defendant-Appellee." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE O\u2019MALLEY\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nIn a two-count indictment, the State charged defendant, Douglas R Poncar, with aggravated driving under the influence of alcohol (aggravated DUI) (625 ILCS 5/11\u2014501(a)(1), (a)(2), (d)(1)(A) (West 1998)). The trial court granted defendant\u2019s motion to suppress the results of a blood test medical personnel administered at a hospital. On appeal, the State contends that the trial court erroneously concluded that suppressing the evidence was appropriate because defendant was injured while in custody. We reverse and remand.\nThe State indicted defendant on September 30, 1998. On June 1, 1999, defendant moved to quash his arrest and suppress evidence. The trial court denied the motion on August 2, 1999. Defendant then moved to suppress the results of the blood test.\nDuring the suppression hearing on defendant\u2019s second motion, defendant presented the testimony of Officers James Sakelakos and William Rowley. Their testimony revealed the following, essentially undisputed facts. At 2:49 p.m. on July 30, 1998, Sakelakos observed defendant driving with a flat tire and stopped him. Because of the damage to the rim, it seemed that defendant had been driving with a flat tire for some time. Defendant appeared highly intoxicated, and Sakelakos attempted to administer field sobriety tests. Shortly thereafter, Sakelakos arrested defendant. Because defendant had soiled himself, Sakelakos called for a transport van and had defendant sit on the curb.\nDefendant became unhappy when another officer who arrived at the scene began to search defendant\u2019s vehicle. Defendant attempted to stand up several times. When he finally managed to do so, he stumbled. Sakelakos extended his arms to prevent defendant from falling and again had him sit on the curb.\nWhen the van arrived, defendant initially refused to enter it. Defendant then attempted twice to enter the van but missed the step. Rowley, the driver of the van, guided defendant\u2019s foot onto the step and assisted him inside. Defendant then sat on the bench in the van. Sakelakos followed the van to the police station.\nAccording to Sakelakos, when the van arrived at the station, Rowley opened the door, and defendant was lying on the floor. Defendant did not respond when the officers asked him to exit the vehicle, so Rowley attempted to assist defendant out of the van. Defendant initially resisted and used vulgar language but eventually exited the van.\nDefendant also resisted somewhat as the officers led him to the \u201cshakedown\u201d room to inventory his property. In the room, Rowley asked defendant to place his hands and head against the wall. When defendant did not comply, Rowley placed defendant\u2019s hands on the wall. Defendant repeatedly pulled his hands away from the wall and tried to turn to face Rowley. Each time, defendant appeared to be more agitated and uncooperative. At one point, defendant turned abruptly. Because Rowley was concerned that defendant might become aggressive, he positioned defendant against the wall again and held his forearm across the middle of defendant\u2019s back. Rowley testified that he used only the force necessary to return defendant to the desired position against the wall and did not shove him. At least two other officers assisted Rowley. Sakelakos testified that, because he turned away momentarily to retrieve a pair of gloves, he did not see how the injury occurred. Rowley testified that defendant turned his head, and defendant\u2019s right ear was cut after it struck the wall and became pinched between the wall and his eyeglass frames. According to Sakelakos, defendant was not bleeding profusely, but enough to warrant medical attention beyond basic first aid. Accordingly, the officers called for an ambulance. Defendant did not request medical treatment.\nBecause defendant continued to be uncooperative, the officers struggled with defendant while waiting for the ambulance and wrestled him to the floor. Sakelakos rode in the ambulance with defendant and was with defendant while he received treatment in the emergency room. In the emergency room, Sakelakos handcuffed defendant\u2019s left wrist to the gurney. Defendant remained uncooperative and refused to answer the treating nurse\u2019s questions. The nurse explained to defendant that he appeared to be intoxicated and that it was necessary to determine what he had taken. Therefore, a blood test was necessary before an anesthetic could be administered. Defendant objected to having his blood drawn. He did not resist, however, when medical personnel ultimately drew his blood. Shortly thereafter, medical personnel administered novocaine to defendant and treated the injury. None of the police officers present requested the blood test. Upon his discharge from the hospital, defendant told the hospital staff that the police officers beat him.