{ "id": 171746, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. NATHANIEL SLABAUGH, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Slabaugh", "decision_date": "2001-07-20", "docket_number": "No. 2\u201400\u20140571", "first_page": "723", "last_page": "733", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "323 Ill. App. 3d 723" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "76 Ill. 2d 289", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2982988 ], "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "309" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/76/0289-01" ] }, { "cite": "119 Ill. 2d 119", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3193621 ], "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "139-40" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/119/0119-01" ] }, { "cite": "65 Ill. App. 3d 375", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3327923 ], "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "378-79" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/65/0375-01" ] }, { "cite": "131 Ill. App. 3d 597", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3437693 ], "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "609", "parenthetical": "same" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/131/0597-01" ] }, { "cite": "55 Ill. 2d 443", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2938325 ], "year": 1973, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "451-52", "parenthetical": "trial court did not abuse discretion by refusing to permit cross-examination on this point" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/55/0443-01" ] }, { "cite": "34 Ill. App. 3d 821", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2964516 ], "year": 1975, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "830" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/34/0821-01" ] }, { "cite": "48 Ill. App. 3d 972", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3372726 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "977" }, { "page": "977" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/48/0972-01" ] }, { "cite": "236 Ill. App. 3d 175", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5783074 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "183" }, { "page": "185" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/236/0175-01" ] }, { "cite": "166 Ill. App. 3d 643", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5069519 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "651" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/166/0643-01" ] }, { "cite": "129 Ill. 2d 123", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5567019 ], "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "159" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/129/0123-01" ] }, { "cite": "228 Ill. App. 3d 204", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5222360 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "208" }, { "page": "209" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/228/0204-01" ] }, { "cite": "291 Ill. App. 3d 1028", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 456120 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1035" }, { "page": "1035" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/291/1028-01" ] }, { "cite": "147 Ill. 2d 510", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3278412 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "542" }, { "page": "542" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/147/0510-01" ] }, { "cite": "152 Ill. 2d 133", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5602879 ], "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "184" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/152/0133-01" ] }, { "cite": "189 Ill. 2d 99", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 1224818 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "127" }, { "page": "128" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/189/0099-01" ] }, { "cite": "97 Ill. 2d 487", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5516622 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "500" }, { "page": "497" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/97/0487-01" ] }, { "cite": "89 Ill. 2d 189", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5494030 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "194-95" }, { "page": "195" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/89/0189-01" ] }, { "cite": "47 Ill. 2d 510", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2903225 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1971, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "516" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/47/0510-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1016, "char_count": 23002, "ocr_confidence": 0.786, "pagerank": { "raw": 8.302962269794651e-08, "percentile": 