{ "id": 256355, "name": "THEODORE E. PARKER, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. HOUSE O'LITE CORPORATION, d/b/a Holcor, et al., Defendants-Appellees", "name_abbreviation": "Parker v. House O'Lite Corp.", "decision_date": "2001-08-22", "docket_number": "No. 1 \u2014 00\u20143764", "first_page": "1014", "last_page": "1032", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "324 Ill. App. 3d 1014" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "534 N.E.2d 987", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1989, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "126 Ill. 2d 411", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5556950 ], "year": 1989, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/126/0411-01" ] }, { "cite": "742 N.E.2d 425", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2000, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "318 Ill. App. 3d 686", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 279730 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "696" }, { "page": "695-97" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/318/0686-01" ] }, { "cite": "664 N.E.2d 1094", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1996, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "279 Ill. App. 3d 345", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 75386 ], "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "350" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/279/0345-01" ] }, { "cite": "592 N.E.2d 8", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1991, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "227 Ill. App. 3d 414", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5792801 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "421" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/227/0414-01" ] }, { "cite": "619 N.E.2d 129", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1993, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "156 Ill. 2d 16", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 777540 ], "weight": 14, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "24-29" }, { "page": "29" }, { "page": "25" }, { "page": "28" }, { "page": "24" }, { "page": "19" }, { "page": "19-20" }, { "page": "20-22" }, { "page": "29" }, { "page": "29-30" }, { "page": "30" }, { "page": "30" }, { "page": "30" }, { "page": "31" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/156/0016-01" ] }, { "cite": "706 N.E.2d 514", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "\"An effective process for evaluating fitness of police officers is essential to ensuring public safety and maintaining a reliable, responsible police force\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "302 Ill. App. 3d 1051", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1352923 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1055" }, { "page": "1056", "parenthetical": "\"An effective process for evaluating fitness of police officers is essential to ensuring public safety and maintaining a reliable, responsible police force\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/302/1051-01" ] }, { "cite": "671 N.E.2d 1154", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1996, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "284 Ill. App. 3d 367", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1260367 ], "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "371" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/284/0367-01" ] }, { "cite": "698 N.E.2d 674", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1998, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "298 Ill. App. 3d 419", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1073627 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "424" }, { "page": "424" }, { "page": "424" }, { "page": "426" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/298/0419-01" ] }, { "cite": "617 N.E.2d 191", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "defendant's statement that the plaintiff was \"working a scam\" was defamation per se because it could impute plaintiff had committed a crime, and also the statement could prejudice him in his profession or trade" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "247 Ill. App. 3d 216", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2930827 ], "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "227", "parenthetical": "defendant's statement that the plaintiff was \"working a scam\" was defamation per se because it could impute plaintiff had committed a crime, and also the statement could prejudice him in his profession or trade" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/247/0216-01" ] }, { "cite": "323 Ill. App. 3d 1052", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 171713 ], "weight": 5, "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1057" }, { "page": "1053" }, { "page": "1057" }, { "page": "1059" }, { "page": "1059-60" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/323/1052-01" ] }, { "cite": "672 N.E.2d 1207", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1996, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "602 N.E.2d 864", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1992, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "236 Ill. App. 3d 796", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5783440 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "799" }, { "page": "802" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/236/0796-01" ] }, { "cite": "705 N.E.2d 898", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1998, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "185 Ill. 2d 299", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 122000 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "307" }, { "page": "307" }, { "page": "308" }, { "page": "307" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/185/0299-01" ] }, { "cite": "489 N.E.2d 867", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "111 Ill. 2d 229", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3166688 ], "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "240" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/111/0229-01" ] }, { "cite": "698 