{ "id": 256245, "name": "PAMELA TOLVE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. OGDEN CHRYSLER PLYMOUTH, INC., d/b/a Bill Kay Chrysler Plymouth, Inc., et al., Defendants-Appellees (Nicola Tolve, Plaintiff); PAMELA TOLVE, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. OGDEN CHRYSLER PLYMOUTH, INC., d/b/a Bill Kay Chiysler Plymouth, Inc., Defendant-Appellant (Nicola Tolve, Plaintiff; Chrysler Motors Corporation, n/k/a DaimlerChrysler Motors Corporation, Defendant)", "name_abbreviation": "Tolve v. Ogden Chrysler Plymouth, Inc.", "decision_date": "2001-08-29", "docket_number": "Nos. 2 \u2014 00\u20140527, 2 \u2014 00\u20140947", "first_page": "485", "last_page": "493", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "324 Ill. App. 3d 485" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "311 Ill. App. 3d 321", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 415394 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "328" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/311/0321-01" ] }, { "cite": "274 Ill. App. 3d 515", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 291535 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "518" }, { "page": "517" }, { "page": "517" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/274/0515-01" ] }, { "cite": "126 Ill. 2d 326", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5557342 ], "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "341-42" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/126/0326-01" ] }, { "cite": "297 Ill. App. 3d 317", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 910282 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "326" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/297/0317-01" ] }, { "cite": "158 Ill. 2d 527", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 780289 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "534" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/158/0527-01" ] }, { "cite": "381 Ill. 549", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 2559525 ], "year": 1943, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "554-55" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/381/0549-01" ] }, { "cite": "120 Ill. App. 3d 773", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3592766 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "776" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/120/0773-01" ] }, { "cite": "150 Ill. App. 3d 787", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3502082 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "793" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/150/0787-01" ] }, { "cite": "309 Ill. App. 3d 550", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 349579 ], "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "563-64" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/309/0550-01" ] }, { "cite": "229 Ill. App. 3d 1032", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5216443 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1041" }, { "page": "1040-41" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/229/1032-01" ] }, { "cite": "321 Ill. App. 3d 349", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 132471 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "353" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/321/0349-01" ] }, { "cite": "129 Ill. 2d 351", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5567184 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "358" }, { "page": "358" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/129/0351-01" ] }, { "cite": "266 Ill. App. 3d 213", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 887222 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "219" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/266/0213-01" ] }, { "cite": "284 Ill. App. 3d 312", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1260388 ], "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "316" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/284/0312-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 845, "char_count": 20497, "ocr_confidence": 0.779, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.4084131051655944e-07, "percentile": 0.6464712807580674 }, "sha256": "877e1902b0207395d1a62faff943278bd49d9664e496a3ef2fb4a6ff2f13c9d8", "simhash": "1:84a797e62b4ac534", "word_count": 3364 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:56:29.143572+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "PAMELA TOLVE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. OGDEN CHRYSLER PLYMOUTH, INC., d/b/a Bill Kay Chrysler Plymouth, Inc., et al., Defendants-Appellees (Nicola Tolve, Plaintiff). \u2014 PAMELA TOLVE, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. OGDEN CHRYSLER PLYMOUTH, INC., d/b/a Bill Kay Chiysler Plymouth, Inc., Defendant-Appellant (Nicola Tolve, Plaintiff; Chrysler Motors Corporation, n/k/a DaimlerChrysler Motors Corporation, Defendant)." