{ "id": 1281447, "name": "TERRENCE DOMIN et al., Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. SHELBY INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "Terrence Domin v. Shelby Insurance", "decision_date": "2001-11-21", "docket_number": "No. 1-01-1143", "first_page": "688", "last_page": "697", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "326 Ill. App. 3d 688" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "648 N.E.2d 180", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "271 Ill. App. 3d 50", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 249130 ], "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "62-65" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/271/0050-01" ] }, { "cite": "751 N.E,2d 637", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2001, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "323 Ill. App. 3d 417", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 171583 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "423-25" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/323/0417-01" ] }, { "cite": "335 Ill. App. 3d 1109", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 637065 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1114-16" }, { "page": "1114-20" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/335/1109-01" ] }, { "cite": "128 F.3d 462", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.3d", "case_ids": [ 977943 ], "weight": 9, "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "464" }, { "page": "464" }, { "page": "464" }, { "page": "465-66" }, { "page": "465" }, { "page": "467" }, { "page": "467" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f3d/128/0462-01" ] }, { "cite": "683 N.E.2d 972", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1997, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "291 Ill. App. 3d 343", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 456097 ], "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "345" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/291/0343-01" ] }, { "cite": "728 N.E.2d 115", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2000, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "312 Ill. App. 3d 829", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 411715 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "833" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/312/0829-01" ] }, { "cite": "607 N.E.2d 1204", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1992, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "154 Ill. 2d 90", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 4820940 ], "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "108" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/154/0090-01" ] }, { "cite": "620 N.E.2d 355", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "362" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "156 Ill. 2d 179", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 777559 ], "weight": 10, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "193" }, { "page": "189-94" }, { "page": "189-90" }, { "page": "189-91" }, { "page": "191" }, { "page": "193-94" }, { "page": "192" }, { "page": "192" }, { "page": "192" }, { "page": "193" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/156/0179-01" ] }, { "cite": "707 N.E.2d 1259", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1999, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "303 Ill. App. 3d 639", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 511429 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "646" }, { "page": "647-49" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/303/0639-01" ] }, { "cite": "659 N.E.2d 952", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "168 Ill. 2d 216", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 307253 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "221" }, { "page": "223" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/168/0216-01" ] }, { "cite": "750 N.E.2d 1285", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2001, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "322 Ill. App. 3d 1004", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 126435 ], "weight": 4, "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1004-05" }, { "page": "1004-05" }, { "page": "1004-05" }, { "page": "1006" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/322/1004-01" ] }, { "cite": "705 N.E.2d 956", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1999, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "302 Ill. App. 3d 227", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1352844 ], "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "231" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/302/0227-01" ] }, { "cite": "724 N.E.2d 1042", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 2000, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "311 Ill. App. 3d 797", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 415355 ], "weight": 9, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "798-99" }, { "page": "800" }, { "page": "800" }, { "page": "800" }, { "page": "800" }, { "page": "800" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/311/0797-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 710, "char_count": 20545, "ocr_confidence": 0.806, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.56196423288224e-07, "percentile": 0.6770834901957604 }, "sha256": "f5121bccb6a5cd8b529d3785f564b7c9126a88e33102d9205894f17a9c1ced95", "simhash": "1:9bcf1f8a4235b5ed", "word_count": 3321 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:10:13.053989+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "TERRENCE DOMIN et al., Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. SHELBY INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE WOLFSON\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThe question before us is whether uninsured motorist coverage under a particular insurance policy could be \u201cstacked\u201d or aggregated. The answer seems to come down to how many times the policy\u2019s limits of liability appear on its declarations page. The trial court entered summary judgment for the insureds. We reverse the trial court\u2019s decision and remand this cause with directions to enter summary judgment for the insurance company.\nFACTS\nTerrence and Marie Domin (the Domins) insured two cars under an automobile policy issued by Shelby Insurance Company (Shelby). The policy provided uninsured/underinsured motorists coverage to the Domins. On January 21, 1998, Terrence Domin was driving one of the insured vehicles when he was injured in a collision with an oncoming car.\nTerrence later filed a lawsuit in the circuit court of Cook County against the owner, driver, and passenger of the other car (the underlying suit). That lawsuit was based on negligence. Marie Domin, who was neither involved nor injured in the accident, joined her husband\u2019s lawsuit. She asserted claims for loss of society due to his injuries.\nThe defendants in the underlying suit were uninsured, so the Domins turned to Shelby. The Domins requested Shelby provide uninsured motorist coverage under their insurance policy No. IA 8537640. That policy provided, in part:\n\u201cPART C \u2014 UNINSURED MOTORISTS COVERAGE\nINSURING A. We will pay compensatory damages which-an insured is legally entitled to recover from the owner or operator of an uninsured motor vehicle because of bodily injury:\n1. Sustained by an insured; and\n2. Caused by an accident.\u201d\nThe policy defined \u201cbodily injury\u201d as \u201cbodily harm, sickness or disease, including death that results.\u201d\nThe uninsured motorist coverage provision was subject to another provision titled \u201cLimit of Liability.\u201d It'provided:\n\u201cSPLIT Uninsured Motorists SCHEDULE\nUNINSURED Coverage $ See Declarations each person\nMOTORISTS $ See Declarations each accident\nLIMITS\nThe first paragraph of the Limit provision in Part C is replaced by the following:\nLIMIT OF LIABILITY\nThe limit of liability shown in the Schedule or in the Declarations for each person for Uninsured Motorists Coverage is our maximum limit of liability for all damages, including damages for care, loss of services or death, arising out of bodily injury sustained by any one person in any one accident. Subject to this limit for each person, the limit of liability shown in the Schedule or in the Declarations for each accident for Uninsured Motorists Coverage is our maximum limit of liability for all damages for bodily injury resulting from any one accident. This is the most we will pay regardless of the number of:\n1. Insureds;\n2. Claims made;\n3. Vehicles or premiums shown in the Declarations; or\n4. Vehicles involved in the accident.\u201d\nWith respect to uninsured motorist coverage, the policy\u2019s declarations page showed the following \u201cLimits of Liability\u201d:\nIn response to the Domins\u2019 request, Shelby offered to pay them $100,000 \u2014 the per-person bodily injury limit of the policy\u2019s uninsured motorist coverage. The Domins rejected Shelby\u2019s $100,000 offer.