0.4796798963955041 }, "sha256": "4cdf3267a41823f80ada8a6bac6e45ed664ff843eea2180744fd13e3bc92b145", "simhash": "1:1b96fd1271095845", "word_count": 3866 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:00:03.625992+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. NATHANIEL SLABAUGH, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE GROMETER\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nFollowing a jury trial, defendant, Nathanial Slabaugh, was convicted of mob action (720 ILCS 5/25\u20141(a)(2) (West 1996)), aggravated battery (720 ILCS 5/12\u20144(b)(6) (West 1996)), and resisting or obstructing a peace officer (720 ILCS 5/31\u20141(a) (West 1996)). He appeals, contending that (1) the trial court erred by allowing the prosecutor to impeach two defense witnesses with evidence that they pleaded guilty to misdemeanors arising out of the same incident as the charges against defendant; and (2) the prosecutor\u2019s closing argument deprived defendant of a fair trial. We reverse and remand.\nOn June 25, 1997, Kenneth Kloweit and Janet Kloweit held a birthday party for their daughter, Kelly, at the Auto Inn in Rockford. Kelly\u2019s fianc\u00e9, Corey Jones, and defendant were among the guests. Sometime after midnight a fight broke out. Apparently the fight was initially between Jason Radounis and Sam Stella but soon escalated into a general melee. The fight started in the beer garden and spilled out onto the sidewalk. The police were called. By the time the officers arrived the conflict had subsided, but they attempted to disperse the crowd so that it would not start up again.\nKurt Whisenand was one of the first officers to arrive. He and Jason Cebuhar, another Rockford police officer, told the people gathered in the beer garden several times that they had to leave but received little or no response. According to the police officers, as a few people began leaving the beer garden, Whisenand saw Corey Jones push another man, later identified as Michael Scalise. Cebuhar told Jones that he was under arrest, but Jones responded with a profanity. Whisenand and Cebuhar then grabbed Jones\u2019s arms in an attempt to arrest him. Cebuhar and Jones ended up on the ground.\nWhisenand testified that, as he and Cebuhar were struggling with Jones, Whisenand saw defendant punch Cebuhar in the midsection. Cebuhar testified that he punched defendant in the face. Meanwhile, two other officers, Kevin Nordberg and David Lee, pulled defendant off Cebuhar and tried to arrest him. Defendant and Lee fell to the ground with defendant on top. Nordberg and Lee testified that defendant punched Lee in the head before they were able to handcuff him. At some point Jolie Swartz stepped in front of Cebuhar and said something like, \u201cThis is not necessary.\u201d He arrested her for obstructing a peace officer\nThe defense witnesses testified that neither defendant nor Jones, who was tried with him but is not a party to this appeal, provoked or assaulted the officers. Janet Kloweit testified that after the fight broke out she and her husband decided it was time to end the party. As she was walking to her car, she saw Jones facedown on the sidewalk. A police officer had his knee on Jones\u2019s shoulder.\nSwartz testified that she saw some officers standing behind Jones, with an officer holding each arm. She later saw defendant on the ground with five or six officers around him punching him and spraying him with mace. Defendant was curled up in a fetal position. She approached one of the officers and told him that what they were doing was not necessary.\nScalise testified that he was standing on the street next to Jones when Jones pushed him in the chest and was immediately arrested. Defendant was standing 5 to 10 feet away. As defendant began to move toward Jones, he was thrown to the ground by four or five officers. Scalise never saw defendant punch or push a police officer.\nMichael Rich testified that defendant was telling the officers to calm down because they were being too rough with Jones. Defendant was only trying to get the officers\u2019 attention when they tackled him and sprayed him with mace.\nJones testified that after the fight ended he was standing at the entrance to the beer garden with Scalise. The two exchanged words and Jones pushed Scalise. He was then hit in the back of the head by several officers, fell to the ground, and was handcuffed.\nDefendant testified that after Jones pushed Scalise several officers threw Jones to the ground and started kicking and kneeing him. He began moving toward Jones and either fell or was knocked down. Officers then began hitting and macing him.\nIn rebuttal, Vic Olszewski, the owner of the Auto Inn, testified that he saw Jones struggling with police officers who were trying to arrest him. He later saw defendant hit an officer, after which there was a brawl. Defendant fought back before being maced and taken into custody.