{ "id": 1281385, "name": "JOHNNY R. BARNES et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. THE CHICAGO HOUSING AUTHORITY et al., Defendants-Appellees", "name_abbreviation": "Barnes v. Chicago Housing Authority", "decision_date": "2001-12-03", "docket_number": "No. 1-00-2856", "first_page": "710", "last_page": "731", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "326 Ill. App. 3d 710" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "196 Ill. 2d 484", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 351284 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "489" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/196/0484-01" ] }, { "cite": "321 Ill. App. 3d 92", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 132456 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "96" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/321/0092-01" ] }, { "cite": "196 Ill. 2d 50", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 351251 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "55" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/196/0050-01" ] }, { "cite": "171 Ill. 2d 378", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 57332 ], "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "388-89" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/171/0378-01" ] }, { "cite": "195 Ill. 2d 210", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 725365 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "same as to little league baseball association" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/195/0210-01" ] }, { "cite": "306 Ill. App. 3d 13", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1336048 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "24" }, { "page": "23-24" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/306/0013-01" ] }, { "cite": "185 Ill. 2d 632", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "same as to local symphony orchestra association" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "303 Ill. App. 3d 825", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 511405 ], "weight": 14, "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "830" }, { "page": "828" }, { "page": "828" }, { "page": "829" }, { "page": "829" }, { "page": "829" }, { "page": "829" }, { "page": "830" }, { "page": "828" }, { "page": "829" }, { "page": "830", "parenthetical": "distinguishing between areas of traditional government involvement and those, such as music, that are of the public interest" }, { "page": "830" }, { "page": "830" }, { "page": "829" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/303/0825-01" ] }, { "cite": "301 Ill. App. 3d 798", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 257179 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "811", "parenthetical": "same as to YWCA" }, { "page": "811", "parenthetical": "refusing to extend section 1 - 206 to cover members-only YWCA" }, { "page": "811", "parenthetical": "finding relevant the corporation's area of service with respect to membership organizations" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/301/0798-01" ] }, { "cite": "317 Ill. App. 3d 985", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1026001 ], "weight": 4, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "993-94", "parenthetical": "finding that health care services provider was not conducting public business" }, { "page": "994" }, { "page": "994" }, { "page": "991-93" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/317/0985-01" ] }, { "cite": "210 Ill. App. 3d 223", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2533168 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "228", "parenthetical": "same as to commuter rail corporation" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/210/0223-01" ] }, { "cite": "277 Ill. App. 3d 357", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1172352 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "364", "parenthetical": "same as to Chicago's Lincoln Park Zoo" }, { "page": "364" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/277/0357-01" ] }, { "cite": "730 F. Supp. 1449", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F. Supp.", "case_ids": [ 11649488 ], "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1454", "parenthetical": "finding that county mental health center was conducting public business" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f-supp/730/1449-01" ] }, { "cite": "197 Ill. 2d 28", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 259112 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "35" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/197/0028-01" ] }, { "cite": "314 Ill. App. 3d 665", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 140160 ], "weight": 4, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "667" }, { "page": "670", "parenthetical": "same as to local elder services organization" }, { "page": "670" }, { "page": "669" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/314/0665-01" ] }, { "cite": "178 Ill. 2d 370", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 385561 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "376-77" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/178/0370-01" ] }, { "cite": "313 Ill. App. 3d 710", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 186467 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "716" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/313/0710-01" ] }, { "cite": "885 F. Supp. 949", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F. Supp.", "case_ids": [ 7844634 ], "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "955" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f-supp/885/0949-01" ] }, { "cite": "42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1437", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "U.S.C.", "weight": 2, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "et seq.", "parenthetical": "the Housing Act" }, { "page": "et seq." } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "24 C.F.R. \u00a7\u00a7 964.100", "category": "laws:admin_compilation", "reporter": "C.F.R.", "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "24 C.F.R. \u00a7 964.3", "category": "laws:admin_compilation", "reporter": "C.F.R.", "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(a)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "186 Ill. 2d 381", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 243891 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "387" }, { "page": "404" }, { "page": "404-05" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/186/0381-01" ] }, { "cite": "176 Ill. 2d 179", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 544917 ], "weight": 5, "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "196" }, { "page": "196" }, { "page": "196" }, { "page": "192-93", "parenthetical": "finding that the City of Chicago enjoyed section 3 - 108(a) immunity from liability for its alleged failure to supervise a contractor hired to replace wooden pilings at several bridges over the Chicago River" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/176/0179-01" ] }, { "cite": "281 Ill. App. 3d 347", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 150181 ], "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "355-57", "parenthetical": "discussing Doe and the reasoning of our supreme court therein" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/281/0347-01" ] }, { "cite": "161 Ill. 2d 374", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 783173 