{ "id": 256317, "name": "BRIAN HARTLEP, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. DAVID TORRES, Chief of Police of Posen, Illinois, Defendant-Appellee", "name_abbreviation": "Hartlep v. Torres", "decision_date": "2001-08-29", "docket_number": "No. 1 \u2014 00\u20143768", "first_page": "817", "last_page": "820", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "324 Ill. App. 3d 817" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "700 N.E.2d 1064", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1998, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "299 Ill. App. 3d 157", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 221479 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "165" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/299/0157-01" ] }, { "cite": "683 N.E.2d 1286", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1997, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "291 Ill. App. 3d 559", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 456191 ], "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "562" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/291/0559-01" ] }, { "cite": "537 N.E.2d 851", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1989, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "181 Ill. App. 3d 920", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 8499442 ], "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "925-26" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/181/0920-01" ] }, { "cite": "323 Ill. App. 3d 1129", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 171776 ], "weight": 4, "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1131" }, { "page": "1131" }, { "page": "1131" }, { "page": "1131" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/323/1129-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 420, "char_count": 6721, "ocr_confidence": 0.785, "pagerank": { "raw": 9.816839068896254e-08, "percentile": 0.53316930832647 }, "sha256": "dd03ab583d7054a5f50e22455850bd217be87965d751018f132af34c5148220d", "simhash": "1:1d5f4513aeedde25", "word_count": 1058 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:56:29.143572+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "BRIAN HARTLEP, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. DAVID TORRES, Chief of Police of Posen, Illinois, Defendant-Appellee." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE WOLFSON\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nPlaintiff Brian Hartlep brought this suit for slander against defendant David Torres, chief of police of the Village of Posen, Illinois, alleging Torres made defamatory statements when he characterized Hartlep \u201cas being not trustworthy, and not re-employable.\u201d Because Torres spoke the allegedly defamatory words while testifying at a disciplinary hearing before the Village of Glenwood Board of Fire and Police Commissioners (BFPC), the trial court found the statements were absolutely privileged. The trial court then granted Torres\u2019 Code of Civil Procedure section 2 \u2014 619 motion to dismiss Hartlep\u2019s complaint. See 735 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 619 (West 1998). We affirm.\nFACTS\nOn April 7, 1999, Torres testified before the Glenwood BFPC in a disciplinary hearing involving Hartlep:\n\u201cQ. What was your experience with Brian [Hartlep] as a police officer?\nA. In terms of?\nQ. His performance?\nA. Well, my personal experience with Mr. Hartlep was\u2014\nMR. McGUIRE [plaintiff\u2019s counsel]: Objection; relevance and materiality as to performance. We\u2019re not here for the generalization. We should get to the specifics which, unfortunately, the Board wants to get to.\nMR. BROIHIER [BFPC counsel]; You indicated there was a difficulty with his employment at Posen; why don\u2019t we go to that.\u201d\nTorres then testified that while Hartlep was working as a probationary police officer for the Village of Posen, he \u201cmade a pass at a female driver who was stopped by Officer Hartlep on a traffic incident, and that he had given his business card to this young lady with his home telephone number.\u201d According to Torres, Hartlep was \u201cin violation of our rules and regulations pertaining to his conduct and ethics.\u201d When asked if Torres would reemploy Hartlep, Torres said, \u201cNo, I would not.\u201d\nTorres\u2019 testimony was inconsistent, however, with a statement filed by the Village of Posen with the Illinois Department of Employment Security. The statement indicated that although Hartlep had once been suspended, he was reliable and subject to being rehired by the Village of Posen.\nDECISION\nOn appeal, Hartlep contends the trial court erred in granting Torres\u2019 motion to dismiss because the allegedly defamatory state-merits were not pertinent or relevant to the disciplinary hearing before the BFPC of the Village of Glenwood.\nel A section 2 \u2014 619 motion may be granted when the claim asserted is barred by some affirmative matter defeating the claim. 