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE RAPP\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThese consolidated appeals arise from an action brought in the circuit court of Du Page County by plaintiffs, Nicola Tolve and Pamela Tolve, against defendants, Ogden Chrysler Plymouth, Inc., d/b/a Bill Kay Chrysler Plymouth, Inc. (Dealer), and Chrysler Motors Corporation, n/k/a DaimlerChrysler Motors Corp. (Chrysler), in connection with the purchase of a 1997 Plymouth Neon automobile. Nicola was dismissed from the suit by the trial court and is not a party to either appeal. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the Dealer and Chrysler. In appeal No. 2 \u2014 00\u20140527, Pamela argues that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment. We affirm.\nThe second appeal, No. 2 \u2014 00\u20140947, was brought by Dealer after the trial court dismissed its petition for attorney fees pursuant to section 10a(c) of the Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act (Consumer Fraud Act) (815 ILCS 505/10a(c) (West 1998)). We reverse and remand.\nI. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY\nThe following facts are taken from the record on appeal. On December 23, 1996, Pamela, her husband, and her in-laws, Nicola and Faustina Tolve, went to Dealer because Nicola was in the market for a new vehicle. Pamela and her husband accompanied Nicola and Faus-tina in order to interpret because Nicola and Faustina do not speak English. Pamela\u2019s in-laws became interested in purchasing a new Plymouth Neon.\nAccording to Pamela, the salesman told her that there was a $400 rebate available to purchasers who graduated from college in the last two years. Pamela asked the salesman if she qualified, explaining that she completed a program at the Institute of Management at Illinois Benedictine College. Pamela said that the salesman advised her that if the certificate was earned in the last two years she would be eligible for the rebate. Pamela further alleges that the salesman advised her that she should become a co-buyer of the vehicle so that Nicola could take advantage of the $400 rebate. Dealer asserts that Pamela misrepresented herself as a college graduate or at least misled the salesman.\nPamela said that they did not want to take delivery of the vehicle that day because Nicola wanted to clean up his trade-in and Pamela wanted to bring her certificate to the salesman. According to Pamela, the Dealer wanted them to take delivery that day and rushed them through the paperwork. Nicola and Pamela purchased the Plymouth Neon as co-buyers. The $400 college-graduate rebate was credited against the price of the vehicle. Pamela\u2019s in-laws also decided to buy a service contract.\nUltimately, Chrysler refused to provide the college-graduate rebate because Pamela was not a college graduate. Pamela\u2019s certificate from Illinois Benedictine College reads as follows:\n\u201cThis certifies that Pamela L. Tolve has completed the program of continuing education for middle managers of Chicagoland business and industries in The Institute For Management and in recognition thereof is awarded this Certificate Summa Cum Laude Given at Lisle, Illinois, this 3rd Day of June, 1995.\u201d\nDealer filed a small claims complaint in the circuit court of Du Page County against Pamela and Nicola, seeking $400, costs, and attorney fees. When Pamela and Nicola moved to file a counterclaim, Dealer dismissed the suit. Pamela claimed that she incurred over $400 in attorney fees defending the small claims suit.\nAfter the small claims suit was dismissed, Nicola and Pamela filed a two-count complaint against Dealer and Chrysler. Count I, pleaded under the Consumer Fraud Act, alleged that Dealer (a) advertised low financing rates that were actually unavailable; (b) sold the vehicle for more than sticker price; (c) sold a service contract that was actually duplicative of the manufacturer\u2019s warranty; and (d) told Pamela she qualified for a $400 college-graduate rebate when she did not. Count I also alleged that Dealer was acting as an agent or apparent agent of Chrysler. Count II alleged a cause of action for common-law fraud based on the same factual allegations made in count I. The complaint prayed for $30,000 in compensatory damages and $100,000 in punitive damages.