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "390" }, { "page": "388-91" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/161/0374-01" ] }, { "cite": "228 Ill. App. 3d 412", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5220092 ], "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "extending the voluntary undertaking theory to municipality would 'effectively abrogate the tort immunity provided by section 4 - 102 of the Act'" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/228/0412-01" ] }, { "cite": "233 Ill. App. 3d 923", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5195725 ], "year": 1992, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/233/0923-01" ] }, { "cite": "262 Ill. App. 3d 592", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2849893 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "'[Cross] did not involve the question of governmental tort immunity and, therefore, lends no support to plaintiffs position' that [the] city's voluntary undertaking overrides [the] Tort Immunity Act" }, { "page": "595" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/262/0592-01" ] }, { "cite": "122 Ill. App. 3d 405", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3524115 ], "year": 1984, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/122/0405-01" ] }, { "cite": "248 Ill. App. 3d 124", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2944810 ], "year": 1993, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/248/0124-01" ] }, { "cite": "278 Ill. App. 3d 628", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1156905 ], "weight": 5, "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "634-35" }, { "page": "635" }, { "page": "631-32" }, { "page": "635" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/278/0628-01" ] }, { "cite": "267 Ill. App. 3d 519", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 333086 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "524" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/267/0519-01" ] }, { "cite": "89 Ill. 2d 122", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5493074 ], "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "129" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/89/0122-01" ] }, { "cite": "82 Ill. 2d 313", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5474568 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "317" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/82/0313-01" ] }, { "cite": "78 Ill. 2d 204", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3074180 ], "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "209" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/78/0204-01" ] }, { "cite": "136 Ill. 2d 296", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3254770 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "299-300" }, { "page": "301" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/136/0296-01" ] }, { "cite": "316 Ill. App. 3d 581", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1096600 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "583" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/316/0581-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1410, "char_count": 46788, "ocr_confidence": 0.8, "pagerank": { "raw": 9.30767108999389e-08, "percentile": 0.5126493861225114 }, "sha256": "3da15da57ef50ac7497739f8e7ba1689b153a8384da6941d860ed929d04f037d", "simhash": "1:97c9de9636665c87", "word_count": 7532 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:10:13.053989+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "JOHNNY R. BARNES et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. THE CHICAGO HOUSING AUTHORITY et al., Defendants-Appellees." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "PRESIDING JUSTICE COHEN\ndelivered the opinion of the court: Plaintiffs Johnny R. Barnes, Angela Barnes and Angela Foster appeal the dismissal of their third amended complaint against defendant Chicago Housing Authority (CHA), as well as the order of the trial court granting summary judgment in favor of defendant LeClaire Courts Resident Management Corporation (LCRMC), a private, not-for-profit corporation. The issue before the court is one of first impression: whether the LCRMC is a \u201clocal public entity\u201d within the meaning of section 1 \u2014 206 of the Local Governmental and Governmental Employees Tort Immunity Act (745 ILCS 10/1 \u2014 206 (West 2000)) (the Tort Immunity Act). If the LCRMC is determined to be a \u201clocal public entity,\u201d then the LCRMC is immune from liability for its alleged failure to provide adequate security at the LeClaire Courts public housing development. 745 ILCS 10/4 \u2014 102 (West 2000). Should we determine that the LCRMC enjoys immunity under the Act, the plaintiffs then urge us to hold that the legislature exceeded the scope of its authority in extending such immunity to the LCRMC and ask that we declare section 1 \u2014 206 unconstitutional.\nWe hold that the trial court correctly dismissed plaintiffs\u2019 third amended complaint as to the CHA. We further hold that the LCRMC is a \u201clocal public entity\u201d within the meaning of section 1 \u2014 206 and is therefore immune from plaintiffs\u2019 allegations of failure to provide adequate police protection at LeClaire Courts. The trial court correctly entered summary judgment in favor of the LCRMC and we affirm.\nBACKGROUND\nOn June 17, 1994, plaintiff Johnny R. Barnes was visiting his wife and daughter, coplaintiffs Angela Barnes and Angela Foster, at their residence in the LeClaire Courts public housing development on 43rd Street in Chicago. LeClaire Courts was owned by defendant CHA and managed by defendant LCRMC. While on the LeClaire Courts premises, Mr. Barnes observed his daughter, Angela Foster, being attacked and severely beaten by a group of teenage gang members. When Mr. Barnes attempted to intervene, he was shot by one of the gang members, resulting in permanent paralysis below the waist.\nFor several years prior to the date of the shooting, the LCRMC had contracted to provide private security services for the LeClaire Courts development. On that date, however, no private security officers were present on the LeClaire Courts premises.\nIn order to contract for outside security services, the LCRMC was required to submit proposed contracts to the CHA (and ultimately to the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD)) for review and approval. In this case, the contract in effect between the LCRMC and Network Security, a private security company, had expired prior to the date of the shooting. Prior to the expiration of the Network Security contract, the LCRMC had submitted to the CHA a proposed contract to retain the services of Tight Security, Inc., which was scheduled to begin providing security services on the LeClaire Courts premises on April 1, 1994. However, the CHA had not yet approved funding for the LCRMC\u2019s proposed Tight Security contract, resulting in a six- to eight-week gap in private security coverage at the LeClaire Courts complex. It was during this gap that Mr. Barnes and his daughter were injured.\nSeveral police officers offered deposition testimony that at the time of the shooting, the LeClaire Courts development was hotly contested turf in an armed conflict involving no fewer than nine different street gangs. These officers further testified to a dramatic increase in criminal activity at the LeClaire Courts development in 1994 following the expiration of the Network Security contract.