N.E.2d 574", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1998, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "298 Ill. App. 3d 329", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1073617 ], "weight": 5, "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "338" }, { "page": "338" }, { "page": "338" }, { "page": "339" }, { "page": "338" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/298/0329-01" ] }, { "cite": "719 N.E.2d 1101", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1999, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "308 Ill. App. 3d 393", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 261339 ], "weight": 9, "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "399" }, { "page": "399" }, { "page": "399" }, { "page": "400" }, { "page": "400", "parenthetical": "\"Proof of publication requires that the defamatory statements were communicated to some person other than the plaintiff\"" }, { "page": "402", "parenthetical": "\"[Tjhere is a definite general public interest in eradicating sexual harassment in the workplace\"" }, { "page": "404" }, { "page": "404" }, { "page": "407" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/308/0393-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1484, "char_count": 39407, "ocr_confidence": 0.77, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.338052426189984e-07, "percentile": 0.7918550463752906 }, "sha256": "bc8ab5e05a7b0d79572547f1885927b13c340e0daad0e1fcce8e6ee72a006032", "simhash": "1:3bfa915d574ad4ed", "word_count": 6333 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:56:29.143572+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THEODORE E. PARKER, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. HOUSE O\u2019LITE CORPORATION, d/b/a Holcor, et al., Defendants-Appellees." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE WOLFSON\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThe free flow of information on matters of compelling public interest is highly prized in our society. There are times when someone speaking out on such a matter gets the facts wrong and ends up defaming someone else. For these occasions the law provides a qualified privilege, one that can be abused and lost. This case requires us to examine whether the defendant defamed the plaintiff, whether she was protected by a qualified privilege, and, if the privilege did exist, whether it was abused.\nINTRODUCTION\nPlaintiff Theodore E. Parker, PE.. (Parker), brought this suit for defamation per se and false light invasion of privacy against defendant Susan M. Larson, individually and in her capacity as president of House O\u2019Lite Corporation, d/b/a Holcor (collectively Larson), alleging Larson published false and defamatory statements when she wrote two letters questioning his specifications for lighting fixtures to be used in a multimillion dollar project to build a new Cook County Hospital (CCH).\nLarson moved for summary judgment, contending the letters she wrote were substantially true and were privileged communications. The trial court entered an order granting summary judgment, finding that because her statements in the letters involved a matter of public interest, i.e., construction of a public hospital using taxpayer monies, they were privileged communications.\nOn appeal, Parker contends the trial court erred in granting summary judgment on his claim for defamation per se because Larson\u2019s statements in her two letters were not privileged communications, and if Larson\u2019s statements were found to be privileged, the trial court should have allowed a jury to determine whether she abused that privilege. Parker also contends the trial court erred in granting summary judgment on his false light claim \u201cwhere the record contained substantial evidence of actual malice,\u201d sufficient to raise material questions of fact. We reverse the trial court\u2019s order granting summary judgment and remand for further proceedings.\nFACTS\nIn 1994, Cook County (County) received approval to build a new state-of-the-art hospital. The new CCH would replace the old CCH on the near west side of Chicago. The County hired Turner Construction (Turner) as the program manager to oversee the CCH project.\nAs program manager, Turner was to oversee the work of a design team of private architectural and engineering firms. The design team comprised a partnership or joint venture of four private firms. These firms were responsible for designing the hospital and preparing drawings, plans, and specifications that detailed how the hospital was to be built, including the types and quantities of materials for the project.\nGlobetrotters Engineering Corporation (Globetrotters) was one of four private firms selected in early 1997 to form the design team for the CCH project. Although Globetrotters was retained by the County to do the electrical and mechanical design work, including lighting design and specification, the County\u2019s agent on the CCH project always was Turner.\nParker was employed by Globetrotters as a senior electrical engineer. He was responsible for the electrical and lighting design for the new CCH. His responsibilities included the drafting of a lighting fixture schedule or specifications of fixtures to be installed in the new CCH.\nParker drafted the lighting specifications which became the subject matter of this lawsuit. Although he was responsible to ensure the information on the lighting specifications was accurate and met Globetrotters\u2019 quality assurance guaranties before he sent it out for bidding in January 1998, he sent out \u201cincomplete\u201d lighting specifications.\nIn the fall of 1997, Larson decided she wanted to sell Holcor products for use in the CCH project. At the time, she was president of Holcor. Holcor was a women\u2019s business enterprise (WBE) that manufactured, among other things, fixtures for institutional applications such as hospitals.