{ "id": 570790, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. RONALD L. WATKINS, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Watkins", "decision_date": "2001-10-10", "docket_number": "Nos. 2\u201400\u20140643, 2\u201400\u20140644 cons.", "first_page": "13", "last_page": "22", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "325 Ill. App. 3d 13" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "306 Ill. App. 3d 803", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1336050 ], "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "808" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/306/0803-01" ] }, { "cite": "166 Ill. 2d 247", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 198915 ], "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "258" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/166/0247-01" ] }, { "cite": "225 Ill. App. 3d 331", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5245265 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "335-36" }, { "page": "335-36" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/225/0331-01" ] }, { "cite": "288 Ill. App. 3d 620", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1597001 ], "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "635" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/288/0620-01" ] }, { "cite": "196 Ill. 2d 518", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 351227 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "526", "parenthetical": "consecutive sentences imposed under section 5 - 8-4(a) do not violate Apprendi" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/196/0518-01" ] }, { "cite": "196 Ill. 2d 269", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 351226 ], "weight": 4, "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "284" }, { "page": "286" }, { "page": "286" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/196/0269-01" ] }, { "cite": "143 Ill. 2d 271", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5591518 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "278-79" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/143/0271-01" ] }, { "cite": "163 Ill. 2d 346", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 477785 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "355", "parenthetical": "imposition of consecutive sentences does not constitute increase in penalty" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/163/0346-01" ] }, { "cite": "145 Ill. App. 3d 873", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3535066 ], "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "879" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/145/0873-01" ] }, { "cite": "175 Ill. App. 3d 420", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3553672 ], "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "430" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/175/0420-01" ] }, { "cite": "164 Ill. 2d 218", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 477021 ], "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "235" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/164/0218-01" ] }, { "cite": "86 Ill. 2d 242", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5469020 ], "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "245-46" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/86/0242-01" ] }, { "cite": "151 Ill. 2d 79", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3291993 ], "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "83-84" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/151/0079-01" ] }, { "cite": "315 Ill. App. 3d 980", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 980640 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "994" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/315/0980-01" ] }, { "cite": "183 Ill. 2d 16", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 209984 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "21" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/183/0016-01" ] }, { "cite": "122 Ill. 2d 176", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5550081 ], "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "186" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/122/0176-01" ] }, { "cite": "170 Ill. App. 3d 572", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3586656 ], "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "576" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/170/0572-01" ] }, { "cite": "530 U.S. 466", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 9413911 ], "weight": 6, "year": 2000, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/530/0466-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 800, "char_count": 18547, "ocr_confidence": 0.789, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.0116422291964239e-07, "percentile": 0.542362894516244 }, "sha256": "3550b056b018fa098008952c7c6232058edd77ee93d0aae9922970ce0bb42e72", "simhash": "1:bb8e3d8c624fe87c", "word_count": 