\nThe Domins do not question the clarity of the \u201cLIMIT OF LIABILITY\u201d provision. There is no ambiguity to it. It clearly means what it says \u2014 the limit of liability shown in the schedule or in the declarations for each insured who receives bodily injury is the most the company will pay, no matter how many claims or vehicles are covered. But, they say, ambiguity arises when the \u201cLIMIT OF LIABILITY\u201d provision is read with the declarations page. That is, the policy can reasonably be interpreted to allow liability limits of the two covered vehicles to be \u201cstacked\u201d or aggregated, providing a total maximum coverage of $200,000. The Domins contend they must be the beneficiaries of ambiguity in the policy language.\nOf course, Shelby denies the policy is ambiguous. It says the \u201cLIMITS OF LIABILITY\u201d provision clearly prohibits stacking. That is, says Shelby, the policy limit for one bodily injury is $100,000, regardless of the number of vehicles insured by the Domins, and here there is only one bodily injury.\nThe Domins filed a complaint for declaratory judgment in the circuit court of Cook County.\nOn plaintiffs\u2019 motion for summary judgment, the trial court entered judgment for the Domins. The court ruled that under Yates v. Farmers Automobile Insurance Ass\u2019n, 311 Ill. App. 3d 797, 724 N.E.2d 1042 (2000), the Domins were entitled to \u201cstack\u201d the \u201c$100,000 each person\u201d limits of uninsured motorist coverage under the automobile policy they purchased from Shelby because the Domins paid premiums for two vehicles.\nThis appeal followed.\nDECISION\nThe trial judge felt obligated to follow Yates v. Farmers Automobile Insurance Ass\u2019n, 311 Ill. App. 3d 797, 724 N.E.2d 1042 (2000). We, however, do not.\nSTANDARD OF REVIEW\nSummary judgment is proper when the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, reveal there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See 735 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 1005(c) (West 1998); American Family Mutual Insurance Co. v. Hinde, 302 Ill. App. 3d 227, 231, 705 N.E.2d 956 (1999). We review de novo a trial court\u2019s order granting summary judgment. Pekin Insurance Co. v. Estate of Ritter, 322 Ill. App. 3d 1004, 1004-05, 750 N.E.2d 1285 (2001).\nSTACKING\nAnti-stacking provisions in insurance policies are unenforceable when the language employed is unclear or ambiguous. Grzeszczak v. Illinois Farmers Insurance Co., 168 Ill. 2d 216, 221, 659 N.E.2d 952 (1995). If an anti-stacking clause is unambiguous and does not violate public policy, there is no need for construction; it must be enforced according to its terms. Grzeszczak, 168 Ill. 2d at 223.\n\u201cThe touchstone when determining whether an ambiguity exists regarding an insurance policy is whether the relevant portion is subject to more than one reasonable interpretation, not whether creative possibilities can be suggested. \u2018Reasonableness is the key.\u2019 \u201d Pekin Insurance Co. v. Estate of Goben, 303 Ill. App. 3d 639, 646, 707 N.E.2d 1259 (1999), quoting Bruder v. Country Mutual Insurance Co., 156 Ill. 2d 179, 193, 620 N.E.2d 355, 362 (1993).\nWe review de novo a trial court\u2019s construction of an insurance policy. Ritter, 322 Ill. App. 3d at 1004-05. The construction of an insurance policy is a question of law. Outboard Marine Corp. v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., 154 Ill. 2d 90, 108, 607 N.E.2d 1204 (1992).\nShelby does not dispute the Domins are entitled to benefits under the policy\u2019s uninsured motorist coverage provision. The vehicle owned and operated by the defendants in the underlying suit was uninsured. The Domins are entitled to the \u201ceach person\u201d limit of uninsured motorists coverage shown on the policy\u2019s declarations page. This is true regardless of whether the limit is $100,000 or $200,000. But only the insured who incurs \u201cbodily injury\u201d \u2014 here, Terence \u2014 is covered.\nThe parties dispute whether the Domins are entitled to \u201cstack\u201d the \u201c$100,000 each person\u201d liability limits for each of their two vehicles insured under the policy, for a total available benefit of $200,000.\nFirst, we must determine whether the policy clearly and unambiguously prohibits the Domins from stacking their liability limits. If the policy is unambiguous, summary judgment is appropriate for Shelby. But, if the policy is ambiguous, it must be interpreted in favor of the insured and the trial court\u2019s grant of summary judgment for the Domins will be affirmed. See Ritter, 322 Ill. App. 3d at 1004-05.