\nLarson was disturbed by Parker\u2019s lighting specifications for the CCH project. Specifically, she believed they authorized bids from companies that were not manufacturers, did not meet Globetrotters\u2019 quality specifications, and/or were owned or affiliated with Jeff Baum of Total Lighting Resources (TLR) and Design Galleries. She felt Baum was preferred on the lighting specifications because of a rumored \u201cspecial relationship\u201d between Baum and Parker, i.e., they were brothers-in-law.\nAfter Larson conducted an investigation of Parker and spoke to several people in the lighting industry familiar with the CCH project, she met with Turner\u2019s Ken Mullin, the program manager who represented the County on the CCH project. They discussed Larson\u2019s concern that Parker \u201crigged\u201d the lighting specifications of the CCH project in favor of his \u201cbrother-in-law\u201d Baum. Mullin, after conducting his own investigation, told Larson he could not substantiate any of her concerns and/or allegations. Mullin declined to investigate Parker\u2019s lighting specifications any further, causing Larson to write the letters that led to this lawsuit.\nDECISION\nSTANDARD OF REVIEW\nParker contends the trial court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of Larson on his defamation per se and false light invasion of privacy claims.\n\u20221 Summary judgment is appropriate where \u201cthe pleadings, depositions and admissions, together with the affidavits, show that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.\u201d Vickers v. Abbott Laboratories, 308 Ill. App. 3d 393, 399, 719 N.E.2d 1101 (1999), citing 735 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 1005(c) (West 1996). The party opposing summary judgment does not have to prove his or her case, but must present some factual basis arguably entitling him or her to judgment. Dunlap v. Alcuin Montessori School, 298 Ill. App. 3d 329, 338, 698 N.E.2d 574 (1998).\n\u20222 We note that while summary judgment is \u201c \u2018encouraged as an aid in the expeditious disposition of a lawsuit [citation], it is a drastic means of disposing of litigation and therefore should be allowed only when the right of the moving party is clear and free from doubt. [Citations.]\u2019 \u201d Vickers, 308 Ill. App. 3d at 399, quoting Purtill v. Hess, 111 Ill. 2d 229, 240, 489 N.E.2d 867 (1986).\nWe review de nova the trial court\u2019s ruling on a motion for summary judgment. Vickers, 308 Ill. App. 3d at 399. Although the scope of our review of a summary judgment motion is limited to the record as it existed at the time the trial court ruled, we are not restricted to the exact reasons the trial court stated or implied in entering its order. Dunlap, 298 Ill. App. 3d at 338. We may affirm the trial court\u2019s decision for any reason in the record, regardless of its basis for the decision. Dunlap, 298 Ill. App. 3d at 338.\nDEFAMATION\n\u20223 To prove defamation, a plaintiff must show (1) the defendant made a false statement about the plaintiff, (2) there was an unprivileged publication to a third party with fault by the defendant, and (3) the publication damaged the plaintiff. Vickers, 308 Ill. App. 3d at 400.\nThe law of defamation is well settled:\n\u201cA statement is considered defamatory if it tends to cause such harm to the reputation of another that it lowers that person in the eyes of the community or deters third persons from associating with him. [Citations.] Certain limited categories of defamatory statements are deemed actionable per se because they are so obviously and materially harmful to the plaintiff that injury to the plaintiffs reputation may be presumed.\u201d Van Horne v. Muller, 185 Ill. 2d 299, 307, 705 N.E.2d 898 (1998).\n\u20224 Illinois recognizes five categories of statements that are considered actionable per se, two pertinent to this case: (1) those imputing the commission of a criminal offense; and (2) those imputing an inability to perform or want of integrity in the discharge of duties of office or employment. Van Horne, 185 Ill. 2d at 307. In determining whether the statement is defamatory, we must \u201cfocus on the predictable effect the statement had on those who received the publication.\u201d Dunlap, 298 Ill. App. 3d at 339.\nThis case centers on Larson\u2019s January 12, 1998, letter. We set it out in full:\n\u201cMr. Ken Mullin, Project Executive Turner Construction Company 230 S. La Salle Street Chicago, IL 60604-1413\nDear Ken,\nEnclosed is some of the documentation on the Cook County hospital lighting specifications that we have discussed on several previous occasions.\nOur concern, as we have advised, is that the specification of the lighting is rigged. The specifications are written so that only one lighting representative, Mr. Jeff Baum, of TLC and Design Galleries, has a complete lighting package. In our industry, if you cannot present a complete fighting package, you are usually unable to bid the job competitively or successfully.\nAs shown in the attached spreadsheet, only Mr. Baum is able to bid the entire job. In several cases, the spec does not fist \u2018apples to apples\u2019. For example, Mr. Baum\u2019s fixture is fisted against higher quality, higher cost products, giving him a price advantage in supplying a lesser quality product. Additionally, on one item, F24R, Mr. Baum is fisted as the only approved fixture, as a \u2018one name spec\u2019. As a comparison, we have only included P&G, the agent able to bid the most items. P&G has bid items that are not approved to improve the coverage of the bid. Other agents have far fewer items than P&G that they are able to bid and have little chance of winning the job.\nOur concerns are exacerbated by the fact that the specifier, Mr. Ted Parker of Globetrotters, is Mr. Jeff Baum\u2019s brother-in-law. It appears that he has rigged the specifications so that only his relative can bid and win the job.\nIn addition, Globetrotter\u2019s Mr. Parker has violated his own specifications in rigging this bid. In the \u2018Quality Assurance\u2019 section of the Lighting requirements, the specifications read as follows:\nSection 16510, 1.3 Quality Assurance A Manufacturer\u2019s Qualifications: Firms regularly engaged in the manufacture of interior fighting fixture of the types and ratings required, whose products have been in satisfactory use in similar service for not less than 5 years.