2977 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:13:10.268443+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. RONALD L. WATKINS, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE BYRNE\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nPursuant to a plea negotiation, defendant, Ronald L. Watkins, pleaded guilty to one count of retail theft (720 ILCS 5/16A \u2014 10(a) (West 1998)) in case No. 98 \u2014 CF\u20141246 (\u201998 offense) and to one count of retail theft in case No. 99 \u2014 CF\u2014749 (\u201999 offense). Defendant was sentenced to two consecutive three-year terms of imprisonment. Thereafter, defendant filed motions to vacate the pleas and to reconsider the sentences, which were subsequently denied. Defendant contends on appeal that the sentences (1) are improperly enhanced; (2) violate Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 147 L. Ed. 2d 435, 120 S. Ct. 2348 (2000); and (3) are excessive. We affirm.\nBACKGROUND\nThe relevant facts may be briefly stated. In 1998, defendant was charged by indictment with retail theft for allegedly stealing merchandise valued at $22.98 from a Sears store. In 1999, while out on bond for the \u201998 offense, defendant was indicted with, inter alia, retail theft for stealing merchandise totaling less than $150 from a Dominicks store.\nDefendant pleaded guilty to both offenses at one hearing. During the factual basis hearing for both the \u201998 and \u201999 offenses, the State introduced, without objection, a prior \u201993 conviction as the basis for enhancing each respective retail theft charge to a Class 4 felony. The court informed defendant that both cases were Class 4 felonies, punishable by terms of imprisonment of one to three years and a one-year period of mandatory supervised release. Defendant indicated that he understood the charges and possible penalties. The State noted that, because the \u201999 offense was committed while defendant was out on bond for the \u201998 offense, it was mandatory that the sentences be served consecutively. After the court explained the differences between sentences and admonished that consecutive sentences were required, defendant indicated that he was still willing to plead guilty to both offenses. Thereafter, the court noted that defendant had signed a jury waiver in open court, that the pleas were being entered into freely and voluntarily, and that there was a factual basis for accepting the pleas. The court then entered findings of guilt and judgments of conviction on both offenses.\nEvidence presented at the sentencing hearing indicated that the 45-year-old defendant had an extensive criminal history, consisting mostly of retail thefts and thefts. In addition, defendant had a hearing impairment and had used cocaine or heroin \u201con an almost daily basis\u201d since the age of 17. The court noted that it considered defendant\u2019s statement, the nonviolent nature of the crimes, defendant\u2019s acknowledgment of guilt, and his recent efforts to address his drug problem. The court also considered defendant\u2019s \u201chistory and character,\u201d as well as \u201chis current status.\u201d The court found that it was indisputable that defendant was a drug addict and that there was a relationship between defendant\u2019s addiction and the crimes he committed. However, after considering the testimony of defendant and the Treatment Alternatives for Safe Communities (TASC) report, the court believed that there was no likelihood that defendant could be rehabilitated. The court concluded that a period of incarceration was necessary to protect the public and that probation would be inconsistent with the ends of justice and would deprecate the seriousness of defendant\u2019s conduct. The court sentenced defendant to two three-year terms of imprisonment \u201cto run consecutively.\u201d\nOn January 13, 2000, defendant filed pro se motions to withdraw his pleas. On April 19, 2000, new defense counsel filed a superceding motion to withdraw the plea under the \u201999 offense and also filed Supreme Court Rule 604(d) (188 Ill. 2d R. 604(d)) certificates and motions to reconsider the sentences under both cases.\nThe trial court denied the motion to withdraw the plea, finding that defendant was properly admonished, that his plea was made freely and voluntarily, and that he understood the consequences of his plea. The trial court also denied the motions to reconsider the sentences following a hearing on the motions.\nWe note that defendant was sentenced for both offenses on December 17, 1999. On January 13, 2000, defendant filed timely pro se motions to withdraw his pleas. Although the motions to vacate were filed within 30 days of sentencing, the motions to reduce the sentences were not filed until April 19, 2000, beyond the 30-day time limit set forth under Supreme Court Rule 604(d). However, neither the trial court nor the State complained of the untimeliness of the motions to reduce the sentences, and a full hearing was conducted on the motions. We agree with defendant that the revestment doctrine allows the parties to revest a court with jurisdiction when the parties \u201cactively participate in proceedings which are inconsistent with the merits of the prior judgment.