{
  "id": 569987,
  "name": "FRIEDA McKINNON, as Mother of Aaron A. McKinnon, a Minor, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. RICK THOMPSON, Indiv. and as Agent, Employee, and/or Servant of West Aurora School District 129, et al., Defendants-Appellees (Washington Middle School, a Member School Under the West Aurora School District 129, Defendant)",
  "name_abbreviation": "McKinnon v. Thompson",
  "decision_date": "2001-08-22",
  "docket_number": "No. 2\u201400\u20141255",
  "first_page": "241",
  "last_page": "244",
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    "id": 8837,
    "name": "Illinois Appellate Court"
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    "name_long": "Illinois",
    "name": "Ill."
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      "reporter": "Ill. 2d",
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      "year": 2001,
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:13:10.268443+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
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  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "FRIEDA McKINNON, as Mother of Aaron A. McKinnon, a Minor, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. RICK THOMPSON, Indiv. and as Agent, Employee, and/or Servant of West Aurora School District 129, et al., Defendants-Appellees (Washington Middle School, a Member School Under the West Aurora School District 129, Defendant)."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "JUSTICE BOWMAN\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nAaron McKinnon, by his mother, plaintiff Frieda McKinnon, appeals from an order entered by the circuit court of Kane County dismissing with prejudice his cause of action against defendants Rick Thompson and West Aurora School District 129 (District 129) pursuant to section 2 \u2014 619(a)(5) of the Code of Civil Procedure (Code) (735 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 619(a)(5) (West 1998)). Washington Middle School was also named as a defendant but was dismissed on other grounds and is not a party to this appeal. Aaron argues that, in determining that his action against Thompson and District 129 was time-barred, the trial court erroneously applied the one-year statute of limitations provided in the Local Governmental and Governmental Employees Tort Immunity Act (Act) (745 ILCS 10/8 \u2014 101 (West 1998)) instead of the statute of limitations applicable to causes of action brought by minors (735 ILCS 5/13 \u2014 211 (West 1998)). We agree with Aaron that his complaint was timely filed and reverse the trial court\u2019s judgment.\nThe complaint alleged that on February 2, 1998, Rick Thompson, who was the vice-principal of Washington Middle School in District 129, physically assaulted Aaron in the middle school\u2019s technology center. The complaint sought damages for both physical and emotional injuries that Aaron allegedly suffered as a result of defendants\u2019 negligence, wilful and wanton misconduct, assault and battery, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Aaron was 12 years old when the alleged assault occurred. The complaint was filed on September 15, 1999, at which time Aaron was 14 years old.\nDefendants filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to section 2 \u2014 619(a)(5) of the Code, which authorizes involuntary dismissal of an action that was not commenced within the time limited by law. They argued that section 8 \u2014 101 of the Act applied to Aaron\u2019s case and that Aaron had not filed his cause of action within one year of the date his cause of action accrued. The trial court agreed with defendants and on July 26, 2000, entered an order dismissing Aaron\u2019s cause of action with prejudice. The court\u2019s order stated that \u201cthe one year statute of limitations found in the Tort Immunity Act applies and prevails over the two year statute of limitations for minors.\u201d Aaron filed a motion to reconsider the court\u2019s ruling. The court denied the motion to reconsider, and this appeal ensued.\nOur determination of which statute of limitation applies to Aaron\u2019s cause of action is controlled by our supreme court\u2019s recent decision in Ferguson v. McKenzie, 202 Ill. 2d 304 (2001). The issue before the court in Ferguson was whether the Act\u2019s one-year statute of limitations (745 ILCS 10/8 \u2014 101 (West 1994)) took precedence over the statute of repose applicable to a minor\u2019s medical malpractice claim (735 ILCS 5/13 \u2014 212(b) (West 1994)). Under section 13 \u2014 212(b), a minor who is entitled to bring a medical malpractice action must do so within eight years of the injury-causing act or omission and may not bring the cause of action after his or her twenty-second birthday. The Ferguson minor\u2019s cause of action had accrued when she was 17 years and 5 months of age, but her complaint was not filed until she was 19 years and 5 months of age. The defendants in Ferguson contended that the one-year limitations period under section 8 \u2014 101 began to run when the minor plaintiff turned 18 and, consequently, she was required to file her complaint prior to her nineteenth birthday. The minor plaintiff, on the other hand, argued that she had until her twenty-second birthday to file her complaint pursuant to section 13\u2014 212(b). Unlike defendants in the case at bar, the defendants in Ferguson did not assert that the statute of limitations expired against the minor plaintiff while she was still a minor.