{ "id": 1281392, "name": "IRENE BEETLE, as Special Adm'r of the Estate of Robert Beetle, Deceased, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. WAL-MART ASSOCIATES, INC., et al., Defendants-Appellees", "name_abbreviation": "Beetle v. Wal-Mart Associates, Inc.", "decision_date": "2001-12-21", "docket_number": "No. 2-00-1195", "first_page": "528", "last_page": "541", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "326 Ill. App. 3d 528" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "42 Ill. App. 3d 330", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2642186 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1976, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "335" }, { "page": "335" }, { "page": "336" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/42/0330-01" ] }, { "cite": "200 Ill. App. 3d 581", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2462369 ], "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "586-87" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/200/0581-01" ] }, { "cite": "322 Ill. App. 3d 64", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 126327 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "69" }, { "page": "70" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/322/0064-01" ] }, { "cite": "108 Ill. App. 3d 525", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3009575 ], "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "529", "parenthetical": "holding that discovery rule applied to wrongful death action predicated on medical malpractice" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/108/0525-01" ] }, { "cite": "64 Ill. App. 3d 259", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3332580 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "264" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/64/0259-01" ] }, { "cite": "88 Ill. 2d 407", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3083558 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "416" }, { "page": "416" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/88/0407-01" ] }, { "cite": "167 Ill. 2d 353", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 222781 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "361" }, { "page": "362" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/167/0353-01" ] }, { "cite": "138 Ill. 2d 178", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5576867 ], "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "189" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/138/0178-01" ] }, { "cite": "220 Ill. App. 3d 1036", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5276189 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1043", "parenthetical": "concluding that medical malpractice statute of repose found in section 13 - 212(a) of the Code operated to bar the plaintiffs wrongful death action" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/220/1036-01" ] }, { "cite": "254 Ill. App. 3d 492", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2978403 ], "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "495" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/254/0492-01" ] }, { "cite": "146 Ill. 2d 477", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5597177 ], "year": 1992, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/146/0477-01" ] }, { "cite": "181 Ill. App. 3d 621", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 8498998 ], "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "628" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/181/0621-01" ] }, { "cite": "177 Ill. App. 3d 373", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3622191 ], "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "379", "parenthetical": "same" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/177/0373-01" ] }, { "cite": "186 Ill. App. 3d 865", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2654152 ], "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "867-69", "parenthetical": "holding that the then two-year statute of limitations for construction-related actions found in section 13 - 214(a) of the Code applies over the five-year statute of limitations period for certain actions found in section 13 - 205 of the Code" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/186/0865-01" ] }, { "cite": "242 Ill. App. 3d 437", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5120782 ], "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "443, 446-47", "parenthetical": "finding that (1) in suit against municipality, limitations period for construction-related actions found in section 13 - 214(a" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/242/0437-01" ] }, { "cite": "149 Ill. 2d 190", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5599792 ], "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "196", "parenthetical": "holding that the limitations period in section 13 - 214(a) takes precedence over the limitations period for personal injuries found in section 13 - 202 of the Code" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/149/0190-01" ] }, { "cite": "285 Ill. App. 3d 864", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1295609 ], "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "870", "parenthetical": "same" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/285/0864-01" ] }, { "cite": "287 Ill. App. 3d 194", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 521003 ], "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "198-99", "parenthetical": "same" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/287/0194-01" ] }, { "cite": "998 F.2d 487", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 10512086 ], "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "491", "parenthetical": "holding wrongful death action barred by 10-year