{ "id": 256309, "name": "In re T.B., JR., et al., Minors (The People of the State of Illinois, Petitioner-Appellee, v. Terry B., Sr., Respondent-Appellant)", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Terry B.", "decision_date": "2001-08-24", "docket_number": "No. 3 \u2014 01\u20140025", "first_page": "506", "last_page": "509", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "324 Ill. App. 3d 506" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "715 N.E.2d 263", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "272", "parenthetical": "as modified on denial of rehearing" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "306 Ill. App. 3d 779", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1336097 ], "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "790", "parenthetical": "as modified on denial of rehearing" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/306/0779-01" ] }, { "cite": "704 N.E.2d 826", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "829" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "302 Ill. App. 3d 28", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 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App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 680631 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "367" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/264/0363-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 448, "char_count": 7562, "ocr_confidence": 0.798, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.03580807328026e-08, "percentile": 0.01018862489666386 }, "sha256": "2f59a0286579122305a6094abcb85f20095f28bce5cb796e423cca12152d8e0a", "simhash": "1:ea76fc47ea2197c1", "word_count": 1271 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:56:29.143572+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "In re T.B., JR., et al., Minors (The People of the State of Illinois, Petitioner-Appellee, v. Terry B., Sr., Respondent-Appellant)." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE LYTTON\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThe respondent, Terry B., Sr. (Terry), was charged with neglect of his child because he had been convicted of predatory criminal sexual assault. The State filed a motion for summary judgment, which the trial court granted. We reverse and remand for further proceedings.\nFACTS\nOn October 28, 1999, an assistant State\u2019s Attorney for Tazewell County filed a petition under section 2 \u2014 3(l)(b) of the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (Act) (705 ILCS 405/2 \u2014 3(l)(b) (West 1998)), alleging that Terry was guilty of neglecting his minor son due to the injurious environment created by Terry\u2019s conviction for predatory criminal sexual assault of a child. Terry filed an answer admitting the conviction but denying that it created an injurious environment for his son as a matter of law. The State filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that \u201c[t]he nature of the offense *** is sufficient evidence to support a finding that the environment of the Minor *** is injurious to his welfare even though [Terry\u2019s] sexual abuse was perpetrated on a female child under the age of 13.\u201d The trial court granted the State\u2019s motion.\nDISCUSSION \u2022\n\u20221 In reviewing a summary judgment order, we will consider de nova whether any genuine issue of material fact remained and, if not, whether judgment was properly entered as a matter of law. Prodromos v. Forty East Cedar Condominium Ass\u2019n, 264 Ill. App. 3d 363, 367, 636 N.E.2d 846, 849 (1994).\nTerry argues that it is improper to grant summary judgment for the State without considering facts related to his conviction that are outside the record at this stage of the proceedings.\nThe State and the attorney for the minor contend that the entry of summary judgment is supported by the decisions in In re David D., 202 Ill. App. 3d 1090, 560 N.E.2d 966 (1990), and In re Harpman, 146 Ill. App. 3d 504, 496 N.E.2d 1242 (1986). However, these decisions are inapplicable to the instant case.\nIn David D., the trial court dismissed the case against the respondent because the State failed to make a prima facie case. On review, the appellate court held that the State\u2019s prima facie showing at trial that the father had sexually abused his daughter in their house was sufficient to constitute an injurious environment for the girl\u2019s brother. In re David D., 202 Ill. App. 3d at 1094, 560 N.E.2d at 968. The court remanded the cause for continuation of the trial and the presentation of the father\u2019s case. In In re Harpman, 146 Ill. App. 3d 504, 496 N.E.2d 1242 (1986), the court affirmed the trial court\u2019s finding of an injurious environment after the completion of full evidentiary hearings.\nIn contrast to these cases, this case involves a summary judgment order that precludes Terry from presenting evidence. The issue here is whether the mere existence of a conviction for sexual abuse of a minor is a sufficient basis, standing alone, to constitute an injurious environment per se. At this stage of the proceedings, we are not concerned about the quantum of evidence necessary to meet the State\u2019s initial burden of proof at trial or, whether, after trial, there is sufficient evidence to prove an injurious environment.