\nThe Domins do not and cannot assert that simply because they paid separate premiums for the two cars they should be able to stack coverage. See American Family Mutual Insurance Co. v. Martin, 312 Ill. App. 3d 829, 833, 728 N.E.2d 115 (2000). Nor can they say an anti-stacking clause is per se violative of public policy. See Pahn v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 291 Ill. App. 3d 343, 345, 683 N.E.2d 972 (1997).\nThe Illinois Supreme Court has addressed the question of whether uninsured motorists coverage for multiple vehicles covered in a single insurance policy can be stacked or aggregated to provide additional coverage. Bruder, 156 Ill. 2d at 189-94.\nIn Bruder, the plaintiffs insured two pickup trucks under the same insurance policy. 156 Ill. 2d at 189-90. The policy contained an anti-stacking provision that referred the insured to the declarations page for the limit of liability. Bruder, 156 Ill. 2d at 189-91. On the declarations page of the policy, the two vehicles were listed separately and there was only one liability limit listed for both vehicles. Bruder, 156 Ill. 2d at 191.\nSince the liability limit was listed only once on the declarations page, the court held the anti-stacking clause was unambiguous. The court did not allow the plaintiff to stack the uninsured motorists coverage. Bruder, 156 Ill. 2d at 193-94.\nThe court then went beyond the precise issue in the case. In dicta, it noted that if there were a liability limit listed for each vehicle on the declarations page, the policy would likely be ambiguous and stacking would be allowed. Bruder, 156 Ill. 2d at 192. The court reasoned that if there were a separate liability limit listed for each vehicle listed on the declarations page, there would be little to suggest the parties intended to limit coverage to the amount provided for only one of the two vehicles. Bruder, 156 Ill. 2d at 192. In that case, the court said, \u201cIt would be more reasonable to assume that the parties intended that, in return for the two premiums, two $100,000 coverage amounts were afforded.\u201d Bruder, 156 Ill. 2d at 192.\nHere, as in Bruder, stacking is prohibited. The policy\u2019s anti-stacking provision is clear and unambiguous. The policy\u2019s \u201cLimit of Liability\u201d provision says that regardless of the number of vehicles or premiums shown on the declarations page, Shelby only agreed to pay up to the limit of insurance shown for uninsured motorists coverage for bodily injury, which is \u201c$100,000 each person.\u201d Only Terrence Domin suffered bodily injury.\nThe Domins\u2019 two vehicles were listed separately on the declarations page of the policy and there was only one liability limit listed for both vehicles. Since, as in Bruder, the liability limit was listed only once on the declarations page, we hold the anti-stacking clause is unambiguous and the Domins cannot stack their uninsured motorists coverage. Bruder, 156 Ill. 2d at 193.\nThe Domins contend we should find Shelby\u2019s policy ambiguous on whether stacking is permitted. They suggest this case is controlled by the Seventh Circuit\u2019s decision in Allen v. Transamerica Insurance Co., 128 F.3d 462 (7th Cir. 1997), and by the Fifth District\u2019s decision in Yates v. Farmers Automobile Insurance Ass\u2019n, 311 Ill. App. 3d 797, 724 N.E.2d 1042 (2000).\nSpecifically, the Domins contend Allen \u2014 which has been adopted by the Fifth District (see, e.g., Janes v. Western States Insurance Co., 335 Ill. App. 3d 1109, 1114-16 (2001) \u2014 and Yates have resolved the issue before us. That is, we should find, under Allen and Yates, the anti-stacking provision in Shelby\u2019s policy is ambiguous. The Domins conclude the policy should be interpreted to allow stacking and provide a liability limit of $200,000 per person because all ambiguities must be interpreted in favor of the insured.\nThe Domins are incorrect. This case is not controlled by Allen and Yates. We need not conduct a frontal assault on the Allen and Yates decisions in order to reach a contrary conclusion. Those cases involve construction of different insurance policy language. Not much different, but different enough.\nIn Allen, the Seventh Circuit, relying on the dicta in Bruder, allowed an insured to stack underinsured motorist coverage due to ambiguity in her policy. Allen, 128 F.3d 462. Allen had insured two vehicles under the same policy. Each vehicle had an underinsured motorist liability limit of $50,000 per person and $100,000 per incident. Allen, 128 E3d at 464.