\u201d People v. Hubbard, 170 Ill. App. 3d 572, 576 (1988). The State does not challenge the trial court\u2019s jurisdiction. We therefore conclude that the trial court had jurisdiction to consider defendant\u2019s motions. Because defendant filed his notices of appeal within 30 days from the date of the denial of the motions, his appeals are timely. We consolidated the \u201998 and \u201999 cases on appeal.\nANALYSIS\nI. Double Enhancement\nOn appeal, defendant challenges only his sentences. He first contends that the trial court\u2019s imposition of consecutive sentences was the result of improper double enhancement. The State responds that defendant has waived this issue by failing to raise it during the sentencing hearing or in the motion to reconsider the sentences. Defendant does not dispute that he failed to raise this issue below. Therefore the issue ordinarily would be deemed waived. See People v. Enoch, 122 Ill. 2d 176, 186 (1988). However, defendant argues that we should address the issue as plain error pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 615(a) (134 Ill. 2d R. 615(a)) because the error is so fundamental that it could result in an illegal sentence. We agree with defendant and will therefore review the issue under the plain error rule.\nOn the merits, defendant argues that the trial court improperly used the \u201993 conviction twice to enhance both the \u201998 and the \u201999 retail theft offenses to felonies and then improperly used the \u201993 conviction to impose consecutive sentences. Defendant reasons that his \u201cstatus as a felon\u201d was used twice to \u201cupgrade\u201d his crimes from misdemeanors to felonies, and then used again to \u201cenhance\u201d his sentences to consecutive sentences. In other words, defendant reasons that, because he committed the \u201999 offense, now classified as a felony, while he was on pretrial release from the \u201998 felony, consecutive sentences were mandated. According to defendant, this constituted an impermissible \u201cdouble enhancement\u201d and the reversal of his sentences is required. We disagree.\nThis case revolves around the application of the retail theft and consecutive sentencing statutes. Because it involves only a pure question of law, our review is de novo. See People v. Wright, 183 Ill. 2d 16, 21 (1998); People v. Becker, 315 Ill. App. 3d 980, 994 (2000).\nThe offenses of which defendant was convicted, felony retail thefts, are Class 4 felonies. Section 16A \u2014 10 of the Criminal Code of 1961, provides:\n\u201c(1) Retail theft of property, the full retail value of which does not exceed $150, is a Class A misdemeanor.\n(2) A person who has been convicted of retail theft of property, the full retail value of which does not exceed $150, and who has been previously convicted of any type of theft, robbery, armed robbery, burglary, residential burglary, possession of burglary tools or home invasion is guilty of a Class 4 felony.\u201d 720 ILCS 5/16A \u2014 10 (West 1998).\nDuring the factual basis hearing, the State introduced the same prior \u201993 conviction as the basis for upgrading both the \u201998 and \u201999 retail theft charges from misdemeanors to Class 4 felonies. The requirements for enhancing Class A misdemeanor retail thefts to Class 4 felonies were present in both the \u201998 and \u201999 offenses.\nMoreover, it is undisputed that defendant committed the \u201999 offense while out on bond for the \u201998 felony. Mandatory consecutive sentences are required when a person charged with a felony commits a separate felony while on pretrial release. 730 ILCS 5/5 \u2014 8\u20144(h) (West 1998). All of the requirements for the enhancement of the offenses and the imposition of consecutive sentences were therefore fulfilled in each case. Nevertheless, defendant challenges the application of the \u201993 conviction on the ground that it constitutes improper double enhancement.\nImproper double enhancement occurs when the court uses a single factor both as an element of a defendant\u2019s crime and as an aggravating factor to justify the imposition of a harsher sentence than might otherwise have been imposed. People v. Gonzalez, 151 Ill. 2d 79, 83-84 (1992). The legislature prescribes the sentencing range for an offense by putting the offense into a specific class, such as a Class A misdemeanor or a Class 4 felony, and then designating the sentences that may be imposed for each class of offenses. Accordingly, if one of those same factors that make up the offense is used as the basis for imposing a harsher penalty than might otherwise be imposed, it constitutes a double use of a single factor. Gonzalez, 151 Il. 2d at 84.