{ "id": 256252, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. CHARLES WILLIAMS, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Williams", "decision_date": "2001-07-13", "docket_number": "No. 1 \u2014 98\u20142123", "first_page": "419", "last_page": "441", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "324 Ill. App. 3d 419" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "186 Ill. 2d 439", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 243906 ], "year": 1999, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/186/0439-01" ] }, { "cite": "89 Ill. B.J. 248", "category": "journals:journal", "reporter": "Ill. B.J.", "year": 2001, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "230 Ill. App. 3d 377", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 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CHARLES WILLIAMS, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "PRESIDING JUSTICE QUINN\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nFollowing simultaneous separate jury trials, Charles Williams and his codefendant, Dwight Peal, were found guilty of the first degree murder of Andrew Webb. Williams was 15 years old at the time of the offense but was tried and sentenced as an adult pursuant to section 5 \u2014 4(6) (a) of the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (705 ILCS 405/5 \u2014 4(6)(a) (West 1996)). Williams was initially sentenced to 30 years in the Illinois Department of Corrections, but after reconsideration, this sentence was reduced to 25 years. On appeal, defendant claims that: (1) the trial court should have suppressed his statements to the authorities; (2) the court erred in admitting prejudicial evidence regarding the structure of the Gangster Disciples street gang and defendant\u2019s gang membership; and (3) the evidence was insufficient to prove defendant\u2019s guilt on a theory of accountability where defendant asserts he was merely present at the time of the offense and did not participate in the shooting. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.\nThis case arose out of the facts concerning the shooting death of Andrew Webb in the early morning hours of July 13, 1996, in the lobby of the housing project building at 3542-44 South State Street, Chicago. The defendant was picked up by the police at 3:30 p.m. on July 16, 1996. Before trial, defendant filed a motion to suppress his statements obtained during his interrogation by police and prosecutors. Defendant argued that the police efforts to notify his mother of his whereabouts were insufficient, a youth officer was not present until eight hours after his arrest, and the youth officer expressed no interest in safeguarding his rights.\nDuring the hearing on the motion to suppress, Detective Frank Valadez testified that defendant was picked up on July 16, 1996, at 3:30 p.m. by other police officers. Valadez testified that shortly after arrival at Area One police station, defendant told him he was 15 years old. Valadez asked defendant for his mother\u2019s home phone number and called it three or four times but no one answered. Valadez testified he then phoned defendant\u2019s mother\u2019s place of employment and left a message with a co-employee that it was important for the mother to call the police regarding her son. Valadez testified that at approximately 4 p.m. he checked on the availability of a youth officer to participate in the interview of defendant. He was told a youth officer would be sent to him as soon as one became available. Valadez interviewed other suspects and witnesses until youth officer Terrell saw him at 11:30 p.m. Shortly thereafter, Valadez gave defendant his Miranda rights and Terrell asked defendant \u201cbasic information.\u201d The interview took place in a large conference room and defendant was not handcuffed.\nIn his initial statement, at approximately midnight, defendant said he was with his girlfriend at the time of the shooting. Valadez testified that he spoke with the girlfriend, who did not corroborate defendant\u2019s story. Valadez talked to defendant again at 12:30 a.m. on July 17, 1996, and told him of the discrepancy. Defendant then admitted he was present at the shooting. At 3:30 a.m., an assistant State\u2019s Attorney interviewed defendant and defendant agreed to give a court reported statement. At 6 a.m., Assistant State\u2019s Attorney Michael Oppenheimer took a court-reported statement from defendant in the presence of Valadez and Terrell.\nDefendant\u2019s mother also testified at the hearing on the motion to suppress. She testified that she is deaf but that she has a TTY phone in her home. A TTY telephone is designed to allow hearing-impaired persons to communicate over the telephone. When the phone rings, a light on the phone goes on. To communicate, the hearing-impaired person types in her message on the phone\u2019s keyboard. This message is then transmitted to another TTY phone, where it is printed out. Defendant\u2019s mother never saw the light on the phone go on, indicating an incoming call. On cross-examination she admitted that on the afternoon of July 16, 1996, a neighbor told her the police had picked up her son. The neighbor told her that she thought the police had taken her son to 51st and Wentworth. Defendant\u2019s mother testified that she did not go to Area One or call Area One. She also admitted that she would not have seen the light on the phone go on while she was sleeping.\nDefendant testified that after being picked up by Valadez, he was handcuffed and put in an interview room where he was handcuffed to a chair. Defendant testified that at one point Valadez told him that he had spoken to defendant\u2019s mother. Valadez said defendant\u2019s mother was not very happy with him and she told Valadez to \u201cleave his black ass in here.\u201d Defendant testified that only the assistant State\u2019s Attorney read him his rights and when he made his court-reported statement at 6 a.m. he only repeated what the police told him about the case.\nIn rebuttal, Officer Thomas Richardson testified that he and his partner picked defendant up at 3:30, Valadez was not present, and defendant was not handcuffed. After arguments, the trial court denied the motion to suppress defendant\u2019s statements.\nFannie May Branch testified that about 5:30 p.m. on July 12, 1996, she was walking with her two cousins past the building located at 3542-44 South State Street in Chicago, which was \u201ccontrolled\u201d by the Gangster Disciples street gang. She saw a group of men she recognized as members of the Gangster Disciples standing outside the building. This group included defendant, James Freeman, Dwight Peal and Narvel Salter. Branch had lived in the area for a year and was familiar with all four and knew them to be members of the Gangster Disciples street gang. As she walked past the building, she saw Salter \u201cwriting some BD was going to die, something, GD, and then something.