construction statute of repose" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/998/0487-01" ] }, { "cite": "177 Ill. App. 3d 464", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3622651 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "469" }, { "page": "473", "parenthetical": "holding that limitations period in section 13 - 214(a) of the Code applies over limitations period for contribution actions found in section 13 - 204 of the Code because former provision is more specific" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/177/0464-01" ] }, { "cite": "369 Ill. 222", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 2566565 ], "year": 1938, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "225" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/369/0222-01" ] }, { "cite": "166 Ill. 2d 337", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 198922 ], "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "361" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/166/0337-01" ] }, { "cite": "118 Ill. App. 3d 669", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5661006 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "674" }, { "page": "674", "parenthetical": "noting that the controlling date in wrongful death actions is the date of death" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/118/0669-01" ] }, { "cite": "173 Ill. App. 3d 608", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3477238 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "612" }, { "page": "612" }, { "page": "612", "parenthetical": "finding that the plaintiff had two years from the date of her husband's death to file her wrongful death claim provided that two-year limitations period did not exceed four-year medical malpractice statute of repose" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/173/0608-01" ] }, { "cite": "251 Ill. App. 3d 980", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2958253 ], "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "985" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/251/0980-01" ] }, { "cite": "292 Ill. App. 3d 699", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1725038 ], "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "703" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/292/0699-01" ] }, { "cite": "239 Ill. 414", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 849053 ], "year": 1909, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "423" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/239/0414-01" ] }, { "cite": "156 Ill. App. 3d 634", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3506565 ], "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "636" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/156/0634-01" ] }, { "cite": "206 Ill. App. 3d 676", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2560259 ], "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "680" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/206/0676-01" ] }, { "cite": "306 Ill. App. 3d 822", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1336045 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "825" }, { "page": "825" }, { "page": "825" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/306/0822-01" ] }, { "cite": "131 Ill. 2d 403", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5569667 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "410" }, { "page": "410" }, { "page": "413", "parenthetical": "noting that the Act created a new cause of action" }, { "page": "414-15" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/131/0403-01" ] }, { "cite": "181 Ill. 2d 415", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 821406 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "427" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/181/0415-01" ] }, { "cite": "316 Ill. App. 3d 835", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1096605 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "842" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/316/0835-01" ] }, { "cite": "188 Ill. 2d 186", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 536019 ], "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "191" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/188/0186-01" ] }, { "cite": "323 Ill. App. 3d 461", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 171769 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "463" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/323/0461-01" ] }, { "cite": "279 Ill. App. 3d 217", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 75253 ], "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "221" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/279/0217-01" ] }, { "cite": "283 Ill. App. 3d 1031", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 182723 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1037" }, { "page": "1038", "parenthetical": "same" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/283/1031-01" ] }, { "cite": "252 Ill. App. 3d 260", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2968469 ], "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "264" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/252/0260-01" ] }, { "cite": "231 Ill. App. 3d 493", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5204603 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "496" }, { "page": "497" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/231/0493-01" ] }, { "cite": "136 Ill. 2d 450", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3255119 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "458-59" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/136/0450-01" ] }, { "cite": "177 Ill. App. 3d 464", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3622651 ], "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "472" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/177/0464-01" ] }, { "cite": "188 Ill. 2d 186", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 536019 ], "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "191" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/188/0186-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1126, "char_count": 32299, "ocr_confidence": 0.812, "pagerank": { "raw": 9.184464449616115e-08, "percentile": 0.5092808499646119 }, "sha256": "d1a971a9bc9ef2de05a521d2af117962768b30208ccb4144c899bdca98775121", "simhash": "1:2bf83df203305439", "word_count": 5323 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:10:13.053989+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "IRENE BEETLE, as Special Adm\u2019r of the Estate of Robert Beetle, Deceased, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. WAL-MART ASSOCIATES, INC., et al., Defendants-Appellees." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE GEOMETER\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nPlaintiff, Irene Beetle, as special administrator of the estate of her deceased husband, Robert Beetle, appeals the order of the circuit court of De Kalb County dismissing with prejudice her second amended complaint against defendants, Wal-Mart Associates, Inc., Wal-Mart Stores East, Inc., Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., and E.W. Howell Company, Inc. Plaintiffs complaint asserted a cause of action under the Wrongful Death Act (740 ILCS 180/0.01 et seq. (West 1998)) based on defendants\u2019 alleged negligence in the construction of a Wal-Mart store. The sole issue presented in this appeal is whether the four-year statute of limitations period in section 13 \u2014 214(a) of the Code of Civil Procedure (Code) (735 ILCS 5/13 \u2014 214(a) (West 1998)) or the two-year limitations period in section 2 of the Wrongful Death Act (Act) (740 ILCS 180/2 (West 1998)) applies to plaintiffs cause of action. Because we find that the Act\u2019s two-year statute of limitations applies, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court.\nBACKGROUND\nOn April 27, 1999, plaintiff, acting as the special, administrator of her deceased husband\u2019s estate, filed a complaint against defendants. According to the allegations in plaintiffs complaint, in September 1996, defendants were involved in the construction of a Wal-Mart store in De Kalb, Illinois. Defendant E.W Howell Company, Inc. (Howell), a contractor on the project, hired Area Construction Trades, Inc. (Area Construction), to provide the store with a roof. Plaintiff\u2019s decedent was employed as a roofer by Area Construction. On September 24, 1996, while working on the Wal-Mart project, plaintiffs decedent fell from the structural steel framework of the building. As a result of the injuries sustained in the fall, plaintiffs decedent died later the same day.\nPlaintiffs complaint asserted a cause of action under the Act based on defendants\u2019 alleged negligence in the construction of the Wal-Mart store. The Wal-Mart defendants and defendant Howell each moved to dismiss plaintiffs complaint pursuant to section 2 \u2014 619(a)(5) of the Code (735 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 619(a)(5) (West 1998)). Defendants urged the trial court to dismiss plaintiffs claim because she did not commence the action within two years after her husband\u2019s death as required by section 2 of the Act (740 ILCS 180/2 (West 1998)). In response to defendants\u2019 motions, plaintiff claimed that the four-year limitations period for construction-related actions found in section 13 \u2014 214(a) of the Code (735 ILCS 5/13 \u2014 214(a) (West 1998)) applied because it was more specific than the Act\u2019s two-year limitations period. On January 27, 2000, the trial court granted defendants\u2019 motions to dismiss, but allowed plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint.\nPlaintiff filed her amended complaint on February 15, 2000. The amended pleading alleged for the first time that it was not until July 1, 1997, that plaintiff discovered \u201cfactually specific information relative to the circumstances of decedent\u2019s fall\u201d so as to alert her \u201cto the need for further inquiries to determine if the cause of the decedent\u2019s injury was actionable at law.\u201d The amended complaint did not allege the specific facts made available on July 1, 1997. In response, the Wal-Mart defendants and defendant Howell each filed a section 2 \u2014 619 motion to dismiss. Defendants again asserted that plaintiff did not timely file her complaint under section 2 of the Act. Defendants also claimed that plaintiffs attempt to extend the limitations period by invoking the discovery rule was improper. Defendants reasoned that plaintiffs decedent\u2019s injuries were the result of a sudden and traumatic event and, as such, the cause of action accrued at the time the injuries occurred. On May 4, 2000, the trial court granted defendants\u2019 motions and dismissed plaintiffs amended complaint. The court also found that the discovery rule was not applicable to the case. Nevertheless, the court granted plaintiff leave to file a second amended complaint.\nPlaintiff filed her second amended complaint on June 21, 2000. The second amended complaint stated that at no time prior to July 1, 1997, did plaintiff \u201chave facts sufficient to know or have reason to know that a third party may have negligently caused [her husband\u2019s] death.