{ "id": 256304, "name": "In re MARRIAGE OF GRANT A. BAYLOR, Petitioner-Appellant, and KIM K. BAYLOR, Respondent-Appellee", "name_abbreviation": "In re Marriage of Baylor", "decision_date": "2001-08-03", "docket_number": "No. 4 \u2014 00\u20140983", "first_page": "213", "last_page": "220", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "324 Ill. App. 3d 213" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "745 N.E.2d 1233", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1238" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "195 Ill. 2d 291", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 725379 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "298" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/195/0291-01" ] }, { "cite": "526 N.E.2d 335", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "340", "parenthetical": "\"It is fundamental in Illinois that the decisions of an appellate court are binding precedent on all circuit courts regardless of locale\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "123 Ill. 2d 113", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5550782 ], "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "128", "parenthetical": "\"It is fundamental in Illinois that the decisions of an appellate court are binding precedent on all circuit courts regardless of locale\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/123/0113-01" ] }, { "cite": "605 N.E.2d 539", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "542" }, { "page": "542" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "152 Ill. 2d 533", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5603065 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "540" }, { "page": "540" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/152/0533-01" ] }, { "cite": "690 N.E.2d 980", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "982" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "181 Ill. 2d 32", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 821417 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "36" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/181/0032-01" ] }, { "cite": "666 N.E.2d 340", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "341" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "279 Ill. App. 3d 1083", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 75310 ], "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1085" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/279/1083-01" ] }, { "cite": "481 U.S. 619", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6219459 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "635" }, { "page": "614" }, { "page": "2039" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/481/0619-01" ] }, { "cite": "653 N.E.2d 55", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "57" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "273 Ill. App. 3d 955", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 258629 ], "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "958" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/273/0955-01" ] }, { "cite": "664 N.E.2d 88", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "92", "parenthetical": "reviewing de nova whether the trial court should have allowed certain deductions from the noncustodial parent's gross income to determine his child support obligation" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "279 Ill. App. 3d 140", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 75316 ], "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "145", "parenthetical": "reviewing de nova whether the trial court should have allowed certain deductions from the noncustodial parent's gross income to determine his child support obligation" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/279/0140-01" ] }, { "cite": "652 N.E.2d 330", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "334", "parenthetical": "section 508(a)(3) of the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act (Act) (750 ILCS 5/508(a)(3) (West 1998)) \"expressly authorizes a circuit court to make a prospective award of attorney fees to a party for the defense of an appeal\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "166 Ill. 2d 232", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 198917 ], "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "240", "parenthetical": "section 508(a)(3) of the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act (Act) (750 ILCS 5/508(a)(3) (West 1998)) \"expressly authorizes a circuit court to make a prospective award of attorney fees to a party for the defense of an appeal\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/166/0232-01" ] }, { "cite": "523 N.E.2d 573", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "581" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "169 Ill. App. 3d 318", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3550877 ], "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "329" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/169/0318-01" ] }, { "cite": "534 N.E.2d 1014", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1019" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "179 Ill. App. 3d 744", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2608932 ], "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "752" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/179/0744-01" ] }, { "cite": "638 N.E.2d 695", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "698" }, { "page": "697" }, { "page": "697-98" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "265 Ill. App. 3d 976", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 872530 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "980" }, { "page": "978" }, { "page": "979" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/265/0976-01" ] }, { "cite": "693 N.E.2d 379", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "385" }, { "page": "385" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "181 Ill. 2d 552", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 821411 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "565" }, { "page": "565-66" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/181/0552-01" ] }, { "cite": "732 N.E.2d 720", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "722" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "314 Ill. App. 3d 330", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 140278 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "332-33" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/314/0330-01" ] }, { "cite": "85 Ill. B.J. 410", "category": "journals:journal", "reporter": "Ill. B.J.", "year": 1997, "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "1987 Ill. Laws 1957", "category": "laws:leg_session", "reporter": "Ill. Laws", "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "528 N.E.2d 986", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1988, "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "122 Ill. 2d 572", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "year": 1988, "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "522 N.E.2d 619", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "624" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "167 Ill. App. 3d 1014", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3472624 ], "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1022" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/167/1014-01" ] }, { "cite": "664 N.E.2d 88", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "95-96", "parenthetical": "Cook, EJ., dissenting" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "279 Ill. App. 3d 140", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 75316 ], "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "150-52" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/279/0140-01" ] }, { "cite": "652 N.E.2d 330", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "332" }, { "page": "335" }, { "page": "335" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "166 Ill. 2d 232", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 198917 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "235" }, { "page": "241-42" }, { "page": "242" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/166/0232-01" ] }, { "cite": "523 N.E.2d 573", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "580-81" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "169 Ill. App. 3d 318", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3550877 ], "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "328-29" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/169/0318-01" ] }, { "cite": "534 N.E.2d 1014", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1019" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "179 Ill. App. 3d 744", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2608932 ], "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "752" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/179/0744-01" ] }, { "cite": "638 N.E.2d 695", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "697" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "265 Ill. App. 3d 976", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 872530 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "978" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/265/0976-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 799, "char_count": 15641, "ocr_confidence": 0.794, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.202577703474417e-07, "percentile": 0.5940276826950143 }, "sha256": "3c5171795dc9adf9011f540af05e4a31b3051f7ae1afe7bcbc63a0704bd71654", "simhash": "1:8d3e38966e449cc6", "word_count": 2627 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:56:29.143572+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "In re MARRIAGE OF GRANT A. BAYLOR, Petitioner-Appellant, and KIM K. BAYLOR, Respondent-Appellee." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "PRESIDING JUSTICE STEIGMANN\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nIn September 1995, the trial court entered a judgment dissolving the marriage between petitioner, Grant A. Baylor, and respondent, Kim K. Baylor, and incorporating the parties\u2019 marital and joint-parenting agreements. Those agreements provided that (1) the parties would share joint custody of their child, Blake (born November 19, 1993); (2) Blake would live with Grant; (3) Kim would have reasonable visitation; and (4) Kim was financially able to pay child support. (The record does not show that the dissolution judgment set a child support amount.)