\nBefore granting defendant\u2019s motion, the court expressed concern that allowing the evidence to be admitted could lead to police misconduct:\n\u201cDoesn\u2019t that cause you some concern that if you allow the results of the tests when taken for treatment for these injuries that were inflicted by police, whether intentional or unintentional, that that would then open the door for police to do that whatever they wanted and then come up with a scheme and say, I don\u2019t know what happened?\nHe was combative and we had to bat him down and he got injured.\nHow do you prevent that from becoming the norm, I guess my question is.\u201d\nThe court then formulated a \u201cprophylactic rule\u201d as follows:\n\u201cIsn\u2019t it easier to have a blanket ruling that says if a person is injured at the hands of police, intentionally or unintentionally, the result they get can\u2019t be used against them in a DUI?\nThat way the police\u2014even if there was a thought they might want to do that, it doesn\u2019t benefit them to do it.\nIsn\u2019t it more of a prophylactic type of protection rather to say in each case did they beat him up or not beat him up? See what I\u2019m saying?\nI have heard enough I think. I\u2019m going to decide this case not on the issue of whether it\u2019s admissible on the statute but on the basis that something bothers me about the idea of a person being in custody for DUI and then receiving some type of physical injuries at the hands of the police.\nI\u2019m not saying these officers, that they intentionally beat this man up or did anything intentional to cause him harm.\nBut there\u2019s no question that whatever the harm was, the injury he suffered while at the hands of police, be it because he was an aggressor or wasn\u2019t an aggressor\u2014I don\u2019t know what happened, and I don\u2019t have to decide that.\nI think it\u2019s a better rule to say that if a person is injured, after already being arrested for DUI, he\u2019s injured at the hands of the police, and there is no question he was injured at the hands of the police.\nThey did something that caused the injury.\nAgain, it\u2019s not a matter of whether they did it intentionally or in terms of trying to protect themselves from some aggression.\nIf they do that, if it happens, they know they can\u2019t then take him to the hospital and get blood results and use that in a DUI.\nThat I think is a safety net for everyone involved.\nThat way the police would not be tempted to do that, and we don\u2019t have to make that decision.\nSo I\u2019m going to base my decision in suppressing the blood results on the basis that in this particular factual situation where the person is already arrested for DUI, he suffers injuries while in custody at the hands of the police, then those blood results will not be admissible against him in the DUI case.\nNow, that\u2019s basically these facts of this case.\nI\u2019m not going to say if someone is walking into the police station and he trips on his own and bangs his head, and they take him to the hospital, that might not be a different result.\nBut on these facts and these circumstances I\u2019m going to grant the motion.\u201d\nThe State filed a certificate of impairment and timely appealed. See 145 Ill. 2d R 604(a)(1). We review de novo the trial court\u2019s interpretation of the law.\nel Only fourth amendment constraints and specific statutory provisions govern the admissibility of blood-alcohol tests in a DUI prosecution. People v. Yant, 210 Ill. App. 3d 961, 964 (1991).\nSection 11\u2014501.4 of the Illinois Vehicle Code (Code) provides:\n\u201c(a) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the results of blood tests performed for the purpose of determining the content of alcohol *** of an individual\u2019s blood conducted upon persons receiving medical treatment in a hospital emergency room are admissible in evidence as a business record exception to the hearsay rule only in prosecutions for any violation of Section 11\u2014501 of this Code *** when each of the following criteria are met:\n(1) the chemical tests performed upon an individual\u2019s blood were ordered in the regular course of providing emergency medical treatment and not at the request of law enforcement authorities;\n(2) the chemical tests *** were performed by the laboratory routinely used by the hospital; and\n(3) results of chemical tests performed upon an individual\u2019s blood are admissible into evidence regardless of the time that the records were prepared.\n(b) The confidentiality provisions of law pertaining to medical records and medical treatment shall not be applicable with regard to chemical tests performed upon an individual\u2019s blood under the provisions of this Section in prosecutions as specified in subsection\n(a) of this Section.\u201d 625 ILCS 5/11\u2014501.4 (West 1998).