\nGlobetrotter\u2019s Mr. Parker has listed 2 companies that exist in name only and do not meet this specification. They are PMC and Lexes. These companies are owned by Mr. Jeff Baum, Mr. Parker\u2019s brother-in-law, and are not manufacturers in any sense of the word. Mr. Baum\u2019s non-existent manufacturers represent $500,000 of the lighting requirements, or 25-30% or more of this $2 million fighting job (manufacturers\u2019 level pricing).\nMr. Baum\u2019s \u2018manufacturers\u2019 purchase fighting from other real manufacturers and submit it as their own. There is no factory, no employees and the firms have never made a fighting fixture. Mr. Baum is currently working with a small local lighting manufacturer to supply the items specified as PMC and Lexes on this job. This manufacturer has not previously made these fixtures.\nGlobetrotter\u2019s Mr. Parker has a history of specifying jobs in this fashion in the past. However, the situations where this has occurred have not been of the magnitude of the Cook County Hospital job. The most recent previous example of this that we are aware of, occurred on Northwestern\u2019s Dyche Stadium. In that case, Mr. Parker also specified the bid so that only Mr. Baum could bid and win the job. In that case, he even refused to approve one of the manufacturers that PMC, one of Mr. Baum\u2019s non-existent manufacturers, was buying from. He would only approve it if the item bore a PMC name.\nWe object to the situation occurring again on Cook County Hospital.\nThere are a number of fixtures that our company, HOLCOR, is able to provide on this job. However, Mr. Parker has refused to meet with us and our agent[,] has refused to accept our submittals and has stood us up for arranged appointments.\nAs the only WBE and DBE manufacturer in the Chicago area, we want and need to be represented on this project. The way that the lighting has been specified, is being bid, and appears will be awarded violates all the rules of fairness and ethics. It also presents a situation where it is unlikely that the contractor, and ultimately the Hospital and the taxpayers, will get the most competitive price available.\nWe request the following actions to be implemented immediately to correct this problem:\n1. All the specifications be changed to \u2018or equal\u2019.\n2. PMC and Lexes be removed from the specifications, as they are not manufacturers.\n3. Globetrotter\u2019s Mr. Parker\u2019s conflict of interest be recognized and addressed.\nAs this project is bidding in the next week, we request your immediate attention and response.\nSincerely,\nSusan M. Larson\nPresident\nCC: Mr. Richard Devine, Cook County States Attorney\nMr. Lewis Matuszewich, Bowles, Resting, Bering, Matuszewich & Fiordaliel\nMr. Niranjan Shah, CEO, Globetrotters\nMr. William B. Moore, President, Globetrotters.\u201d (Bold in original.)\nOn January 13, 1998, Larson sent a letter containing nearly identical statements to Richard Devine, Cook County State\u2019s Attorney. The January 13 letter indicates copies were sent to the same individuals listed in the January 12 letter.\n\u20225 The trial court found, and the parties do not dispute, the complained-of statements by Larson were published. Vickers, 308 Ill. App. 3d at 400 (\u201cProof of publication requires that the defamatory statements were communicated to some person other than the plaintiff\u201d).\n\u20226 In addition, the trial court, in its order granting Larson\u2019s motian for summary judgment, said: \u201cFor purposes of the pending motion for summary judgment, and without in any way deciding the matter, the court treats the complained of statements made by Holcor[, i.e., Larson,] as defamatory per se.\u201d When a defamatory statement is actionable per se, the plaintiff does not have to plead or prove actual damage to his or her reputation in order to recover. Dunlap, 298 Ill. App. 3d at 338.\nThe trial court then determined Larson\u2019s statements were qualifiedly privileged.\nParker contends Larson\u2019s letters of January 12 and January 13, 1998, defamed him by imputing to him (1) the commission of a criminal offense, i.e., \u201cbid rigging,\u201d and (2) the inability to perform or want of integrity in the discharge of duties of office or employment.\nLarson replies the challenged statements in her letters are nondefamatory as a matter of law because they are capable of \u201cinnocent construction\u201d and are \u201csubstantially true.\u201d She also contends her statements are protected by a qualified privilege.\nAlthough \u201c[a]n otherwise defamatory statement is not actionable if made under a qualified privilege\u201d (Larson v. Decatur Memorial Hospital, 236 Ill. App. 3d 796, 799, 602 N.E.2d 864 (1992)), we first consider whether the challenged statements in Larson\u2019s letters are nondefamatory as a matter of law. We are obliged to decide this issue because Larson contends summary judgment should be affirmed on the grounds there was no defamation per se. The issue has been fully briefed.\nINNOCENT CONSTRUCTION\n\u20227 Even if a communication falls within one of the recognized per se categories, a court will not find the communication actionable if it is reasonably capable of an innocent construction. Bryson v. News America Publications, Inc., 174 Il. 2d 77, 90, 672 N.E.2d 1207 (1996). Under the innocent construction rule, we are required to consider a written or oral statement in context, giving the words, and their implications, their natural and obvious meaning. Bryson, 174 Ill. 2d at 90. Whether a communication is reasonably susceptible to an innocent interpretation is a question of law for the court to decide. Bryson, 174 Ill. 2d at 90.\nLarson contends the assertions \u201cthe specification of the lighting is rigged,\u201d \u201cIt appears that he [(Parker)] has rigged the specifications so that only his relative can bid and win the job,\u201d and \u201cGlobetrotter\u2019s Mr. Parker has violated his own specifications in rigging this bid\u201d (bold in original) are not actionable per se because the word \u201crigged\u201d may reasonably be innocently construed.