\nOn December 18, 1998, Dealer filed an answer, affirmative defenses, and a counterclaim. The counterclaim was against Pamela. Count I of the counterclaim alleged that her misrepresentation that she was a college graduate was an unfair business practice under the Consumer Fraud Act. Count II alleged that Pamela\u2019s conduct constituted common-law fraud. Dealer prayed for $400 in compensatory damages, punitive damages of $1,000, attorney fees, and costs. The trial court granted Pamela\u2019s motion to dismiss, under section 2 \u2014 615 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Code) (735 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 615 (West 1998)), count I of Dealer\u2019s counterclaim. Count II of Dealer\u2019s counterclaim remained. Nicola and Pamela filed an amended complaint on September 22, 1999. The trial court granted Nicola\u2019s motion for the voluntary dismissal of his claims against Dealer and Chrysler pursuant to section 2 \u2014 1009 of the Code (735 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 1009 (West 1998)). Thereby, Pamela became the sole plaintiff in the lawsuit.\nOn April 6, 2000, the trial court granted summary judgment for Dealer and Chrysler on both counts of Pamela\u2019s amended complaint, which left Dealer\u2019s common-law fraud counterclaim against Pamela as the only remaining controversy between the parties. The trial court determined pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 304(a) (134 Ill. 2d R. 304(a)) that there was no just reason to delay appeal of its order granting summary judgment. Pamela timely appealed.\nOn May 10, 2000, Dealer filed a petition for attorney fees pursuant to section 10a(c) as the prevailing party under the Consumer Fraud Act (815 ILCS 505/10a(c) (West 1998)). Pamela filed a motion to dismiss Dealer\u2019s petition for attorney fees, claiming that the petition was untimely.\nAt the hearing on Pamela\u2019s motion to dismiss Dealer\u2019s petition for attorney fees, Pamela argued that Dealer\u2019s petition was untimely because it was filed on May 10, 2000, more than 30 days beyond the April 6, 2000, order granting summary judgment. Accordingly, Pamela argued that the trial court was without the jurisdiction to hear Dealer\u2019s fee petition. Dealer argued in the first instance that the trial court had the jurisdiction to rule on the fee petition because Dealer\u2019s counterclaim remained pending. Secondly, Dealer argued that its petition should be considered filed on May 4, 2000, the day it was mailed, and therefore the petition was timely.\nThe trial court rejected Dealer\u2019s arguments and dismissed Dealer\u2019s petition. The trial court found that the Dealer\u2019s petition was filed May 10, 2000. The trial court ruled that it did not have the jurisdiction to hear Dealer\u2019s petition for attorney fees because the petition was filed more than 30 days after the order granting summary judgment. The trial court made a finding that there was no just reason to delay the appeal of the order pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 304(a) (134 Ill. 2d R. 304(a)). Dealer timely appealed.\nII. DISCUSSION\nA. Summary Judgment\nIn appeal No. 2 \u2014 00\u20140527, Pamela contends that the trial court erred as a matter of law in granting summary judgment for Dealer and Chrysler on both counts of her complaint. We disagree.\nel Summary judgment is proper only where the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that no genuine issue as to any material fact exists and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 735 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 1005(c) (West 1998). In ruling on the motion, the court is required to construe all evidentiary material strictly against the movant and liberally in favor of the nonmovant. Laurel Motors, Inc. v. Airways Transportation Group of Cos., 284 Ill. App. 3d 312, 316 (1996). While the nonmoving party in a summary judgment motion is not required to prove his case, he must nonetheless present a factual basis that would arguably entitle him to a judgment. Gauthier v. Westfall, 266 Ill. App. 3d 213, 219 (1994). If from the pleadings, depositions, affidavits, and admissions on file, a plaintiff fails to establish an element of his cause of action, summary judgment for the defendant is proper. Pyne v. Witmer, 129 Ill. 2d 351, 358 (1989). We conduct de nova review of an order granting summary judgment. American Multi-Cinema, Inc. v. City of Warrenville, 321 Ill. App. 3d 349, 353 (2001).