\nJohnny Barnes and Angela Foster brought an action to recover damages for injuries sustained during the attack at LeClaire Courts. Plaintiffs\u2019 third amended complaint contained eight counts, with different plaintiffs seeking relief under each count. In paragraph 24 of counts I and II, plaintiffs alleged that the CHA committed willful and wanton misconduct in that it: In counts III and TV[ plaintiffs alleged negligence against the CHA on identical ground^.\n\u201cA. Failed to adequately police the premises of the LeClaire Courts with its own police force;\nB. Failed to act on defendant [LCRMC\u2019s] request for approval to hire a new private security firm for the LeClaire Courts before June 17, 1994;\nC. Mismanaged the LeClaire Courts by failing to oversee defendant [LCRMC];\nD. Failed to adequately monitor defendant [LCRMC] after defendant [LCRMC] was placed on probation by defendant CHA;\nE. Failed to adequately monitor the crime statistics at the LeClaire Courts and therefore failed to recognize that the LeClaire Courts were in a high crime area in need of additional security and/or police; and\nF. Increased the danger at the LeClaire Courts by failing to police the premises after the contract with Network Security had not been renewed and after gang activity and incidences of violence increased markedly, and after defendant CHA knew, or should have known, that gang activity and incidences of violence would increase after the contract with Network Security was terminated.\u201d\nIn paragraph 24 of counts V and VI, plaintiffs alleged that the LCRMC committed willful and wanton misconduct in that it:\n\u201cA. Failed to renew the contract of the previous security firm without first making certain that a new security firm was in place;\nB. Failed to possess and apply the requisite degree of skill and care in managing the premises, in making an oral promise to hire Tight Security, and then not hiring any private security to take the place of Network Security until after June V], 1994;\nC. Failed to protect the plaintiffs from injury when the defendant [LCRMC] knew or should have known of the increased dangers and crime on the premises after the contract with Network Security was not renewed; and\nD. Increased the danger on the premises by failing to police the premises after the contract with Network Security was not renewed and gang activity and incidences of violence increased markedly.\u201d\nIn counts VII and VIII, plaintiffs alleged negligence against the LCRMC on identical grounds.\nOn July 15, 1999, the trial court granted the CHA\u2019s motion to dismiss plaintiffs\u2019 third amended complaint pursuant to section 2 \u2014 619 of the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure. 735 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 619 (West 2000). The trial court found that the CHA was immune from liability pursuant to sections 2 \u2014 104, 2 \u2014 201, 3 \u2014 108 and 4 \u2014 102 of the Tort Immunity Act. 745 ILCS 10/2 \u2014 104, 2 \u2014 201, 3 \u2014 108, 4 \u2014 102 (West 2000). On December 17, 1999, predicated on a finding that the LCRMC was a \u201clocal public entity\u201d within the meaning of section 1 \u2014 206 of the Tort Immunity Act, the trial court: (1) held that the LCRMC was immune from liability under section 4 \u2014 102 for failure to provide security on the LeClaire Courts premises; and (2) granted the LCRMC\u2019s motion for summary judgment. 745 ILCS 10/1 \u2014 206, 4 \u2014 102 (West 2000).\nPlaintiffs moved for reconsideration of the order granting summary judgment in favor of the LCRMC. Plaintiffs argued that as a private, not-for-profit corporation, the LCRMC was not a \u201clocal public entity\u201d within the meaning of section 1 \u2014 206. Plaintiffs further argued to the trial court that if it construed section 1 \u2014 206 to cover the LCRMC, then it must find section 1 \u2014 206 to be unconstitutional in that the General Assembly had exceeded its authority in granting sovereign immunity to a \u201cnonsovereign.\u201d The trial court denied plaintiffs\u2019 motion to reconsider, specifically finding section 1 \u2014 206 to be constitutional. This appeal followed.\nANALYSIS\n1. CHA\nA. Adequate Police Protection\nWe first consider plaintiffs\u2019 argument that the trial court erred in dismissing plaintiffs\u2019 third amended complaint as to the CHA. Motions to dismiss pursuant to section 2 \u2014 619 of the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 619 (West 2000)) are reviewed de novo. Neppl v. Murphy, 316 Ill. App. 3d 581, 583 (2000).\nThe trial court ruled that under the Tort Immunity Act, the CHA was immune from liability for both negligence and willful and wanton misconduct as to each of the allegations set forth in subparagraphs 24A through F of plaintiffs\u2019 third amended complaint. Plaintiffs do not dispute that the CHA, as a municipal corporation, is a \u201clocal public entity\u201d within the meaning of section 1 \u2014 206 of the Tort Immunity Act. 745 ILCS 10/1 \u2014 206 (West 2000); Davis v. Chicago Housing Authority, 136 Ill. 2d 296, 299-300 (1990). Rather, plaintiffs argue that the trial court erred in applying various sections of the Tort Immunity Act to the CHA.\nIn subparagraphs 24A, E and F, plaintiffs alleged that the CHA failed to provide adequate police protection on the LeClaire Courts premises. The trial court found the CHA immune from these allegations under section 4 \u2014 102 of the Tort Immunity Act. Section 4 \u2014 102 provides:\n\u201cNeither a local public entity nor a public employee is liable for failure to establish a police department or otherwise provide police protection service or, if police protection service is provided, for failure to provide adequate police protection or service, failure to prevent the commission of crimes, failure to detect or solve crimes, and failure to identify or apprehend criminals. This immunity is not waived by a contract for private security service, but cannot be transferred to any non-public entity or employee.\u201d 745 ILCS 10/4\u2014 102 (West 2000).\nSection 4 \u2014 102 notwithstanding, plaintiffs argue that where the CHA has voluntarily undertaken to provide security at one of its housing developments, the CHA may be held liable on a theory of willful and wanton misconduct for failure to protect an invitee on CHA property from criminal attack by a third party. Pippin v. Chicago Housing Authority, 78 Ill. 2d 204, 209 (1979); Cross v. Wells Fargo Alarm Services, 82 Ill. 2d 313, 317 (1980); Phillips v. Chicago Housing Authority, 89 Ill. 2d 122, 129 (1982); Hernandez v. Rapid Bus Co., 267 Ill. App. 3d 519, 524 (1994).\nPlaintiffs\u2019 argument lacks merit. Our decision in Lawson v. City of Chicago, 278 Ill. App. 3d 628 (1996), controls. In Lawson, we discussed whether the voluntary undertaking doctrine would supercede the City of Chicago\u2019s immunity from liability under section 4 \u2014 102 for its alleged failure to operate metal detectors installed at Tilden High School. Lawson, 278 Ill. App. 3d at 634-35. As in the case at bar, the plaintiff in Lawson relied on Cross v. Wells Fargo Alarm Services, 82 Ill. 2d 313 (1980), in support of its voluntary undertaking theory. The plaintiff in Lawson further relied on Siklas v. Ecker Center for Mental Health, Inc., 248 Ill. App. 3d 124 (1993), and Comastro v. Village of Rosemont, 122 Ill. App. 3d 405 (1984). In considering these cases, we stated:\n\u201cCross and Siklas are not relevant to the case at bar since those cases did not involve the Tort Immunity Act. See Rascher v. City of Champaign, 262 Ill. App. 3d 592, 595 *** (1994) (\u2018[Cross] did not involve the question of governmental tort immunity and, therefore, lends no support to plaintiffs position\u2019 that [the] city\u2019s voluntary undertaking overrides [the] Tort Immunity Act). The Tort Immunity Act was inapplicable in Comastro as well, not because of the absence of an undertaking by a governmental entity but because the governmental entity was engaged in a nongovernmental function and thus was held to the same standard as a private citizen.