\u201d \u201cBD\u201d referred to the Black Disciples street gang, while \u201cGD\u201d referred to the Gangster Disciples street gang. Branch then went to her sister\u2019s home for the next several hours.\nWhen Branch left her sister\u2019s house about 9:30 p.m., she saw the same group of men outside the side and back doors of the 3542 building, with other men she also recognized as members of the Gangster Disciples. Branch testified that the lights were on in the common areas. She went upstairs and played cards at her cousin\u2019s apartment until about 3 a.m. She then left her cousin\u2019s apartment and walked down the stairs.\nAt the bottom of the stairwell, Branch saw Peal, Salter, Mario Bailey and another person she only knew as \u201cMike\u201d holding guns. She also saw that the lights in the hallway by the elevator were out and Peal was walking back and forth, looking out the front and back doors. When Branch asked why the lights were out, Salter stated that a peace treaty between the Gangster Disciples and the Black Disciples had been broken and that a \u201cBlack Disciple\u201d was going to die. She heard Peal say, \u201cHere come [sic] a Black Disciple,\u201d as the victim, Andrew Webb, walked through the front door. The victim said \u201cWhat\u2019s up\u201d but nobody replied. Salter then pushed Branch behind some bricks by the stairs, and he and Bailey each fired two shots at the victim. Salter then told Branch to \u201cget out.\u201d When she stood up, she saw the victim lying on the floor with blood around him. Peal then opened the door so she could leave. Branch testified that she did not see Peal or Mike fire any shots. Branch testified that she told a Chicago Housing Authority police officer what she had seen. She then talked to Detective John Bloore and later gave a written statement to an assistant State\u2019s Attorney and testified before a grand jury.\nCherlyn Wilson testified that she lived at 3542 South State Street, in July 1996 with her boyfriend, Andrew Webb. Before the shooting, there was a stick figure of a dead body with writing around it underneath her window. The building where she lived was controlled by Gangster Disciples. After hearing shots and getting phone calls from Webb\u2019s mother and some other people, Wilson went downstairs. Wilson saw Webb lying on the floor with one of his shoes off. There was a stick in the front door so the Gangster Disciples could prevent people from coming and going. She called the police, and when they arrived, she removed the stick from the door and let them in. Medical examiner Dr. Chira testified that Webb died as a result of gunshot wounds to his chest.\nOver the objection of defendant, Detective John Bloore testified as a gang expert that the hierarchy of the Gangster Disciples consisted of the leader, Larry Hoover, then board members, governors, regions, coordinators, and soldiers. Coordinators make sure that the soldiers turn in their money and are paid. Soldiers are the lowest-ranking members in the gang, and if they do not do as they are told they are punished, or \u201cviolated,\u201d which may include being killed. Bloore testified that Narvel Salter was a coordinator for the Stateway Gardens housing project, which included the 3542-44 South State building. Bloore testified that defendant was a soldier and would not make any major decisions. Bloore testified that the Black Disciples had split from the Gangster Disciples. Webb was a \u201cminister\u201d in the Black Disciples, which is the equivalent of a governor in the Gangster Disciples. Webb was the leader of the building located at 3517 South Federal, another building in the Stateway Garden housing project, approximately one block from 3542 South State. Approximately a month before Webb was murdered, an administrator in the Black Disciples was killed. There was a dispute within the gang over whether the administrator had been shot by members of his own gang or the Gangster Disciples. This made things uneasy between the Gangster Disciples and the Black Disciples.\nOfficer Kyle Erbacker was at the scene of the shooting and saw a stick figure drawn in chalk just outside the rear door of 3542. Written next to the figure were the letters \u201cGDN or die tonight bitch.\u201d On the wall \u201cNuNu\u201d (Webb\u2019s nickname) and \u201cG\u201d were printed. He also saw a broken six-pointed star, which is a sign of disrespect for the Black Disciples. Some three hours later, he saw the letters \u201cDOA\u201d next to the figure.\nValadez testified before the jury in a manner consistent with his testimony at the hearing on the motion to suppress statements.\nAssistant State\u2019s Attorney Oppenheimer testified before the jury in the same manner as at the suppression hearing. He additionally testified that he spoke to defendant alone and asked him how he had been treated by the police. Defendant said he had been treated well. While reading defendant his rights, during the court-reported statement, Oppenheimer told him that even though he was 15 years old, he would be tried and sentenced as an adult.\nAs defendant\u2019s conviction rests primarily on his statement, we will recite it in some detail. Defendant said that he had been a member of the Gangster Disciples for four or five months. He was a soldier \u2014 \u201cI do what the people with rank tell me to do.\u201d He said there was a meeting of the Gangster Disciples board on July 12, 1996. \u201cI was told there was going to be a war between Gangster Disciples and Black Disciples...That meant they were going to start shooting.\u201d This conversation took place outside 3542 South State and included Narvel Salter, Mario Bailey, Dwight Peal, and two others. All of them were in the lobby shortly after the conversation, with defendant sitting on a crate.\n\u201cQ. Were you working security for this?\nA. Not really. Not really. But I was around there so I just did it... When you work security oint no sitting down. Supposed to stand by the door.\nQ. What does it mean to work security?\nA. Like call out when the police come. And like since it was already tension between Black Disciples and Gangster Disciples, you had all Black Disciples break theirself; that means they got to raise their shirt up and show [if they had a gun].\n* * *\nNarvel had a gun...He was playing with it. Like, man, if they come out, we are going to get them, you know what I am saying.\nQ. What did you interpret that to mean?\nA. That he was going to kill somebody.\n* * *\nQ. Once [victim] came into the building, what happened?\nA. When he came in the building the first people I told \u2014 I was getting ready to tell him to break himself, but he already broke himself. [He was not armed].