\nLarson notes Webster\u2019s Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary includes a number of different definitions for the word \u201crigged,\u201d including \u201cto manipulate or control.\u201d Webster\u2019s Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary at 1015 (1983). She argues that, because \u201crigged\u201d may be considered synonymous with \u201cto fix in advance for a desired result,\u201d the court must innocently construe the word \u201crigged\u201d as something other than an accusation of a crime.\nBryson dispels the notion that the innocent construction rule applies whenever a word has more than one dictionary definition, one of which is not defamatory. Bryson, 174 Ill. 2d at 93.\nIn Bryson, the plaintiff brought a defamation action against the author of an article that appeared in a magazine\u2019s \u201cfiction\u201d section, and against the publisher of that magazine, alleging the article defamed plaintiff by referring to and characterizing a character (who had plaintiffs last name) as a \u201cslut,\u201d thereby implying the plaintiff was an \u201cunchaste\u201d individual. Bryson, 174 Ill. 2d at 84-87.\nThe defendants claimed the assertion plaintiff was a \u201cslut\u201d was not actionable per se because the word \u201cslut\u201d may reasonably be innocently construed as describing the plaintiff as a \u201cbully,\u201d where the American Heritage Dictionary includes a number of different definitions for the word \u201cslut,\u201d including \u201ca slovenly, dirty woman,\u201d \u201ca woman of loose morals,\u201d \u201cprostitute,\u201d a \u201cbold, brazen girl,\u201d or \u201ca female dog.\u201d Bryson, 174 Ill. 2d at 92-93.\nThe supreme court held the innocent construction rule does not apply simply because allegedly defamatory words are \u201ccapable\u201d of an innocent construction. Bryson, 174 Ill. 2d at 93. The court instructed that allegedly defamatory words are to be interpreted as they appear to be used and according to the idea they were intended to convey to the reasonable reader. Bryson, 174 Ill. 2d at 93.\n\u20228 Here, Larson made several statements in her letter accusing Parker of \u201crigging\u201d the hghting specifications on the CCH project and the Northwestern Dyche stadium project for Mr. Baum. The crime of \u201cbid-rigging\u201d is committed when a person\n\u201cknowingly agrees with any person who is, or but for such agreement would be, a competitor of such person concerning any bid submitted or not submitted by such person or another to a unit of State or local government when with the intent that the bid submitted or not submitted will result in the award of a contract to such person or another and he either (1) provides such person or receives from another information concerning the price or other material term or terms of the bid which would otherwise not be disclosed to a competitor in an independent noncollusive submission of bids or (2) submits a bid that is of such a price or other material term or terms that he does not intend the bid to be accepted.\u201d 720 ILCS 5/33E \u2014 3 (West 1998).\nWe find a defamatory meaning was conveyed by Larson. \u201cA statement need not state the commission of a crime with the particularity of an indictment to qualify as defamatory per se.\u201d Van Horne, 185 Ill. 2d at 308.\nStavros v. Marrese, 323 Ill. App. 3d 1052, 1057 (2001), supports our conclusion. In Stavros, the plaintiff brought suit for defamation, alleging a letter written by the defendant, sent to the plaintiffs employer, contained a wrongful and malicious accusation the plaintiff committed \u201cextortion\u201d in connection with the issuance of a construction permit. Stavros, 323 Ill. App. 3d at 1053. The court held the defendant\u2019s \u201cletter\u2019s repeated references to extortion are defamatory per se under the first category,\u201d i.e., words that impute the commission of a criminal offense. Stavros, 323 Ill. App. 3d at 1057.\nOf course, a criminal accusation is only one category of statement which can be considered defamatory per se. The record could support a finding that Larson\u2019s letters impute Parker with \u201can inability to perform or want of integrity in the discharge of duties of office or employment.\u201d Van Horne, 185 Ill. 2d at 307. Larson accuses Parker of violating \u201chis own specifications in rigging this bid\u201d (bold in original) and \u201cspecifying jobs in this fashion in the past.\u201d See Kumaran v. Brotman, 247 Ill. App. 3d 216, 227, 617 N.E.2d 191 (1993) (defendant\u2019s statement that the plaintiff was \u201cworking a scam\u201d was defamation per se because it could impute plaintiff had committed a crime, and also the statement could prejudice him in his profession or trade).\nWe are not required to strain to find an unnatural but possibly innocent meaning for words where the defamatory meaning is far more reasonable. See Bryson, 174 iLL. 2d at 93. Nor are we required to espouse a naivete unwarranted under the circumstances. Bryson, 174 Ill. 2d at 93. We reject Larson\u2019s contention the defamatory language at issue must be innocently construed as a matter of law.\nSUBSTANTIAL TRUTH\nLarson next contends the trial court\u2019s decision was proper because her statements were substantially true.\n\u20229 An allegedly defamatory statement is not actionable if it is substantially true, even though it is not technically accurate in every detail. Cianci v. Pettibone Corp., 298 Ill. App. 3d 419, 424, 698 N.E.2d 674 (1998). A defendant bears the burden of establishing the \u201csubstantial truth\u201d of her assertions, which she can demonstrate by showing that the \u201cgist\u201d or \u201csting\u201d of the defamatory material is true. Cianci, 298 Ill. App. 3d at 424.\nWhen determining the \u201cgist\u201d or \u201csting\u201d of allegedly defamatory material, a trial court must \u201c \u2018look at the highlight of the article, the pertinent angle of it, and not to items of secondary importance which are inoffensive details, immaterial to the truth of the defamatory statement.\u2019 [Citation.]\u201d Gist v. Macon County Sheriff\u2019s Department, 284 Ill. App. 3d 367, 371, 671 N.E.2d 1154 (1996).