\n*** In accordance with section 4 \u2014 102 of the Tort Immunity Act, the City was immune from liability for any alleged failure to provide adequate police protection or to prevent the commission of the alleged crime. The City\u2019s undertaking to operate the metal detectors does not override the Tort Immunity Act nor does it prevent that statutory immunity from attaching to immunize the City from liability for any alleged negligence in the performance of that function. See Rascher v. City of Champaign [, 262 Ill. App. 3d at 595]; Hill v. Chicago Housing Authority, 233 Ill. App. 3d 923 *** (1992); Burley v. On Waterfront, Inc., 228 Ill. App. 3d 412, 419 *** (1992) (extending the voluntary undertaking theory to municipality would \u2018effectively abrogate the tort immunity provided by section 4 \u2014 102 of the Act\u2019).\u201d Lawson, 278 Ill. App. 3d at 635.\nWe note that the plaintiff in Lawson alleged only negligence against the City of Chicago. Lawson, 278 Ill. App. 3d at 631-32. However, we can find no reason to depart from Lawson where, as here, plaintiffs attempt to hold the CHA liable on a theory of willful and wanton misconduct. None of the cases upon which plaintiffs rely involve or even address the Tort Immunity Act. The voluntary undertaking doctrine cannot supercede the CHA\u2019s statutory immunity from allegations of either negligence or willful and wanton misconduct. Lawson, 278 Ill. App. 3d at 635. Under the plain language of section 4 \u2014 102, the CHA was clearly immune from liability for failure to provide police protection on the LeClaire Courts premises. 745 ILCS 10/4 \u2014 102 (West 2000).\nPlaintiffs direct us to the decision of our supreme court in Doe v. Calumet City, 161 Ill. 2d 374 (1994), for the proposition that \u201cplaintiffs can escape the statutory immunities granted municipalities and their employees either by proving facts that show the existence of a special duty and proving simple negligence or by proving willful and wanton conduct alone.\u201d (Emphasis added.) Doe, 161 Ill. 2d at 390. Plaintiffs argue that Doe supports the existence of a willful and wanton misconduct exception to the immunity granted in section 4 \u2014 102. We disagree.\nDoe discussed the immunity of police officers from liability for injuries caused while executing their official duties. Doe, 161 Ill. 2d at 388-91. Section 2 \u2014 202 of the Tort Immunity Act states that \u201c[a] public employee is not liable for his act or omission in the execution or enforcement of any law unless such act or omission constitutes willful and wanton conduct.\u201d (Emphasis added.) 745 ILCS 10/2 \u2014 202 (West 2000). By its plain language, section 2 \u2014 202 applies only to \u201cpublic employee[s],\u201d which are defined in the Tort Immunity Act as \u201cemployee[s] of a local public entity.\u201d (Emphasis added.) 745 ILCS 10/1\u2014 207, 2 \u2014 202 (West 2000). The CHA is clearly a local public entity, not a public employee. Compare 745 ILCS 10/1 \u2014 206 (West 2000) (defining \u201clocal public entity\u201d) with 745 ILCS 10/1 \u2014 207 (West 2000) (defining \u201cpublic employee\u201d). Thus, the \u201cwillful and wanton\u201d immunity exception set forth in section 2 \u2014 202 does not apply to the CHA. Doe is therefore inapposite. See also Fatigato v. Village of Olympia Fields, 281 Ill. App. 3d 347, 355-57 (1996) (discussing Doe and the reasoning of our supreme court therein).\nIn re Chicago Flood Litigation, 176 Ill. 2d 179 (1997), further undercuts plaintiffs\u2019 argument. In Chicago Flood, our supreme court considered whether an exception for willful and wanton misconduct could be read into the grant of immunity under section 2 \u2014 201 of the Tort Immunity Act (745 ILCS 10/2 \u2014 201 (West 2000)), where section 2- \u2014 201 did not specifically provide for such an exception. The court held:\n\u201cThe plain language of section 2 \u2014 201 is unambiguous. That provision does not contain an immunity exception for willful and wanton misconduct. Where the legislature has chosen to limit an immunity to cover only negligence, it has unambiguously done so. Since the legislature omitted such a limitation from the plain language of section 2 \u2014 201, then the legislature must have intended to immunize liability for both negligence and willful and wanton misconduct.\u201d Chicago Flood, 176 Ill. 2d at 196.\n\u201cThe primary rule of interpreting statutes, to which all other rules are subordinate, is that a court should ascertain and give effect to the intent of the legislature. The court should seek the legislative intent primarily in the language of the statute.\u201d Henrich v. Libertyville High School, 186 Ill. 2d 381, 387 (1998). Section 4 \u2014 102 contains no language creating an exception for willful and wanton misconduct. 745 ILCS 10/4 \u2014 102 (West 2000). In the absence of such language, no willful and wanton misconduct exception to the immunity granted in section 4 \u2014 102 exists. Chicago Flood, 176 Ill. 2d at 196.\nWe conclude that the trial court correctly dismissed plaintiffs\u2019 third amended complaint against the CHA with respect to the CHA\u2019s alleged failure to provide police protection at the LeClaire Courts development.\nB. Discretionary Acts\nIn subparagraph 24B of plaintiffs\u2019 third amended complaint, plaintiffs alleged that the CHA was liable on theories of both negligence and willful and wanton misconduct for \u201c[f]ail[ing] to act on defendant [LCRMC\u2019s] request for approval to hire a new private security firm for the LeClaire Courts before June 17, 1994.\u201d The trial court ruled that the CHA was immune from liability under sections 2 \u2014 104 and 2 \u2014 201 of the Tort Immunity Act. 745 ILCS 10/2 \u2014 104, 2 \u2014 201 (West 2000).\nSection 2 \u2014 104 states:\n\u201cA local public entity is not liable for an injury caused by the issuance, denial, suspension or revocation of, or by the failure or refusal to issue, deny, suspend or revoke, any permit, license, certificate, approval, order or similar authorization where the entity or its employee is authorized by enactment to determine whether or not such authorization should be issued, denied, suspended or revoked.\u201d (Emphasis added.) 745 ILCS 10/2 \u2014 104 (West 2000).\nWe first note that section 2 \u2014 104 contains no explicit exception for willful and wanton misconduct. As we previously concluded with respect to section 4 \u2014 102, section 2 \u2014 104 immunity therefore extends to willful and wanton misconduct as well as negligence. Chicago Flood, 176 Ill. 2d at 196.\nPlaintiffs dispute the applicability of section 2 \u2014 104 immunity to the CHA, asserting that no \u201cenactment\u201d exists authorizing the CHA to approve or disapprove of the LCRMC\u2019s request for funding. We disagree.\nThe term \u201cenactment\u201d is defined in the Tort Immunity Act as a \u201cconstitutional provision, statute, ordinance or regulation.\u201d 745 ILCS 10/1 \u2014 203 (West 2000). The LCRMC was created as part of a HUD program to encourage tenant management of public housing developments. The Code of Federal Regulations provides that \u201c[t]he policies and procedures contained in this part apply to any HA [Housing Authority] that has a Public Housing Annual Contributions Contract with HUD.