\u201d Plaintiff added that on or about July 1, 1997, she spoke over the telephone to a previously unavailable witness from the construction site who possessed factually specific information relative to the circumstances of decedent\u2019s fall. Plaintiff, however, did not disclose the substance of her conversation with the undisclosed witness. Defendants filed a joint section 2 \u2014 619 motion to dismiss on the basis that plaintiffs action was time-barred. On September 11, 2000, the trial court granted defendants\u2019 motion and dismissed plaintiffs complaint with prejudice. In so ruling, the court reiterated that the discovery rule was not applicable. This appeal followed.\nSTANDARD OF REVIEW\nThe purpose of a motion to dismiss under section 2 \u2014 619 is to dispose of issues of law and easily proved issues of fact. Tatara v. Peterson Diving Service, 283 Ill. App. 3d 1031, 1037 (1996). We must accept all well-pleaded facts in the motion as well as reasonable inferences that can be drawn from those facts. Wolf v. Buesser, 279 Ill. App. 3d 217, 221 (1996). Our review of a trial court order granting a motion to dismiss is de novo. Greb v. Forest Preserve District, 323 Ill. App. 3d 461, 463 (2001).\nANALYSIS\nPlaintiff argues that the trial court erred in applying the two-year statute of limitations found in section 2 of the Act (740 ILCS 180/2 (West 1998)). According to plaintiff, the four-year statute of limitations found in section 13 \u2014 214(a) of the Code (735 ILCS 5/13 \u2014 214(a) (West 1998)) applies to her cause of action. Plaintiff notes that her husband was killed in a construction-related accident and that section 13 \u2014 214 addresses the limitations period for construction-related actions. Thus, she reasons that the \u201cspecific\u201d statute of limitations found in section 13 \u2014 214 should prevail over the \u201cgeneral\u201d statute of limitations found in section 2 of the Act.\nThe issue raised in this case is one of statutory construction. The primary rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the legislature. People v. Owens, 323 Ill. App. 3d\n222, 228 (2001). Plaintiffs argument rests on the premise that either section 13 \u2014 214(a) of the Code or section 2 of the Act could apply to her cause of action. We do not dispute that, when two limitations periods are applicable to a particular action, the more specific statute generally applies. See Tosado v. Miller, 188 Ill. 2d 186, 191 (1999); Roark v. Macoupin Creek District, 316 Ill. App. 3d 835, 842 (2000). However, where there is an alleged conflict between two statutes, a court has a duty to interpret the statutes in a manner that avoids an inconsistency and gives effect to both statutes, where such an interpretation is reasonably possible. McNamee v. Federated Equipment & Supply Co., 181 Ill. 2d 415, 427 (1998). We determine that plaintiffs argument is based on a misunderstanding of the function of the Act and its interplay with the limitations period found in section 13\u2014 214(a) of the Code.\nEssentially, plaintiff attempts to treat her wrongful death complaint as if it were a claim under the Survival Act (755 ILCS 5/27 \u2014 6 (West 1998)). However, the purposes of the two statutes are different. The Survival Act allows a decedent\u2019s survivors to recover damages for injuries suffered by the decedent prior to death. Wyness v. Armstrong World Industries, Inc., 131 Ill. 2d 403, 410 (1989). However, plaintiffs complaint is one for wrongful death. A wrongful death action allows a recovery for damages because of the loss of the deceased. Wyness, 131 Ill. 2d at 410. In other words, the purpose of the Act is to compensate the surviving spouse and next of kin for the pecuniary losses sustained due to the decedent\u2019s death. Mio v. Alberto-Culver Co., 306 Ill. App. 3d 822, 825 (1999).\nAlso insightful to our analysis is an examination of the history of the Act. A cause of action for wrongful death did not exist at common law. Rallo v. Crossroads Clinic, Inc., 206 Ill. App. 3d 676, 680 (1990). In adopting the Act, the General Assembly created a separate and independent cause of action for damages arising from a decedent\u2019s wrongful death. Mio, 306 Ill. App. 3d at 825; see also Wyness, 131 Ill. 2d at 413 (noting that the Act created a new cause of action). As a creature of legislative enactment, the Act itself is the source for determining who may sue and under what conditions, and the Act must be strictly construed. Forthenberry v. Franciscan Sisters Health Care Corp., 156 Ill. App. 3d 634, 636 (1987).\nSection 1 of the Act provides in relevant part:\n\u201cWhenever the death of a person shall be caused by wrongful act, neglect or default, and the act, neglect or default is such as would, if death had not ensued, have entitled the party injured to maintain an action and recover damages in respect thereof, then and in every such case the person who or company or corporation which would have been liable if death had not ensued, shall be liable to an action for damages, notwithstanding the death of the person injured, and although the death shall have been caused under such circumstances as amount in law to felony.\u201d 740 ILCS 180/1 (West 1998). \u201d\nIllinois courts interpreting the Act have long found that a wrongful death action will lie only where the deceased had a claim that was not time-barred on or before his death. Mooney v. City of Chicago, 239 Ill. 414, 423 (1909); O\u2019Brien v. O\u2019Donoghue, 292 Ill. App. 3d 699, 703 (1997); Kessinger v. Grefco, Inc., 251 Ill. App. 3d 980, 985 (1993); Wolfe v. Westlake Community Hospital, 173 Ill. App. 3d 608, 612 (1988); Fountas v. Breed, 118 Ill. App. 3d 669, 674 (1983). Once it is determined that the decedent\u2019s cause of action was not time-barred, section 2 of the Act governs the time within which a wrongful death action may be brought. Section 2 of the Act provides that \u201c[ejvery *** action shall be commenced within 2 years after the death of such person.