{
  "id": 256308,
  "name": "In re A.M., a Minor (The People of the State of Illinois, Petitioner-Appellee, v. M.M., Respondent-Appellant)",
  "name_abbreviation": "People v. M.M.",
  "decision_date": "2001-08-16",
  "docket_number": "No. 2 \u2014 00\u20141197",
  "first_page": "144",
  "last_page": "146",
  "citations": [
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    "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.",
    "id": 8837,
    "name": "Illinois Appellate Court"
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    "name_long": "Illinois",
    "name": "Ill."
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          "parenthetical": "biological mother's consent to adoption of her two children by her parents rendered moot their petition to have the mother declared an unfit parent and to adopt her children"
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      "year": 2001,
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    {
      "cite": "322 Ill. App. 3d 1011",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d",
      "case_ids": [
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      "year": 2001,
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          "page": "1013"
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:56:29.143572+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
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  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "In re A.M., a Minor (The People of the State of Illinois, Petitioner-Appellee, v. M.M., Respondent-Appellant)."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "JUSTICE BOWMAN\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nRespondent-mother, M.M., appeals from the trial court\u2019s September 11, 2000, order changing the permanency goal for her child, A.M., from return home to substitute care, pending a court determination on the termination of respondent\u2019s parental rights. The court had determined that respondent\u2019s principal problem was her substance abuse, which had led to criminal involvement and the neglect of her minor son, and that respondent had made no progress or reasonable efforts in the return home of her child. The child had been in the protective custody of the Illinois Department of Children and Family Services since October 29, 1997.\nOn appeal, respondent contends that (1) the trial court\u2019s written order failed to comply with the statutory requirements governing permanency hearings, and (2) the trial court\u2019s finding that the appropriate permanency goal for the minor was substitute care, pending a court determination on termination of parental rights, was against the manifest weight of the evidence.\nThe State has filed a motion to dismiss this appeal, which we ordered taken with the case. In its motion the State argues that this court lacks the jurisdiction to consider the appeal because the statutory provision purporting to make any order entered in a permanency hearing immediately appealable is unconstitutional. We agree.\nRespondent bases this court\u2019s jurisdiction to hear her appeal on section 2 \u2014 28(3) of the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (705 ILCS 405/2\u2014 28(3) (West 1998)), which provides in pertinent part:\n\u201cAny order entered pursuant to this subsection *** shall be immediately appealable as a matter of right under Supreme Court Rule 304(b)(1).\u201d\nHowever, both the Fourth District (In re C.B., 322 Ill. App. 3d 1011 (2001)) and the Fifth District (In re D.D.H., 319 Ill. App. 3d 989 (2001)) of this court have found that this provision enabling an appeal of a permanency order is invalid because it constitutes an unconstitutional violation of the separation-of-powers clause of our state constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI, \u00a7 6).\nIn D.D.H. the Fifth District initially pointed out that \u201ca permanency goal does not finally determine a right or status of a party but instead looks at the anticipated future status of the child.\u201d (Emphasis in original.) D.D.H., 319 Ill. App. 3d at 991. The court then stated:\n\u201cGenerally, only final judgments are appealable as a matter of right. Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI, \u00a7 6. Only the supreme court may provide by rule for appeals to the appellate court from nonfinal judgments. The legislature may only regulate the practice and set limits on the time for review. In this case, the legislature attempted to define appellate jurisdiction over a nonfinal order, in violation of our constitution\u2019s separation-of-powers clause (Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI, \u00a7 6);\u201d D.D.H., 319 Ill. App. 3d at 991-92.\nThe court determined, therefore, that the provision of section 2 \u2014 28(3) making a permanency order immediately appealable is invalid. As a result of its determination, the court was left only with an attempt by the respondent to appeal an order that was not final and that was not authorized by the supreme court. Consequently, the court dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. D.D.H., 319 Ill. App. 3d at 992-93.\nIn C.B., the Fourth District agreed with the analysis in D.D.H. regarding section 2 \u2014 28(3) and found:\n\u201cThe appealability provision in section 2 \u2014 28(3) of the Juvenile Court Act encroaches upon the exclusive power of the supreme court to regulate matters of appellate practice and procedure by directing that a nonfinal order is appealable contrary to the rules of the supreme court.\u201d C.B., 322 Ill. App. 3d at 1013.\nThe court concluded that the respondent-father\u2019s appeal from the trial court\u2019s permanency review order constituted an unauthorized appeal from a nonfinal order and, consequently, dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.\nBased on the decisions in C.B. and D.D.H., we conclude that the order changing the permanency goal in the instant case constitutes a nonfinal order for which the supreme court has provided no rule for an appeal to this court and, therefore, we lack jurisdiction to consider the appeal.\nGiven our decision, we find it unnecessary to address the State\u2019s alternative argument for dismissing the appeal, i.e., that respondent\u2019s execution on March 8, 2001, of a final and irrevocable consent to the adoption of her son rendered the appeal moot. However, were we to consider this alternative argument, we would agree with the State that, by surrendering her parental rights over A.M., respondent\u2019s appeal of the change in permanency goal became moot. See In re Adoption of Walgreen, 186 Ill. 2d 362 (1999) (biological mother\u2019s consent to adoption of her two children by her parents rendered moot their petition to have the mother declared an unfit parent and to adopt her children).\nAccordingly, for the reasons stated, we grant the State\u2019s motion to dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.\nMotion granted.\nAppeal dismissed.\nHUTCHINSON, EJ., and GEOMETER, J., concur.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "JUSTICE BOWMAN"
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Jay Wiegman, of Wiegman & Farmer, of Somonauk, for appellant.",
      "Meg G\u00f3recki, State\u2019s Attorney, of St. Charles (Martin R Moltz, of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), and Paul Benjamin Linton, of Northbrook, for the People."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "In re A.M., a Minor (The People of the State of Illinois, Petitioner-Appellee, v. M.M., Respondent-Appellant).\nSecond District\nNo. 2 \u2014 00\u20141197\nOpinion filed August 16, 2001.\nJay Wiegman, of Wiegman & Farmer, of Somonauk, for appellant.\nMeg G\u00f3recki, State\u2019s Attorney, of St. Charles (Martin R Moltz, of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), and Paul Benjamin Linton, of Northbrook, for the People."
  },
  "file_name": "0144-01",
  "first_page_order": 162,
  "last_page_order": 164
}