{ "id": 1281475, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JOHN E. GEORGE, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. George", "decision_date": "2002-01-14", "docket_number": "No. 4-00-0607", "first_page": "1096", "last_page": "1105", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "326 Ill. App. 3d 1096" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "588 N.E.2d 307", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "310" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "225 Ill. App. 3d 624", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5245901 ], "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "628" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/225/0624-01" ] }, { "cite": "752 N.E.2d 430", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "439" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "196 Ill. 2d 269", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 351226 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "282" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/196/0269-01" ] }, { "cite": "752 N.E.2d 1137", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1144-45" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "196 Ill. 2d 518", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 351227 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "531-32" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/196/0518-01" ] }, { "cite": "530 U.S. 466", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 9413911 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2000, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/530/0466-01" ] }, { "cite": "751 N.E.2d 1143", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1147-48" }, { "page": "1147-48" }, { "page": "1147-48" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "196 Ill. 2d 343", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 351244 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "351-52" }, { "page": "351-52" }, { "page": "351-52" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/196/0343-01" ] }, { "cite": "652 N.E.2d 322", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "327" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "166 Ill. 2d 247", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 198915 ], "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "257" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/166/0247-01" ] }, { "cite": "469 N.E.2d 569", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "575" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "103 Ill. 2d 192", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3152614 ], "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "205-06" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/103/0192-01" ] }, { "cite": "381 N.E.2d 254", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "256" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "72 Ill. 2d 282", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5442815 ], "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "285" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/72/0282-01" ] }, { "cite": "721 N.E.2d 1182", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1190" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "308 Ill. App. 3d 995", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 261330 ], "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1006" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/308/0995-01" ] }, { "cite": "1999 Ill. Laws 1995", "category": "laws:leg_session", "reporter": "Ill. Laws", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "1999 Ill. Laws 3647", "category": "laws:leg_session", "reporter": "Ill. Laws", "opinion_index": 0 } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 716, "char_count": 17712, "ocr_confidence": 0.832, "pagerank": { "raw": 6.011620893327797e-08, "percentile": 0.37302464352168796 }, "sha256": "5b1b931cc15587e54ec95627428b863295544efe5a2f5ef5aff881aff3adca4b", "simhash": "1:a934b64ca8c6a557", "word_count": 2995 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:10:13.053989+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JOHN E. GEORGE, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE TURNER\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nAfter an April 2000 trial, a jury found defendant, John E. George, guilty of aggravated kidnaping (720 ILCS 5/10 \u2014 2(a)(2) (West 1998)), child abduction (720 ILCS 5/10 \u2014 5(b)(10) (West 1998)), false person-ation of a peace officer (720 ILCS 5/32 \u2014 5.1 (West 1998)), obstructing justice (720 ILCS 5/31 \u2014 4(a) (West 1998)), three counts of predatory criminal sexual assault of a child (720 ILCS 5/12 \u2014 14.1(a)(1) (West 1998)), and aggravated criminal sexual abuse (720 ILCS 5/12\u2014 16(c)(l)(i) (West 1998)). Defendant filed a posttrial motion. After a May 2000 hearing, the trial court denied defendant\u2019s motion and sentenced him to 16 years\u2019 imprisonment for aggravated kidnaping, 6 years for child abduction, 6 years for false personation of a peace officer, and 6 years for obstructing justice, all to run concurrent with each other, but consecutive to 30 years for each of the three counts of predatory criminal sexual assault of a child and 14 years for aggravated criminal sexual abuse. The three predatory criminal sexual assault sentences were to run consecutive to each other and consecutive to the aggravated criminal sexual abuse sentence.\nOn appeal, defendant asserts (1) the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions for (a) aggravated kidnaping and (b) child abduction; (2) the trial court erred in imposing extended-term sentences for the child abduction, false personation of a peace officer, and aggravated criminal sexual abuse convictions; and (3) the consecutive sentencing provisions of sections 5 \u2014 8\u20144(a) and 5 \u2014 8\u20144(b) of the Unified Code of Corrections (Unified Code) (730 ILCS 5/5 \u2014 8\u20144(a), (b) (West 1998)) violate defendant\u2019s rights to due process and trial by jury. We affirm in part, vacate in part, and remand with directions.\nI. BACKGROUND\nThe victim, B.W., testified as follows. In September 1999, B.W was having troubles with his mother and ran away from home. At the time, B.W was 12 years old. The first night, B.W stayed at a friend\u2019s home. The next day, as B.W. was walking past the home of Rodney and Helen Martin, defendant asked B.W. to \u201ccome here.\u201d Defendant introduced himself as Jack Stamos. B.W and defendant began conversing, and B.W. told defendant he was looking for a place to stay. Defendant told B.W. he was a police officer with the crash team and showed B.W. a badge. Defendant then told B.W he had radioed the police station, and the police were on their way. Defendant informed B.W. he could make it so the police would not come, but he would have to make up some sort of punishment. At that point, defendant took B.W. to the bushes on the Martins\u2019 property where defendant placed his penis on B.W.