\n* * *\nQ. If he had not broken himself or lifted up his shirt, would you have asked him to break himself?\nA. Yes.\nQ. Once he did that what happened next?\nA. Narvel followed him. And Narvel and Dwight came, and then it was just two shots.\nQ. Do you know if Nu-Nu is in a gang?\nA. Yes.\nQ. What gang is he in?\nA. I think they said he is minister of the Black Disciples.\nQ. Does minister mean that he has rank in the Black Disciples?\nA. Yes.\nQ. Do you know if Narvel has any rank in your gang?\nA. Yes.\nQ. What rank does Narvel have in your gang?\nA. Coordinator.\nQ. What does coordinator mean?\nA. He like \u2014 he up under the region, so he gets everything together.\nQ. So does that mean if there was or there is a war, that he would put togther what needs to be done?\nA. Yes.\nQ. When Nu-Nu came in the building, did he do anything or say anything?\nA. He looked like you know, he like wary. He didn\u2019t look like\u2014 because usually when he came to the building, he have a lot of guys around. He came by himself.\nQ. Do you know why he always comes to that building?\nA. Because his girlfriend lives in that building.\nQ. Once he lifted up his shirt and didn\u2019t show anything, where did he go?\nA. It looked like he was going up to his girlfriend\u2019s house, but he didn\u2019t get a chance to make it. Because as soon as he turn the corner, right behind the mailbox room, that is where he got killed.\nQ. As he turned the corner then tell me what happened?\nA. As he turned the corner Narvel followed him. And it was just like two shots. Everybody was going to follow him, right.\nQ. Why was everybody going to follow him?\nA. Because he is a coordinator and we got to watch. So when I heard the two shots, Speedy ran out the building, out the front\ndoor, and I ran up the stairs, just ran.\n* * *\nQ. Let me stop you right there. Before you ran, though, did you see Narvel with a gun?\nA. Yes.\nQ. Where did you see Narvel with a gun?\nA. Like standing over Nu-Nu; not over him but right by him, you know.\nQ. What was Narvel doing with the gun?\nA. He had just shot him.\u201d\nDefendant said that he saw Salter give the gun he had used to another gang member, who took it into another building. That gang member then gave a different gun to the defendant. The defendant hid this gun under his mother\u2019s water bed. The defendant lived in the 3542 building.\nDefendant\u2019s mother testified in a manner consistent with her testimony during the hearing on motion to suppress statements. The defense rested. After closing arguments, the jury found defendant guilty of first degree murder. The court sentenced defendant to 30 years in the Illinois Department of Corrections. The court reconsidered the sentence and imposed a 25-year sentence. Defendant timely appeals.\nDefendant first argues that his statements should have been suppressed because police efforts to notify his mother of his whereabouts were insufficient, a youth officer was not present until eight hours after his arrest, and the youth officer expressed no interest in safeguarding his rights.\n\u20221 In reviewing whether a defendant\u2019s confession was voluntary, courts of review will accord great deference to the trial court\u2019s factual findings, and we will reverse these findings only if they are against the manifest weight of the evidence. However, we review de nova the ultimate question of whether the confession was voluntary. In re G.O., 191 Ill. 2d 37, 50 (2000).\n\u20222 At the time respondent was questioned, section 5 \u2014 6(2) of the Juvenile Court Act provided:\n\u201cA law enforcement officer who takes a minor into custody without a warrant under Section 5 \u2014 5 shall, if the minor is not released, immediately make a reasonable attempt to notify the parent or other person legally responsible for the minor\u2019s care or the person with whom the minor resides that the minor has been taken into custody and where the minor is being held; and the law enforcement officer shall without unnecessary delay take the minor to the nearest juvenile police officer designated for such purposes in the county of venue or shall surrender the minor to a juvenile police officer in the city or village where the offense is alleged to have been committed.\u201d 705 ILCS 405/5 \u2014 6(2) (West 1996).\n\u20223 In determining whether a juvenile\u2019s confession is voluntary, a court looks to the totality of the circumstances. In re G.O., 191 Ill. 2d at 54; People v. McNeal, 298 Ill. App. 3d 379, 390 (1998). Factors to consider include the respondent\u2019s age, intelligence, background, experience, mental capacity, education, and physical condition at the time of questioning; the legality and duration of the detention; the duration of the questioning; and any physical or mental abuse by police, including the existence of threats or promises. People v. Gilliam, 172 Ill. 2d 484, 500-01 (1996).\nWhen a juvenile is involved, the courts should also consider the time of day when questioning occurred and the presence or absence of a parent or other adult interested in the minor\u2019s welfare. In re L.L., 295 Ill. App. 3d 594, 600-01 (1998). No single factor is dispositive. People v. Gilliam, 172 Ill. 2d at 500. The benchmark for voluntariness is not whether the defendant would have confessed in the absence of interrogation but, rather, whether the defendant\u2019s will was overborne at the time of the confession. People v. Brown, 169 Ill. 2d 132, 144 (1996). In making this determination, courts must consider the characteristics of the accused as well as the details of the interrogation. In re M.W., 314 Ill. App. 3d 64, 69 (2000).\n\u20224 Applying all of these factors, we find that defendant\u2019s statements were voluntary. After determining that the defendant was 15 years old, Valadez testified that he discontinued interviewing defendant and only reinitiated the questioning when youth officer Terrell was available. Valadez also testified that he phoned defendant\u2019s mother several times, albeit unsuccessfully. The purpose of the notice requirement is to permit, where possible, a parent to confer and counsel with the juvenile before interrogation. People v. Fuller, 292 Ill. App. 3d 651, 665 (1997). Here, defendant\u2019s mother testified that her neighbor told her that the police had picked up her son and taken him to Area One. She further testified that she did not go to Area One, approximately 15 blocks from her home, nor did she phone Area One.