{ "id": 1281459, "name": "In re NICHOLAS K., JR., a Minor (The People of the State of Illinois, Petitioner-Appellee, v. Nicholas K., Respondent-Appellant)", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Nicholas K.", "decision_date": "2001-12-21", "docket_number": "No. 2-00-0968", "first_page": "497", "last_page": "502", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "326 Ill. App. 3d 497" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "83 Ill. B.J. 402", "category": "journals:journal", "reporter": "Ill. B.J.", "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "403" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "149 Ill. 2d 247", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5599893 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "251" }, { "page": "252" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/149/0247-01" ] }, { "cite": "295 Ill. App. 3d 840", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 45671 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "842" }, { "page": "843" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/295/0840-01" ] }, { "cite": "167 Ill. 2d 307", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 222749 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "320" }, { "page": "320" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/167/0307-01" ] }, { "cite": "238 Ill. App. 3d 1086", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5154973 ], "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1092" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/238/1086-01" ] }, { "cite": "198 Ill. 2d 156", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 29939 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "163" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/198/0156-01" ] }, { "cite": "161 Ill. 2d 233", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 783186 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "240" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/161/0233-01" ] }, { "cite": "155 Ill. 2d 103", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 4810424 ], "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "110" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/155/0103-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 617, "char_count": 11033, "ocr_confidence": 0.776, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.8440693819167133e-07, "percentile": 0.8401524567648538 }, "sha256": "fa0cf4ba52effd61956a48ab153aa2667af8c9ccc3d47c490138024b8b937d0f", "simhash": "1:41e53514d6b53b51", "word_count": 1804 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:10:13.053989+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "In re NICHOLAS K., JR., a Minor (The People of the State of Illinois, Petitioner-Appellee, v. Nicholas K., Respondent-Appellant)." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE McLAREN\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nRespondent, Nicholas K., appeals the circuit court\u2019s order that required him to register as a juvenile sex offender. He contends that the sex offender registration statute does not require juveniles to register as sex offenders. We reverse.\nOn November 19, 1998, respondent stipulated to a charge that he committed criminal sexual abuse (720 ILCS 5/12 \u2014 15(a)(2) (West 1998)). Respondent was 13 years old. The charge arose from an incident that occurred when respondent was 10, when he and another boy attempted to vaginally penetrate the other boy\u2019s seven-year-old sister. The court released respondent to his parents\u2019 custody, placing him on reporting supervision for 24 months. The court also ordered him to complete any recommended counseling. Because court supervision is not an adjudication of delinquency, respondent would not have had to register as a sex offender even under the State\u2019s expansive reading of the statute at the time of the initial disposition.\nOn March 29, 1999, the State petitioned to revoke respondent\u2019s supervision because he missed several scheduled court services meetings. Julie Schuelke, respondent\u2019s probation officer, testified that he missed or was late for appointments on January 7, January 15, February 3, February 19, February 25, March 10, and March 17. On cross-examination, she admitted that respondent\u2019s father, N.K., Sr., had told her that respondent would only be able to attend appointments scheduled on Mondays because Monday was N.K., Sr.\u2019s day off and he could not miss work on other days. Respondent had no other way to get to the appointments. Nonetheless, Schuelke\u2019s schedule was \u201cset in stone\u201d and \u201cshe couldn\u2019t deviate from it.