\nAfter hearing this evidence, the jury found defendant guilty. The court sentenced him to two years\u2019 conditional discharge, and this appeal followed.\nDefendant first contends that the court erred by permitting the State to impeach two defense witnesses, Swartz and Rich, with evidence that each pleaded guilty to obstructing a peace officer. On cross-examination, Swartz denied that she had ignored several requests by the police to leave the area. However, she admitted that on July 27, 1997, she pleaded guilty to obstructing a peace officer. According to the prosecutor, the complaint alleged that \u201cOfficer Cebuhar told Miss Swartz to leave the area several times and she refused the officer\u2019s request.\u201d Swartz testified that she did not have a lawyer when she pleaded guilty and did not read the complaint. She did not recall the complaint being read to her in open court.\nDuring the prosecutor\u2019s cross-examination of Michael Rich, the following colloquy occurred:\n\u201cQ. *** Were you told several times to leave the area by officers and did you refuse to leave and attempt to start the fight again?\u201d\nA. I never tried to start the fight again. But I was told to leave the area a lot, yes.\u201d\nHowever, the prosecutor then asked him whether he had pleaded guilty to a complaint charging that he \u201cwas told by officers several times to leave the area. He refused to leave and attempted to start the fight again.\u201d He admitted that he pleaded guilty.\n\u20221 In People v. Montgomery, 47 Ill. 2d 510 (1971), the supreme court considered under what circumstances a defendant could be impeached with evidence of his prior convictions. The court adopted proposed Federal Rule of Evidence 609, providing that prior convictions for impeachment purposes should be limited to crimes punishable by imprisonment for more than one year (felonies) or any crimes involving dishonesty. Montgomery, 47 Ill. 2d at 516.\nIn People v. Stover, 89 Ill. 2d 189 (1982), the court held that Montgomery applied to witnesses other than the defendant. Specifically, Stover held that it was error to permit the impeachment of a defense witness with the fact that he pleaded guilty to charges of obstructing a peace officer that arose out of the same incident as the charges against defendant. Stover, 89 Ill. 2d at 194-95. The court rejected the State\u2019s argument that the guilty plea was admissible as a prior inconsistent statement after the witness denied the conduct to which he pleaded guilty. Stover, 89 Ill. 2d at 195.\n\u20222 Stover is indistinguishable from this case. The State impeached both Swartz and Rich with their guilty pleas to obstructing a peace officer. Obstructing a peace officer is a misdemeanor (see 720 ILCS 5/31\u20141(a) (West 1996)) that does not involve dishonesty or false statement and is therefore inadmissible as impeachment under Montgomery. The State attempts to distinguish Stover on the basis that the guilty pleas here were \u201cjudicial admissions\u201d rather than \u201cprior inconsistent statements.\u201d This is a distinction without a difference. The plea in Stover was surely a judicial admission also.\nThe only authority the State cites in support of its contention that the guilty pleas were admissible is a passage from a reference work discussing the admission of guilty pleas in traffic cases during related civil litigation. See M. Graham, Cleary & Graham\u2019s Handbook of Illinois Evidence \u00a7 802.4, at 758-59 (7th ed. 1999). Professor Graham expressly acknowledges and distinguishes Stover.\nWe note that testimony about his guilty plea did not even impeach Rich, who admitted that the police told him several times to leave. Thus, evidence of the guilty plea was merely cumulative of Rich\u2019s testimony during cross-examination. Generally, prior consistent statements are inadmissible. See People v. Emerson, 97 Ill. 2d 487, 500 (1983). Although Rich denied that he attempted to \u201crestart the fight,\u201d attempting to restart a fight is not an element of obstructing or resisting a peace officer (see 720 ILCS 5/31\u20141(a) (West 1996)) and therefore was not admitted by the guilty plea.\nClearly, the witnesses\u2019 credibility was the critical issue at trial. Defendant was thus prejudiced by the improper impeachment of the defense witnesses, and his conviction must be reversed.\nDefendant also contends that the prosecutor made numerous improper comments during closing argument. Defendant contends that the prosecutor stated repeatedly that defense witnesses conspired to commit perjury, that the jurors should show their support for law enforcement by their verdict, and that defendant was an \u201canimal\u201d and a \u201cmaniac.