\nAllen\u2019s policy contained a limit of liability provision that said:\n\u201cThe limit of liability shown in the Schedule or in the Declarations for each person for Underinsured Motorists Coverage is our maximum limit of liability for all damages, including damages for care, loss of services or death, arising out of \u2018bodily injury\u2019 sustained by any one person in any one accident. Subject to this limit for each person, the limit of liability shown in the Schedule or in the Declarations for each accident for Underinsured Motorists Coverage is our maximum limit of liability for all damages for \u2018bodily injury\u2019 resulting from any one accident. This is the most we will pay regardless of the number of:\n1. Insureds;\n2. Claims made;\n3. Vehicles or premiums shown in the Declarations; or\n4. Vehicles involved in the accident.\u201d Allen, 128 F.3d at 464.\nThe court held there was no ambiguity in the anti-stacking language of the limit of liability provision of the policy, Allen, 128 F.3d at 464, but the court found an ambiguity when it tried to determine the \u201climit of liability\u201d referred to in the anti-stacking provision.\nThe limit of liability provision directed the insured to either the \u201cSchedule\u201d or the \u201cDeclarations\u201d to determine the amount of the limit. The limit of liability sections on the schedules were left blank. The only place to look to determine the limits was the declarations page. There, two limits of liability were listed \u2014 one for each vehicle. Allen, 128 F.3d at 464. After looking at the declarations page, the court looked to Bruder for guidance in construing the anti-stacking provision in conjunction with the declarations page. Allen, 128 F.3d at 465-66.\nAfter analyzing Bruder, the court noted the declarations page in Bruder listed the amount of coverage only once, not twice, as did the declarations page in Allen\u2019s policy. The court explained the significance of this distinction by relying on Bruder\u2019s dicta. Allen, 128 F.3d at 465.\nThe court held \u201c[t]he Bruder dicta predicts that the Illinois Supreme Court would find the anti-stacking clause ambiguous when viewed in conjunction with the columnar arrangement of the declarations page, and would therefore rule in favor of coverage.\u201d Allen, 128 F.3d at 467. In short, the court found the anti-stacking provision in the plaintiffs policy had been rendered ambiguous under Illinois law and it stacked the underinsured motorist coverage. Allen, 128 F.3d at 467.\nIn Yates, the plaintiff insured two vehicles under a single insurance policy that provided underinsured motorist coverage. Yates, 311 Ill. App. 3d at 798-99. The policy had an anti-stacking provision that referred to the declarations page for the limit of liability amounts.\nThe policy\u2019s declarations page included a statement directly above the policy limits that said: \u201cCOVERAGE IS PROVIDED WHERE A PREMIUM AND A LIMIT OF LIABILITY OR THE WORD \u2018INCLUDED\u2019 ARE SHOWN FOR COVERAGE.\u201d Yates, 311 Ill. App. 3d at 800.\nOn the declarations page, the row corresponding to uninsured/ underinsured motorist coverage showed limits of \u201c50/100\u201d and a premium of $5 under both \u201cauto one\u201d and \u201cauto two\u201d \u2014 in other words, two vehicles were listed separately and a $50,000-per-person liability limit was listed under each. Yates, 311 Ill. App. 3d at 800.\nThe court found the plaintiffs policy contained provisions that were ambiguous and contradictory because \u201c[i]n one part of the insurance policy, there is a provision claimed to be an antistacking provision,\u201d and \u201c[o]n the declarations page, the policy states that coverage is provided where a premium and a limit of liability are shown.\u201d Yates, 311 Ill. App. 3d at 800.\nThe court said that where, \u201c[o]n the declarations page, the policy shows limits of \u201850/100\u2019 and a premium under each of the two vehicles,\u201d it must construe the policy in a manner that is most favorable to the insured. Yates, 311 Ill. App. 3d at 800. It held the trial court\u2019s.decision granting the plaintiff $100,000 in underinsured motorist coverage, a figure calculated by aggregating the $50,000 limit for underinsured motorist coverage on each of the two vehicles in the plaintiffs insurance policy, was correct. Yates, 311 Ill. App. 3d at 800.\nIn Allen, and again in Yates, it was the declaration page of the policy that turned a clear anti-stacking provision into ambiguity. That is, the declarations page in each policy listed the amount of maximum liability coverage separately for each vehicle. The declarations page of the Domins\u2019 policy does not. Nor did the declarations page in Bruder. There, as here, the declarations page contained only one limit of liability for bodily injury suffered by each person on the page.