\nIn her amended complaint, Pamela made four allegations that she claimed violated the Consumer Fraud Act and constituted common-law fraud: (a) Dealer advertised low financing rates that were actually unavailable; (b) Dealer charged more than the sticker price; (c) Dealer misled her into purchasing a service contract that provided duplicate coverage of the manufacturer\u2019s warranty; and (d) Dealer misrepresented the availability of a $400 college-graduate rebate.\n\u20222, 3 The elements of a cause of action for fraud under the Consumer Fraud Act are (1) a statement by the seller; (2) of an existing or future material fact; (3) that was untrue, without regard to the defendant\u2019s knowledge or lack thereof of such untruth; (4) made for the purpose of inducing the reliance; (5) on which the victim relied; and (6) that resulted in damage to the victim. Duran v. Leslie Oldsmobile, Inc., 229 Ill. App. 3d 1032, 1041 (1992). The elements of a cause of action for common-law fraud are (1) a false statement of material fact; (2) known or believed to be false by the party making it; (3) an intent to induce the other party to act; (4) action by the other party in reliance on the truth of the statement; and (5) damage to the other party as a result of the reliance. Pawlikowski v. Toyota Motor Credit Corp., 309 Ill. App. 3d 550, 563-64 (1999).\nIn granting summary judgment, the trial court ruled that Pamela had not established the requisite element of damage because she did not pay for, or use, the Plymouth Neon. Pamela only became a co-buyer so that her father-in-law, Nicola, could enjoy the $400 college-graduate rebate. Therefore, any damage caused by the defendants\u2019 alleged fraudulent acts was not suffered by Pamela. The trial court also held that, even if the attorney fees expended by Pamela to defend the small claims case filed by Dealer could be considered damage, Pamela had not presented facts sufficient to establish that she paid such fees.\n\u20224 Pamela contends that she has established in several ways damage as a result of Dealer\u2019s misrepresentations. First, Pamela contends that she has established damage because she is a co-buyer of the Plymouth Neon and obligated as a signator under the contract of sale and the retail installment contract. Pamela argues that because she could sue or be sued to enforce the contract she suffered damage by the acts of Dealer and Chrysler. We reject this contention. There is no question that Pamela is technically in privity of contract with Dealer. This fact, as Pamela points out, would allow her to maintain a cause of action for breach of contract if a breach occurred, but it does not establish the requisite element of damage for the common-law and statutory torts that Pamela has pleaded.\nPamela also contends that the $400 rebate itself constitutes damage and the fact that Dealer has counterclaimed to collect the $400 from Pamela is evidence of damage she suffered due to Dealer\u2019s tor-tious conduct. We fail to see how the $400 rebate could constitute damage. At this point, Pamela in theory and Nicola in fact have received the benefit of the $400 college-graduate rebate, since it was credited against the Plymouth Neon and has not been recouped by Dealer. The attempt by Dealer to recoup that amount from Pamela was abandoned when Dealer dismissed the small claims suit and only reemerged when Pamela decided to sue the Dealer. In short, Pamela is not out $400.