{
  "id": 570747,
  "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. RALPH B. CAMPBELL, Defendant-Appellant",
  "name_abbreviation": "People v. Campbell",
  "decision_date": "2001-10-30",
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  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. RALPH B. CAMPBELL, Defendant-Appellant."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "JUSTICE KNECHT\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nDefendant, Ralph Campbell, pleaded guilty to driving while license revoked (DWR) (625 ILCS 5/6 \u2014 303 (West 2000)). As part of his sentence of conditional discharge, the trial court required him to pay $2,263 in past-due periodic imprisonment fees from a 1994 conviction for driving under the influence. 625 ILCS 5/11 \u2014 501(a) (West 2000). Defendant appeals this condition of his sentence and argues the trial court abused its discretion in ordering him to pay fees from a previous conviction and sentence as part of his current sentence. We affirm in part, vacate in part, and remand with directions.\nI. BACKGROUND\nDefendant, Ralph Campbell, pleaded guilty to two counts of DWR. 625 ILCS 5/6 \u2014 303 (West 2000). He was sentenced to 24 months\u2019 conditional discharge and 240 hours of public service work and ordered to pay costs. On the bottom of defendant\u2019s sentencing order is a handwritten addendum requiring him to pay $2,263 in periodic imprisonment fees he owed from a 1994 conviction for driving under the influence. 625 ILCS 5/11 \u2014 501(a) (West 2000). In the 1994 case, defendant was ordered to serve 300 days in the Champaign County correctional center subject to work release, pay court costs, and pay $10 per day for periodic imprisonment. Defendant paid the court costs, but at the time of the current offense, he still owed $2,263 in periodic imprisonment fees.\nOn November 16, 1999, the trial court heard defendant\u2019s motion to reconsider sentence. Defendant asked the court to reconsider its order requiring him to pay $2,263 in fees from his 1994 conviction. He argued it was improper for the court to reimpose a five-year-old fee from a previous conviction, especially when the State never attempted to secure the payment. Defendant also presented testimony and evidence of his current inability to pay the fees due to his financial situation and his poor health.\nThe trial court denied defendant\u2019s motion. In support of its ruling, the court stated it believed defendant had the assets to pay the fee and had not shown he was unable to work, and the court believed it was proper to reimpose the fee because the previous offense \u201cwas the exact same type of offense\u201d as the current offense.\nDefendant appeals his sentence and presents two issues for review: (1) whether the trial court abused its discretion when it ordered defendant to pay work release fees from a prior sentence; and (2) whether it was unreasonable to require the defendant to pay the work release fee when his monthly liabilities exceeded his monthly income.\nII. ANALYSIS\nDefendant contends the trial court abused its discretion when it ordered him, as part of his sentence for the current offense, to pay work release fees he owed as part of his sentence from a previous conviction. The State argues costs are a continuing obligation that the trial court in this case was authorized to reimpose. We agree with defendant.\nA trial court\u2019s sentencing decision is entitled to deference and weight and will not be overturned on appeal absent an abuse of discretion. People v. Streit, 142 Ill. 2d 13, 18-19, 566 N.E.2d 1351, 1353 (1991).\nOur review of the sentencing statutes revealed no authority for the trial court to reimpose fees from a previous offense as a condition of a sentence of conditional discharge for a later, unrelated offense. Section 5 \u2014 6\u20143 of the Unified Code of Corrections allows the trial court to order a defendant to satisfy many requirements, including the payment of a fine and costs, pursuant to a sentence of conditional discharge. 730 ILCS 5/5 \u2014 6\u20143(b)(2) (West 2000). However, the statute states the conditions imposed must be reasonable and relate to the nature of the offense. 730 ILCS 5/5 \u2014 6\u20143(b) (West 2000). Our interpretation of the plain meaning of this paragraph is all conditions of a sentence of conditional discharge must be related to the specific offense for which the defendant is sentenced. Other paragraphs of section 5 \u2014 6\u20143 specifically limit a defendant\u2019s financial obligations to the \u201coffense for which the defendant was sentenced.\u201d See 730 ILCS 5/5\u2014 6 \u2014 3(b)(12), (b)(13) (West 2000).\nThe State argues the trial court\u2019s order was supported by both statutory and case law. We disagree. The case cited by the State, People v. Keagbine, 77 Ill. App. 3d 1039, 1047, 396 N.E.2d 1341, 1346 (1979), is inapplicable to the current situation. In Keagbine, the appellate court held the failure of the trial court to assess costs against a defendant following his conviction and sentence did not preclude a subsequent correction of the error. Keagbine, 77 Ill. App. 3d at 1047, 396 N.E.2d at 1346. In the present case, no error occurred in the assessment of costs for the defendant\u2019s previous conviction and sentence. Defendant was properly assessed periodic imprisonment fees, but he failed to pay them. Further, the defendant in Keagbine, unlike the defendant in the present case, was ordered on remand to pay costs and fees as part of the offense for which he was sentenced, not an offense for which he had been previously sentenced. Therefore, Keagbine offers little guidance.\nThe State further argues the rationale of the statute that allows the trial court to use a defendant\u2019s bail bond in one offense to satisfy financial obligations relating to fines, court costs, restitution, or fees of the defendant\u2019s attorney in a different case (see 725 ILCS 5/110\u2014 7(f) (West 2000)) supports its contention the trial court had authority to reimpose the fees from defendant\u2019s previous sentence. We find this statute irrelevant to the issue before us. The statute provides a specific means by which the trial court can hold defendants accountable for certain court-ordered financial obligations. We agree with the State that court-ordered fees and costs are a continuing obligation. However, we must determine whether the trial court had authority to reimpose the past-due fees from defendant\u2019s previous conviction and sentence. The statute cited by the State, which provides the trial court with a means of collection for money owed by defendants, provides no guidance here.\nWe understand the trial court\u2019s frustration in a situation where the defendant failed to pay mandatory fees in a previous case, especially where the record indicates the defendant, at the time he was sentenced for the previous offense, had the resources to pay. However, ordering the defendant to pay those fees four years later as part of a sentence in an unrelated matter is not the proper avenue to attempt to collect those past-due fees.\nBecause we vacate that portion of the trial court\u2019s sentencing order purporting to require defendant to pay $2,263 in past-due periodic imprisonment fees from a previous conviction and sentence, we need not address whether the order was unreasonable in light of d\u00e9fendant\u2019s current financial and physical condition.\nIII. CONCLUSION\nWe vacate that portion of defendant\u2019s sentencing order that requires him to pay $2,263 for past-due periodic imprisonment fees from a 1994 conviction and sentence; we otherwise affirm and remand with directions to issue an amended judgment of sentence.\nAffirmed in part and vacated in part; cause remanded with directions.\nCOOK and TURNER, JJ., concur.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "JUSTICE KNECHT"
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Daniel D. Yuhas, of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Springfield, for appellant.",
      "John C. Piland, State\u2019s Attorney, of Urbana (Norbert J. Goetten, Robert J. Biderman, and Linda Susan McClain, all of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. RALPH B. CAMPBELL, Defendant-Appellant.\nFourth District\nNo. 4\u201499\u20140978\nOpinion filed October 30, 2001.\nDaniel D. Yuhas, of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Springfield, for appellant.\nJohn C. Piland, State\u2019s Attorney, of Urbana (Norbert J. Goetten, Robert J. Biderman, and Linda Susan McClain, all of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People."
  },
  "file_name": "0569-01",
  "first_page_order": 587,
  "last_page_order": 591
}