\nIn November 1999, Grant filed a petition requesting that the trial court (1) order Kim to pay reasonable child support and (2) terminate joint custody. In March 2000, Kim filed a counterpetition seeking custody of Blake and child support. Following a June 2000 hearing, the court (1) denied Grant\u2019s petition to terminate joint custody; (2) denied Kim\u2019s petition to change custody; (3) modified Kim\u2019s visitation schedule; and (4) ordered Kim to pay $350 per month in child support. In October 2000, Grant filed a motion to reconsider, which the court later denied.\nGrant appeals, arguing only that the trial court erred by failing to include Kim\u2019s military allowances in calculating her net income to determine her child support obligation. We reverse and remand with directions.\nI. BACKGROUND\nThe evidence presented at the June 2000 hearing showed the following. Kim was a noncommissioned officer in the United States Air Force. In addition to her gross annual base pay, which totaled $21,960, Kim earned approximately $2,678 annually from nonmilitary part-time work. She also received certain military allowances to supplement her off-base housing and other living expenses. Those military allowances, which totaled $9,876.92 annually, were not subject to federal income tax.\nFollowing the hearing, the trial court took the matter under advisement. In September 2000, the court entered an order providing, in pertinent part, as follows:\n\u201cChild support should be set at $350 per month. This amount slightly exceeds the guideline amount [(750 ILCS 5/505(a)(l) (West Supp. 1999) (effective June 1, 2000))] based upon Kim Baylor\u2019s net income of $20,000 per year from military pay and outside employment.\u201d\nIn October 2000, Grant filed a motion to reconsider, arguing, inter alla, that (1) in In re Marriage of McGowan, 265 Ill. App. 3d 976, 980, 638 N.E.2d 695, 698 (1994), the First District Appellate Court held that military allowances should be included in calculating a noncustodial parent\u2019s net income for child-support purposes; and (2) the trial court should have included Kim\u2019s military allowances in its calculation of her net income. Following a hearing, the court denied Grant\u2019s motion, stating, in pertinent part, as follows:\n\u201cWith respect to the net income, [Grant\u2019s counsel] has raised a very good point. However, I just don\u2019t believe it\u2019s a point that requires me to get into the types of calculations that I think are far beyond my abilities insofar as making those determinations of net income and things of that nature.\u201d\nThis appeal followed.\nII. ANALYSIS\nA. Kim\u2019s Motion for Attorney Fees\nel Initially, we address Kim\u2019s motion requesting that we award her reasonable attorney fees incurred for this appeal, which was taken with this case. This court is without jurisdiction to award attorney fees. In re Marriage of Emery, 179 Ill. App. 3d 744, 752, 534 N.E.2d 1014, 1019 (1989); In re Marriage of Stockton, 169 Ill. App. 3d 318, 329, 523 N.E.2d 573, 581 (1988). Kim should have addressed the issue of appellate attorney fees to the trial court. See In re Marriage of Talty, 166 Ill. 2d 232, 240, 652 N.E.2d 330, 334 (1995) (section 508(a)(3) of the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act (Act) (750 ILCS 5/508(a)(3) (West 1998)) \u201cexpressly authorizes a circuit court to make a prospective award of attorney fees to a party for the defense of an appeal\u201d).\nB. The Trial Court\u2019s Calculation of Kim\u2019s Net Income Grant argues that the trial court erred by failing to include Kim\u2019s military allowances in calculating her net income to determine her child support obligation. We agree.\n\u20222 This issue involves the application of law to undisputed facts; therefore, our review is de nova. See Gay v. Dunlap, 279 Ill. App. 3d 140, 145, 664 N.E.2d 88, 92 (1996) (reviewing de nova whether the trial court should have allowed certain deductions from the noncustodial parent\u2019s gross income to determine his child support obligation).\n\u20223 The starting point for determining a child support award is to arrive at the noncustodial parent\u2019s net income. 750 ILCS 5/505 (West Supp. 1999) (effective June 1, 2000); In re Marriage ofBenish, 273 Ill. App. 3d 955, 958, 653 N.E.2d 55, 57 (1995). Section 505(a)(3) of the Act defines \u201cnet income\u201d as \u201cthe total of all income from all sources,\u201d minus the following deductions: (1) federal income tax; (2) state income tax; (3) social security payments; (4) mandatory retirement contributions required by law or as a condition of employment; (5) union dues; (6) dependent and individual health insurance premiums; (7) prior child support obligations or maintenance actually paid under a court order; and (8) 11 [expenditures for repayment of debts that represent reasonable and necessary expenses for the production of income, medical expenditures necessary to preserve life or health, reasonable expenditures for the benefit of the child and the other parent, exclusive of gifts.\u201d 750 ILCS 5/505(a)(3) (West Supp. 1999) (effective June 1, 2000).\n\u20224 In McGowan, 265 Ill. App. 3d at 978, 638 N.E.2d at 697, the First District Appellate Court held that the plain, broad language of section 505 of the Act \u201cmust be given effect to include military allowances in the computation of child support.