\nPamela contends that the attorney fees she expended to defend the small claims lawsuit filed by Dealer constitute damage sufficient to establish that element of the torts alleged. Pamela cites Duran as authority for her argument. Duran, however, does not hold that damages in the form of attorney fees are recoverable against the same tortfeasor in a prior action concerning the same wrongful act. In fact, Duran cites the cases of Marvel Engineering Co. v. Matson, Driscoll & D\u2019Amico, 150 Ill. App. 3d 787 (1986), and Nalivaika v. Murphy, 120 Ill. App. 3d 773 (1983), which hold that, where the wrongful acts of a defendant involve the plaintiff in litigation with third parties, plaintiff may recover damages against the wrongdoer, measured by the reasonable expenses of such litigation, including attorney fees. Marvel Engineering, 150 Ill. App. 3d at 793; Nalivaika, 120 Ill. App. 3d at 776. Moreover, section 914(2) of the Restatement (Second) of Torts states:\n\u201c(2) One who through the tort of another has been required to act in the protection of his interests by bringing or defending an action against a third person is entitled to recover reasonable compensation for loss of time, attorney fees and other expenditures thereby suffered or incurred in the earlier action.\u201d (Emphasis added.) Restatement (Second) of Torts \u00a7 914(2) (1979).\nThe prior litigation from which arose the attorney fees that Pamela claims satisfy the element of damage in this case involved not only the same party but also the same alleged wrongful act, i.e., a misrepresentation concerning the college-graduate rebate. Our supreme court stated the following concerning the recovery of attorney fees as damages:\n\u201cWhile it is recognized that where the natural and proximate consequences of a wrongful act have been to involve the plaintiff in litigation with others, there may be recovery in damages against the author of such act, measured by the reasonable expenses incurred in such litigation, [citation], yet the rule is equally well established that where an action based on the same wrongful act has been prosecuted by the plaintiff against the defendant to a successful issue, he can not in a subsequent action recover, as damages, his costs and expenses in the former action.\u201d (Emphasis added.) Ritter v. Ritter, 381 Ill. 549, 554-55 (1943).\nAccordingly, the attorney fees expended by Pamela to defend the small claims lawsuit filed by Dealer to recoup the $400 college-graduate rebate do not establish the requisite damage element of the torts Pamela aEeges.\nFinaEy, Pamela makes the argument that she has suffered nominal damage as a result of Dealer\u2019s misrepresentations. However, the record does not show that Pamela made this argument to the trial court and Pamela does not seek nominal damages in her complaint. Therefore, the argument is waived. See Eagan v. Chicago Transit Authority, 158 Ill. 2d 527, 534 (1994). Waiver aside, damage may not be presumed under the Consumer Fraud Act. Duran, 229 Ill. App. 3d at 1040-41. With respect to the common-law fraud count, unless all the elements of the tort, including the element of damage, are established, nominal damages cannot be recovered. City of Chicago v. Michigan Beach Housing Cooperative, 297 Ill. App. 3d 317, 326 (1998). As we have concluded above, Pamela has not established that she has suffered damage as a result of Dealer\u2019s alleged misrepresentations.\nBecause Pamela has failed to establish the damage element of her claims under the Consumer Fraud Act and for common-law fraud, summary judgment for Dealer and Chrysler was proper. See Pyne, 129 Ill. 2d at 358. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court\u2019s order granting Dealer and Chrysler summary judgment on count I and count II of Pamela\u2019s amended complaint.\nB. Petition for Attorney Fees\nIn appeal No. 2 \u2014 00\u20140947, Dealer contends that the trial court erred in dismissing for the lack of jurisdiction Dealer\u2019s petition for attorney fees pursuant to the Consumer Fraud Act. Dealer argues that (1) the trial court had the jurisdiction to rule on Dealer\u2019s petition even if it was filed more than 30 days beyond the trial court\u2019s order granting summary judgment; and (2) Dealer\u2019s petition was timely because it was filed the day it was mailed. Because we agree with Dealer\u2019s\" second argument, we need not address Dealer\u2019s first argument.\n\u20225 It is undisputed that Dealer\u2019s petition for attorney fees was mailed on May 4, 2000, and file stamped by the circuit clerk on May 10, 2000. Therefore, the determination of the filing date is purely a question of law to which we apply de nova review. In re Appointment of a Special State\u2019s Attorney, 305 II. App. 3d 749, 756 (1999).