{ "id": 570929, "name": "In re MARRIAGE OF WILLARD A. BOOTH, Petitioner-Appellant, and LORI ANN BOOTH, n/k/a, Lori Ann Hunt, Respondent-Appellee", "name_abbreviation": "In re Marriage of Booth", "decision_date": "2001-04-13", "docket_number": "No. 3\u201400\u20140573", "first_page": "92", "last_page": "95", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "325 Ill. App. 3d 92" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "576 N.E.2d 250", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "determining that where statutory authority exists, a court may only enforce the statute to the terms of its specific language" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "216 Ill. App. 3d 90", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5289117 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "determining that where statutory authority exists, a court may only enforce the statute to the terms of its specific language" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/216/0090-01" ] }, { "cite": "536 N.E.2d 1359", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1989, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "181 Ill. App. 3d 472", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 8498828 ], "year": 1989, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/181/0472-01" ] }, { "cite": "530 U.S. 57", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 9413198 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2000, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/530/0057-01" ] }, { "cite": "526 N.E.2d 125", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1988, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "123 Ill. 2d 161", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5550827 ], "year": 1988, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/123/0161-01" ] }, { "cite": "684 N.E.2d 1355", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1997, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "292 Ill. App. 3d 229", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1725068 ], "year": 1997, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/292/0229-01" ] }, { "cite": "685 N.E.2d 1038", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1997, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "292 Ill. App. 3d 379", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1725030 ], "year": 1997, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/292/0379-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 490, "char_count": 8154, "ocr_confidence": 0.788, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.03580807328026e-08, "percentile": 0.02035080037484811 }, "sha256": "3e8100cae606236d8358f9ce972fa33b1881ba55d1942e2b05289b9ccb5536a8", "simhash": "1:8ccc99335b44eabe", "word_count": 1312 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:13:10.268443+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "In re MARRIAGE OF WILLARD A. BOOTH, Petitioner-Appellant, and LORI ANN BOOTH, n/k/a, Lori Ann Hunt, Respondent-Appellee." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE BRESLIN\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nPetitioner Willard Booth appeals the trial court\u2019s decision granting respondent Lori Ann Booth, n/k/a Lori Ann Hunt, visitation privileges with his 14-year-old daughter. Because we determine that a parent may not bargain away the interests of a child by providing for stepparent visitation in a marital settlement agreement in contravention of Illinois law, we reverse.\nFACTS\nWillard and Lori were married on November 23, 1991. At the time, Willard was the custodial parent of Brittinie, his five-year-old daughter who was the product of a previous marriage. In the spring of 1999, Willard filed a petition for dissolution of marriage. On October 14, 1999, the trial court entered an agreed order for dissolution of marriage. The order included a marital settlement agreement, which included a provision that stated \u201c[w]ife is hereby awarded reasonable visitation with her step-daughter, Brittinie Booth, upon reasonable advanced notice.\u201d\nSeveral months later, Lori filed a petition seeking to have the court order a specific visitation schedule. Thereafter, Willard retained new legal counsel and filed a petition for relief from the judgment. In his petition, Willard claimed that he consented to stepparent visitation without being properly informed by his former counsel of the terms of section 607(b)(1.5) of the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act (Marriage Act) (750 ILCS 5/607(b)(1.5) (West 1998)), a recently enacted statute that governs stepparent visitation. He requested that Lori be enjoined from visitation with Brittinie and that the October 14, 1999, judgment be vacated or, at a minimum, the provision regarding visitation be stricken. Willard\u2019s motion was dismissed by the court for failure to raise the issue prior to judgment.\nAt the hearing on Lori\u2019s petition to set a visitation schedule, Willard testified that his previous attorney advised him to agree to reasonable visitation, but did not advise him to discuss the matter with Brittinie first. Willard admitted that although he first saw the proposed written agreement on the same d\u00e1y the court entered its order, he approved the settlement and specifically acknowledged the provision regarding stepparent visitation. Even though the agreement provided for reasonable visitation, Brittinie and Lori have seen each other only two times since the divorce.\nLori testified that after she married Willard, she became Brittinie\u2019s primary caregiver while Willard worked. She attended Brittinie\u2019s school and sports activities and helped her with her homework. When Brittinie was older, they had a regular \u201cgirls night out.