\nIn determining whether the limitations period of section 8 \u2014 101 or the repose period of section 13 \u2014 212(b) applied, the court struck a compromise that recognized the principles underlying both statutes, namely, the need to encourage early investigation against a local governmental entity while the matter is still fresh and the need to protect minors\u2019 rights to bring suit. Ferguson, 202 Ill. 2d at 305-14. Accordingly, the court held that the medical malpractice statute of repose applied insofar as the plaintiff was a minor when her cause of action accrued. Ferguson, 202 Ill. 2d at 312. However, the court further held that \u201cbecause defendants are a local government entity and its employees, the one-year limitations period of section 8 \u2014 101 of the Tort Immunity Act also applies to [the plaintiff]\u201d and began to run when she reached 18 years of age. Ferguson, 202 Ill. 2d at 312. Thus, because the plaintiff in Ferguson failed to file her action before she turned 19, the court held that it was time-barred. Ferguson, 202 Ill. 2d at 312-13.\nHere, we are asked to determine whether section 8 \u2014 101 of the Act takes precedence over section 13 \u2014 211 of the Code. Section 8 \u2014 101 provides:\n\u201cNo civil action may be commenced in any court against a local entity or any of its employees for any injury unless it is commenced within one year from the date that the injury was received or the cause of action accrued.\u201d 745 ILCS 10/8 \u2014 101 (West 1998).\nSection 13 \u2014 211, on the other hand, provides as follows:\n\u201cIf the person entitled to bring an action, specified in Sections 13 \u2014 201 through 13 \u2014 210 of this Act, at the time the cause of action accrued, is under the age of 18 years, or is under a legal disability, then he or she may bring the action within 2 years after the person attains the age of 18 years, or the disability is removed.\u201d 735 ILCS 5/13 \u2014 211 (West 1998).\nSection 13 \u2014 211 is applicable because Aaron\u2019s cause of action is one for \u201cdamages for an injury to the person\u201d as described in section 13\u2014 202 of the Code (735 ILCS 5/13 \u2014 202 (West 1998)).\nThe rationale set forth in Ferguson applies to the issue before us. Under that rationale, Aaron must comply with both section 13\u2014 211 of the Code and section 8 \u2014 101 of the Act. See Ferguson, 202 Ill. 2d at 313. This means that the one-year limitations period of section 8 \u2014 101 applies, but it does not begin to run until Aaron reaches 18 years of age. Thus, Aaron\u2019s cause of action would not be time-barred as long as it was filed prior to his nineteenth birthday. It is undisputed that Aaron has not yet turned 19 and was approximately 14 years of age when the complaint was filed on his behalf. Accordingly, Aaron\u2019s cause of action is not time-barred, and the trial court erred when it dismissed the cause of action.\nFor the reasons stated, we reverse the judgment of the circuit court of Kane County and remand this cause for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.\nReversed and remanded.\nHUTCHINSON, P.J., and GEIGER, J., concur.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "JUSTICE BOWMAN"
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Nicholas C. Syregelas, of Law Offices of Nicholas C. Syregelas, of Chicago, for appellant.",
      "Wayne F. Plaza and Cheryl A. Warzynski, both of Rooks, Pitts & Poust, of Chicago, and Peter K. Wilson, Jr., of Mickey, Wilson, Weiler & Renzi, P.C., of Aurora, for appellees."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "FRIEDA McKINNON, as Mother of Aaron A. McKinnon, a Minor, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. RICK THOMPSON, Indiv. and as Agent, Employee, and/or Servant of West Aurora School District 129, et al., Defendants-Appellees (Washington Middle School, a Member School Under the West Aurora School District 129, Defendant).\nSecond District\nNo. 2\u201400\u20141255\nOpinion filed August 22, 2001.\nModified on denial of rehearing October 9, 2001.\nNicholas C. Syregelas, of Law Offices of Nicholas C. Syregelas, of Chicago, for appellant.\nWayne F. Plaza and Cheryl A. Warzynski, both of Rooks, Pitts & Poust, of Chicago, and Peter K. Wilson, Jr., of Mickey, Wilson, Weiler & Renzi, P.C., of Aurora, for appellees."
  },
  "file_name": "0241-01",
  "first_page_order": 259,
  "last_page_order": 262
}