\u201d The record reflects that, despite the relative difficulty of complying with such regimented scheduling, the respondent-minor was adjudicated delinquent and placed on probation. The State moved to compel respondent to register pursuant to the Sex Offender Registration Act (the Act) (730 ILCS 150/1 et seq. (West 2000)). The State alleged that the Act had been amended on July 1, 1999, to require juveniles to register. Defense counsel asked the court to declare the amended act unconstitutional. The trial court denied the motion and ordered respondent to register as a sex offender. The court stayed its order pending appeal and respondent filed a timely notice of appeal.\nRespondent contends that the trial court erred in requiring him to register as a sex offender. He argues that, although the statute now contains a definition of \u201cjuvenile sex offender,\u201d it does not explicitly require juvenile sex offenders to register. Applying rules of statutory construction, respondent concludes that the court erred by reading into the statute a requirement that he register. The State responds that, by including a definition of \u201cjuvenile sex offender,\u201d the legislature was merely attempting to clarify that juvenile sex offenders are a subset of sex offenders generally and, therefore, sex offenders who are juveniles are required to register just like other sex offenders. We agree with respondent.\nIn construing a statute, our primary function is to ascertain and give effect to the legislature\u2019s intent in enacting the statute. Collins v. Board of Trustees of the Firemen\u2019s Annuity & Benefit Fund, 155 Ill. 2d 103, 110 (1993). The statutory language is usually the best indication of the drafters\u2019 intent and should be given its plain, ordinary, and popularly understood meaning. Collins, 155 Ill. 2d at Ill. Statutes in derogation of the common law must be strictly construed, and nothing should be read into them by implication. In re Illinois Bell Switching Station Litigation, 161 Ill. 2d 233, 240 (1994). Statutory construction issues are questions of law that we review de novo. In re Marriage of Kates, 198 Ill. 2d 156, 163 (2001).\nThe court required respondent to register as a sex offender pursuant to the Act. \u201cSex offender\u201d is defined, as relevant here, as any person convicted of one of a specified group of sex offenses. 730 ILCS 150/2(A)(1) (West 2000). A sex offender must register with the chief of police of the municipality where he or she resides or with the county sheriff if the offender lives in an unincorporated area. 730 ILCS 150/3(a) (West 2000).\nPrior to 1999, the Act did not explicitly refer to \u201cjuvenile sex offenders.\u201d Effective July 1, 1999, the legislature amended the Act to add the following definition:\n\u201c(A \u2014 5) \u2018Juvenile sex offender\u2019 means any person who is adjudicated a juvenile delinquent as the result of the commission of or attempt to commit a violation set forth in item (B), (C), or (C \u2014 5) of this Section or a violation of any substantially similar federal, sister state, or foreign country law. For purposes of this Section, \u2018convicted\u2019 shall have the same meaning as \u2018adjudicated.\u2019 \u201d 730 ILCS 150/2(A \u2014 5) (West 2000).\nSection 3, governing who is required to register, was not amended.\nRespondent contends that the way the Act is now structured, \u201csex offenders\u201d and \u201cjuvenile sex offenders\u201d are defined as separate classes, but only \u201csex offenders\u201d are required to register. He cites the familiar rule of statutory construction that, where the legislature uses certain words in one context and different words in another, it must intend a different meaning. See In re Marriage of Walters, 238 Ill. App. 3d 1086, 1092 (1992). The State contends, however, that the legislature was merely attempting to clarify that \u201cjuvenile sex offenders\u201d is a subset of \u201csex offenders\u201d and that the same registration requirements apply to both. We cannot agree.\nBy creating a separate category of \u201cjuvenile sex offenders,\u201d the legislature must have intended those in this category to be treated differently. Section 3 of the Act plainly provides that only \u201csex offenders\u201d are required to register. It says nothing about \u201cjuvenile sex offenders.\u201d If the legislature wanted to provide that juveniles who were adjudicated delinquent for having committed sex crimes had to register as sex offenders on the same basis as adults convicted of sex crimes, it could simply have amended the definition of \u201csex offender\u201d to include juveniles who were adjudicated delinquent.\nIt is at least arguable, as the State contends, that the last sentence of section 2(A \u2014 5), stating, \u201cFor purposes of this Section, \u2018convicted\u2019 shall have the same meaning as \u2018adjudicated,\u2019 \u201d was intended to bring juveniles within the class of sex offenders generally. 730 ILCS 150/ 2(A \u2014 5) (West 2000). However, this is by no means clear. As noted earlier, if this was the legislature\u2019s intention, it could simply have included this sentence in the definition of \u201csex offender\u201d without creating a separate category of juvenile sex offenders.