\nIn this appeal, defendant focuses most of his argument on the assertion that the youth officer\u2019s failure to actively protect his rights was a basis for suppressing his statements. Defendant cites the holdings in In re J.J.C., 294 Ill. App. 3d 227, 237 (1998), In re L.L., 295 Ill. App. 3d 594, 603 (1998), and In re G.O., 304 Ill. App. 3d 719, 733 (1999). All three of these cases held that where the youth officer failed to demonstrate an interest in the juvenile\u2019s welfare, the statutory purpose behind the requirement that a youth officer be notified was defeated. These decisions were criticized in People v. Plummer, 306 Ill. App. 3d 574, 586-87 (1999), and People v. Hardaway, 307 Ill. App. 3d 592, 607-08 (1999). More importantly, our supreme court reversed the appellate court in In re G.O., 191 Ill. 2d 37 (2000). The dissent in In re G.O. specifically asserted that where youth officers do not offer genuine help to the juvenile, their mere presence should not be considered as a factor supporting the admissibility of the juvenile confession. In re G.O., 191 Ill. 2d at 70-71 (McMorrow, J., dissenting).\nIn the instant case, Valadez testified that Terrell was present for all interviews with defendant, that Valadez read defendant his Miranda rights in the presence of Terrell and Terrell asked defendant \u201cbasic information.\u201d In his motion to suppress, defendant did not allege coercion. In the court-reported confession read to the jury, the defendant said he understood his rights under Miranda, that he understood he would be tried and sentenced as an adult, and that he was treated well by the police. Assistant State\u2019s Attorney Oppenheimer testified that he spoke to defendant outside the presence of the police and defendant said he was treated well by the police. Under the totality of the circumstances, we find that defendant\u2019s statements were voluntary.\n\u20225 Defendant next argues that the trial court erred in allowing Detective Bloore to testify regarding the structure of the Gangster Disciples street gang and the history of that gang\u2019s relationship with the Black Disciples street gang.\nWe employ a three-part analysis to determine this issue: (1) whether Detective Bloore\u2019s testimony qualifies as an expert\u2019s opinion; (2) if it does, is the testimony relevant?; and (3) does the prejudicial effect of the testimony outweigh its probative value? People v. Clifton, 321 Ill. App. 3d 707, 719 (2000); People v. Davenport, 301 Ill. App. 3d 143, 150 (1998), citing People v. Jackson, 145 Ill. App. 3d 626, 633 (1986); see also People v. Cruzado, 299 Ill. App. 3d 131, 141 (1998).\nDefendant does not dispute that Bloore\u2019s testimony qualifies as expert opinion. He argues that it was cumulative to Fannie Branch\u2019s testimony that the Gangster Disciples and Black Disciples did not \u201cget along,\u201d that the 3542-44 building was controlled by the Gangster Disciples and Salter told her that the treaty between the Gangster Disciples and Black Disciples had been broken and there was a war. The trial court could have reasonably concluded that Bloore\u2019s knowledge about the detailed hierarchy and activities of the two street gangs was superior to that of Branch. See People v. Davenport, 301 Ill. App. 3d at 150 (holding that allowing Detective Bloore to testify as an expert was not error).\nDefendant argues that Bloore\u2019s testimony was irrelevant and was only offered to inflame the jury. It is within the discretion of the trial court to determine whether evidence is relevant and admissible, and a reviewing court will not reverse the trial court\u2019s determination absent a clear abuse of discretion resulting in manifest prejudice to the defendant. People v. Pursley, 284 Ill. App. 3d 597, 604 (1996). Similarly, a trial court\u2019s decision to admit gang evidence will not be overturned on appeal absent a clear abuse of discretion. People v. Gonzalez, 142 Ill. 2d 481, 489-90 (1991); People v. Colon, 162 Ill. 2d 23, 30 (1994).\nOur supreme court and our appellate court have acknowledged that there may be a strong prejudice against street gangs. People v. Strain, 194 Ill. 2d 467, 477 (2000), citing People v. Patterson, 154 Ill. 2d 414, 458 (1992); People v. Smith, 141 Ill. 2d 40, 58 (1990); People v. Pogue, 312 Ill. App. 3d 719, 727 (1999); People v. Jimenez, 284 Ill. App. 3d 908, 912 (1996). In spite of this prejudice, gang-related evidence will not necessarily be excluded if it is relevant and admissible. People v. Gonzalez, 142 Ill. 2d at 489; People v. Davenport, 301 Ill. App. 3d at 150. Relevant evidence is that which has any tendency to make the existence of a fact of consequence to the determination of the action more or less probable than it would be without the evidence. People v. Gonzalez, 142 Ill. 2d at 487-88.\nGang-related evidence is admissible to show that the defendant acted with a common purpose or was part of a common criminal design, or to provide a motive for an otherwise inexplicable act. People v. Smith, 141 Ill. 2d at 58; People v. Clifton, 321 Ill. App. 3d at 722. Gang-related evidence is also relevant to the issue of identification or to corroborate a defendant\u2019s confession. People v. Gonzalez, 142 Ill. 2d at 488; People v. Davenport, 301 Ill. App. 3d at 151. However, such evidence must be related to the crime charged. People v. Strain, 194 Ill. 2d 467, 477 (2000); People v. Joya, 319 Ill. App. 370, 375 (2001).\nThe defendant cites People v. Mason, 274 Ill. App. 3d 715 (1995), as support for his position. In Mason, the defendant and the murder victim were both Gangster Disciples. The trial court allowed the State to introduce gang-specialist testimony to support its theory of motive, which was that a superior member of the gang ordered the defendant to kill the victim because of a fear that the victim had become an informer.\nThis court held that while the testimony regarding the structure of the gang was relevant to the State\u2019s theory of motive, testimony regarding gang rivalries, tattoos and drug sales was not relevant. Mason, 274 Ill. App. 3d at 722. This court also found error in the State\u2019s argument that photographs of the defendant\u2019s tattoos showed that the defendant was proud of his gang membership, rather than arguing that the tattoos showed defendant was a member of a gang, which would have been proper. Mason, 274 Ill. App. 3d at 723. This court held that the defendant was denied a fair trial where much of the gang-crime testimony was irrelevant, inflammatory and excessive.\nThe State responds that the Illinois Supreme Court allowed evidence of gang structure and history in People v. Lucas, 151 Ill. 2d 461, 488-89 (1992). There the trial court allowed an expert witness to testify as to the inception and development of the Black Gangster Disciples from the 1960s to the time the crime was committed, and also described the types of criminal activity the gang was involved in. The supreme court held that the trial court properly exercised its discretion in admitting the evidence as it was relevant to the crime charged (the murder of a prison official) and this consideration outweighed the testimony\u2019s prejudicial effect.