\n\u202210 The defense of substantial truth normally is a jury question. But, first, courts must ask whether a reasonable jury could find substantial truth has not been established. If the answer is no, the question is one of law, subject to de nova review. Cianci, 298 Ill. App. 3d at 424.\nLarson contends the essence of her letters was that Parker\u2019s lighting specifications failed in various ways to meet statutory guidelines and contractually mandated quality assurance and bid guidelines, thereby threatening the taxpayers\u2019 right to obtain quality products at the most competitive price available. Larson\u2019s view was that these perceived deficiencies served to ensure \u201cthat the specification of the lighting is rigged\u201d to favor Mr. Jeff Baum, Parker\u2019s brother-in-law. (Bold in original.)\nParker replies Larson\u2019s contentions are not pertinent to the \u201cangle\u201d of her letter and are of secondary importance. Parker contends Larson\u2019s argument focuses on inoffensive details immaterial to the truth of the allegedly defamatory statement. Parker says, \u201cIt is clear that the \u2018highlight\u2019 of Larson\u2019s statements are her charges \u2014 which she herself highlighted in bold typeface in her letters \u2014 that Mr. Parker engaged in criminal and unethical conduct by rigging the lighting specifications in order to steer business to his relative and to companies owned by his relative. The clear \u2018angle\u2019 is that Mr. Parker was engaging in nepotism, a most basic form of corruption.\u201d\n\u202211 We note there is no evidence of any family relationship between Baum and Parker and no evidence \u201cMr. Parker also specified the bid so that only Mr. Baum could bid and win the\u201d Northwestern Dyche Stadium project. We also note there is evidence PMC is a company \u2014 not just a name \u2014 and Baum did not own part of PMC or arrange to buy fixtures for relabeling under the PMC name.\nAlthough we review the grant of summary judgment strictly against the moving party, we cannot say as a matter of law Larson\u2019s statements in her two letters were either substantially true or false. There is an obvious factual dispute. That is:\nDid Larson make false and defamatory statements about Parker \u201crigging\u201d the lighting specification of a public project to give business to Baum?\nWe find the answer to that question is a triable issue of material fact, allowing a jury to decide whether the \u201cgist\u201d or \u201csting\u201d of Larson\u2019s statements was substantially true.\nQUALIFIED PRIVILEGE\nWe next consider the trial court\u2019s finding of privilege. See Turner v. Fletcher, 302 Ill. App. 3d 1051, 1055, 706 N.E.2d 514 (1999).\n\u202212 Illinois follows the Restatement (Second) of Torts (1977) in determining whether a qualified privilege should be recognized in a given situation. Kuwik v. Starmark Star Marketing & Administration, Inc., 156 Ill. 2d 16, 24-29, 619 N.E.2d 129 (1993), citing Restatement (Second) of Torts \u00a7\u00a7 593 through 599 (1977). In Kuwik, our supreme court recognized three classes of qualified privilege: (1) situations in which some interest of the person who publishes the defamatory matter is involved; (2) situations in which some interest of the person to whom the matter is published or of some other third person is involved; and (3) situations in which a recognized interest of the public is concerned. 156 Ill. 2d at 29.\nParker contends Larson failed to prove the existence of a qualified privilege. Although Larson has the burden of proving whether a conditional privilege for an alleged defamation statement exists, we look only to the occasion itself and determine as a matter of law and general policy whether the occasion created a recognized duty or interest that makes the communication privileged. Kuwik, 156 Ill. 2d at 25; Larson, 236 Ill. App. 3d at 802.\nOur inquiry is a general one, requiring us to weigh the value of the type of interest to be protected against the degree of damage to be expected from release of the type of defamatory matter involved. Kuwik, 156 Ill. 2d at 28. The qualified privilege, in particular, effectuates the policy of facilitating a free flow of information so that correct information may ultimately be attained. Kuwik, 156 Ill. 2d at 24.\nIn Kuwik, the plaintiff/chiropractor\u2019s bill was submitted to the defendant insurance administrator for payment. Kuwik, 156 Ill. 2d at 19. In response, the plaintiff received a letter from the defendant stating the services the plaintiff rendered were \u201coutside the scope of the practicing physician\u2019s license\u201d and payment was therefore denied. In fact, the treatment rendered was not outside the scope of the plaintiffs license. Kuwik, 156 Ill. 2d at 19-20. Because the bill also was submitted by the plaintiffs patient, the defendant\u2019s response letter was communicated to the patient. The patient showed the letter to the plaintiff, and the plaintiff brought suit for defamation per se against the defendant. Kuwik, 156 Ill. 2d at 20-22.\nThe court found the letters were subject to a qualified or conditional privilege. Kuwik, 156 Ill. 2d at 29. It concluded the defendants and third parties all had a compelling interest in knowing whether the plaintiff was acting within the scope of her license. Kuwik, 156 Ill. 2d at 29-30.\nBecause the letters in Kuwik were sent on occasions where not only the interests of defendants, i.e., insurance carriers and their employees, were involved, but where plaintiffs and the patient/claimant\u2019s interests were involved as well, \u201ca misstatement of information should be afforded some degree of protection in order to facilitate the free flow of correct information.\u201d Kuwik, 156 Ill. 2d at 30.\n\u202213 In accord with Kuwik, and consistent with the trial court\u2019s ruling, we find Larson\u2019s letters involve an interest of social importance \u2014 fair bidding on a public project. The interest is important enough to receive direct legal protection. See 720 ILCS 5/33E \u2014 3 (West 1998). It is protected by the privilege as described in Kuwik. See Restatement (Second) of Torts \u00a7 594, Comment d (1977). Cf. Vicker, 308 Ill. App. 3d at 402 (\u201c[Tjhere is a definite general public interest in eradicating sexual harassment in the workplace\u201d).