\u201d 740 ILCS 180/2 (West 1998). Since the precipitating injury in a wrongful death action is the death (Wyness, 131 Ill. 2d at 414-15), section 2 of the Act provides a plaintiff with a two-year statute of limitations that begins to run on the date of the decedent\u2019s death (Wolfe, 173 Ill. App. 3d at 612; Fountas, 118 Ill. App. 3d at 674 (noting that the controlling date in wrongful death actions is the date of death)). Our supreme court has determined that the requirement that a plaintiff file his or her action within two years is a condition precedent to the filing of a wrongful death action. Pasquale v. Speed Products Engineering, 166 Ill. 2d 337, 361 (1995); Metropolitan Trust Co. v. Bowman Dairy Co., 369 Ill. 222, 225 (1938).\nIn light of the foregoing discussion, we find that there is a reasonable interpretation of the statutes involved that avoids an inconsistency and gives effect to both statutes. Plaintiffs cause of action is based on the Act. As such, the only limitations period applicable to her claim is the two-year statute of limitations period found in section 2 of the Act. Thus, plaintiff had two years from the date of her husband\u2019s death to file a wrongful death action provided that plaintiffs decedent had a claim that was not time-barred at the time of his death. For purposes of determining whether plaintiffs decedent had a claim that was time-barred at the time of his death, we use the limitations period found in section 13 \u2014 214(a), which applies to construction-related actions. In other words, section 13 \u2014 214(a) of the Code applied to plaintiffs decedent to the extent that he could have filed an action against defendants during his lifetime. In this case, plaintiffs decedent died on the same day that he sustained his injuries. Thus, it is evident that plaintiffs decedent had a claim that was not time-barred on the date of his death. Since plaintiff did not commence her wrongful death action within two years after her husband\u2019s death, it was time-barred.\nWe note that our view of the interplay between section 13 \u2014 214(a) of the Code and section 2 of the Act gives effect to the aim of both statutory provisions. It recognizes the legislature\u2019s intent to protect persons involved in the design and construction of buildings from potentially unlimited liability (see La Salle National Bank v. Edward M. Cohon & Associates, Ltd., 177 Ill. App. 3d 464, 469 (1988)) while also allowing a reasonable time for a surviving spouse or next of kin to bring an action for the pecuniary losses sustained due to the decedent\u2019s death (Mio, 306 Ill. App. 3d at 825).\nNevertheless, in support of her position, plaintiff cites several cases in which courts have applied the construction statute of repose (735 ILCS 5/13 \u2014 214(b) (West 1998)) to wrongful death actions. See, e.g., Herriott v. Allied Signal, Inc., 998 F.2d 487, 491 (7th Cir. 1993) (holding wrongful death action barred by 10-year construction statute of repose); Risch v. Paul J. Krez Co., 287 Ill. App. 3d 194, 198-99 (1997) (same); O\u2019Brien v. City of Chicago, 285 Ill. App. 3d 864, 870 (1996) (same). Plaintiff reasons that subsections (a) and (b) of section 13 \u2014 214 should be construed together and that these cases support her argument that wrongful death actions fall within the purview of section 13 \u2014 214(a). We find the cases cited by plaintiff of little precedential value. In none of the cases cited by plaintiff was the reviewing court asked to decide whether the construction statute of repose governed over the Act\u2019s two-year statute of limitations. In fact, none of these cases cite to or mention the Act\u2019s two-year limitations period.\nWe are also unpersuaded by plaintiffs reliance on cases comparing the limitations period in section 13 \u2014 214(a) of the Code with the limitations period found in other statutory provisions of the Code. None of those cases addressed the role of the Act\u2019s limitations period. See, e.g., Hernon v. E.W. Corrigan Construction Co., 149 Ill. 2d 190, 196 (1992) (holding that the limitations period in section 13 \u2014 214(a) takes precedence over the limitations period for personal injuries found in section 13 \u2014 202 of the Code); Tatara, 283 Ill. App. 3d at 1038 (same); Zimmer v. Village of Willowbrook, 242 Ill. App. 3d 437, 443, 446-47 (1993) (finding that (1) in suit against municipality, limitations period for construction-related actions found in section 13 \u2014 214(a) of the Code applies over limitations period found in section 8 \u2014 101 of the Local Governmental and Governmental Employees Tort Immunity Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 85, par. 8 \u2014 101) because former statute was enacted after latter provision; and (2) section 13 \u2014 214(a), as a specific statutory provision, takes precedence over the limitations period for certain actions found in section 13 \u2014 205 of the Code); American National Bank & Trust Co. of Chicago v. Booth/Hansen Associates, Ltd., 186 Ill. App. 3d 865, 867-69 (1989) (holding that the then two-year statute of limitations for construction-related actions found in section 13 \u2014 214(a) of the Code applies over the five-year statute of limitations period for certain actions found in section 13 \u2014 205 of the Code); Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Walsh Construction Co., 177 Ill. App. 3d 373, 379 (1988) (same); LaSalle National Bank, 177 Ill. App. 3d at 473 (holding that limitations period in section 13 \u2014 214(a) of the Code applies over limitations period for contribution actions found in section 13 \u2014 204 of the Code because former provision is more specific). But see Antunes v. Sookhakitch, 181 Ill. App. 3d 621, 628 (1989), aff\u2019d on other grounds, 146 Ill. 2d 477 (1992) (holding that statute of limitations for contribution actions found in section 13 \u2014 204 of the Code applies over limitations period for malpractice actions found in section 13 \u2014 212 of the Code; where the plaintiffs complaint was based solely on Contribution Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 70, par. 301 et seq.), section 13 \u2014 204 is more specific than section 13 \u2014 212).