\nFor example, in People v. Hobbs, 86 Ill. 2d 242, 245-46 (1981), a case upon which defendant relies, an improper double enhancement occurred when the same prior conviction was applied to enhance the offense from a misdemeanor to a felony and then the same prior conviction was used again to impose an extended-term sentence on the same charge. However, in People v. Hicks, 164 Ill. 2d 218, 235 (1995), the court found no double enhancement occurred because one prior conviction was used to enhance the classification of the offense and another separate prior conviction was used to increase the length of the defendant\u2019s prison term.\nDefendant argues that the trial court could not use the \u201993 conviction twice, once to enhance the \u201998 offense and then a second time to enhance the \u201999 offense. Defendant appears to base this assertion on the unsound assumption that the \u201998 and \u201999 offenses are but one case. This argument lacks merit. There is nothing in section 16A\u2014 10(2) (720 ILCS 5/16A \u2014 10(2) (West 1998)) to suggest that the legislature intended to preclude using the same prior conviction to enhance two subsequent, separate, and factually distinct misdemeanors to felonies. In cases where there are separate trials resulting in separate convictions arising out of distinct factual situations, the trial court can properly impose extended sentences based upon the same prior felony conviction. See, e.g., People v. Berry, 175 Ill. App. 3d 420, 430 (1988). Similarly, we see no reason to prevent the court from using the same prior conviction to enhance two subsequent offenses that arose from distinct factual situations. To read such a limitation into the statute would undermine the purpose of punishing recidivists more severely. See People v. Hall, 145 Ill. App. 3d 873, 879 (1986).\nFurthermore, clearly no single factor was used both to establish the elements of defendant\u2019s crimes and to lengthen the sentences. First, defendant\u2019s sentences were not lengthened. In this case, defendant was sentenced to consecutive sentences. We agree with the State that a qualitative difference exists between extended-term sentences and consecutive sentences. By definition, extended-term sentences require the consideration of statutorily determined factors in aggravation to increase the length of a defendant\u2019s sentence in excess of the maximum authorized. 730 ILCS 5/5 \u2014 8\u20142 (West 1998). In Hobbs, the issue of double enhancement concerned the application of a former conviction with respect to extended-term sentences. It was the enhancement of both the class of the offense and of the length of the sentence by a single factor that resulted in improper double enhancement. By definition, consecutive sentences do not lengthen a sentence; rather, they involve the manner in which a defendant\u2019s sentences shall be served. 730 ILCS 5/5 \u2014 8\u20144(a) (West 1998); see also People v. Wendt, 163 Ill. 2d 346, 355 (1994) (imposition of consecutive sentences does not constitute increase in penalty). Moreover, it is a well-settled rule in this state that sentences that run consecutively to each other are not transmuted thereby into a single sentence. Thomas v. Greer, 143 Ill. 2d 271, 278-79 (1991). Our supreme court in People v. Wagener, 196 Ill. 2d 269 (2001), recently distinguished extended-term sentences from consecutive sentences. The court reasoned that Apprendi concerns are not raised unless the maximum penalty for a crime is increased, as in extended-term sentences, and since consecutive sentences remain distinct and separate sentences, none of the penalties for any individual crime has been increased. Wagener, 196 Ill. 2d at 284. Because the imposition of consecutive sentences does not constitute an increase in penalty, a single factor used to establish the elements of an offense cannot be used to double the enhancement where the trial court imposes consecutive sentences.\nAdditionally, once the trial court determined that it was proper to enhance the \u201998 and \u201999 offenses on the basis of the \u201993 conviction, it no longer needed to consider the prior conviction for the purpose of imposing consecutive sentences. It is undisputed that defendant committed a separate felony while on pretrial release for the \u201998 offense. Because defendant committed a separate felony in 1999 while out on bond for another felony, the trial court was required to impose consecutive sentences pursuant to section 5 \u2014 8\u20144(h) of the Unified Code of Corrections (730 ILCS 5/5 \u2014 8\u20144(h) (West 1998)). Thus, regardless of whether consecutive sentences constituted an \u201cextended term\u201d of imprisonment for \u201cdouble enhancement\u201d purposes, it is clear that no single factor was used to enhance the offense and then used again to impose an enhanced sentence. Accordingly, no double use of a single factor occurred, and thus, no impermissible double enhancement resulted.