\nWe hold the trial court correctly concluded Larson\u2019s communications were conditionally privileged because Larson\u2019s \u201cmisstatement of information should be afforded some degree of protection in order to facilitate the free flow of correct information.\u201d Kuwik, 156 Ill. 2d at 30. Cf. Turner v. Fletcher, 302 Ill. App. 3d 1051, 1056, 706 N.E.2d 514 (1999) (\u201cAn effective process for evaluating fitness of police officers is essential to ensuring public safety and maintaining a reliable, responsible police force\u201d).\nABUSE OF THE QUALIFIED PRIVILEGE\nParker contends the question of whether Larson abused her privilege was a question of fact for the jury to decide, not for the trial court. We agree.\n\u202214 Once a defendant has established a qualified privilege, a communication is actionable only if the plaintiff can show the defendant abused the privilege. Vickers, 308 Ill. App. 3d at 404. To satisfy this burden, the plaintiff must present evidence of a \u201creckless act which shows a disregard for the defamed party\u2019s rights, including the failure to properly investigate the truth of the matter, limit the scope of the material, or send the material to only the proper parties.\u201d Kuwik, 156 Ill. 2d at 30.\nThe issue of whether a privilege was abused ordinarily is a question of fact. Vickers, 308 Ill. App. 3d at 404. The plaintiff must come forward with actual evidence creating an issue of fact. Cianci, 298 Ill. App. 3d at 426.\nIn Kuwik, the court, after holding defendant\u2019s communications were conditionally privileged, found a genuine issue of material fact existed where the plaintiff offered evidence of the defendant\u2019s recklessness. Kuwik, 156 Ill. 2d at 31. At a deposition, one of the defendant\u2019s employees testified that company policy required input from both the legal and medical departments when investigating physician licensing. Additional evidence established that only the legal department was consulted on this particular matter. As a result, the court determined a question of fact existed as to whether the defendant was reckless because company investigatory procedures clearly were not followed.\nThe questions here are (1) whether Larson recklessly failed to conduct a proper investigation into whether Parker had participated in \u201cbid-rigging\u201d and \u201cnepotism\u201d before making those statements, and (2) whether she sent her letters to the proper parties, i.e., Nanci Wright, Tom Drzich, Jim Konnerth, or Pam Zekman.\nParker asserts Larson \u201cacted maliciously by recklessly disregarding the truth of her defamatory statements\u201d and acted with intent to harm him because she was motivated by greed, wanting to drive him off the CCH project so bidding would open up. The crux of Parker\u2019s contention is that Larson wrote and published her statements in the two letters with \u201cactual malice\u201d because she wrote what she wrote based on gratuitous gossip maliciously conjured up, and not as the result of a thorough investigation.\nParker is correct to point out that the important issue in a defamation suit is whether Larson\u2019s investigation was so deficient that it was conducted in reckless disregard of plaintiffs rights. See Stavros, 323 Ill. App. 3d at 1059 (\u201cIt is possible that a finder of fact would determine that defendant should have investigated more carefully \u2018the matter,\u2019 i.e., the definition of extortion, to determine whether plaintiffs behavior in fact amounted to this criminal behavior, prior to sending the letter to plaintiffs employer\u201d).\n\u2022 15 Larson suggests nothing in her investigation led her to disbelieve her assertions, or that the facts in her letter were incorrect. When \u201c \u2018determining whether factual issues exist for purposes of a summary judgment motion,\u2019 \u201d we \u201c \u2018must ignore personal conclusions, opinions and self-serving statements and consider only facts admissible in evidence.\u2019 \u201d Vickers, 308 Ill. App. 3d at 407, quoting Reuben H. Donnelley Corp. v. Krasny Supply Co., 227 Ill. App. 3d 414, 421, 592 N.E.2d 8 (1991).\n\u202216 Before January 12, 1998, Larson had no personal experience with Parker on the CCH project or any other project. In addition, other than the lighting specifications themselves, Larson did not review any other public documents concerning the CCH project. Nor did she attend any of the public meetings discussing the specifications and the bid process for the CCH project. To get Holcor products into the CCH project, Larson asked her sales representative, Jim Kon-nerth, to ask Parker to dinner \u2014 an invitation Parker declined.\nKonnerth\u2019s attempts to present Parker with Holcor materials on behalf of Larson failed. Larson never made any attempts of her own to contact Globetrotters or Parker or present them with materials concerning Holcor products.\nLarson and Konnerth had several conversations concerning their inability to get Holcor listed as a manufacturer in Parker\u2019s lighting specifications. Their conversations led Larson to several conclusions, some of which were: (1) Parker and Baum had a \u201cspecial relationship\u201d of some kind \u2014 she was not sure if they were related; (2) Baum\u2019s products were being specified and used to \u201can unusual degree on [Parker\u2019s] projects\u201d and it was \u201cobvious the [CCH] specifications favored Jeff Baum\u201d; (3) there were rumors in the industry \u201cindicating that some manufacturers or some representatives don\u2019t even want to bid on Parker\u2019s projects because they believe that have very little chance, if any, of getting that project\u201d before January 1998; (4) it was unfair that companies which did not meet Globetrotters\u2019 specifications were listed in Parker\u2019s specifications, and these were companies that had some sort of affiliation, relationship, or possible ownership with Baum, which she thought was \u201csuspect\u201d; and (5) although PMC and Lexes were listed as manufacturers on Parker\u2019s specifications, they were not manufacturers \u2014 suggesting that because PMC and Lexes were affiliated with Baum, Parker overlooked the fact that PMC and Lexes bought fixtures from other companies and relabeled them as their own.