\u201d\nThe State responds that defendant waived his objections to many of the remarks by failing to object to them during trial and that the court sustained several of the objections that were made, thus curing any prejudice. The State contends that the remaining remarks were either proper comments on the evidence or were harmless error. Because we are reversing defendant\u2019s conviction on the improper impeachment issue, we address this issue primarily for the benefit of the parties on remand. As a result, we find it unnecessary to distinguish between comments that were objected to and those that were not. We trust that errors will not be repeated on retrial regardless of whether defendant successfully preserved his objection in the first trial.\nWe observe that the State\u2019s closing argument was not so much a comment on the evidence as a series of innuendos and outright personal attacks against the defense witnesses. Several times, the prosecutor strongly implied that various defense witnesses had conspired to commit perjury. For example, in discussing Jolie Swartz\u2019s testimony, the prosecutor emphasized that she pleaded guilty to an offense arising from the same incident. He then stated:\n\u201cAnd before she could get\u2014could think about getting a chance to or think about this and think about lying about it or thinking about taking some other action about what she had done on that particular night, before she could talk to some lawyer who might try to talk her out of doing the right thing and pleading guilty, in a fleeting moment for her of doing the right thing she pied guilty to exactly what she did in this particular situation. ***\nNow of course she had nothing to lose because of that plea of guilty and she wants to help out her friends. And so she\u2019s here to testify, and she lie [sic] all she wants.\u201d\nLater, in discussing the testimony of defendant and Jones, the prosecutor stated:\n\u201cThey want a free pass on hitting these police officers. Make no mistake about it. They have totally [sic] control over how this defense was conducted, how these witnesses were brought in. And it\u2019s amazing out of\u2014out of 25 pals of theirs that were there, these were the best that they could come up with.\nThey talked together about the case. All the rules go out the window.\nMR. GAZIANO [defense counsel]: Judge, objection.\nTHE COURT: Sustained as to all the rules.\n* * *\nMR. WEBER [the prosecutor]: Apparently no one instructed them not to talk together about this case because\u2014\nMR. GAZIANO: Objection.\nMR. WEBER: \u2014because they did.\n* * *\nMR. WEBER: Apparently nobody told these two defendants that you can\u2019t get\u2014sit down together and get your stories straight and come in to court and talk about it. Because that\u2019s what they told you they did. Corey, you\u2019re a peaceful guy, right? Calls Gary Jury [sic] to say that, you know, he\u2019s peaceful. What an insult. What an insult to your intelligence. That\u2019s all I am going to say about that.\nTotal control over who they are going to call and what they will say. And of course they denied hitting these police officers. They are home free.\u201d\nIn rebuttal, the prosecutor stated:\n\u201cAnd Mr. Gaziano says, you know, that I say that these two guys concocted a defense, and where does that leave him. I can\u2014can answer for him where that leaves him. That leaves him in the dark. Way long gone in a cloud of dust. Because before this man could get a chance to even talk to these two guys and tell them look, look you knuckleheads, don\u2019t get together and talk about your testimony, it looks stupid, it looks like you are lying, it looks like you are concocting a story, don\u2019t do it. Unfortunately for this man he got lost in a cloud of dust while they were creating their defense.\u201d\n\u20223 Prosecutors generally have a great deal of latitude in closing argument. People v. Blue, 189 Ill. 2d 99, 127 (2000). The State may comment on the evidence and all the inferences reasonably drawn from it. People v. Pasch, 152 Ill. 2d 133, 184 (1992). However, argument that serves no purpose but to inflame the jury is error. Blue, 189 Ill. 2d at 128; People v. Kidd, 147 Ill. 2d 510, 542 (1992). Statements in closing argument that defense counsel fabricated a defense, attempted to free his client through trickery or deception, or suborned perjury are improper. Kidd, 147 Ill. 2d at 542; Emerson, 97 Ill. 2d at 497. \u201cIt is blatantly improper to suggest that the defense is fabricated, as such accusations serve no purpose other than to prejudice the jury.\u201d People v. Aguirre, 291 Ill. App. 3d 1028, 1035 (1997).\nHere, the prosecutor repeatedly argued that defense witnesses were \u201clying,\u201d \u201cs[a]t down together and [got their] stories straight,\u201d \u201cconcocted\u201d their defense, and \u201ccreat[ed] a defense.\u201d This was clearly improper unless based on some evidence. However, both defendant and Jones denied that they discussed their testimony. Specifically, Jones testified on cross-examination as follows:\n\u201cQ. *** [H]ow often have you guys talked about what happened?