{ "id": 1281460, "name": "In re S.R. et al., Minors (The People of the State of Illinois, Petitioner-Appellee, v. T.T.R., Respondent-Appellant)", "name_abbreviation": "People v. T.T.R.", "decision_date": "2001-11-02", "docket_number": "No. 2-00-1249", "first_page": "356", "last_page": "363", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "326 Ill. App. 3d 356" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "313 Ill. App. 3d 607", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 186558 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "612" }, { "page": "612" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/313/0607-01" ] }, { "cite": "316 Ill. App. 3d 669", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1096585 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "672-73" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/316/0669-01" ] }, { "cite": "196 Ill. 2d 405", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 351263 ], "year": 2001, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/196/0405-01" ] }, { "cite": "309 Ill. App. 3d 581", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 349637 ], "year": 2000, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/309/0581-01" ] }, { "cite": "303 Ill. App. 3d 559", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 511373 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "565" }, { "page": "567" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/303/0559-01" ] }, { "cite": "314 Ill. App. 3d 649", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 140331 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "655" }, { "page": "655" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/314/0649-01" ] }, { "cite": "311 Ill. App. 3d 720", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 415428 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "726" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/311/0720-01" ] }, { "cite": "138 Ill. 2d 255", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5576828 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "277" }, { "page": "277" }, { "page": "279" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/138/0255-01" ] }, { "cite": "268 Ill. App. 3d 239", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 381803 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "245" }, { "page": "245" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/268/0239-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 742, "char_count": 16895, "ocr_confidence": 0.821, "pagerank": { "raw": 7.661946072368636e-08, "percentile": 0.4520809900499991 }, "sha256": "b16f7d90ff248bdc6aa73e0c082a628f03d72b0223f358ea9aac73b3bb150bf1", "simhash": "1:53b3d22a638417d5", "word_count": 2755 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:10:13.053989+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "In re S.R. et al., Minors (The People of the State of Illinois, Petitioner-Appellee, v. T.T.R., Respondent-Appellant)." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE GEOMETER\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nRespondent, T.T.R., appeals from separate orders of the circuit court of Winnebago County declaring him an unfit parent, terminating his parental rights to his two children, Se. R. and Sy. R., and authorizing the appointment of a guardian with authority to consent to the minors\u2019 adoption. On appeal, respondent contends that the trial court\u2019s finding that he is an unfit parent was against the manifest weight of the evidence. We affirm.\nI. BACKGROUND\nRespondent is the father of two children, Se. R. (born on January 13, 1992) and Sy. R. (born on July 12, 1997). On July 8, 1998, the trial court adjudicated the minors neglected. The trial court then made the minors wards of the court and appointed the Department of Children and Family Services as the legal guardian and custodian of the children. Thereafter, the minors\u2019 mother, VR., voluntarily surrendered her parental rights to the children.\nOn August 20, 1999, the State separately moved to terminate respondent\u2019s parental rights to both children and to appoint a legal guardian with the power to consent to the minors\u2019 adoption. Each motion alleged that respondent was unfit on three grounds. Count I alleged child abandonment (750 ILCS 50/1 (D)(a) (West 1998)). Count II alleged the failure to maintain a reasonable degree of interest, concern, or responsibility as to the minors\u2019 welfare (750 ILCS 50/l(D)(b) (West 1998)). Count III alleged incarceration as a result of a criminal conviction that prevents the discharge of parental duties for a period in excess of two years after the filing of the motion for termination of parental rights, accompanied by little or no previous contact and/or support for the child (750 ILCS 50/l(D)(r) (West 1998)).\nA fitness hearing commenced on August 9, 2000. The State\u2019s first witness was Sharon Lindley, the minors\u2019 maternal grandmother. Lind-ley characterized her relationship with defendant as \u201cbad.