\nIn People v. Fort, 248 Ill. App. 3d 301, 315 (1993), this court upheld the admission of a police officer\u2019s testimony about the history and structure of the defendant\u2019s and victim\u2019s gangs. We noted that since the evidence suggested that the victim\u2019s killing was motivated by a feud between the defendant\u2019s and victim\u2019s gangs, testimony regarding the defendant\u2019s gang\u2019s infrastructure and history was relevant to show the defendant\u2019s knowledge and involvement in the murder.\nIn People v. Davenport, 301 Ill. App. 3d 143 (1998), this court affirmed Bloore\u2019s testimony relating the history and structure of the Black E Stone Nation street gang (the Stones) and that of the Gangster Disciples. This testimony included the meaning of gang symbols and tattoos and the boundaries of the gangs\u2019 respective territories. It also included the fact that a soldier in a street gang may be \u201cviolated\u201d for failure to obey an order of a higher-up. In Davenport, a member of the Stones had shot and killed a person the defendant thought was a Gangster Disciple. This court found Bloore\u2019s testimony regarding the hierarchy of the defendant\u2019s gang was relevant to explain an otherwise inexplicable act and to establish a motive for the shooting. This court also found Bloore\u2019s testimony regarding the rivalry between the gangs, the boundaries between the gangs, and the tactics of \u201cfalse flagging\u201d to be relevant and admissible. Davenport, 301 Ill. App. 3d at 151. However, this court found Bloore\u2019s testimony regarding the background, history and criminal activity of the two gangs to be \u201cfar more troublesome, as it is peripheral to the offense at issue.\u201d Davenport, 301 Ill. App. 3d at 151-52. In affirming, this court relied upon the extremely deferential standard of review.\nIn the instant case, we find that Bloore\u2019s testimony was properly admissible. Defendant concedes that the jury needed to be informed of the structure of the Gangster Disciples at least so far as the fact that coordinators, like Narvel Salter, may give orders to soldiers, like defendant. We find Bloore\u2019s testimony regarding the structure of the Gangster Disciples to be relevant because, in his court-reported statement, defendant said there was a meeting of the \u201cboard\u201d earlier on July 12, 1996, and that he was told there was going to be a \u201cwar\u201d between the Gangster Disciples and Black Disciples. He explained that Salter was a \u201ccoordinator,\u201d who was under the \u201cregion,\u201d and that, as a \u201csoldier,\u201d he, defendant, \u201cdo[es] what the people with the rank tell [him] to do.\u201d Defendant stated that Black Disciples had to \u201cbreak\u201d when they entered 3542-44 and that the victim was a minister of the Black Disciples. Defendant further stated that he and the others had to follow Salter when he shot the victim \u201cbecause he is a coordinator and we got to watch.\u201d As to the testimony regarding the history of the Gangster Disciples and Black Disciples, we find that under the particular facts of this case, where members of the Gangster Disciples shot a minister of the Black Disciples after a truce was called off, it was relevant. Unlike the facts in Davenport, where members of the Black P Stone Nation street gang shot someone they believed to be a Gangster Disciple, here, the Gangster Disciples and the Black Disciples share common history. Testimony regarding the split up of the Black Gangster Disciples into the Black Disciples and Gangster Disciples was relevant to explain the source of friction between the two gangs.\nBased on the particular facts of this case, especially defendant\u2019s statement in which he describes how the orders regarding the \u201cwar\u201d come form the gang\u2019s \u201cboard,\u201d were relayed to \u201ccoordinators,\u201d who relayed them to \u201csoldiers,\u201d we find Bloore\u2019s testimony regarding the structure of the gangs was properly admissible in the exercise of the trial court\u2019s discretion. \u201c \u2018An accused may not insulate the trier of fact from his gang membership where it is relevant to a determination of the case, simply because prejudice attaches to that revelation. [Citation.]\u2019 \u201d People v. Gonzalez, 142 Ill. 2d at 489.\n\u20226 Finally, defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to prove him guilty where he asserts he was merely present at the time of the offense and did not participate in the shooting. When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence in a criminal case, the relevant question is whether, \u201cviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.\u201d People v. Brown, 169 Ill. 2d 132, 152 (1996). The verdict \u201cwill not be overturned unless [it is] so unreasonable, improbable, and unsatisfactory as to leave a reasonable doubt as to the defendant\u2019s guilt.\u201d Brown, 169 Ill. 2d at 152. Furthermore, the trier of fact bears the responsibility of determining the credibility of the witnesses, the weight to be given their testimony, and reasonable inferences to be drawn from the evidence presented. People v. Bofman, 283 Ill. App. 3d 546, 553 (1996). It is not the function of the reviewing court to retry the defendant or to substitute its judgment for that of the trier of fact on questions involving the credibility of witnesses and the weight of the evidence. People v. Mullen, 313 Ill. App. 3d 718, 724 (2000).\n\u20227 Under Illinois law, a defendant is legally accountable for the conduct of another person if \u201c[e]ither before or during the commission of an offense, and with the intent to promote or facilitate such commission, he solicits, aids, abets, agrees or attempts to aid, such other person in the planning or commission of the offense.\u201d 720 ILCS 5/5\u2014 2(c) (West 1996).\n\u20228 The accountability statute requires that, for a person to be legally accountable for the criminal acts of another, he must solicit, aid, abet, agree or attempt to aid the criminal acts of another. People v. Perez, 189 Ill. 2d 254, 266 (2000). To prove that the defendant possessed the intent to promote or facilitate the crime, the State must present evidence that proves beyond a reasonable doubt that either: (1) the defendant shared the criminal intent of the principal; or (2) there was a common criminal design. People v. Perez, 189 Ill. 2d at 266. Intent may be inferred from the character of the defendant\u2019s actions and from the circumstances surrounding the commission of the offense. People v. Perez, 189 Ill. 2d at 266.