\nPlaintiff also finds support for her position in cases involving the interplay between the limitations period relating to medical malpractice actions (735 ILCS 5/13 \u2014 212(a) (West 1998)) and the limitations period in section 2 of the Act. For instance, in Durham v. Michael Reese Hospital, 254 Ill. App. 3d 492, 495 (1993), the plaintiff filed a wrongful death action predicated on medical malpractice within two years of her husband\u2019s death. The trial court dismissed the action as untimely. The reviewing court affirmed, holding that the four-year medical malpractice statute of repose barred the plaintiff\u2019s action because it was filed more than four years after the date of the alleged negligent treatment. See also Limer v. Lyman, 220 Ill. App. 3d 1036, 1043 (1991) (concluding that medical malpractice statute of repose found in section 13 \u2014 212(a) of the Code operated to bar the plaintiffs wrongful death action); Wolfe v. Westlake Community Hospital, 173 Ill. App. 3d 608, 612 (1988) (finding that the plaintiff had two years from the date of her husband\u2019s death to file her wrongful death claim provided that two-year limitations period did not exceed four-year medical malpractice statute of repose).\nHowever, we do not agree that this line of cases supports plaintiffs contention that the limitations period in section 13 \u2014 214(a) prevails over the limitations period in section 2 of the Act. Notably, plaintiffs reliance on these cases is misplaced because the language of section 13 \u2014 212(a) is fundamentally different from the language the legislature used in enacting section 13 \u2014 214(a) of the Code.\nSection 13 \u2014 214(a) provides, in pertinent part:\n\u201cActions based upon tort, contract or otherwise against any person for an act or omission of such person in the design, planning, supervision, observation or management of construction, or construction of an improvement to real property shall be commenced within 4 years from the time the person bringing an action, or his or her privity, knew or should reasonably have known of such act or omission.\u201d 735 ILCS 5/13 \u2014 214(a) (West 1998).\nSection 13 \u2014 212(a) states:\n\u201c[N]o action for damages for injury or death against any physician *** or hospital *** whether based upon tort, or breach of contract, or otherwise, *** shall be brought more than 2 years after the date on which the claimant knew, or through the use of reasonable diligence should have known, or received notice in writing of the existence of the injury or death for which damages are sought in the action, whichever of such date occurs first, but in no event shall such action be brought more than 4 years after the date on which occurred the act or omission or occurrence alleged in such action to have been the cause of such injury or death.\u201d (Emphasis added.) 735 ILCS 5/13 \u2014 212(a) (West 1998).\nThe language used in section 13 \u2014 212(a) of the Code and section 13\u2014 214(a) of the Code contains some similarities. For instance, both apply to actions based in tort, contract, or \u201cotherwise.\u201d Plaintiff urges that her suit is one for \u201ctort, contract or otherwise\u201d and that we should therefore apply the limitations period in section 13 \u2014 214(a) of the Code. However, plaintiffs position would require us to disregard the fundamental rule of statutory construction that no word or phrase should be rendered superfluous or meaningless. See Kraft, Inc. v. Edgar, 138 Ill. 2d 178, 189 (1990). Plaintiff ignores the fact that, unlike section 13 \u2014 212(a), section 13 \u2014 214(a) does not expressly refer to damages resulting in death. Thus, we reiterate that the limitations period in section 13 \u2014 214(a) does not apply to actions brought pursuant to the Act.\nAlternatively, plaintiff claims that she filed her complaint within two years of the time she discovered that defendants\u2019 negligent conduct could or might have caused decedent\u2019s death. Thus, plaintiff argues that, even if the Act\u2019s two-year statute of limitation applies, the discovery rule acts to preserve her cause of action. We disagree.\nThe application of the discovery rule postpones the commencement of the relevant statute of limitations until an injured party knows or reasonably should know that he has been injured and that his injury was wrongfully caused. Golla v. General Motors Corp., 167 Ill. 2d 353, 361 (1995). The term \u201cwrongfully caused\u201d refers to the point in time in which \u201cthe injured person becomes possessed of sufficient information concerning his injury and its cause to put a reasonable person on inquiry to determine whether actionable conduct is involved.\u201d Knox College v. Celotex Corp., 88 Ill. 2d 407, 416 (1981).