\nTerry cites In re L.M., 319 Ill. App. 3d 865, 866, 747 N.E.2d 440, 441 (2001), in support of his argument. In L.M., the State filed a petition alleging that the respondent\u2019s minor child was neglected because she was left in his care after he was convicted of aggravated criminal sexual abuse against the child\u2019s teenage mother. At the close of the State\u2019s case, the respondent filed a motion for a directed finding, arguing that the State had not met its burden of showing the child\u2019s environment was injurious to her welfare; the motion was denied, and at the conclusion of the trial, the State\u2019s petition was granted. The appellate court reversed, holding that a directed finding should have been entered against the State because the respondent\u2019s status as a sex offender, by itself, did not prove an injurious environment. In re L.M., 319 Ill. App. 3d at 868, 747 N.E.2d at 443.\n\u20222 We read this case narrowly to apply only to its unique facts and believe that the entry of a directed finding for a respondent in this type of case would rarely be justified. However, we find that the mere fact that a respondent has been convicted of a sex offense against a minor, without more, is insufficient to create an injurious environment as a matter of law. Our supreme court has stated that parents have a strong fundamental liberty interest in the care and custody of their children. See In re A.H., 195 Ill. 2d 408, 423, 748 N.E.2d 183, 192 (2001). This constitutional interest is implicated whenever the State seeks to remove a child from the custody of a parent. See In re A.H., 195 Ill. 2d at 422-23, 748 N.E.2d at 192. The respondent\u2019s due process rights as a parent are undermined when a neglect finding is entered based entirely on the respondent\u2019s conviction of a sex offense against a minor, without giving the respondent an opportunity to present evidence.\nMoreover, we believe that genuine questions of material fact remain in this case, precluding the entry of summary judgment. The State\u2019s petition and motion for summary judgment allege only that Terry was convicted of sexually abusing a \u201cfemale child under the age of 13.\u201d Although the State\u2019s neglect petition notes the number of Terry\u2019s criminal case, there is no indication that the trial court reviewed this file or considered any of the specific facts contained in it relating to Terry\u2019s conviction prior to rendering its decision.\nThe State claims that \u201c[t]he respondent *** presented no evidence to rebut the prima facie evidence of neglect\u201d and, in fact, admitted his conviction. The presentation of a prima facie case is in petitioner\u2019s initial burden of proof at trial. See generally Denis F. McKenna Co. v. Smith, 302 Ill. App. 3d 28, 31, 704 N.E.2d 826, 829 (1998). Here, there has been no trial. Since summary judgment was entered for the State, Terry has been denied the opportunity to present his case to the trier of fact.\nFinally, the attorney for the minor argues that \u201cthe court could draw the inference that an injurious environment exists\u201d from the factual allegations in the pleadings and the classification of the offense for sentencing purposes. However, the existence of more than one possible reasonable inference from the alleged facts indicates that questions of material fact remain to be decided at trial by the fact finder. Tribune Co. v. Allstate Insurance Co., 306 Ill. App. 3d 779, 790, 715 N.E.2d 263, 272 (1999) (as modified on denial of rehearing).\nUnder these circumstances, summary judgment is inappropriate, and a full evidentiary hearing is required. At such a hearing, both parties can fully develop all the facts relevant to the trial court\u2019s decision. The trial court erred by granting the State\u2019s motion for summary judgment.\nCONCLUSION\nThe judgment of the circuit court of Tazewell County is reversed, and the cause is remanded for further proceedings.\nReversed and remanded.\nHOLDRIDGE and McDADE, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE LYTTON" } ], "attorneys": [ "John A. Bernard!, of Pekin, for appellant.", "Stewart Umholtz, State\u2019s Attorney, of Pekin (John X. Breslin and Dawn D. Duffy, both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People.", "Rhonda Foster, of Pekin, guardian ad litem." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "In re T.B., JR., et al., Minors (The People of the State of Illinois, Petitioner-Appellee, v. Terry B., Sr., Respondent-Appellant).\nThird District\nNo. 3 \u2014 01\u20140025\nOpinion filed August 24, 2001.\nJohn A. Bernard!, of Pekin, for appellant.\nStewart Umholtz, State\u2019s Attorney, of Pekin (John X. Breslin and Dawn D. Duffy, both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People.\nRhonda Foster, of Pekin, guardian ad litem." }, "file_name": "0506-01", "first_page_order": 524, "last_page_order": 527 }