\n\u20229 \u201cThe common [criminal] design rule provides that where two or more persons engage in a common criminal design or agreement, any acts in the furtherance of that common design committed by [any] one party are considered to be the acts of all parties to the design or agreement and all are equally responsible for the consequences of the further acts.\u201d People v. Perez, 189 Ill 2d at 267. \u201cFurther, proof of the common purpose need not be supported by words of agreement or direct evidence, but can be drawn from the circumstances surrounding the commission of an act by a group.\u201d People v. Basden, 264 Ill. App. 3d 530, 548 (1994). Evidence that the defendant voluntarily attached himself to a group bent on illegal acts, with knowledge of its design, also supports an inference that he shared the common purpose and will sustain his conviction for an offense committed by another. People v. Taylor, 164 Ill. 2d 131, 141 (1995).\n\u202210 As previously stated, evidence indicating that the defendant was a member of a gang or was involved in gang-related activity is admissible to show common purpose or common criminal design. People v. Smith, 141 Ill. 2d at 58; People v. Davenport, 301 Ill. App. 3d at 151; People v. Cruzado, 299 Ill. App. 3d at 142; People v. Clifton, 321 Ill. App. 3d at 722.\n\u202211 However, a defendant\u2019s mere presence at the commission of the crime, even-when joined with flight from the crime or knowledge of its commission, is not sufficient to establish accountability. People v. Dennis, 181 Ill. 2d 87, 105 (1998). Nevertheless, active participation in an offense has never been a requirement for the imposition of criminal guilt under an accountability theory. People v. McComb, 312 Ill. App. 3d 589, 593 (2000). \u201cOne may aid and abet without actively participating in the overt act.\u201d People v. Taylor, 164 Ill. 2d at 140. Thus, accountability may be established through a person\u2019s knowledge of and participation in the criminal scheme even though there is no evidence that he directly participated in the criminal act itself. In re W.C., 167 Ill. 2d 307, 338 (1995).\n\u202212 Factors that may be considered by the jury, and which may raise an inference that an accused aided in the commission of a crime, include: \u201c(1) defendant\u2019s presence during the planning of the crime; (2) defendant\u2019s presence at the scene of the crime without any negative reactions to it; (3) acceptance of illegal proceeds from the actual perpetrator; (4) flight from the scene, especially after the victim has been injured or killed; (5) failure to report the incident; and (6) defendant\u2019s continued association with the perpetrator after the criminal act.\u201d People v. Walker, 230 Ill. App. 3d 377, 388 (1992).\n\u202213 Applying the above case law to the facts of this case, it is clear that \u201cdefendant voluntarily attached himself to a group bent on illegal acts, with knowledge of its design.\u201d This supports an inference that he shared the group\u2019s common purpose and his conviction for the murder committed by Salter may be sustained on this ground. People v. Taylor, 164 Ill. 2d at 141.\nIn assessing the six factors that raise an inference that an accused aided in the commission of a crime, we find: (1) Defendant was present during the planning of the crime \u2014 defendant told the authorities that he knew that the Gangster Disciples \u201cboard\u201d had met and that a \u201cwar\u201d was on; prior to the shooting, defendant saw Salter in the lobby with a gun and Salter said \u201cif they come out, we are going to get them,\u201d which defendant knew meant that Salter was going to kill somebody. (2) Defendant was present at the scene of the crime, and not only did he not have any negative reaction to it, he said he was going to tell Webb to \u201cbreak\u201d when he did so on his own, and if Webb had not done so, defendant would have told him to. This was done at a time when he knew Salter intended to kill a Black Disciple. Defendant knew Webb was a ranking member of the Black Disciples and he frequented the building at 3542-44. Defendant followed Salter as he followed Webb around the corner. Defendant said he did this because Salter was a coordinator and the soldiers had to watch. (3) While defendant did not accept illegal proceeds from the actual perpetrator, he did hide a gun (although not the murder weapon) he was given by another gang member immediately after the shooting. (4) Defendant did run from the scene after the victim was killed. (5) Defendant failed to report the incident. (6) Defendant continued to associate with the perpetrators after the criminal act. He hid a gun and saw others take the victim\u2019s shoe. The only factor arguably not present was defendant accepting illegal proceeds from the perpetrator, but this was a murder, not an armed robbery or theft.\nIn B. Max, Criminal Accountability and (\u201cMere Presence\u201d) in Illinois, 89 Ill. B.J. 248 (2001), the author, Assistant Public Defender Brendan Max, discussed recent Illinois cases addressing the issues of mere presence in cases premised upon accountability. After an excellent discussion of recent case law, Max suggests that there are better indicators upon which to determine accountability than those previously mentioned.\nThe first reliable additional indicator would be whether the defendant confessed to participation. Max asserts that a confession will relieve the trier of fact of having to consider which inference should be drawn from the facts presented. As can be seen by the facts in the case sub judice, while confessions are strong direct evidence, what inferences may be drawn from a confession is often disputed.\nThe second reliable additional indicator would be whether there was \u201cevidence of the defendant\u2019s participation in planning of the crime.\u201d Max\u2019s suggestion that this factor be limited to instances where the defendant \u201cparticipated in planning the crime\u201d would limit this factor\u2019s applicability to only gang leaders. Here, defendant knew that the Gangster Disciples \u201cboard\u201d had met hours before the shooting and there was going to be a \u201cwar.\u201d He was also present when Salter told the members of the gang that he was going to kill somebody. These facts are more than sufficient to comprise the factor that defendant was present for the planning of the crime.\nMax\u2019s third rehable additional factor merits strong consideration. He asserts that, in the absence of direct evidence of a defendant\u2019s participation in the crime, courts should look to whether the underlying crime was a spontaneous act of the principal. He cites our supreme court\u2019s recent decisions in People v. Taylor, 186 Ill. 2d 439 (1999), and People v. Dennis, 181 Ill. 2d 87 (1998).