\u201d According to Lindley, respondent suffered from drug and alcohol problems that worsened upon the birth of the younger child. Lindley testified that respondent was in prison \u201clots\u201d when the older minor was young. Moreover, Lindley testified that respondent would hit VR. if he did not like what she was doing. Lindley took care of the minors for extended periods of time without any support from respondent or VR. In addition, Lindley stated that respondent did not provide her with any financial support when she cared for the children. Lindley admitted that respondent loved the minors and that he was a good dad when he was \u201cstraight.\u201d For instance, Lindley noted that, when respondent was with the minors, he cared for and played with them. Lindley stated that during 1998 and 1999, respondent, while incarcerated, never contacted the minors. However, Lindley admitted that respondent later began sending the minors cards and letters. \u2022\nFollowing Lindley\u2019s testimony, the State introduced into evidence a certificate of conviction from Winnebago County in which defendant was convicted of burglary. The conviction occurred in 1998, and defendant was sentenced to a term of 20 years\u2019 imprisonment. The State then called respondent to testify.\nRespondent stated that he has been incarcerated twice in Illinois and one time each in Wisconsin and Indiana. Respondent recalled that in 1994 he began serving a 16- or 18-month sentence in Wisconsin on a parole violation. At the time of the fitness hearing, respondent was incarcerated in Indiana on a burglary charge. Respondent anticipated being released in January 2003. Respondent testified that his Indiana sentence runs concurrently with his Illinois burglary conviction, but he added that it was \u201cstill up in the air\u201d whether he would be transferred to an Illinois prison once he serves his Indiana sentence. Respondent acknowledged that he was not immediately incarcerated when he was convicted of burglary in Winnebago County because he was \u201con the run\u201d at the time.\nRespondent admitted that, at certain times, he was unable to raise the minors due to alcohol, drugs, and family problems. Respondent also admitted that his criminal activity made it \u201ccomplicated\u201d for him to be a day-to-day parent for the minors. Respondent testified that since his incarceration in Indiana he has not completed any drug and alcohol treatment programs. However, respondent stated that he does not consider himself to be an addict.\nRespondent testified that he has received one service plan from Catholic Charities and that he has complied with it completely. For instance, the service plan encouraged respondent to participate in social services. To that end, respondent participated in Bible study groups, a lifestyle change group, and a high-school-diploma program. The service plan also encouraged respondent to remain drug and alcohol free, so he attended Narcotics Anonymous and Alcoholic Anonymous meetings. Respondent further testified that he maintains regular contact with his children by sending them letters, cards, and gifts.\nDonna Kasper, a child welfare case manager with Catholic Charities and respondent\u2019s caseworker, testified that the permanency goal for the minors was intensive care pending court action. Kasper never implemented a return-home goal because respondent has several years remaining on his Indiana prison term and he has additional time to serve in prison upon his return to Illinois. Kasper indicated that, due to these circumstances, respondent would be unable to parent the minors. Although there was no plan to return the minors to respondent, Kasper explained that she was required to provide a service plan until a parent\u2019s rights are terminated. Although respondent\u2019s plan contained no specific tasks directed toward respondent, it recommended that he contact social services in prison, participate in drug and alcohol assessment, attend parenting classes, and sign all consents for release of information. Respondent sent Kasper verification of some of the items included in the service plan.\nAfter the State rested, respondent testified on his own behalf. He stated that he supported his older daughter from her birth in 1992 until he was incarcerated in Wisconsin in 1994. Respondent also testified that he lived with his younger child for about 4 1/2 months, until he was incarcerated in Indiana. Respondent related that he attempted to correspond with the minors while he was in prison but he never received a response. According to respondent, he learned of the whereabouts of his children only in July 1999, when Kasper contacted him. On cross-examination, respondent admitted that he engaged in criminal activity after the birth of his children and that he has not seen his children since late in 1997.\nOn August 22, 2000, the trial court ruled on respondent\u2019s fitness. The court found that the State had failed to prove that respondent had abandoned the minors. However, the court found that the State presented clear and convincing evidence that respondent was unfit based on his failure to maintain a reasonable degree of interest, concern, or responsibility as to the minors\u2019 welfare. The court also found respondent unfit on the basis that he was incarcerated as a result of a criminal conviction that prevented the discharge of his parental duties for a period in excess of two years, accompanied by little or no previous contact and/or support for the children.