\nWhile the Fifth District has held to the course staked out in Yates (see Janes v. Western States Insurance Co., 335 Ill. App. 3d at 1114-20 (2001); Skidmore v. Throgmorton, 323 Ill. App. 3d 417, 423-25, 751 N.E,2d 637 (2001); Pekin Insurance Co. v. Estate of Goben, 303 Ill. App. 3d 639, 647-49, 707 N.E.2d 1259 (1999)), agreement has not been universal, even where declarations page wording is similar.\nIn Pekin Insurance Co. v. Estate of Ritter, 322 Ill. App. 3d 1004, 1006, 750 N.E.2d 1285 (2001), the Fourth District said it was \u201cequally unpersuaded by the analysis\u201d in Yates. In Ritter, as in Yates, the declarations page in the policy (an underinsured motorists policy) contained separate columns for each vehicle and showed separate coverage limits for each column. The court said the separate coverage limits do not allow for aggregation of coverage. Ritter makes no mention of the Bruder dicta. Instead, it relies in part on the First District case of Frigo v. Motors Insurance Corp., 271 Ill. App. 3d 50, 62-65, 648 N.E.2d 180 (1995). In Frigo, the court held an unambiguous anti-stacking clause was not made ambiguous by the presence of separate premiums paid for medical payments coverage of separate vehicles, even though the declarations page expressed a maximum liability limit for each injured person.\nHere, the declarations page carefully and unambiguously identifies the types and amounts of coverage for each vehicle \u2014 there is no confusing columnar arrangement. Because the arrangement of the policy\u2019s anti-stacking provisions and declarations page are different than in Allen and Yates, and identical to that in Bruder, Bruder is controlling precedent. We find Shelby\u2019s policy is unambiguous \u2014 no stacking allowed.\nWe admit to some discomfort deciding a case on the basis of how many times the \u201cLimits of Liability\u201d figure appears on a piece of paper \u2014 here, the declarations page. But that is where the cases, especially the Bruder dicta, take us. That is where we shall remain until instructed otherwise.\nWe hold the trial court erred in not finding the Shelby policy\u2019s \u201cLimit of Liability\u201d provision enforceable to preclude the Domins from stacking the uninsured motorist coverage amounts for their two vehicles, and in not finding the uninsured motorist coverage was limited to $100,000 for Terrence Domin\u2019s injuries.\nWe hold summary judgment should be granted in favor of Shelby. Shelby is entitled to a declaratory judgment that only \u201c$100,000 each person\u201d in uninsured motorist coverage is available to the Domins under the policy\u2019s anti-stacking provisions, and Terrence is that person.\nCONCLUSION\nWe reverse the summary judgment entered by the trial court in favor of the Domins and remand the cause with directions to enter summary judgment in favor of Shelby.\nReversed and remanded, with directions.\nCERDA and SOUTH, JJ., concur.\nWe note that, on appeal, the Domins do not contend multiple limits of uninsured motorist coverage are available because Terrence and Marie Domin asserted separate causes of action in the underlying auto accident lawsuit\u2014 the Domins do not dispute Marie Domin\u2019s loss of society claim is derivative of her husband\u2019s bodily injury claim. Thus, the sole issue on appeal is whether the Domins can \u201cstack\u201d the policy\u2019s liability limits because Shelby issued the policy to cover two vehicles.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE WOLFSON" } ], "attorneys": [ "Clausen Miller, P.C., of Chicago (James T. Ferrini, Robert L. Reifenberg, Jennifer A.C. Manning, and Mark J. Seplak, of counsel), for appellant.", "Andrew K. Miller, of Forman & Miller, P.C., of Chicago, for appellees." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "TERRENCE DOMIN et al., Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. SHELBY INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant-Appellant.\nFirst District (3rd Division)\nNo. 1 \u2014 01\u20141143\nOpinion filed November 21, 2001.\nClausen Miller, P.C., of Chicago (James T. Ferrini, Robert L. Reifenberg, Jennifer A.C. Manning, and Mark J. Seplak, of counsel), for appellant.\nAndrew K. Miller, of Forman & Miller, P.C., of Chicago, for appellees." }, "file_name": "0688-01", "first_page_order": 706, "last_page_order": 715 }