\nIn Taylor, the court held that the defendant driver was not accountable for the criminal acts of his passenger. The defendant knew his passenger was armed. While driving down the street, the defendant\u2019s car almost hit another car. The passenger jumped out of the defendant\u2019s car and got into a shouting match with the occupants of the other car. He then fired a shot at them, jumped back into the defendant\u2019s car, and the defendant sped away. A jury found the defendant accountable for the shooting. In reversing, the supreme court focused on the spontaneous nature of the crime.\nIn Dennis, the defendant drove a friend to an area where drugs were sold, in order to purchase narcotics. After being dropped off, the passenger saw two men in an alley and decided to rob them. The passenger then ran back to the defendant\u2019s car and defendant sped away. A jury convicted the defendant of armed robbery based on accountability and the supreme court reversed. As in Taylor, the crime was a spontaneous event. Because the robbery was spontaneous, the defendant could not have had the intent to assist in the robbery when he drove the principal to the drug house.\nAs a defendant should not be held accountable for the spontaneous act of the principal, whether the principal\u2019s crime was a spontaneous act is a proper factor to consider when determining whether another person should be held legally responsible for the principal\u2019s actions.\nThis last factor is of no assistance to the defendant in this case. The murder of Webb was certainly not a spontaneous act on the part of Salter and Bailey. The evidence was overwhelming that defendant had knowledge of the common criminal design to kill Webb.\nFor all of the above stated reasons, we affirm defendant\u2019s conviction and sentence for first degree murder.\nAffirmed.\nTHEIS, J., concurs.", "type": "majority", "author": "PRESIDING JUSTICE QUINN" }, { "text": "JUSTICE REID,\ndissenting:\nI dissent. To paraphrase the definition in Black\u2019s Law Dictionary, mens rea, which in Latin means \u201cthe guilty mind\u201d is defined as the state of mind that the prosecution must prove that a defendant had when committing a crime in order to secure a conviction. Black\u2019s Law Dictionary 999 (7th ed. 1999). It can be shown as either criminal intent or recklessness. Mens rea is the second of two essential elements of every crime at common law, the other being the actus reus, or \u201cthe guilty act.\u201d The record demonstrates that, without the largely exculpatory statement of defendant Williams, there would be little or no evidence of his involvement other than his being seen outside the building long before the shooting took place. 324 Ill. App. 3d at 426-28.\nWilliams was convicted of murder under the accountability theory. The issue of accountability is pertinent to cases involving deaths resulting from conflicts between street gangs or informal youth groups. People v. Horton, 43 Ill. App. 3d 150 (1976). Under Illinois law, a person is legally accountable for the conduct of another if \u201c[ejither before or during the commission of an offense, and with the intent to promote or facilitate such commission, he solicits, aids, abets, agrees or attempts to aid, such other person in the planning or commission of the offense.\u201d People v. Taylor, 164 Ill. 2d 131, 140 (1995). Conviction under the accountability theory requires the State to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt. People v. Groves, 294 Ill. App. 3d 570 (1998). One must have the mental state requisite to an offense and aid in its commission in order to be accountable for it. In re W.C., 167 Ill. 2d 307, 337 (1995). Mere presence at the scene, with knowledge that a crime is being committed, is insufficient to establish accountability. In re W.C., 167 Ill. 2d at 338. While active participation is not a requirement for conviction under an accountability theory, more than presence at the scene of a crime plus knowledge that a crime is being committed is required. Mere knowledge that a crime is being committed is insufficient to establish aiding and abetting. However, one may aid and abet without actively participating in the overt act. Taylor, 164 Ill. 2d at 140. In order to prove that the defendant possessed the intent to promote or facilitate the crime, the State may present evidence that a given defendant voluntarily attached himself to a group bent on illegal acts with knowledge of its design. Taylor, 164 Ill. 2d at 141. Such evidence would, depending on the facts of the individual case, also support an inference that he shared the common purpose such that one defendant can justifiably be convicted for the offense committed by another. This is not such a case. It is clear that a reasonable doubt remains in this case, as it stretches the limits of believability to conclude, on these particular facts and circumstances, that Williams is responsible for the murder of Andrew Webb.\nWilliams neither fired the gun that killed Webb nor did he hide it after the crime was committed. Williams is not a higher-up in the Gangster Disciples. He is, at best, a low level soldier who had joined the gang about four months earlier, probably as a self-defense measure for the summer because the gang controlled his high-rise public housing. He was still in high school and was to be in his junior year when school resumed in the fall. He did not participate in the meetings at which the decisions were made by the Gangster Disciples to go to war with the Black Disciples. Since the accountability doctrine requires that the accused actively participate either before or diming the commission of the offense, and conspicuously does not mention the accused\u2019s activities after the commission of the offense, this court\u2019s inquiry is limited. Williams did not participate in the planning of the offense. He was not present at any of the relevant meetings. He also did not have authority to make policy for the gang. When Narvel Salter took out his gun and shot Webb, Williams was among the gang members who were in the lobby of the building, who only heard the shots fired, and who later scattered. Williams ran back to his apartment. The gun used in the shooting was given by the shooter to Black James, who switched it for another gun and brought that new gun to Williams\u2019 apartment. This suggests that, while Williams did come into possession of a gun, he never actually touched the murder weapon. Also, in this case, the scene of the crime is in the building where the defendant resided and it was not unusual for him to be in the lobby of his residence for legitimate purposes. He had every right to be in that lobby without any strained leap of logic that he was there to commit a crime.\nWhen asked why he was in the lobby at the time of the murder, Williams said he was merely \u201cin the lobby *** sitting on a crate.