\nOn October 18, 2000, the trial court moved to the second phase of the proceeding, the best-interest hearing. At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court ruled that it was in the best interests of both minors that respondent\u2019s parental rights be terminated. The order terminating respondent\u2019s parental rights was signed on October 23, 2000. Respondent now appeals.\nII. ANALYSIS\nThe termination of parental rights is an extraordinary measure, given the superior rights of parents, against the rights of others, to raise their children. In re T.D., 268 Ill. App. 3d 239, 245 (1994). The Juvenile Court Act of 1987 therefore provides a bifurcated procedure to determine whether a parent\u2019s rights should be terminated. 705 ILCS 405/2 \u2014 29(2) (West 1998). First, the court must find by clear and convincing evidence that the parent is unfit. In re Adoption of Syck, 138 Ill. 2d 255, 277 (1990). If the parent is found unfit, the court must then determine whether the termination of parental rights would serve the child\u2019s best interests. Syck, 138 Ill. 2d at 277. In this case, respondent challenges only the trial court\u2019s determination that he was unfit based on counts II and III of the State\u2019s motions.\nAt the trial court level, a finding of parental unfitness must be proved by clear and convincing evidence. In re E.O., 311 Ill. App. 3d 720, 726 (2000). Since the trial court is in the best position to observe the witnesses and evaluate their credibility, our review is limited to determining whether the trial court\u2019s decision was against the manifest weight of the evidence. In re M.J., 314 Ill. App. 3d 649, 655 (2000); In re M.M., 303 Ill. App. 3d 559, 565 (1999). A decision is against the manifest weight of the evidence only where the opposite result is clearly evident or the determination is unreasonable, arbitrary, and not based on the evidence presented. M.J., 314 Ill. App. 3d at 655. In addressing whether the circuit court\u2019s decision is against the manifest weight of the evidence, we are guided by the principle that each case concerning parental fitness is sui generis. Syck, 138 Ill. 2d at 279. Thus, factual comparisons to other cases by reviewing courts are of little value. T.D., 268 Ill. App. 3d at 245. With these principles in mind, we turn to respondent\u2019s arguments.\nWe first address respondent\u2019s argument that the trial court erred in finding that the State proved by clear and convincing evidence the allegations of unfitness based on count III of the State\u2019s motions. As noted above, count III alleged that respondent was unfit based on incarceration as a result of a criminal conviction that prevents the discharge of parental duties for a period in excess of two years after the filing of the motion for termination of parental rights, accompanied by little or no previous contact and/or support for the children (750 ILCS 50/l(D)(r) (West 1998)).\nThe trial court found that the State met its burden of proof with respect to the allegations of unfitness based on section l(D)(r) of the Adoption Act (Act) (750 ILCS 50/l(D)(r) (West 1998)). More specifically, the court found that respondent\u2019s contact with the minors was unstable and chaotic, requiring the children to spend extended periods of time with their maternal grandparents. The court pointed out that respondent\u2019s incarceration made him unable to exercise any appropriate or immediate contact with the children. In addition, the court opined that any support that respondent provided the children was minimal and insufficient to support the children in any meaningful way or for any sustained period of time.\nAs a preliminary matter, respondent argues that the interpretation of section l(D)(r) is an issue of first impression. The State disagrees, citing four cases that it claims discuss section l(D)(r). We agree with respondent that the interpretation of section l(D)(r) is an issue of first impression. None of the cases cited by the State discuss section l(D)(r). Moreover, we are disturbed by some misrepresentations in the State\u2019s discussion of the cases it cites. For instance, the State claims that this court considered the application of section l(D)(r) in In re D.D., 309 Ill. App. 3d 581 (2000), affd, 196 Ill. 2d 405 (2001). However, our discussion in D.D. dealt with section l(D)(s) of the Act (750 ILCS 50/1 (D)(s) (West 1998)), an entirely different statutory provision. The State also cites to In re S.B., 316 Ill. App. 3d 669 (2000), suggesting that the reviewing court upheld the trial court\u2019s finding of unfitness based on section l(D)(r) of the Act. However, our reading of S.B. indicates that the case does not construe section l(D)(r). In fact, S.B. contains no citation whatsoever to section l(D)(r). The respondent in S.B. was found unfit because of his inability to discharge his parental responsibilities due to mental illness (see 750 ILCS 50/l(D)(p) (West 1998)). S.B., 316 Ill. App. 3d at 672-73.