{
  "id": 256269,
  "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. RUBEN RODRIGUEZ, Defendant-Appellee",
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:56:29.143572+00:00",
  "provenance": {
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  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. RUBEN RODRIGUEZ, Defendant-Appellee."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "JUSTICE O\u2019BRIEN\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThe State appeals the order of the circuit court suppressing defendant\u2019s statements to police. On appeal, the State argues that the circuit court erred in holding that defendant\u2019s right to counsel was violated when police refused to allow a law student to consult with defendant at the police station. We reverse and remand.\nAt the hearing on the motion to suppress, testimony established that on March 20, 1997, defendant was arrested for murder. At around 2 p.m. on the following day, defendant\u2019s brother called an attorney and asked him to represent defendant.\nThe attorney testified that he called the police station and spoke with an officer there. The attorney told the officer that he had been retained to represent defendant but that he was leaving for a vacation in Florida and could not appear at the police station to speak to defendant. The attorney told the officer that he did not want defendant interviewed further and that someone from his office would arrive at the police station shortly.\nThe attorney then told one of his employees, a third-year law student, to go to the police station and speak with defendant and tell him not to answer any questions from police. The law student went to the police station and told an officer that he wanted to talk to defendant. Since the law student was not an attorney, the officer refused to allow him to see defendant. Defendant subsequently made incriminating statements to the police.\nThe circuit court suppressed defendant\u2019s incriminating statements, finding that the police had violated defendant\u2019s right to counsel by refusing to allow defendant to consult with the law student. The State appeals pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 604(a)(1) (145 Ill. 2d R. 604(a)(1)).\n\u20221 For purposes of this appeal, neither side disputes the relevant facts. Accordingly, we conduct de nova review of the circuit court\u2019s application of the law to the uncontested facts. People v. Chapman, 194 Ill. 2d 186, 208 (2000).\nTwo Illinois Supreme Court opinions, People v. McCauley, 163 Ill. 2d 414 (1994), and People v. Chapman, 194 Ill. 2d 186 (2000), control the resolution of this case. In McCauley, defendant was brought to the police station for questioning in connection with a murder. McCauley, 163 Ill. 2d at 418. Defendant was advised of his Miranda rights but did not request an attorney. McCauley, 163 Ill. 2d at 418. Unknown to defendant, his family had retained an attorney for him. Defendant\u2019s attorney went to the police station and requested to speak with defendant. McCauley, 163 Ill. 2d at 418. The police refused to allow the attorney to see defendant and also failed to tell defendant that his attorney was present at the station and seeking to consult with him. McCauley, 163 Ill. 2d at 445. Defendant subsequently made incriminating statements to police.\n\u20222 The trial court suppressed defendant\u2019s statements. The supreme court affirmed. The supreme court first noted that a defendant\u2019s right to counsel is guaranteed by article I, section 10, of\nthe Illinois Constitution of 1970 (Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, \u00a7 10) and that a defendant may waive those rights as long as the waiver is voluntary, knowing, and intelligent. McCauley, 163 Ill. 2d at 421. The supreme court then held that, under the facts of the case, the police violated defendant\u2019s rights under article I, section 10, by failing to tell him that his attorney was present and by refusing to allow the attorney to see defendant. McCauley, 163 Ill. 2d at 445-46.\nThe supreme court further concluded that defendant\u2019s statement to police was obtained in violation of defendant\u2019s due process rights under article I, section 2, of the Illinois Constitution of 1970 (111. Const. 1970, art. I, \u00a7 2). The court held that \u201cdue process is violated when police interfere with a suspect\u2019s right to his attorney\u2019s assistance and presence by\" affirmatively preventing the suspect, exposed to interrogation, from receiving the immediately available assistance of an attorney hired or appointed to represent him.\u201d McCauley, 163 Ill. 2d at 444.\nIn Chapman, defendant was questioned at the police station in connection with a homicide investigation. Chapman, 194 Ill. 2d at 199. While defendant was being questioned, defendant\u2019s attorney called the police and spoke briefly with an officer. Chapman, 194 Ill. 2d at 206. The attorney hung up the phone and drove to the police station; defendant made an incriminating statement after the time his attorney telephoned the officer but before the time his attorney physically arrived at the police station. Chapman, 194 Ill. 2d at 205-08.\nAt the police station, the attorney was denied access to defendant. Defendant subsequently made further incriminating statements. Chapman, 194 Ill. 2d at 207.\n\u20223 The trial court admitted the statement defendant made before his attorney arrived at the police station; the trial court suppressed the statements defendant made after his counsel had arrived at the police station. Chapman, 194 Ill. 2d at 208. The supreme court affirmed. Relying on McCauley, the supreme court held that \u201ca defendant\u2019s state constitutional rights [are] violated where the police [deny] the attorney retained for the defendant physical access to the defendant during interrogation, and where the police [do] not inform the defendant that the attorney was seeking to consult with him at the police station.\u201d (Emphasis in original.) Chapman, 194 Ill. 2d at 211. The court refused to expand McCauley to situations where an attorney is not physically present at the police station at the time he is seeking contact with a client in custody. Chapman, 194 Ill. 2d at 213.\n\u20224 Thus, McCauley and Chapman hold that a defendant\u2019s constitutional rights are violated when officers deny defendant access to his attorney who is physically present at the police station and ready to speak with him. Here, defendant\u2019s attorney was not physically present at the police station, ready to speak with him; rather, the attorney sent a third-year law student to the police station in his stead. The third-year law student was not an attorney and thus defendant\u2019s constitutional rights were not violated when the officers refused to allow defendant access to him. Accordingly, the circuit court erred in suppressing defendant\u2019s statements.\nFor the foregoing reasons, we reverse the order of the circuit court granting defendant\u2019s motion to suppress and remand for further proceedings.\nReversed and remanded.\nCAMPBELL, PJ., and GALLAGHER, J., concur.\nThe Illinois Supreme Court explained that the United States Supreme Court, in Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 89 L. Ed. 2d 410, 106 S. Ct. 1135 (1986), rejected the argument that such police conduct violated a defendant\u2019s right to counsel under the fifth amendment to the United States Constitution. However, the Illinois Supreme Court concluded that the right to counsel under the Illinois constitution should be construed more broadly than its federal counterpart. McCauley, 163 Ill. 2d at 423-24.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "JUSTICE O\u2019BRIEN"
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Richard A. Devine, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (James Fitzgerald and Carol L. Gaines, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People.",
      "Richard M. Beuke and Samuel S. Shim, both of Chicago, for appellee."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. RUBEN RODRIGUEZ, Defendant-Appellee.\nFirst District (6th Division)\nNo. 1 \u2014 00\u20140635\nOpinion filed July 27, 2001.\nRichard A. Devine, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (James Fitzgerald and Carol L. Gaines, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People.\nRichard M. Beuke and Samuel S. Shim, both of Chicago, for appellee."
  },
  "file_name": "0468-01",
  "first_page_order": 486,
  "last_page_order": 489
}