\u201d 24 C.F.R. \u00a7 964.3(a) (1999). The parties do not dispute the existence of such a contract between HUD and the CHA.\nSubpart B of Part 964, entitled \u201cTenant Participation,\u201d describes in detail the requirements for the formation of a \u201cResident Management Corporation\u201d (RMC) and sets forth the regulations governing the relationship between a housing authority and a resident management corporation. 24 C.F.R. \u00a7\u00a7 964.100 through 964.150 (1999). The authority for the promulgation of the federal regulations relating to resident management of public housing lies in the United States Housing Act of 1937, as amended. 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1437 et seq. (West 1994) (the Housing Act). Specifically, section 1437r of the Housing Act provides:\n\u201cA resident management corporation that qualifies under this section *** shall enter into a contract with the public housing agency establishing the respective management rights and responsibilities of the corporation and the public housing agency. Such contract shall be consistent with the requirements of this chapter applicable to public housing projects and may include specific terms governing *** submission of and adherence to budgets ***.\u201d (Emphasis added). 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1437r(b)(4) (1994).\nThus, before a resident management corporation may undertake to provide management services, it is required by federal law to enter into a contract with its supervising housing authority. Alazan-Apache Resident Ass\u2019n v. San Antonio Housing Authority, 885 F. Supp. 949, 955 (W.D. Tex. 1995). Section 1437r further states that \u201c[a]ny management contract between a public housing agency and a resident management corporation that is entered into after November 7, 1988, shall be subject to this section and the regulations issued to carry out this section.\u201d 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1437r(h) (1994).\nThe record reflects that the management contract between the CHA and the LCRMC (the management contract) was entered into as of December 17, 1992. Section 1437r and its attendant regulations are therefore applicable. Paragraph 17.0(d) of the management contract provides that \u201c[c]opies of all contracts involving expenditures of $10,000 or more shall be forwarded to the [CHA] for review and approval prior to their execution(Emphasis added.) The parties do not dispute that the proposed security contract at issue in this case involved an expenditure in excess of $10,000.\nThe management contract, mandated by federal law, clearly authorized the CHA to review and approve the LCRMC\u2019s request for funding for the proposed security contract. We therefore hold that section 1437r of the Housing Act, which required the LCRMC to enter into the management contract with the CHA, is an \u201cenactment\u201d within the meaning of section 2 \u2014 104 of the Tort Immunity Act. 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1437r(b)(4) (1994); 745 ILCS 10/2 \u2014 104 (West 2000). The CHA is therefore immune under section 2 \u2014 104 from liability for failure to fund the proposed security contract.\nPlaintiffs dispute the trial court\u2019s ruling that the CHA was also immune from liability for failure to fund the proposed security contract under section 2 \u2014 201 of the Tort Immunity Act. 745 ILCS 10/2 \u2014 201 (West 2000). Because section 2 \u2014 201 does not apply to the CHA, we need not address the substance of plaintiffs\u2019 argument. Section 2 \u2014 201 provides:\n\u201cExcept as otherwise provided by Statute, a public employee serving in a position involving the determination of policy or the exercise of discretion is not liable for an injury resulting from his act or omission in determining policy when acting in the exercise of such discretion even though abused.\u201d (Emphasis added.) 745 ILCS 10/2 \u2014 201 (West 2000).\nAs we have stated, the CHA is a local public entity, not a public employee. Compare 745 ILCS 10/1 \u2014 206 (West 2000) (defining \u201clocal public entity\u201d) with 745 ILCS 10/1 \u2014 207 (West 2000) (defining \u201cpublic employee\u201d). Thus, section 2 \u2014 201 immunity cannot apply to the CHA, and the trial court erred in so holding. However, because we have found the CHA immune from liability under section 2 \u2014 104 for failure to fund the security contract, the error is harmless, and reversal is not required.\nC. Failure to Supervise\nSubparagraphs 24C and D of plaintiffs\u2019 third amended complaint allege that the CHA was liable on theories of both negligence and willful and wanton misconduct for failing to adequately oversee and supervise the operation of the LCRMC. The trial court found the CHA immune with respect to these allegations under section 3 \u2014 108(a) of the Tort Immunity Act. 745 ILCS 10/3 \u2014 108(a) (West 1994).\nWe first note that the trial court found the CHA immune under the preamended version of section 3 \u2014 108(a), which contained no exception for willful and wanton misconduct, and which provided in relevant part that \u201cneither a local public entity nor a public employee is liable for an injury caused by a failure to supervise an activity on or the use of any public property.\u201d 745 ILCS 10/3 \u2014 108(a) (West 1994). After plaintiffs were injured, but before plaintiffs filed this appeal, the legislature passed Public Act 90 \u2014 805, which amended section 3 \u2014 108 of the Tort Immunity Act by creating an exception for willful and wanton misconduct. Pub. Act 90 \u2014 805, \u00a7 5, eff. December 2, 1998 (amending 745 ILCS 10/3 \u2014 108 (West 1994)).\nThe trial court held that because the preamended version of section 3 \u2014 108(a) contained no exception for willful and wanton misconduct, the CHA had a \u201cvested ground of defense\u201d against such allegations. Henrich v. Libertyville High School, 186 Ill. 2d 381, 404 (1998). We agree.\n\u201cIt is settled that where the legislature changes the law pending an appeal, \u2018a reviewing court should simply apply the law as it exists at the time of the appeal, unless doing so would interfere with a vested right.\u2019 (Emphasis added.) [Citation.] ***\nWhen this cause of action arose, the [CHA\u2019s] immunity under the unamended section 3 \u2014 108 was \u2018unconditional,\u2019 and \u2018 \u201cimmediate, fixed and determinate\u201d \u2019 [citation]; it did not depend on the entry of a judgment. Thus, the [CHA\u2019s] right to the total immunity provided by the unamended section 3 \u2014 108 vested when the cause of action accrued. [Citations.] The amended section 3 \u2014 108 cannot reach back and take that vested right away, impose a new duty on the [CHA], and breathe life into this previously barred claim.\u201d Henrich, 186 Ill. 2d at 404-05.\nThe trial court was therefore correct in applying the preamended version of section 3 \u2014 108(a).\nPlaintiffs offer one additional argument disputing the applicability of section 3 \u2014 108(a) immunity to the CHA. Citing Capps v. Belleville School District No. 201, 313 Ill. App. 3d 710, 716 (2000), plaintiffs argue that section 3- \u2014 108(a) immunity is applicable only in cases involving supervision of recreational and scholastic activities on public property. Plaintiffs conclude that because no such activity was involved in this case, the trial court erred in applying section 3 \u2014 108(a) to the CHA.