\n\u20226 Our supreme court has held that notices of appeal mailed within the 30-day period and received thereafter are timely filed but stated that it expressed no opinion as to whether this policy would apply to other papers filed in the circuit court. Harrisburg-Raleigh Airport Authority v. Department of Revenue, 126 Ill. 2d 326, 341-42 (1989). We believe that this court\u2019s decision in Pakrovsky v. Village of Lakemoor, 274 Ill. App. 3d 515 (1995), is dispositive of the issue of whether the time of mailing a document is equated with the time of filing a document with the clerk of the circuit court. The Pakrovsky court stated:\n\u201cWe recognize that court documents are often filed by mail and that there are sometimes delays in mail service. Furthermore, the weight of authority clearly favors equating the mailing date with the filing date for court documents which do not commence a new cause of action.\u201d Pakrovsky, 274 Ill. App. 3d at 518.\nThis court also stated:\n\u201cExcept for the filing of complaints and the filing of petitions pursuant to section 2 \u2014 1401 of the Code of Civil Procedure [cita-tian], the appellate court has consistently held that documents mailed to the circuit court within the requisite time period but received thereafter are timely filed.\u201d Pokrovsky, 274 Ill. App. 3d at 517.\nThe trial court concluded that Dealer\u2019s petition was not filed until it was file stamped on May 10, 2000, relying on local circuit court rule 2.02(b) (18th Jud. Cir. Ct. R. 2.02(b) (eff. July 15, 1991)) and Supreme Court Rule 104(b) (134 Ill. 2d R. 104(b)). Rule 104(b) does not speak to the issue with which we are presented. Rule 2.02(b), on the other hand, provides in pertinent part:\n\u201cA paper filed by mail shall not be deemed as filed until such date and time as said document was received, stamped and dated by the proper designated Deputy Clerk of the Circuit Court.\u201d 18th Judicial Cir. Ct. R. 2.02(b) (eff. July 15, 1991).\nHowever, local circuit court rules may not abrogate, limit, or modify existing law. Valio v. Board of Fire & Police Commissioners of the Village of Itasca, 311 Ill. App. 3d 321, 328 (2000). Because documents mailed to the circuit court within the requisite time period but received thereafter are timely filed (Pakrovsky, 274 Ill. App. 3d at 517), Dealer\u2019s petition for attorney fees was timely. Therefore, the trial court erred in dismissing Dealer\u2019s petition for lack of jurisdiction. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court\u2019s order dismissing Dealer\u2019s petition for attorney fees.\nIV CONCLUSION\nFor the foregoing reasons, we affirm the order of the circuit court of Du Page County appealed in No. 2 \u2014 00\u20140527 granting Dealer and Chrysler summary judgment. As to appeal No. 2 \u2014 00\u20140947, we reverse the order of the circuit court of Du Page County dismissing Dealer\u2019s petition for attorney fees and remand the cause for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.\nNo. 2 \u2014 00\u20140527, Affirmed.\nNo. 2 \u2014 00\u20140947, Reversed and remanded.\nMcLAREN and CALLUM, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE RAPP" } ], "attorneys": [ "Maureen Flaherty, of Lehrer, Flaherty & Canavan, of Wheaton, for Pamela Tolve.", "Stuart D. Gordon, of Zukowski, Rogers, Flood, McArdle & Orr, of Chicago, for Ogden Chrysler Plymouth, Inc.", "James R. Vogler and Randall L. Oyler, both of Barack Ferrazzano Kirsch-baum Perlman & Nagelberg, of Chicago, and Susan B. Hanmer and Maura Healey, both of Hale & Dorr, of Boston, Massachusetts, for Chrysler Motors Corporation." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "PAMELA TOLVE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. OGDEN CHRYSLER PLYMOUTH, INC., d/b/a Bill Kay Chrysler Plymouth, Inc., et al., Defendants-Appellees (Nicola Tolve, Plaintiff). \u2014 PAMELA TOLVE, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. OGDEN CHRYSLER PLYMOUTH, INC., d/b/a Bill Kay Chiysler Plymouth, Inc., Defendant-Appellant (Nicola Tolve, Plaintiff; Chrysler Motors Corporation, n/k/a DaimlerChrysler Motors Corporation, Defendant).\nSecond District\nNos. 2 \u2014 00\u20140527, 2 \u2014 00\u20140947 cons.\nOpinion filed August 29, 2001.\nMaureen Flaherty, of Lehrer, Flaherty & Canavan, of Wheaton, for Pamela Tolve.\nStuart D. Gordon, of Zukowski, Rogers, Flood, McArdle & Orr, of Chicago, for Ogden Chrysler Plymouth, Inc.\nJames R. Vogler and Randall L. Oyler, both of Barack Ferrazzano Kirsch-baum Perlman & Nagelberg, of Chicago, and Susan B. Hanmer and Maura Healey, both of Hale & Dorr, of Boston, Massachusetts, for Chrysler Motors Corporation." }, "file_name": "0485-01", "first_page_order": 503, "last_page_order": 511 }