\u201d He also indicated he was sitting with his \u201cback lying on the security guard booth.\u201d He was then asked leading questions by the. assistant State\u2019s Attorney who took the statement whether he was working security at the time of the incident. Williams responded, \u201cNot really. But I was around there so I just did it.\u201d When asked if the position in which he was sitting was the point where normally people who work security are, Williams responded \u201cwhen you work security, ain\u2019t no sitting down. Supposed to stand by the door.\u201d He was not standing by the door.\nWhile Williams, a Gangster Disciple gang member with no rank, was socializing near the official security booth, Andrew Webb came, unarmed, to visit his girlfriend, another resident of the building. \u201cIt looked like he was going up to his girlfriend\u2019s house, but he didn\u2019t get a chance to make it. As soon as he turned the corner, right behind the mailbox room, that is where he got killed.\u201d\nWilliams also argues that the trial court erred in allowing the testimony of the gang crimes expert. He argues that the testimony of the expert was so inflammatory and irrelevant as to outweigh any probative value, since there had already been considerable testimony from Fannie Branch which would tend to establish the fact that there was a gang war going on between the Gangster Disciples and the Black Disciples at the time of this murder. Williams argues that, since he was not a part of the decision-making process to kill Webb, a discussion of the gang hierarchy was completely unnecessary in this trial.\nIt is within the discretion of the trial court to determine whether evidence is relevant and admissible, and a reviewing court will not reverse the trial court\u2019s determination absent a clear abuse of discretion resulting in manifest prejudice to the defendant. People v. Pursley, 284 Ill. App. 3d 597, 603 (1996).\nThere is a three-part analysis when determining whether the admission of the gang expert testimony is inappropriate. People v. Davenport, 301 Ill. App. 3d 143, 150-51 (1998). First, it must be determined whether the person tendered as an expert is in fact an expert. Second, the testimony must be relevant. Finally, does the prejudicial effect outweigh the probative value?\nAlthough a deep and widespread public prejudice may exist against street gangs, gang-related evidence will not necessarily be excluded if it is relevant and admissible. People v. Gonzalez, 142 Ill. 2d 481, 489 (1991). Generally, gang-related evidence is admissible to show common purpose or design, or to provide a motive for an otherwise inexplicable act. People v. Smith, 141 Ill. 2d 40, 58 (1990). However, such evidence must relate to the crime charged. This is a murder, only connected to Williams based upon his membership in the gang and his presence in the lobby of his home that also turns out to be the scene of the crime. He was neither the shooter nor was he involved in the decision that resulted in the shooting. Here we have a 15 year old who was simply there at the time the victim was killed, not someone looking to make a name for himself or advance in the gang hierarchy by the killing. Certain evidence relating to the terminology of the gang hierarchy probably was appropriate, but to bring in alleged narcotics traffic by the gang clearly was too prejudicial and clearly outweighed any possible probative value to have been allowed by the trial judge. Because this case is so closely balanced I would have found the admission of the testimony of the \u201cgang expert\u201d to be plain error. For the majority to have considered the testimony of Detective Bloore, that this 15-year-old relatively new gang member somehow acted with common purpose and common criminal design stretching from the death of Andrew Webb to the gang masterminds currently incarcerated, would be laughable if the practical effect was not such a sad commentary on the state of our high-risk children. The majority has turned its back on certain facts. First, Williams was socializing in the lobby of his place of residence with his friends, not standing guard. Second, at best, his knowledge and input in the decision-making process involving whether the gang would go to war was virtually nonexistent. Did he know the Gangster Disciples and the Black Disciples were at war? Yes, he did, in the same way a private in the United States Army does. That is to say, he knows what he has been told and what he hears from his fellow soldiers. To impute the knowledge of his seniors in the gang to Williams, using the inflammatory testimony of a gang expert to equate Williams and his facts to gang problems in general should, were it not for the obvious bias in favor of getting rid of gangs, shock the conscience. While I generally understand and applaud the efforts of our legislature, courts and law enforcement to rid our streets of the pestilence of gangs, I cannot in good conscience wear blinders so as to allow the rights of even a single child to be trampled. I believe Charles Williams is that child, or was at time of his arrest and trial. Had he fired the gun, hidden the gun from law enforcement, or even been told specifically that he was to kill or help kill someone, I would not blink an eye when the proverbial book was thrown at him.\nBased on the facts of this case, with due deference to the standard of review, while the defendant is guilty of the lapse of judgment which made him join the gang in the first place, assuming he had any real choice in the matter, this court should have had a reasonable doubt of Williams\u2019 guilt of the murder of Andrew Webb.\nThe record shows that his codefendant, Dwight Peal, was standing by the door and clearly the only one pointed out by an eyewitness as working security. Williams was never mentioned by that witness as even being present in the lobby before or at the time of the shooting.", "type": "dissent", "author": "JUSTICE REID," } ], "attorneys": [ "Rita A. Fry, Public Defender, of Chicago (Denise A. Avant, Assistant Public Defender, of counsel), for appellant.", "Richard A. Devine, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Renee Goldfarb, Alan J. Spellberg, and Daniel W Elbaum, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. CHARLES WILLIAMS, Defendant-Appellant.\nFirst District (5th Division)\nNo. 1 \u2014 98\u20142123\nOpinion filed July 13, 2001.\nREID, J., dissenting.\nRita A. Fry, Public Defender, of Chicago (Denise A. Avant, Assistant Public Defender, of counsel), for appellant.\nRichard A. Devine, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Renee Goldfarb, Alan J. Spellberg, and Daniel W Elbaum, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0419-01", "first_page_order": 437, "last_page_order": 459 }