735 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 619(a)(9) (West 1998). An absolute privilege is an affirmative defense that may be raised and determined under section 2 \u2014 619. Malevitis v. Friedman, 323 Ill. App. 3d 1129, 1131 (2001). \u201cWhether a particular statement is privileged is a question of law\u201d we review de nova. Malevitis, 323 Ill. App. 3d at 1131.\n\u20222 \u201cIt is the established law of Illinois that statements made during quasi-judicial proceedings are absolutely privileged [citations], and such protection encompasses testimony given before administrative agencies, as well as communications to administrative agencies, when these agencies are performing a judicial function. [Citations.]\u201d Parrillo, Weiss & Moss v. Cashion, 181 Ill. App. 3d 920, 925-26, 537 N.E.2d 851 (1989).\nHartlep agrees \u201cThere is no question *** the plaintiff-appellant was involved in an administrative proceeding involving discipline ***.\u201d See 65 ILCS 5/10 \u2014 2.1\u201417 (West 1998) (the BFPC \u201cshall conduct a fair and impartial hearing,\u201d and \u201ceach member of the board shall have power to administer oaths and affirmations, and the board shall have power to secure by its subpoena both the attendance and testimony of witnesses\u201d). The Glenwood BFPC was performing a judicial function.\nHartlep contends, however, that \u201c[a]lthough Torres did testify as a witness before the Glenwood [BFPC], *** he was not absolutely privileged as his testimony had no relation to the proceeding.\u201d We do not agree.\n\u20223 The scope of the privilege is set forth in section 588 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts (1977), which states in pertinent part:\n\u201cA witness is absolutely privileged to publish defamatory matter concerning another in communications preliminary to a proposed judicial proceeding or as a part of a judicial proceeding in which he is testifying, if it has some relation to the proceeding.\u201d Restatement (Second) of Torts \u00a7 588 (1977).\nSee also Bushell v. Caterpillar, Inc., 291 Ill. App. 3d 559, 562, 683 N.E.2d 1286 (1997).\nThe requirement that statements made in a judicial proceeding be pertinent or relevant is not strictly applied. See Restatement (Second) of Torts \u00a7 588, Comment c, at 251 (1977). \u201cThe privilege will attach even where the defamatory statement is not confined to specific issues related to the litigation [citation], and all doubts should be resolved in favor of a finding of pertinency [citation].\u201d Malevitis, 323 Ill. App. 3d at 1131.\nAlthough a witness may not introduce inflammatory evidence entirely unrelated to the litigation, -the witness is not liable for those statements having any bearing on the subject at issue, regardless of the witness\u2019 motive or the unreasonableness of the witness\u2019 conduct. Malevitis, 323 Ill. App. 3d at 1131, citing Lykowski v. Bergman, 299 Ill. App. 3d 157, 165, 700 N.E.2d 1064 (1998).\n\u20224 Applying these principles to the present case, we find the statements made by Torres were sufficiently related to the proceedings to subject them to an absolute privilege. The transcript excerpts quoted in Hartlep\u2019s complaint support our conclusion. At some point during Hartlep\u2019s disciplinary hearing, the presiding officer for the BFPC said, \u201cYou [the prosecutor] indicated there was a difficulty with his employment at Posen; why don\u2019t we go to that.\u201d Torres then provided the allegedly defamatory testimony.\nBecause Torres\u2019 allegedly defamatory statements were published \u201cin response to a question put to the witness by either counsel or by the judge, that fact is sufficient to bring it within the protection of the privilege, notwithstanding the fact that it is subsequently adjudged to be inadmissible.\u201d Restatement (Second) of Torts \u00a7 588, Comment c, at 251 (1977). We conclude the trial court did not err in dismissing Hartlep\u2019s slander claim, as the statements made to the BFPC were absolutely privileged.\nThe judgment of the trial court is affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nHALL, PJ., and BURKE, J., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE WOLFSON" } ], "attorneys": [ "Stanley H. Jakala, of Berwyn, for appellant.", "Thomas G. DiCianni and Lucy B. Bednarek, both of Ancel, Glink, Diamond, Bush, DiCianni & Rolek, EC., of Chicago, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "BRIAN HARTLEP, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. DAVID TORRES, Chief of Police of Posen, Illinois, Defendant-Appellee.\nFirst District (3rd Division)\nNo. 1 \u2014 00\u20143768\nOpinion filed August 29, 2001.\nStanley H. Jakala, of Berwyn, for appellant.\nThomas G. DiCianni and Lucy B. Bednarek, both of Ancel, Glink, Diamond, Bush, DiCianni & Rolek, EC., of Chicago, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0817-01", "first_page_order": 835, "last_page_order": 838 }