\nThe testimony revealed that defendant\u2019s injury was serious enough to warrant medical attention and that medical personnel ordered the blood test in the regular course of providing emergency medical treatment. Thus, if the State lays the proper foundation regarding the manner in which medical personnel conducted the blood test, section 11\u2014501.4(a) would allow the State to introduce the results of the test at trial.\nThe trial court essentially ruled that, even if section 11\u2014501.4 applied, it is necessary to create an exception where the suspect receives emergency medical treatment after being injured while in police custody. The court expressed concern that admitting the blood test results under the circumstances of this case might provide police with an incentive to injure an uncooperative suspect so they could transport him to the hospital and obtain a blood test.\n\u20222 The trial court\u2019s ruling was contrary to well-established law. Defendant cites no authority for the rule adopted by the trial court that the results of a blood test performed by emergency medical personnel for the treatment of injuries sustained by a person while he was in police custody are per se inadmissible under section 11\u2014501.4. No such rule is provided in the plain text of section 11\u2014501.4. Defendant points to no case construing that text as embodying such a rule, nor can we find any such case. We disagree with defendant\u2019s suggestion that People v. Wilson, 116 Ill. 2d 29 (1987), stands for the rule that \u201cevidence against a person should not be admitted when it is obtained through questionable circumstances relating to an injury to a defendant created at the hands of police officers.\u201d Wilson concerned the admissibility of a confession under section 114\u201411(d) of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 38, par. 114\u2014 11(d) (now 725 ILCS 5/114\u201411(d) (West 1998))), which requires that the State establish the voluntary nature of a defendant\u2019s confession. See Wilson, 116 Ill. 2d at 38. The court in Wilson made no suggestion that its holding was relevant to the admissibility of other types of evidence such as blood test results, and defendant points to no relevant analogy between Wilson and this case.\nThe results of defendant\u2019s blood test are not barred under the fourth amendment either. In Yant, the court held that the fourth amendment did not preclude admission of the defendant\u2019s blood test results because there was no indication that the physician\u2019s blood test order was a subterfuge procured by the police or a form of State action. Yant, 210 Ill. App. 3d at 965. As in Yant, there is no evidence here that supports a conclusion that the blood test was the result of police subterfuge. The only conclusions that reasonably may be drawn from the evidence are that defendant was combative during the entire time he was at the police station and that he was injured accidentally while resisting the officers\u2019 attempt to keep defendant in the desired position. The trial court declined to find that the officers \u201cdid anything intentional to cause [defendant] harm.\u201d Instead, the court declared that the fact that defendant was in police custody when he was injured was sufficient to render the blood test results inadmissible. This rule is contrary to the rule in Yant that the results of a blood test performed by emergency medical personnel are admissible under the fourth amendment unless the police employed subterfuge to procure the test. See Yant, 210 111. App. 3d at 965.\nAccordingly, we reverse the judgment of the circuit court of Du Page County and remand the cause for further proceedings. We direct the trial court to determine, consistent with the rule in Yant, whether or not the police employed subterfuge to obtain a test of defendant\u2019s blood following his arrest.\nReversed and remanded with directions.\nMcLAREN and CALLUM, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE O\u2019MALLEY" } ], "attorneys": [ "Joseph E. Birkett, State\u2019s Attorney, of Wheaton (Martin P. Moltz and Gregory L. Slovacek, both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, and Margaret M. Healy, Assistant State\u2019s Attorney, of counsel), for the People.", "Donald J. Ramsell, of Ramsell & Armamentos, of Wheaton, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. DOUGLAS R. PONCAR, Defendant-Appellee.\nSecond District\nNo. 2\u201400\u20140311\nOpinion filed July 30, 2001.\nJoseph E. Birkett, State\u2019s Attorney, of Wheaton (Martin P. Moltz and Gregory L. Slovacek, both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, and Margaret M. Healy, Assistant State\u2019s Attorney, of counsel), for the People.\nDonald J. Ramsell, of Ramsell & Armamentos, of Wheaton, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0702-01", "first_page_order": 720, "last_page_order": 725 }