\nII. Apprendi v. New Jersey\nDefendant next contends that the consecutive sentences must be vacated because section 5 \u2014 8\u20144(h) is unconstitutional under Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 147 L. Ed. 2d 435, 120 S. Ct. 2348 (2000). Our supreme court recently rejected a similar argument in Wagener.\nIn Wagener, the defendant was convicted of first-degree murder and concealment of a homicidal death and was sentenced to consecutive terms of 50 years\u2019 imprisonment for murder and 5 years\u2019 imprisonment for concealment of a homicidal death. The consecutive sentences were imposed pursuant to section 5 \u2014 8\u20144(b) (730 ILCS 5/5 \u2014 8\u20144(h) (West 1998)). The court held that, because consecutive sentences remain discrete, a determination that sentences are to be served consecutively cannot run afoul of Apprendi, which addresses only sentences for individual crimes. Wagener, 196 Ill. 2d at 286. Since Apprendi concerns are not implicated by consecutive sentencing, the Wagener court held that section 5 \u2014 8\u20144(b) passes constitutional muster. Wagener, 196 Ill. 2d at 286.\nAlthough the parties disagree over whether defendant was sentenced under section 5 \u2014 8\u20144(b) or section 5 \u2014 8\u20144(h), in either case, the same reasoning addressed by the court in Wagener applies here; the imposition of consecutive sentences does not violate Apprendi. See also People v. Carney, 196 Ill. 2d 518, 526 (2001) (consecutive sentences imposed under section 5 \u2014 8\u20144(a) do not violate Apprendi). We therefore reject defendant\u2019s argument.\nIII. Excessive Sentences\nDefendant last argues that the trial court abused its discretion in imposing an excessive aggregate sentence of six years\u2019 imprisonment. In particular, defendant claims that the trial court failed to (1) consider his rehabilitative potential; (2) note on the record, as a factor in mitigation, the impact of incarceration on his already deteriorated health; (3) consider the probation officer\u2019s recommendations; or (4) consider his medical status.\nThe trial court need not recite and assign a value to each factor in aggravation and mitigation that was considered. People v. Grisset, 288 Ill. App. 3d 620, 635 (1997). Absent some showing to the contrary, when factors in mitigation are presented and argued to the sentencing judge, they are presumed to have been considered.\nThe trial court was not required to articulate its consideration of mitigating factors or to make an express finding that defendant lacked rehabilitative potential. See People v. Boclair, 225 Ill. App. 3d 331, 335-36 (1992). Moreover, the trial court was not required to accord any greater weight to defendant\u2019s potential for rehabilitation as opposed to the solemnity of his crimes. See Boclair, 225 Ill. App. 3d at 335-36.\nIt is well established that a trial court\u2019s sentencing decision is entitled to great deference. People v. Coleman, 166 Ill. 2d 247, 258 (1995). We will not substitute our judgment for that of the sentencing judge simply because we might have balanced the sentencing factors differently. See People v. Didier, 306 Ill. App. 3d 803, 808 (1999). Here, the record demonstrates that the trial court reviewed the presentence report, considered all of the proper aggravating and mitigating factors, and contemplated defendant\u2019s personal statement, which detailed his health problems. Considering defendant\u2019s long criminal history, failed attempts at drug rehabilitation, including the fact that defendant was not a good candidate for rehabilitation, and that defendant committed another felony while free on bond for a previous felony charge, we find no abuse of discretion in imposing the aggregate sentence of six years\u2019 imprisonment.\nThe judgment of the circuit court of Du Page County is affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nGEIGER and BOWMAN, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE BYRNE" } ], "attorneys": [ "G. Joseph Weller and Darren E. Miller, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Elgin, for appellant.", "Joseph E. Birkett, State\u2019s Attorney, of Wheaton (Martin E Moltz, of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), and Peter N. Stein, of Lincolnshire, for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. RONALD L. WATKINS, Defendant-Appellant.\nSecond District\nNos. 2\u201400\u20140643, 2\u201400\u20140644 cons.\nOpinion filed October 10, 2001.\nRehearing denied October 19, 2001.\nG. Joseph Weller and Darren E. Miller, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Elgin, for appellant.\nJoseph E. Birkett, State\u2019s Attorney, of Wheaton (Martin E Moltz, of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), and Peter N. Stein, of Lincolnshire, for the People." }, "file_name": "0013-01", "first_page_order": 31, "last_page_order": 40 }