\nWe again disagree. Our supreme court has adopted a much less restrictive reading of section 3 \u2014 108(a), specifically rejecting plaintiffs\u2019 argument in Epstein v. Chicago Board of Education, 178 Ill. 2d 370 (1997). The Epstein court held that the board was immune from liability from failure to supervise construction work at a Chicago public school:\n\u201c[Section 3 \u2014 108] clearly applies to the failure to supervise any \u2018activity\u2019 on public property, as it does not limit, in any manner, the types of activities which are included. The plaintiff asks us to read exceptions into this provision for both Structural Work Act claims and construction activities. The plaintiff also asks us to limit section 3 \u2014 108(a)\u2019s provisions to only recreational and scholastic activities. This court has in the past, however, specifically admonished against reading exceptions into or engrafting tacit limitations onto the Tort Immunity Act\u2019s language that conflict with the express legislative intent. [Citation.] To accept the plaintiffs argument would require us to do just that. We therefore conclude that section 3 \u2014 108(a) allows for no such exceptions or limitations.\u201d Epstein, 178 Ill. 2d at 376-77.\nSee also In re Chicago Flood Litigation, 176 Ill. 2d 179, 192-93 (1997) (finding that the City of Chicago enjoyed section 3 \u2014 108(a) immunity from liability for its alleged failure to supervise a contractor hired to replace wooden pilings at several bridges over the Chicago River).\nWe refuse to read into the Tort Immunity Act a limitation that the legislature has not supplied. Under the plain language of the pre-amended version of section 3 \u2014 108(a), the CHA was immune from allegations of both negligence and willful and wanton misconduct for its alleged failure to supervise the operation of the LCRMC. 745 ILCS 10/ 3 \u2014 108(a) (West 1994).\nNone of the counts that comprise plaintiffs\u2019 third amended complaint, whether sounding in negligence or willful and wanton misconduct, survive our analysis. No set of facts can be proved entitling plaintiffs to recover against the CHA in the face of its various statutory immunities. We conclude that the trial court correctly dismissed plaintiffs\u2019 third amended complaint as to the CHA. Niehaus v. Rural Peoria County Council on Aging, Inc., 314 Ill. App. 3d 665, 667 (2000).\n2. LCRMC\nA. Summary Judgment\n\u201cSummary judgment should be granted if \u2018there is no genuine issue of material fact and *** the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.\u2019 [Citations.] Summary judgment can aid in the expeditious disposition of a lawsuit, but it is a drastic measure and should be allowed only \u2018when the right of the moving party is clear and free from doubt.\u2019 [Citation.] If the plaintiff fails to establish any element of his claim, summary judgment is appropriate. [Citation.] Our standard of review is de novo. [Citation.]\u201d Morris v. Margulis, 197 Ill. 2d 28, 35 (2001).\nIn granting the LCRMC\u2019s motion for summary judgment, the trial court found that the LCRMC was a \u201clocal public entity\u201d within the meaning of section 1 \u2014 206 of the Tort Immunity Act. 745 ILCS 10/1\u2014 206 (West 2000). The trial court held that because the LCRMC was a \u201clocal public entity\u201d under section 1 \u2014 206, it was therefore entitled under section 4 \u2014 102 to immunity from liability for both negligence and willful and wanton misconduct with respect to its alleged failure to provide adequate police protection on the LeClaire Courts premises.\nIn 1986, the Illinois legislature amended the definition of \u201clocal public entity\u201d in section 1 \u2014 206 to include \u201cany not-for-profit corporation organized for the purpose of conducting public business.\u201d Pub. Act 84 \u2014 1431, art. I, \u00a7 2, eff. November 25, 1986. Plaintiffs do not dispute that the LCRMC is a valid not-for-profit corporation under Illinois law. 805 ILCS 105/101.01 et seq. (West 2000). Rather, plaintiffs question whether the LCRMC conducts public business within the meaning of section 1 \u2014 206. During the last decade, several courts have considered what constitutes public business with varying results. Compare McQueen v. Shelby County, 730 F. Supp. 1449, 1454 (C.D. Ill. 1990) (finding that county mental health center was conducting public business), Corral v. Chicago Park District, 277 Ill. App. 3d 357, 364 (1995) (same as to Chicago\u2019s Lincoln Park Zoo), and Smith v. Northeast Illinois Regional Commuter R.R. Corp., 210 Ill. App. 3d 223, 228 (1991) (same as to commuter rail corporation), with Carroll v. Paddock, 317 Ill. App. 3d 985, 993-94 (2000) (finding that health care services provider was not conducting public business), Niehaus v. Rural Peoria County Council on Aging, Inc., 314 Ill. App. 3d 665, 670 (2000) (same as to local elder services organization), Johnson v. Decatur Park District, 301 Ill. App. 3d 798, 811 (1998) (same as to YWCA), O'Melia v. Lake Forest Symphony Ass\u2019n, 303 Ill. App. 3d 825, 830 (1999), appeal denied 185 Ill. 2d 632 (2000) (same as to local symphony orchestra association), and Hills v. Bridgeview Little League Ass\u2019n, 306 Ill. App. 3d 13, 24 (1999), rev\u2019d on other grounds, 195 Ill. 2d 210 (2000) (same as to little league baseball association).\nIn O\u2019Melia, the court explained:\n\u201cOur primary goal in interpreting [section 1 \u2014 206] is to ascertain and give effect to the legislature\u2019s intent. To discern that intent, we first consider the plain language of the provision itself and consider it in the context of the act as a whole and in connection with every other section of the act. [Citation.] If the provision is clear and unambiguous, then the plain language of the act must be given effect without resort to other interpretive aids. [Citation.] We must not depart from the plain language of the act by creating exceptions, limitations or conditions that conflict with the express legislative intent. [Citation.]\u201d O\u2019Melia, 303 Ill. App. 3d at 828.\nThe O\u2019Melia court went on to state:\n\u201cNeither our own research nor the parties suggest that \u2018public business\u2019 is a term of art or should possess any meaning but its plain, ordinary, and commonly understood meaning. \u2018Public\u2019 is defined as \u2018[p]ertaining to a state, nation, or whole community; proceeding from, relating to, or affecting the whole body of people or an entire community. Open to all ***. Belonging to the people at large; *** not limited to or restricted to any particular class of the community.\u2019 Black\u2019s Law Dictionary 1227 (6th ed. 1990). \u2018Business\u2019 is defined as an \u2018[a]ctivity or enterprise for gain, benefit, advantage, or livelihood.\u2019 Black\u2019s Law Dictionary 198 (6th ed. 1990). Thus, to conduct \u2018public business\u2019 under the Act, a corporation must pursue an activity that benefits the entire community without limitation. In addition, the phrase \u2018public business\u2019 is also today commonly understood to mean the business of the government.\u201d O\u2019Melia, 303 Ill. App. 3d at 828.\nIn applying these definitions to the activities of defendant Lake Forest Symphony Association (the Symphony Association), the O\u2019Melia court first noted that \u201cproviding music lessons, subscription concerts, and special events on a pay-for-admission basis does not sufficiently benefit the entire community.\u201d O\u2019Melia, 303 Ill. App. 3d at 829. The court determined that the \u201cSymphony Association\u2019s activities [were] provided only to subscribers or other paying customers, in effect, members.