\u201d After the separation, they went shopping together on one occasion, and she sent Brittinie cards and gifts. Although she has repeatedly attempted to make arrangements to visit Brittinie, Willard has prevented them from seeing each other.\nThe court conducted an in camera interview of Brittinie. Brittinie stated that she is 14 years old and that she was never told that her father had planned to agree to visitation. When asked whether she wanted to see Lori, she stated \u201cI don\u2019t want to go and see her\u201d and \u201cI don\u2019t want to be forced to see her.\u201d Brittinie also stated \u201cI really don\u2019t get along with her. I don\u2019t know why, but she\u2019s [sic] just scares me.\u201d Brittinie also stated that she sees her natural mother and her half-brother almost every weekend and gets along well with them.\nShortly thereafter, the trial court ordered that Lori be granted visitation every other Monday evening, although no visitation was ordered during summer vacation. Willard appealed the court\u2019s decision.\nANALYSIS\nOn appeal, Willard argues that the provision in the marital settlement agreement regarding visitation is not enforceable because the agreed order was signed without Brittinie\u2019s knowledge and consent, was signed under duress, and was signed after receiving improper advice from legal counsel. Willard claims the trial court erred by striking his petition for relief from the judgment and claims the agreement was against Brittinie\u2019s best interests.\nThis court will reverse a trial court\u2019s decision regarding visitation if it determines that the court abused its discretion or if manifest injustice has been done to the child or parent. In re Marriage of Slayton, 292 Ill. App. 3d 379, 685 N.E.2d 1038 (1997).\nUnder ordinary circumstances, a settlement agreement incorporated into a judgment for dissolution of marriage is a contract that is governed by principles of contract law because it is an agreement between the parties and not a judicial determination of the parties\u2019 rights. In re Marriage of Schmidt, 292 Ill. App. 3d 229, 684 N.E.2d 1355 (1997). Nevertheless, a parent may not bargain away his child\u2019s rights, and the court is not bound by any agreement that does not protect the child\u2019s best interests. Blisset v. Blisset, 123 Ill. 2d 161, 526 N.E.2d 125 (1988).\nSection 607(b)(1.5) of the Marriage Act provides that the court may grant reasonable visitation privileges to a stepparent if the court determines it is in the child\u2019s best interests. 750 ILCS 5/607(b)(1.5) (West 1998). Section 607(b)(1.5) also provides that \u201c[a] petition for visitation privileges may be filed *** if the following circumstances are met: (A) the child is at least 12 years old; (B) the child resided continuously with the parent and stepparent for at least 5 years; (C) the parent is deceased or is disabled and is unable to care for the child; (D) the child wishes to have reasonable visitation with the stepparent; and (E) the stepparent was providing for the care, control, and welfare to the child prior to the initiation of the petition for visitation.\u201d 750 ILCS 5/607(b)(1.5) (West 1998).\nThe record indicates that Willard is alive, well, and fully capable of providing for Brittinie\u2019s care. Although Lori raises the issue that Willard has purposefully interfered with her relationship with Brittinie and has ulterior motives in doing so, we must presume that Willard is acting in Brittinie\u2019s best interests. See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 147 L. Ed. 2d 49, 120 S. Ct. 2054 (2000). Additionally, Brittinie does not want to be forced to see Lori and was never consulted about this before the agreed order was entered. Based on these factors, it is clear that the requirements of sections 607(b)(1.5)(C) and (D) have not been met.\nIt is a long-standing policy in Illinois that natural parents have an inherent, paramount right to the care, custody, and control of their children. See In re Marriage of Gustafson, 181 Ill. App. 3d 472, 536 N.E.2d 1359 (1989). We believe section 607(b)(1.5) was designed with that policy in mind in that stepparents are provided visitation rights only when natural parents are incapable of caring for the child and the child wishes to have visitation with the stepparent. By doing so, section 607(b)(1.5) ensures that children maintain a healthy and close relationship with their natural parents.\nIn compliance with section 607(b)(1.5), we determine that Brittinie should be consulted about visitation with her former stepmother, and she cannot be forced to engage in stepparent visitation against her will when she has two natural parents with whom she enjoys a wholesome relationship. See Community Consolidated School District No. 54 v. Illinois State Board of Education, 216 Ill. App. 3d 90, 576 N.E.2d 250 (1991) (determining that where statutory authority exists, a court may only enforce the statute to the terms of its specific language).\nBased on the foregoing reasons, the provision in the marital settlement agreement regarding stepparent visitation is hereby stricken and the judgment of the circuit court of Will County is accordingly reversed.\nReversed.\nHOLDRIDGE and SLATER, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE BRESLIN" } ], "attorneys": [ "Charles E. Thomas (argued), of Burmila & Thomas, P.C., of Joliet, for appellant.", "Bennett J. Braun (argued), of Stefanich, McGarry, Wols, Okrei & Braun, Ltd., of Joliet, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "In re MARRIAGE OF WILLARD A. BOOTH, Petitioner-Appellant, and LORI ANN BOOTH, n/k/a, Lori Ann Hunt, Respondent-Appellee.\nThird District\nNo. 3\u201400\u20140573\nOpinion filed April 13, 2001.\nCharles E. Thomas (argued), of Burmila & Thomas, P.C., of Joliet, for appellant.\nBennett J. Braun (argued), of Stefanich, McGarry, Wols, Okrei & Braun, Ltd., of Joliet, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0092-01", "first_page_order": 110, "last_page_order": 113 }