\nHistorically, the limitations period for bringing a wrongful death action has been regarded as a condition precedent, not modified or affected by the general statute of limitations. Fure v. Sherman Hospital, 64 Ill. App. 3d 259, 264 (1978). However, as plaintiff correctly notes, the discovery rule has been applied to wrongful death actions under certain circumstances. See, e.g., Coleman v. Hinsdale Emergency Medical Corp., 108 Ill. App. 3d 525, 529 (1982) (holding that discovery rule applied to wrongful death action predicated on medical malpractice); Fure, 64 Ill. App. 3d 259 (same). Nevertheless, our supreme court has stated that, where an individual\u2019s injuries are caused by a sudden traumatic event, the cause of action accrues and the statute of limitations begins to run when the injury occurred. Golla, 167 Ill. 2d at 362. A traumatic injury is one in which the damage is caused by external violence or in which the injury is immediate and caused by an external force. Clark v. Galen Hospital Illinois, Inc., 322 Ill. App. 3d 64, 69 (2001). In contrast, where the injury is an aggravation of a physical problem that may naturally develop, absent negligent causes, neither its existence nor potential wrongful cause may immediately be known. Janetis v. Christensen, 200 Ill. App. 3d 581, 586-87 (1990). In the latter situation, it is considered unfair to bar a negligently injured individual\u2019s cause of action before he has a chance to discover that it exists. Clark, 322 Ill. App. 3d at 70.\nIn this case, plaintiffs decedent\u2019s injury occurred on September 24, 1996, when he fell from the structural steel framework of the WalMart store. Thus, the type of injury that led to the death of plaintiffs decedent was not the aggravation of a physical problem that may naturally develop absent negligent causes. Nor was plaintiff\u2019s decedent\u2019s injury latent. Rather, the injury was immediate and caused by an external force. As such, plaintiffs decedent\u2019s injury qualifies as the type of \u201csudden traumatic event\u201d contemplated by Golla. Accordingly, the limitations period in this case began to run on September 24, 1996.\nPlaintiff claims that Golla is distinguishable on the basis that the plaintiff in that case was the injured party. Plaintiff argues that, as the wife of the injured party, it is reasonable to expect that it would take her a longer time to discover if a cause of action existed. We find plaintiffs argument unpersuasive. Plaintiffs decedent died after falling from a building. Given the circumstances of plaintiffs death, we find that as of September 24, 1996, plaintiff possessed sufficient information to put her on notice to determine whether actionable conduct was involved. See Knox, 88 Ill. 2d at 416.\nWe acknowledge that, in Praznik v. Sport Aero, Inc., 42 Ill. App. 3d 330 (1976), the reviewing court applied the discoveiy rule to a wrongful death case arising from a \u201csudden traumatic\u201d accident. However, Praznik is factually distinguishable. In that case, the plaintiff\u2019s decedent died in an airplane crash. Although the crash apparently occurred on March 29, 1969, the date of the decedent\u2019s disappearance, it was not until November 1971 that the actual wreckage of the aircraft was discovered. The plaintiff filed her original complaint on March 29, 1971, naming Sport Aero as the defendant. An amended complaint, filed on May 5, 1972, added defendant Fey. In response, Fey pleaded an affirmative defense. He claimed that plaintiffs action was barred by the two-year limitations period for wrongful death claims. The trial court struck Fey\u2019s affirmative defense and entered an order certifying the issue for interlocutory review. The appellate court allowed leave to appeal.\nOn appeal, Fey argued that the Act\u2019s two-year statute of limitations period applied to bar the plaintiffs wrongful death action. The plaintiff contended that her cause of action did not accrue until November 1971, when the wreckage of the aircraft was discovered. Plaintiff reasoned that it was not until that time that she knew with any certainty of the decedent\u2019s death and the circumstances surrounding the death. The reviewing court conceded that, as a general matter, because the Act is a creature of statute, the discovery rule may not be invoked to save a cause of action that is time-barred. Praznik, 42 Ill. App. 3d at 335. Nevertheless, the court found it prudent to create an exception to the general rule where the time and circumstances of an individual\u2019s death are unknown. Praznik, 42 Ill. App. 3d at 335. The court determined that until the aircraft wreckage was discovered there was a possibility, however remote, that the decedent was still alive. Praznik, 42 Ill. App. 3d at 336. The holding in Praznik is limited to those cases in which the time of an individual\u2019s death is unknown. In the instant case, it is undisputed that plaintiff was aware of her husband\u2019s death on the date it occurred.\nCONCLUSION\nIn short, we conclude that, because plaintiff failed to file her wrongful death action within two years after her husband\u2019s death, her claim is time-barred. Moreover, we determine that the discovery rule does not preserve plaintiffs cause of action. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court of De Kalb County.\nAffirmed.\nHUTCHINSON, P.J., concurs. '", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE GEOMETER" }, { "text": "JUSTICE BOWMAN,\ndissenting:\nI respectfully dissent.\nSection 13 \u2014 214(a) of the Code of Civil Procedure (Code) (735 ILCS 5/13 \u2014 214(a) (West 1998)) provides that \u201cactions based upon tort, contract or otherwise against any person for an act or omission of such person in the design, planning, supervision, observation or management of construction, or construction of an improvement to real property shall be commenced within 4 years from the time the person bringing an action, or his or her privity, knew or should reasonably have known of such act or omission.\u201d (Emphasis added.) Plaintiffs action was commenced within the four-year limitations period.\nPlaintiff argues that her wrongful death suit is one for \u201ctort, contract or otherwise\u201d and that, therefore, the four-year period of limitations in section 13 \u2014 214(a) of the Code should apply. I agree.