\nA. We never talk about it. It\u2019s a sore subject.\u201d\n^ ^ ^\nQ. So you\u2014You never get together and *** talk about this\u2014this sore subject that happened?\nA. We may have a few times. But nothing relevant to the case now. We don\u2019t sit there and say, \u2018Oh, well. What do you think we are gonna do about this?\u2019 \u201d (Emphasis added.)\nSimilarly, defendant testified as follows:\n\u201cQ. You talked about the case with him.\nA. Yes.\nQ. Talked about your testimony with him?\nA. Wondering what it\u2019s going to be like, yes.\u201d\nThese ambiguous comments hardly support the inference that defendants conspired to fabricate a defense. For various reasons, the trial took place nearly two years after the incident in question. It seems unreasonable that two friends would see each other often for two years and never mention the incident. That the codefendants discussed the incident between themselves does not permit the inference that they fabricated their testimony.\nWe are not persuaded that the remarks were proper merely because in rebuttal the prosecutor specifically exempted defense, counsel from complicity, contending instead that he was \u201cin a cloud of dust\u201d while the defense witnesses independently \u201cconcocted\u201d the defense. In People v. Harris, 228 Ill. App. 3d 204, 208 (1992), this court condemned an argument that defendant herself suborned perjury by forcing her daughter to testify falsely. Here, the tenor of the argument was clearly that the defense was fabricated, regardless of who was at fault.\nThe prosecutor also attacked defense witnesses Kenneth and Janet Kloweit, who were both Rockford school teachers, accusing them of fostering disrespect for the police. Specifically, the prosecutor stated:\n\u201cThere are some things that you can\u2019t teach teachers in the Rockford Board of Education if they don\u2019t have it their whole lives, and that thing you cannot teach is integrity and the desire not to hide anything from the police and prosecution. And what does our good schoolteacher from the Rockford Board of Education teach us and teach these two guys? Don\u2019t talk to the police.\nMR. GAZIANO: Objection. Objection.\nMR. WEBER: Judge.\nMR. GAZIANO: Objection.\nTHE COURT: The objection will be sustained. There is no such testimony.\nMR. WEBER: Let me\u2014\nTHE COURT: Ignore that statement.\nMR. GAZIANO: I would like that statement disregarded by the jury.\nTHE COURT: You should totally disregard that comment. Mr. Weber, you need to clarify that.\nMR. WEBER: Sure I will, Judge.\nThe lesson learned here is don\u2019t talk to the prosecutor and his detective from the Rockford City police department when they come over and they want to talk to you about the case.\nMR. GAZIANO: I\u2019ll object.\nMR. WEBER: That is the evidence, Judge.\nMR. GAZIANO: I will object.\nTHE COURT: I will sustain the objection.\nMR. WEBER: Judge, that\u2019s the evidence.\nMR. GAZIANO: Judge, I will object to his arguing in the presence\u2014\nTHE COURT: Continue to another point, Mr. Weber.\nMR. WEBER: The testimony was that I asked\u2014I went over to their house and I asked them okay, folks, I asked them, you know, will you talk to us; will you talk to us. No. That\u2019s what this teacher said. No, I am not going to talk to you. I am going to talk to Mr. Gaziano. I am going to talk to you in court. But I\u2014I\u2014I am going to sit down together with my wife and this defendant and we are going to talk about our testimony and the case. What a wonderful lesson to teach your kids.\u201d\nLater, the prosecutor returned to this point yet again, stating:\n\u201cWell, that is really what is wrong with society today is that we\u2014is some of the things that we teach our kids. *** And they turn out to use the court system as these two defendants did to put together this kind of a defense with friends like Jolie Swartz and Mike Rich.\u201d\n\u20224 Generally, the State may properly dwell upon the evil results of crime and urge the fearless administration of the law. People v. Harris, 129 Ill. 2d 123, 159 (1989). However, it is error for the State to say anything the only effect of which is to arouse the prejudice and passion of the jury without shedding any light on the \u201cparamount question presented to the jury.\u201d Harris, 228 Ill. App. 3d at 209. In People v. Threadgill, 166 Ill. App. 3d 643 (1988), the court found reversible error in the prosecutor\u2019s comments that a not guilty verdict was tantamount to not supporting law enforcement in the community. The court said that the comments \u201cbore no relationship to the evidence and, instead, diverted the jurors away from the evidence by turning the trial into a test of the jurors\u2019 support for their local police officers.