\u201d O\u2019Melia, 303 Ill. App. 3d at 829. The court next noted that \u201cdespite some educational benefit to its membership and other customers, the Symphony Association [did] not provide the government-like services suggested by the phrase \u2018public business.\u2019 \u201d O\u2019Melia, 303 Ill. App. 3d at 829. The court found that government-like services necessarily related to traditional areas of government involvement, i.e., services designed to provide for basic \u201cpublic health, safety, welfare, and education\u201d needs. O\u2019Melia, 303 Ill. App. 3d at 829; see generally U.S. Const., Preamble; Ill. Const. 1970, Preamble. The court held that because the Symphony Association was \u201ca membership organization and operate[d] in an area outside of the traditional areas of governmental concern,\u201d it was not a \u201clocal public entity\u201d for purposes of section 1 \u2014 206. O\u2019Melia, 303 Ill. App. 3d at 830.\nWe agree that the term \u201cpublic business\u201d must be given its commonly understood meaning. O\u2019Melia, 303 Ill. App. 3d at 828. However, we note that the legislature expressly intended the Tort Immunity Act \u201cto protect local public entities and public employees from liability arising from the operation of government.\u201d (Emphasis added.) 745 ILCS 10/1 \u2014 101.1 (West 2000). Therefore, in light of our supreme court\u2019s directive to consider the plain language of section 1- \u2014 206 in the context of the Tort Immunity Act as a whole and in connection with every other section of the Tort Immunity Act (Barnett v. Zion Park District, 171 Ill. 2d 378, 388-89 (1996)), we hold that the paramount inquiry with respect to \u201cpublic business\u201d must be whether the not-for-profit corporation is involved in the operation of government.\nWe agree with the court\u2019s approach in O\u2019Melia based on the operant facts in that case. Whether the activities of the Symphony Association in O\u2019Melia sufficiently benefitted the entire community was certainly a relevant area of inquiry in a case involving a paid-membership organization (O\u2019Melia, 303 Ill. App. 3d at 829), and may even be dispositive in such cases. See Johnson v. Decatur Park District, 301 Ill. App. 3d 798, 811 (1998) (refusing to extend section 1 \u2014 206 to cover members-only YWCA). However, the community-wide scope of benefit implicit in the dictionary definition of \u201cpublic\u201d (Black\u2019s Law Dictionary 1227 (6th ed. 1990)) notwithstanding, we must bear in mind that the Tort Immunity Act\u2019s designated purpose is to shield against liability arising from the operation of government. 745 ILCS 10/1 \u2014 101.1 (West 2000). We therefore reason that the degree to which the corporation\u2019s activities benefit the entire community is only relevant where, as in O\u2019Melia, the not-for-profit corporation is engaged in activities that in no way implicate traditional areas of government involvement, i.e., public health, safety, welfare, and education. See O\u2019Melia, 303 Ill. App. 3d at 830 (distinguishing between areas of traditional government involvement and those, such as music, that are of the public interest). In the instant case, we must therefore scrutinize the activities of the LCRMC in order to determine whether those activities implicate public health, safety, welfare, or education. If so, then under our analysis the degree to which those activities benefit the community at large is irrelevant.\nPursuant to case law, we find the following factors to be relevant in determining whether a not-for-profit corporation conducts \u201cpublic business\u201d within the meaning of section 1 \u2014 206:\n1. whether the corporation \u201cparticipates in the business of government\u201d by providing the type of services that governments have been traditionally obliged to provide in the areas of public health, safety, welfare and education (Carroll, 317 Ill. App. 3d at 994; O\u2019Melia, 303 Ill. App. 3d at 830);\n2. whether and to what degree the corporation is government funded (Niehaus, 314 Ill. App. 3d at 670; Hills, 306 Ill. App. 3d at 23-24); and\n3. whether and to what degree the corporation is \u201cgovernment run [or regulated] or part of a government unit\u201d (Niehaus, 314 Ill. App. 3d at 669; Corral, 277 Ill. App. 3d at 364).\nWe now consider the applicability of the above factors with respect to the LCRMC. We begin by examining the LCRMC\u2019s statement of corporate purpose as set forth in its articles of incorporation:\n\u201cThe purposes for which the corporation is organized are: Exclusively charitable or educational purposes which include: (1) to develop a resident management program for LeClaire Courts and LeClaire Extension (collectively \u2018LeClaire Courts\u2019); (2) to promote economic development in the community and to develop increased employment opportunities for LeClaire Courts residents; (3) to initiate and promote related activities and programs in the community which will increase the well being and improve the quality of life of LeClaire Courts residents; and (4) to acquire property for the corporate purposes *** and to solicit donations and to raise and accept money *** in aid of such purposes.\u201d\nWhile the statement of corporate purpose recites that the LCRMC was organized for \u201c [exclusively charitable or educational purposes,\u201d the record undeniably reflects its primary purpose to be the development of a resident management program for LeClaire Courts. The activities in which it engages relative to this purpose are neither charitable nor educational, but governmental.\nThe LCRMC functions under the supervision of and in cooperation with the CHA, a municipal housing authority. Our legislature has expressly stated that the function of housing authorities in remedying the \u201cshortage of safe and sanitary dwelling accommodations for persons of low income *** constitutes a public use and purpose and an essential governmental function.\u201d (Emphasis added.) 310 ILCS 15/2 (West 2000); Davis v. Chicago Housing Authority, 136 Ill. 2d 296, 301 (1990). There can be no doubt that a housing authority\u2019s services in managing low-income housing implicate the public welfare, an area of traditional governmental concern. Section 1437r of the Housing Act states that the contract between a housing authority and a resident management corporation \u201cshall be treated as a contracting out of services.\u201d 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1437r(b)(4) (1994). Thus, a resident management corporation steps into the shoes of the housing authority under which it operates for purposes of the management services the corporation provides. We conclude that the LCRMC clearly \u201cparticipates in the business of government\u201d by providing \u201cgovernment-like\u201d services relating to the public welfare. Carroll, 317 Ill. App. 3d at 994; O\u2019Melia, 303 Ill. App. 3d at 830.\nAs to our remaining points of inquiry, the record reflects that the LCRMC is entirely government funded. The record further reflects that the LCRMC is subject to regulation by both the CHA and the federal government, as set forth in the Code of Federal Regulations. 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1437 et seq. (1994); 24 C.F.R. \u00a7\u00a7 964.100 through 964.150 (1999).\nIt is thus possible for a not-for-profit corporation such as the LCRMC to be involved in the \u201cbusiness of government\u201d yet provide services to a relatively restricted portion of the community. Under such circumstances, the fact that those services are provided primarily to residents of the LeClaire Courts development and not to the community at large has no bearing on our analysis. But see O\u2019Melia, 303 Ill. App. 3d at 829, and Johnson, 301 Ill. App. 3d at 811 (finding relevant the corporation\u2019s area of service with respect to membership organizations).