\u201d In so holding, the McGowan court reasoned as follows: (1) the exemption of military allowances from federal income tax was not sufficient to shield the allowances from inclusion in a party\u2019s net income; (2) whether military allowances \u201ccan be reached by garnishment is also not appropriate in considering what is included in the child support formula\u201d (see Rose v. Rose, 481 U.S. 619, 635, 95 L. Ed. 2d 599, 614, 107 S. Ct. 2029, 2039 (1987) (\u201cwhile it may be true that [veterans\u2019 disability benefits] are exempt from garnishment or attachment while in the hands of the [a]dministrator, we are not persuaded that once these funds are delivered to the veteran a state court cannot require that veteran to use them to satisfy an order of child support\u201d); and (3) if the legislature had intended to define income for child support purposes in a manner parallel to the income tax definition, then the language of section 505 of the Act would so indicate. McGowan, 265 Ill. App. 3d at 979, 638 N.E.2d at 697-98.\n\u20225 We agree with McGowan and thus conclude that the trial court erred by failing to include Kim\u2019s military allowances in calculating her net income. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court\u2019s child support determination and remand for further proceedings. On remand, the court should do the following, which are the steps that the court should have taken when it first addressed the issue of child support:\n(1) Determine Kim\u2019s net income, pursuant to section 505(a)(3) of the Act (750 ILCS 5/505(a)(3) (West Supp. 1999) (effective June 1, 2000)), including her military allowances. Although not statutorily required, it would be desirable for the court to state how it calculated net income.\n(2) Determine the amount of child support that the statutory guidelines would require Kim to pay. See 750 ILCS 5/505(a)(l) (West Supp. 1999) (effective June 1, 2000) (under the Act, a presumption exists that the stated percentage of the noncustodial parent\u2019s income is an appropriate level of support; the guideline amount for one child is 20% of the noncustodial parent\u2019s net income).\n(3) Indicate either that (a) it is ordering Kim to pay child support based on the statutory guidelines, or (b) after considering relevant factors under section 505(a)(2) of the Act (see 750 ILCS 5/505(a)(2) (West Supp. 1999) (effective June 1, 2000)), including Blake\u2019s needs and resources, the needs and resources of both parties, and the standard of living Blake would have enjoyed had the marriage not been dissolved, it is deviating from the statutory guidelines. If the court deviates from the guidelines, it must explicitly state the reasons why it has chosen to do so. 750 ILCS 5/505(a)(2) (West Supp. 1999) (effective June 1, 2000); see In re Marriage of Stanley, 279 Ill. App. 3d 1083, 1085, 666 N.E.2d 340, 341 (1996).\nAs a final matter, we note that the trial court erred by failing to follow McGowan. \u201cIt is the absolute duty of the circuit court to follow the decisions of the appellate court.\u201d In re A.A., 181 Ill. 2d 32, 36, 690 N.E.2d 980, 982 (1998). This was not a case in which the trial court was faced with conflicting decisions from various appellate districts, and, in the absence of controlling authority from its home district, was free to choose between the decisions of other appellate districts. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Yapejian, 152 Ill. 2d 533, 540, 605 N.E.2d 539, 542 (1992). Instead, the only Illinois court to rule upon the issue of whether military allowances should be included in the calculation of net income for child support purposes was the First District Appellate Court in McGowan. Accordingly, the trial court should not have disregarded the law of the state as set forth in McGowan. See People v. Harris, 123 Ill. 2d 113, 128, 526 N.E.2d 335, 340 (1988) (\u201cIt is fundamental in Illinois that the decisions of an appellate court are binding precedent on all circuit courts regardless of locale\u201d). If a trial court \u201centertains genuine doubt about the continued vitality of a reviewing court decision,\u201d the proper manner in which to proceed in a complex or protracted case is to rule in accordance with existing law and enter a Rule 304(a) finding (155 Ill. 2d R. 304(a)) or certify the question for interlocutory appeal under Rule 308 (155 Ill. 2d R. 308). State Farm, 152 Ill. 2d at 540, 605 N.E.2d at 542. \u201cBecause of our system of precedent!!,] the circuit court is not, however, free to disregard binding authority.\u201d In re R.C., 195 Ill. 2d 291, 298, 745 N.E.2d 1233, 1238 (2001).\nIII. CONCLUSION\nFor the reasons stated, we affirm the trial court\u2019s judgment in part, reverse in part, and remand with directions.\nAffirmed in part and reversed in part; cause remanded with directions.\nMcCullough, j., concurs.", "type": "majority", "author": "PRESIDING JUSTICE STEIGMANN" }, { "text": "JUSTICE COOK,\ndissenting:\nI respectfully dissent. I disagree that the trial court erred in awarding child support, and I would affirm. I also disagree that attorney fees may not be awarded after an appeal is resolved and that by failing to seek prospective attorney fees Kim has waived any right to seek attorney fees.