\nWe now address the merits of respondent\u2019s argument. Section l(D)(r) of the Act provides that a parent may be found to be unfit if:\n\u201c(r) The child is in the temporary custody or guardianship of the Department of Children and Family Services, the parent is incarcerated as a result of criminal conviction [sic] at the time the petition or motion for termination of parental rights is filed, prior to incarceration the parent had little or no contact with the child or provided little or no support for the child, and the parent\u2019s incarceration will prevent the parent from discharging his or her parental responsibilities for the child for a period in excess of 2 years after the filing of the petition or motion for termination of parental rights.\u201d 750 ILCS 50/1 (D)(r) (West 1998).\nRespondent does not argue that the discharge of his parental responsibilities was impaired as a result of his incarceration. However, he suggests that the requirements for the termination of his parental rights were not satisfied in this case because he had \u201cmore than limited or non-existent contact with the children before his incarceration\u201d and because there was testimony that he could be a good father at times.\nWe agree that there was testimony that respondent could be a good father at times and that respondent had some contact with the minors. Therefore, we must focus on what the legislature intended by the term \u201clittle *** contact.\u201d The statute does not quantify or otherwise define the level of contact necessary to avoid a finding of unfitness based on section l(D)(r). Accordingly, we resort to the rules of statutory construction. The fundamental principle of statutory construction is to ascertain and give effect to the intention of the legislature. People v. Gonzalez, 313 Ill. App. 3d 607, 612 (2000). The best evidence of legislative intent is the language used in the statute itself, which must be given its plain and ordinary meaning. Gonzalez, 313 Ill. App. 3d at 612. Webster\u2019s defines \u201clittle\u201d as \u201csmall in number\u201d and \u201clacking distinction.\u201d Webster\u2019s Third New International Dictionary 1323 (1986).\nIn this case, respondent has not seen his children since late in 1997. In fact, the trial court calculated that between mid-1994 and August 2000 respondent was at liberty for only 10 months. In addition, the record does not indicate that respondent ever requested visitation at the prison. Furthermore, the record reflects that the minors\u2019 maternal grandparents took care of the children for extended periods of time during the minors\u2019 youth. Lindley testified that, during the time she cared for the minors in respondent\u2019s absence, he provided no support, financial or otherwise. Moreover, although respondent may have had contact with the children while he was not incarcerated, he admitted that he was unable to raise the minors due to alcohol, drug, and family problems. These problems prevented respondent from developing a significant relationship with his children.\nWe also point out that, while respondent sent cards, gifts, and letters to the children, the testimony at the fitness proceeding suggests that respondent began writing to his children only after receiving his service plan. Lindley testified that she never received any correspondence from respondent during 1998 and most of 1999. Clearly, under the facts of this case, respondent\u2019s contacts with his children were both \u201csmall in number\u201d and \u201clacking distinction.\u201d Accordingly, we cannot say that the trial court\u2019s finding of unfitness based on section l(D)(r) was against the manifest weight of the evidence.\nBecause a finding of parental unfitness may be based on evidence sufficient to support one statutory ground, we need not address whether the State met its burden of proving that respondent was unfit for failure to maintain a reasonable degree of interest, concern, or responsibility as to the children\u2019s welfare. M.M., 303 Ill. App. 3d at 567.\nCONCLUSION\nFor the aforementioned reasons, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court of Winnebago County.\nAffirmed.\nHUTCHINSON, EJ., and BOWMAN, J., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE GEOMETER" } ], "attorneys": [ "Donald P Sullivan, of Rockford, for appellant.", "Paul A. Logli, State\u2019s Attorney, of Rockford (Martin P Moltz, of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), and Kristine A. Karlin, of Mt. Prospect, for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "In re S.R. et al., Minors (The People of the State of Illinois, Petitioner-Appellee, v. T.T.R., Respondent-Appellant).\nSecond District\nNo. 2 \u2014 00\u20141249\nOpinion filed November 2, 2001.\nModified on denial of rehearing December 5, 2001.\nDonald P Sullivan, of Rockford, for appellant.\nPaul A. Logli, State\u2019s Attorney, of Rockford (Martin P Moltz, of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), and Kristine A. Karlin, of Mt. Prospect, for the People." }, "file_name": "0356-01", "first_page_order": 374, "last_page_order": 381 }