\nIn Hayes v. Mercy Hospital & Medical Center, 136 Ill. 2d 450 (1990), our supreme court interpreted the phrase \u201cor otherwise\u201d contained in section 13 \u2014 212(a) of the Code (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 110, par. 13 \u2014 212(a)), which is the medical malpractice statute of repose. The court stated:\n\u201cThe inclusion of the term \u2018or otherwise\u2019 following more restrictive language in the statute seems to us to indicate that the legislature intended the term to be all-inclusive. We believe that the term demonstrates the General Assembly\u2019s desire at the time it originally enacted the statute to limit a physician\u2019s exposure to liability for damages for injury or death arising out of patient care under all theories of liability, whether then existing or not.\u201d Hayes, 136 Ill. 2d at 458-59.\nIn Carlson v. Moline Board of Education, School District No. 40, 231 Ill. App. 3d 493 (1992), the court adopted the supreme court\u2019s reasoning in Hayes and concluded that the two-year statute of limitations (subsequently extended to four years) in section 13 \u2014 214(a) of the Code barred the third-party contribution action. Relying on Hayes, the court held that, when describing the type of actions to which the limitations provision of section 13 \u2014 214(a) applies, the term \u201cotherwise\u201d had the same meaning in the statute of limitations provision as it did in the medical statute of repose provision interpreted in Hayes. Carlson, 231 Ill. App. 3d at 496. In other words, the term was all-inclusive. The court concluded that the limitations provision of section 13\u2014 214(a) applied to contribution actions based on \u201can act or omission in the design, planning, supervision, observation or management of construction, or construction of an improvement to real property.\u201d Carlson, 231 Ill. App. 3d at 497; see also LaSalle National Bank v. Edward M. Cohon & Associates, Ltd., 177 Ill. App. 3d 464, 472 (1988), (the \u201cotherwise\u201d language of the limitations provision set forth in section 13 \u2014 214(a) is broad and includes an action for contribution). I also believe that the term \u201cotherwise\u201d in section 13 \u2014 214(a) is intended to be all-inclusive. In my view, the \u201cotherwise\u201d language of the provision applies to any action, including a wrongful death action, based on an act or omission in the design, planning, supervision, observation or management of construction, or construction of an improvement to real property.\nAlthough my research has revealed no Illinois cases exactly on point, it would appear that actions under the Wrongful Death Act (740 ILCS 180/0.01 et seq. (West 1998)) would also be encompassed by the term \u201ctort\u201d set forth in section 13 \u2014 214(a) of the Code. A \u201ctort\u201d is \u201ca wrongful act for which a civil action will lie except one involving a breach of contract: a civil wrong independent of a contract.\u201d Webster\u2019s Third New International Dictionary 2413 (1986); see also Black\u2019s Law Dictionary 1496 (7th ed. 1999). To maintain a claim under the Wrongful Death Act (Act), a plaintiff must demonstrate that defendant owed a duty to decedent; that defendant breached that duty; that the breach of duty proximately caused decedent\u2019s death; and that pecuniary damages arose therefrom to persons designated under the Act. Leavitt v. Farwell Tower, Ltd. Partnership, 252 Ill. App. 3d 260, 264 (1993). A wrongful death action requires proof of the same elements \u2014 duty, breach of the duty, proximate cause and damages \u2014 as a common-law negligence action, a classic action in tort.\nPlaintiff also contends that section 3 \u2014 214(a) of the Code takes precedence over section 2 of the Wrongful Death Act (740 ILCS 180/2 (West 1998)) because section 13 \u2014 214(a) is more specific than section 2 of the Act. I agree. The Wrongful Death Act applies generally to actions arising from the death of a decedent, regardless of the type of activity from which the cause of action arose. On the other hand, section 13 \u2014 214(a) of the Code \u201chas been called a \u2018special statute of limitations\u2019 [citation] and a \u2018specific\u2019 statute of limitations [citation] and specifically applies to actions arising out of certain conduct, i.e., that related to construction activities.\u201d LaSalle National Bank, 177 Ill. App. 3d at 473. When two limitations periods are applicable to a particular action, the more specific statute generally applies. Tosado v. Miller, 188 Ill. 2d 186, 191 (1999).\nBecause section 13 \u2014 214(a) of the Code is more specific than section 2 of the Wrongful Death Act and because I believe a wrongful death action is one for \u201ctort, contract or otherwise,\u201d I would find that the four-year limitations period set forth in section 13 \u2014 214(a) applies to plaintiffs cause of action. As plaintiff brought her action within the applicable four-year period, I would reverse the circuit court\u2019s order dismissing her complaint as time-barred.", "type": "dissent", "author": "JUSTICE BOWMAN," } ], "attorneys": [ "James D. Sparkman, of Vella, Sparkman, Wheeler & Lund, P.C., of Rockford, for appellant.", "William E. Spizzirri and Michael T. Sprengnether, both of Kralovee & Marquard, Chtrd., of Chicago, for appellees." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "IRENE BEETLE, as Special Adm\u2019r of the Estate of Robert Beetle, Deceased, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. WAL-MART ASSOCIATES, INC., et al., Defendants-Appellees.\nSecond District\nNo. 2 \u2014 00\u20141195\nOpinion filed December 21, 2001.\nBOWMAN, J., dissenting.\nJames D. Sparkman, of Vella, Sparkman, Wheeler & Lund, P.C., of Rockford, for appellant.\nWilliam E. Spizzirri and Michael T. Sprengnether, both of Kralovee & Marquard, Chtrd., of Chicago, for appellees." }, "file_name": "0528-01", "first_page_order": 546, "last_page_order": 559 }