\nIn Talty, the appellee sought prospective attorney fees from the appellant. Talty, 166 Ill. 2d at 235, 652 N.E.2d at 332. The appellant argued that the correct procedure in awarding appellate fees was for the circuit court to make the award after the appeal had been resolved, citing In re Marriage of Divarco, 167 Ill. App. 3d 1014, 1022, 522 N.E.2d 619, 624 (1988), rev\u2019d in part on other grounds, sub nom. Divarco v. Gilleran, 122 Ill. 2d 572, 528 N.E.2d 986 (1988). Talty, 166 Ill. 2d at 241-42, 652 N.E.2d at 335. The supreme court held that prospective fees were possible under a recent amendment authorizing the circuit court to enter an award \u201cfor \u2018the purpose of enabling a party lacking sufficient financial resources to obtain or retain legal representation, expected to be incurred.\u2019 \u201d Talty, 166 Ill. 2d at 242, 652 N.E.2d at 335, quoting Pub. Act 85 \u2014 357, \u00a7 1, eff. January 1, 1988 (1987 Ill. Laws 1957, 1958). That statutory authorization of prospective fees was intended to expand the power of the court, however, not to eliminate the court\u2019s existing power to award fees after an appeal has been resolved. In some cases, a litigant not entitled to the extraordinary remedy of prospective fees might still be entitled to traditional fees after appeal. Prospective fees require speculation; it is only after the appeal has been concluded that fees can be determined with some degree of certainty. A petition for attorney fees pertaining to an appeal can be brought after the.appeal, in the trial court. Stockton, 169 Ill. App. 3d at 328-29, 523 N.E.2d at 580-81; Emery, 179 Ill. App. 3d at 752, 534 N.E.2d at 1019.\nI would also note that the language quoted in Talty is no longer present in section 508, which was extensively revised in 1997. See D. Hopkins, \u201cLeveling the Playing Field\u201d in Divorce: Questions and Answers About the New Law, 85 Ill. B.J. 410 (1997). We should address the new language.\nWhy should a soldier who lives off base and receives a quarters allowance be considered to have more \u201cnet income\u201d for purposes of child support under section 505 than a soldier who lives on base and has quarters furnished to him directly? McGowan recognized that \u201cif the allowance granted is predicated upon the cost of living at the soldier\u2019s station, the court can consider whether he or she requires the entire amount to satisfy housing or other needs.\u201d McGowan, 265 Ill. App. 3d at 978, 638 N.E.2d at 697. That seems to be the case here. I have previously disagreed with the proposition that section 505 provides a clear and certain definition of \u201cnet income\u201d which the trial court may uncritically apply to the case before it. Gay, 279 Ill. App. 3d at 150-52, 664 N.E.2d at 95-96 (Cook, EJ., dissenting). Looking to facts of Gay, was it really the intention of the legislature that a noncustodian might be able to deduct the lease payments for his Mercedes from his \u201cnet income,\u201d while a soldier must be required to include his quarters allowance in \u201cnet income\u201d?\nMore broadly, despite the existence of the child support guidelines, the setting of child support is a judicial function. Slagel v. Wessels, 314 Ill. App. 3d 330, 332-33, 732 N.E.2d 720, 722 (2000). The trial court is required to exercise its best judgment in setting child support, whether the amount set is higher or lower than the guidelines. In the present case the trial court was aware of the quarters allowance. The trial court chose to set child support at an amount \u201cslightly\u201d higher than the guidelines amount, $350 per month. (The trial court found Kim\u2019s \u201cnet income\u201d to be $20,000 per year, which would produce a child support award of $333 per month.) Whether the quarters allowance was considered to be included in \u201cnet income\u201d or not, the trial court concluded that the proper amount of child support was $350 per month. We should respect that decision.\nThe majority mentions that if a court deviates from the guidelines it must explicitly state the reasons why it has chosen to do so. However, Grant has waived that argument by not raising the issue in the trial court. In re Marriage of Minear, 181 Ill. 2d 552, 565, 693 N.E.2d 379, 385 (1998). In any event, it is not necessary that the trial court follow any particular ritual in announcing child support, and the trial court\u2019s announcement here was sufficient. See Minear, 181 Ill. 2d at 565-66, 693 N.E.2d at 385.", "type": "dissent", "author": "JUSTICE COOK," } ], "attorneys": [ "Charles S. Watson, of Watson Law Offices, of Springfield, for appellant.", "Walker R. Filbert, of Feldman, Wasser, Draper & Benson, of Springfield, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "In re MARRIAGE OF GRANT A. BAYLOR, Petitioner-Appellant, and KIM K. BAYLOR, Respondent-Appellee.\nFourth District\nNo. 4 \u2014 00\u20140983\nOpinion filed August 3, 2001.\nCOOK, J., dissenting.\nCharles S. Watson, of Watson Law Offices, of Springfield, for appellant.\nWalker R. Filbert, of Feldman, Wasser, Draper & Benson, of Springfield, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0213-01", "first_page_order": 231, "last_page_order": 238 }