\u201d Threadgill, 166 Ill. App. 3d at 651.\nSimilarly, the Kloweits\u2019 supposed attitude about cooperating with the police had nothing to do with the issue whether defendant assaulted a police officer. The prosecutor\u2019s comments were intended to focus the jury\u2019s attention away from the evidence by turning its deliberations into a referendum on local law enforcement. We note that, although the trial court sustained defendant\u2019s objections, the prosecutor returned to this subject at least twice after being instructed to move on to another point. Although the prompt sustaining of a defense objection and an instruction to disregard the improper statements will generally cure any error, when the State repeatedly attempts to make unfounded arguments, the defendant may be prejudiced despite the sustaining of the objections. Aguirre, 291 Ill. App. 3d at 1035.\nThe prosecutor was apparently piqued because the Kloweits declined to speak to him when he and a Rockford police detective arrived at their house unannounced but a short time later spoke with defense counsel. A witness is not obligated to speak to an attorney for the other party. People v. Allison, 236 Ill. App. 3d 175, 183 (1992); People v. VanZile, 48 Ill. App. 3d 972, 977 (1977); Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions, Criminal, No. 3.10 (4th ed. 2000). Also, it is entirely proper for a lawyer to interview his own witnesses before trial. People v. McAleer, 34 Ill. App. 3d 821, 830 (1975).\n\u20225 There is authority that a witness\u2019s refusal to be interviewed by an opposing party\u2019s attorney is probative of that witness\u2019s testimonial bias. Allison, 236 Ill. App. 3d at 185; VanZile, 48 Ill. App. 3d at 977. But see People v. Peter, 55 Ill. 2d 443, 451-52 (1973) (trial court did not abuse discretion by refusing to permit cross-examination on this point); People v. Williams, 131 Ill. App. 3d 597, 609 (1985) (same). However, we are aware of no authority that allows a prosecutor to argue that a witness\u2019s refusal to be interviewed before trial is evidence that the witness is teaching children an attitude of disrespect for law enforcement. Here, the prosecutor was able to question the witnesses extensively about their refusal to speak with him. Statements about the witnesses fostering a disrespect for the police were clearly unwarranted and served only to prejudice the jury against defendant.\n\u20226 Defendant complains of other comments by the prosecutor. The prosecutor argued that Mike Scalise\u2019s testimony had differed from his earlier statements in which he said that Jones was struggling with the police. The prosecutor then asked rhetorically, \u201cCould it be, could it be that he is going to have to\u2014Mike Scalise is going to have to face this guy out on the street sometime when there aren\u2019t two officers standing right there?\u201d We agree with defendant that there is no evidence in the record to support this innuendo. Argument that defendant has committed crimes other than the one for which he is on trial is improper. People v. Valdery, 65 Ill. App. 3d 375, 378-79 (1978). Characterizing a defendant as a \u201cmaniac\u201d and an \u201canimal\u201d has been condemned although, without more, it has generally been found to be harmless error. See People v. Johnson, 119 Ill. 2d 119, 139-40 (1987).\nIn addition to the improper impeachment, the prosecution\u2019s numerous improper arguments deprived defendant of a fair trial. For these reasons, his conviction must be reversed. However, we have reviewed the evidence and find that it was sufficient to prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Therefore, double jeopardy principles do not bar a new trial, although we are not making a finding that will be binding on retrial. See People v. Taylor, 76 Ill. 2d 289, 309 (1979).\nThe judgment of the circuit court of Winnebago County is reversed, and the cause is remanded for a new trial.\nReversed and remanded.\nHUTCHINSON, P.J., and RAPP, J., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE GROMETER" } ], "attorneys": [ "Peter B. Nolte and Daniel J. Cain, both of Sreenan & Cain, P.C., of Rockford, for appellant.", "Paul A. Logli, State\u2019s Attorney, of Rockford (John X. Breslin, of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), and Deidre A. Donnellan, of Plainfield, for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. NATHANIEL SLABAUGH, Defendant-Appellant.\nSecond District\nNo. 2\u201400\u20140571\nOpinion filed July 20, 2001.\nPeter B. Nolte and Daniel J. Cain, both of Sreenan & Cain, P.C., of Rockford, for appellant.\nPaul A. Logli, State\u2019s Attorney, of Rockford (John X. Breslin, of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), and Deidre A. Donnellan, of Plainfield, for the People." }, "file_name": "0723-01", "first_page_order": 741, "last_page_order": 751 }