\nWe conclude that the LCRMC does conduct \u201cpublic business\u201d within the meaning of section 1 \u2014 206 of the Tort Immunity Act. 745 ILCS 10/1 \u2014 206 (West 2000). The LCRMC is therefore a \u201clocal public entity\u201d and is entitled, under the plain language of section 4 \u2014 102, to immunity from plaintiffs\u2019 allegations of failure to provide adequate police protection on the LeClaire Courts premises. 745 ILCS 10/4\u2014 102 (West 2000). The order of the trial court granting summary judgment in favor of the LCRMC is affirmed.\nB. Constitutional Arguments\nWe review de novo a determination of the trial court as to the constitutionality of a statute. Miller v. Rosenberg, 196 Ill. 2d 50, 55 (2001).\nPlaintiffs moved for reconsideration of the order of the trial court granting summary judgment in favor of the LCRMC. The trial court, finding that plaintiffs had timely raised their constitutional challenges, denied the motion for reconsideration and specifically rejected plaintiffs\u2019 arguments that section 1 \u2014 206 violates: (1) the equal protection and due process clauses of both the United States and Illinois Constitutions; and (2) the prohibition against special legislation found in the Illinois Constitution. U.S. Const., amend. XIV; Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, \u00a7 2, art. iy \u00a7 13. The trial court also rejected plaintiffs\u2019 argument that the legislature exceeded its authority under article XIII, section 4, of the Illinois Constitution by extending tort immunity to the LCRMC. Ill. Const. 1970, art. XIII, \u00a7 4.\nPlaintiffs attempt to renew these arguments on appeal. First, although plaintiffs allege in their brief that section 1 \u2014 206 violates both the due process and equal protection clauses of the United States and Illinois Constitutions, they fail to enlighten us in a comprehensible manner on how the alleged violations violate anything \u2014 especially the constitutions. We decline to speculate. \u201cThe party who challenges a statute\u2019s constitutionality bears the heavy burden of clearly establishing the violation alleged.\u201d Rose v. Pucinski, 321 Ill. App. 3d 92, 96 (2001). The plaintiffs have failed to meet this burden. Their due process and equal protection arguments fail.\nEqually artlessly, plaintiffs argue that section 1 \u2014 206 violates the prohibition against special legislation found in article iy section 13, of the Illinois Constitution. Ill. Const. 1970, art. iy \u00a7 13. Plaintiffs correctly quote this section as providing that \u201c[t]he General Assembly shall pass no special or local law when a general law is or can be made applicable. Whether a general law is or can be made applicable shall be a matter for judicial determination.\u201d Ill. Const. 1970, art. iy \u00a7 13. However, plaintiffs fail to allege the existence of a general law that \u201cis or can be made applicable.\u201d Ill. Const. 1970, art. iy \u00a7 13. We decline to search the entire body of Illinois law on plaintiffs\u2019 behalf. Plaintiffs\u2019 special legislation argument also fails.\nFinally, plaintiffs allege that the Illinois legislature exceeded its authority by \u201cextending sovereign immunity to a non-sovereign\u201d when it included within the definition of \u201clocal public entity\u201d in section 1 \u2014 206 \u201cany not-for-profit corporation organized for the purpose of conducting public business.\u201d 745 ILCS 10/1 \u2014 206 (West 2000). Plaintiffs argue that although the \u201cGeneral Assembly may have the power to grant sovereign immunity to \u2018sovereigns\u2019 such as cities, towns, villages, and counties, the General Assembly does not have the power to grant sovereign immunity to private corporations such as Defendant LeClaire.\u201d\nThe 1970 Illinois Constitution abolishes the doctrine of sovereign immunity \u201c[e]xcept as the legislature may provide by law.\u201d (Emphasis added.) Ill. Const. 1970, art. XIII, \u00a7 4; Village of Bloomingdale v. CDG Enterprises, Inc., 196 Ill. 2d 484, 489 (2001). By its plain language, the grant of legislative authority in article XIII, section 4, does not restrict the types of entities upon which the legislature may elect to bestow such immunity. In the absence of such an explicit constitutional restriction, we decline to hold that the legislature exceeded the limits of its authority under article XIII, section 4, of the Illinois Constitution by extending tort immunity to \u201cnot-for-profit corporation[s] organized for the purpose of conducting public business.\u201d Ill. Const. 1970, art. XIII, \u00a7 4; Pub. Act 84 \u2014 1431, art. I, \u00a7 2, eff. November 25, 1986.\nPlaintiffs\u2019 final constitutional challenge to section 1 \u2014 206 also fails. The judgment of the trial court denying plaintiffs\u2019 motion for reconsideration and rejecting plaintiffs\u2019 challenges to the constitutionality of section 1 \u2014 206 of the Tort Immunity Act is affirmed.\nCONCLUSION\nFor the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the trial court: (1) dismissing plaintiffs\u2019 third amended complaint as to the CHA; (2) granting summary judgment in favor of the LCRMC; (3) denying plaintiffs\u2019 motion for reconsideration; and (4) finding section 1 \u2014 206 of the Tort Immunity Act constitutional.\nAffirmed.\nTULLY and COUSINS, JJ., concur.\nBecause Angela Foster was a minor at the time of the attack, her mother sued on her behalf to recover medical expenses incurred as a result of her injuries. Counts I, III, V and VII were therefore submitted in the name of plaintiff Johnny Barnes, while identical counts II, IV VI and VIII were submitted in the names of plaintiffs Angela Barnes and Angela Foster.\nPlaintiffs concede in their brief that \u201cDefendant CHA is immune from liability for negligently failing to provide police protection.\u201d (Emphasis in original.) We therefore consider this issue solely in the context of willful and wanton misconduct.\nIn the interest of brevity, we direct the reader to Carroll v. Paddock for a more comprehensive review of cases in this area. Carroll, 317 Ill. App. 3d at 991-93.", "type": "majority", "author": "PRESIDING JUSTICE COHEN" } ], "attorneys": [ "John E. Marszalek, of Marszalek & Marszalek, Paul R. Karasik, of Karasik & Herndobler, and John F. Klebba, of John F. Klebba, P.C., all of Chicago, for appellants.", "David E. Neumeister, of Querrey & Harrow, Ltd., of Chicago, for appellee Chicago Housing Authority.", "James Kirk Perrin, of Chicago, for appellee LeClaire Courts Resident Management Corporation." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "JOHNNY R. BARNES et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. THE CHICAGO HOUSING AUTHORITY et al., Defendants-Appellees.\nFirst District (1st Division)\nNo. 1 \u2014 00\u20142856\nOpinion filed December 3, 2001.\nRehearing denied January 15, 2002.\nJohn E. Marszalek, of Marszalek & Marszalek, Paul R. Karasik, of Karasik & Herndobler, and John F. Klebba, of John F. Klebba, P.C., all of Chicago, for appellants.\nDavid E. Neumeister, of Querrey & Harrow, Ltd., of Chicago, for appellee Chicago Housing Authority.\nJames Kirk Perrin, of Chicago, for appellee LeClaire Courts Resident Management Corporation." }, "file_name": "0710-01", "first_page_order": 728, "last_page_order": 749 }