\nMoreover, requiring a delinquent juvenile to register as a sex offender would be inconsistent with the purposes of the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (the Juvenile Court Act) (705 ILCS 405/1 \u2014 1 et seq. (West 2000)). The overriding purpose of the Juvenile Court Act is to promote the minor\u2019s best interests. In re W.C., 167 Ill. 2d 307, 320 (1995). Delinquency proceedings are protective and the purpose of the Juvenile Court Act is to correct, not to punish. W.C., 167 Ill. 2d at 320; In re J.G., 295 Ill. App. 3d 840, 842 (1998). Adult offenders and juvenile delinquents are not similarly situated. J.G., 295 Ill. App. 3d at 843. In a clear statement of its policy, section 1 \u2014 2 of the Juvenile Court Act provides in part:\n\u201cThis Act shall be administered in a spirit of humane concern, not only for the rights of the parties, but also for the fears and the limits of understanding of all who appear before the court.\u201d 705 ILCS 405/1 \u2014 2(2) (West 2000).\nOne aspect of this \u201chumane concern\u201d is to keep confidential the identities of juveniles brought before the court. To that end, the Juvenile Court Act contains strict guidelines to ensure the confidentiality of proceedings under it. The general public, except for the news media and the victim, is excluded from juvenile court proceedings. 705 ILCS 405/1 \u2014 5(6) (West 2000); In re A Minor, 149 Ill. 2d 247, 251 (1992). The circuit court may prevent any party present in court from disclosing the juvenile\u2019s name. A Minor, 149 Ill. 2d at 252. Minors\u2019 law enforcement records may not be released to the general public except in very narrow circumstances. 705 ILCS 405/1 \u2014 7 (West 2000). Supreme Court Rule 660 was recently amended to provide that, in all appeals filed from proceedings under the Juvenile Court Act, minors shall be identified by first name and last initial or by initials only. Official Reports Advance Sheet No. 21 (October 17, 2001), R. 660, eff. October 1, 2001.\nIn short, the legislature and the courts have taken great pains to preserve the confidentiality of minors involved in juvenile court proceedings. The policy of the Juvenile Court Act is to serve minors\u2019 best interests, which mandates that they not be subjected to public scorn and ridicule. See G. O\u2019Reilly, Illinois Lifts the Veil on Juvenile Conviction Records, 83 Ill. B.J. 402, 403 (1995). It makes little sense to go to such lengths to prohibit the release of information about minors involved in juvenile court proceedings, yet require a minor adjudicated delinquent for committing a sex crime to register as a sex offender. The Sex Offender and Child Murderer Community Notification Law allows information about registered sex offenders to be released essentially to anyone who asks for it. 730 ILCS 152/120(c) (West 2000).\nAs the State points out, recent amendments to the Juvenile Court Act do allow for wider dissemination of juvenile court records. See 705 ILCS 405/1 \u2014 8(C)(1), (C)(2) (West 2000) (permitting in certain circumstances the circuit court to allow the general public to view the name, address, and offense of a minor adjudicated delinquent). However, the overriding policy is still one of confidentiality. We note that respondent\u2019s records would not be subject to public inspection under these sections because respondent was not yet 13 years old when he committed the offense. See 705 ILCS 401/1 \u2014 8(C)(1)(B), (C)(2) (West 2000). In the absence of a clearer expression of its intention, we will not assume that the legislature intended to authorize the release of information about the minor and his offense pursuant to the Act when the same information may not be released under the Juvenile Court Act.\nThe judgment of the circuit court of Kane County is reversed.\nReversed.\nHUTCHINSON, EJ., and GEOMETER, J., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE McLAREN" } ], "attorneys": [ "G. Joseph Weller and R. Christopher White, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Elgin, for appellant.", "Meg G\u00f3recki, State\u2019s Attorney, of St. Charles (Martin E Moltz and Marshall M. Stevens, both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "In re NICHOLAS K., JR., a Minor (The People of the State of Illinois, Petitioner-Appellee, v. Nicholas K., Respondent-Appellant).\nSecond District\nNo. 2 \u2014 00\u20140968\nOpinion filed December 21, 2001.\nG. Joseph Weller and R. Christopher White, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Elgin, for appellant.\nMeg G\u00f3recki, State\u2019s Attorney, of St. Charles (Martin E Moltz and Marshall M. Stevens, both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0497-01", "first_page_order": 515, "last_page_order": 520 }