\nLarson wanted support for her conclusions, so she started to investigate Parker. Larson spoke to Nanci Wright, who testified that during some \u201cfriendly chit-chat, gossip\u201d she told Larson it was a \u201crumor\u201d that Parker and Baum were related. Although Larson performed an Internet search which was inconclusive, Larson believed Parker and Baum were brothers-in-law and never called Parker or Baum to verify the truth of their rumored relationship.\nSimilarly, Larson believed Parker had a history of favoring Baum on lighting specifications because Tom Drzich, Nanci Wright, Mike Maclnerney, Paxil DiTomo, and Jim Konnerth told her Parker did. All of these people deny or cannot recall telling Larson that Parker had a history of favoring Baum. In fact, several people she claims provided her with information concerning Parker\u2019s allegedly improper conduct disagreed with Larson\u2019s assertion Parker had \u201crigged\u201d the lighting specifications or otherwise acted improperly in drafting the CCH and Northwestern Dyche Stadium lighting specifications.\nMost significantly, after Larson believed she foxrnd support for all her allegations against Parker, she had several conversations with Mullin regarding her concerns Parker \u201crigged\u201d the CCH lighting specifications to favor Baum. Larson asked Mxxllin of Turner Construction to follow up on her investigation. He did.\nMullin and members of his staff conducted a review of the specifications and concluded there was no evidence of impropriety or noncompetitiveness in Parker\u2019s lighting specifications. Before Larson\u2019s January 12, 1998, letter was written, Mullin telephoned Larson and told her that her allegations against Parker were \u201cunfounded\u201d and representatives other than Baum coxild competitively bid the project.\nLarson wrote her letters anyway, accusing Parker of \u201crigging\u201d the lighting specifications of the CCH project in favor of Baum because they were brothers-in-law. She sent copies of one or both of the letters to people other than those named as recipients on the letters (e.g., Pam Zekman, a reporter for WBBM-TV in Chicago, Nanci Wright, Tom Drzich, and Jim Konnerth). The contents of the letters became public knowledge in the industry.\nA jury could find Larson improperly relied on or communicated with other persons and never conducted a careful investigation into the CCH project before attributing criminal and reprehensible conduct to Parker in her two letters. That is, a jury coxild find she was reckless and abused her qualified privilege.\nParker has raised a triable issue of fact with respect to whether Larson abused the conditional privilege which otherwise protects her letters. We hold the trial coxirt erred in granting the defendant\u2019s motion for summary judgment. See Stavros, 323 Ill. App. 3d at 1059-60.\nFALSE LIGHT INVASION OF PRIVACY\nParker contends Larson\u2019s motion for summary judgment on count II, alleging a cause of action for false light invasion of privacy, should not have been granted. The trial court made no ruling with respect to this cause of action, other than to grant summary judgment on all counts.\n\u202217 The tort of false light invasion of privacy protects one\u2019s interest in being let alone from false publicity. Aroonsakul v. Shannon, 279 Ill. App. 3d 345, 350, 664 N.E.2d 1094 (1996). In a false-light claim, the plaintiff must prove (1) he was placed in a false light before the public as a result of the defendant\u2019s action; (2) the false light in which he was placed would be highly offensive to a reasonable person; and (3) the defendant acted with knowledge that the information he published was false or with reckless disregard for whether the information was true or false. Kurczaba v. Pollock, 318 Ill. App. 3d 686, 696, 742 N.E.2d 425 (2000); Lovgren v. Citizens First National Bank of Princeton, 126 Ill. 2d 411, 534 N.E.2d 987 (1989).\nIn cases where both defamation and false light claims are applicable, the plaintiff can proceed under either theory, or both, although there is only one recovery for each instance of publicity. Kurczaba, 318 Ill. App. 3d at 695-97.\n\u202218 Here, the trial court dismissed Parker\u2019s count alleging false light invasion of privacy, apparently because \u201con this record and with respect to both the question of qualified privilege and the failure to present evidence of reckless conduct, there are no genuine issues of fact in dispute and the defendants are entitled to the judgment of dismissal sought as a matter of law.\u201d\nHaving found Parker raised a triable issue of fact with respect to whether Larson\u2019s letters are substantially true and whether she abused her conditional privilege, we find whether Larson knew her information was false or acted with reckless disregard for the truth are issues of fact for the jury.\nCONCLUSION\nWe reverse the trial court\u2019s grant of summary judgment and remand this matter for further proceedings.\nReversed and remanded.\nHALL, EJ., and CERDA, J., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE WOLFSON" } ], "attorneys": [ "Norman B. Berger and Anne E. Viner, both of Varga Berger Ledsky Hayes & Casey, of Chicago, for appellant.", "Hinshaw & Culbertson, of Chicago (Steven M. Puiszis, Nancy G. Lischer, Robert T. Shannon, and James C. Vlahakis, of counsel), for appellees." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THEODORE E. PARKER, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. HOUSE O\u2019LITE CORPORATION, d/b/a Holcor, et al., Defendants-Appellees.\nFirst District (3rd Division)\nNo. 1 \u2014 00\u20143764\nOpinion filed August 22, 2001.\nNorman B. Berger and Anne E. Viner, both of Varga Berger Ledsky Hayes & Casey, of Chicago, for appellant.\nHinshaw & Culbertson, of Chicago (Steven M. Puiszis, Nancy G. Lischer, Robert T. Shannon, and James C. Vlahakis, of counsel), for appellees." }, "file_name": "1014-01", "first_page_order": 1032, "last_page_order": 1050 }