\u2019s buttocks. Defendant told B.W. the police would not come if he did this.\nB.W and defendant spent the night at the Martins\u2019 home, sleeping on the same bed. B.W. had told Helen he had his mother\u2019s permission to spend the night at a friend\u2019s home. At one point while sleeping on the bed, defendant placed his penis in B.W\u2019s anus. Defendant had told B.W. he had to do it again or he would call the police. \u25a0\nThe next day, B.W remained in the Martins\u2019 house all day playing Nintendo. That night, defendant and B.W. slept in the Martins\u2019 car. While in the car, defendant again touched B.W.\u2019s anus with his penis and tried to touch B.W.\u2019s penis.\nB.W and defendant spent the next day and the third night in the bushes behind the Martins\u2019 home. Defendant again touched B.W.\u2019s anus with his penis. When B.W. protested, defendant stated he had to figure out something to do so B.W. would not get arrested.\nOn the last morning, defendant informed B.W. he had adopted B.W., and they were going to go to his home in Rockford, Illinois. As defendant and B.W were walking behind the Martins\u2019 house, a school bus went by and stopped. B.W.\u2019s friends exited the bus and tried to get B.W. on the bus. However, B.W did not go with the boys. Defendant came up and pushed one of the boys away. Defendant and B.W. then went to two local churches and made up stories to get some money. A pastor of one of the churches took defendant and B.W. out to eat and eventually dropped them off on the University of Illinois campus. Defendant and B.W. got on a bus. Two police officers later boarded the bus and took defendant and B.W to the police station. When asked his name by the officers, defendant gave the name Jack Stamos.\nAccording to Rodney Martin\u2019s testimony, at one point during B.W\u2019s stay at his house, a sheriffs deputy came to Rodney\u2019s house to talk to Rodney about a sleeping bag incident. The deputy was in the home for about a half an hour. During that time, B.W. was present but defendant was not.\nIn October 1999, the State charged defendant with aggravated kidnaping, child abduction, false personation of a peace officer, obstructing justice, and aggravated battery (720 ILCS 5/12 \u2014 4(b)(8) (West 1998) (as amended by Pub. Act 91 \u2014 357, \u00a7 237, eff. July 29, 1999 (1999 Ill. Laws 3647, 4553))). In March 2000, the trial court commenced a jury trial. After the victim\u2019s testimony regarding the sexual contacts, the trial court declared a mistrial. After the mistrial, the State also charged defendant with three counts of predatory criminal sexual assault of a child and aggravated criminal sexual abuse.\nIn April 2000, the trial court held a jury trial. At the beginning of the trial, on the State\u2019s motion, the trial court dismissed the aggravated battery charge. After the trial, the jury found defendant guilty on the remaining charges. In May 2000, defendant filed a motion for acquittal or a new trial. That same month, the trial court held a joint hearing on the motion and sentencing. The trial court denied defendant\u2019s motion and sentenced him as stated.\nIn imposing defendant\u2019s sentences, the trial court found defendant was eligible for extended-term sentencing on all of the convictions because of his prior Class X felony conviction. See 730 ILCS 5/5 \u2014 5\u2014 3.2(b)(1) (West 1998) (as amended by Pub. Act 91 \u2014 120, \u00a7 5, eff. July 15, 1999 (1999 Ill. Laws 1995, 1997-98), and Pub. Act 91 \u2014 357, \u00a7 247, eff. July 29, 1999 (1999 Ill. Laws at 4618)). The court also determined all of the offenses were committed as part of a single course of conduct, and thus consecutive sentences were mandatory for the three predatory criminal sexual assault convictions under section 5 \u2014 8\u20144(a) of the Unified Code (730 ILCS 5/5 \u2014 8\u20144(a) (West 1998)). The court further found a consecutive sentence on the aggravated criminal sexual abuse conviction was necessary to protect the public under section 5 \u2014 8\u20144(b) of the Unified Code (730 ILCS 5/5 \u2014 8\u20144(b) (West 1998)).\nIn June 2000, the trial court denied defendant\u2019s motion to reconsider sentence. This appeal followed.\nII. ANALYSIS\nA. Sufficiency of the Evidence\nDefendant first contends the evidence is insufficient to prove him guilty of aggravated kidnaping and child abduction. When a defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain his conviction, the question for the reviewing court is whether a rational trier of fact, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, could have found the essential elements of the crime proved beyond a reasonable doubt. People v. Adams, 308 Ill. App. 3d 995, 1006, 721 N.E.2d 1182, 1190 (1999).\n1. Aggravated Kidnaping\nKidnaping occurs when a person knowingly induces another by deceit or enticement to go from one place to another with the intent of secretly confining that person against his will. 720 ILCS 5/10 \u2014 1(a)(3) (West 1998). Confinement of a child under the age of 13 is \u201cagainst his will\u201d if such confinement is without the consent of his parent or legal guardian. 720 ILCS 5/10 \u2014 1(b) (West 1998). A kidnaper within the definition of section 10 \u2014 1(a) is guilty of aggravated kidnaping when he takes as his victim a child under the age of 13 years. 720 ILCS 5/10\u2014 2(a)(2) (West 1998).\nDefendant argues the State failed to prove defendant \u201csecretly confined\u201d the victim. Secret confinement is demonstrated by either the secrecy of the confinement or the place of the confinement. People v. Mulcahey, 72 Ill. 2d 282, 285, 381 N.E.2d 254, 256 (1978). \u201cSecret\u201d has been defined as \u201c[c]oncealed; hidden; not made public; particularly, in law, kept from the knowledge or notice of persons liable to be affected by the act, transaction, deed, or other thing spoken of.\u201d (Emphasis added.) Black\u2019s Law Dictionary 1352 (6th ed. 1990).\nHere, B.W., the victim, was only 12 years old and thus could not even consent to being confined. B.W.\u2019s mother was a person affected by defendant\u2019s act, and defendant kept B.W. without her knowledge. During the entire time defendant had B.W., B.W.\u2019s mother was unaware of B.W\u2019s whereabouts.\nAs to confinement, B.W. spent much of his time with defendant on the Martins\u2019 property within their home, vehicle, and bushes. While B.W. did not leave defendant when several opportunities arose, B.W was only 12, and defendant had told B.W. if he complied with defendant\u2019s demands defendant would not call the police on him. Moreover, defendant had informed B.W. he was B.W.\u2019s adoptive parent.\nBased on the totality of the circumstances over the four-day encounter, a rational trier of fact could have found beyond a reasonable doubt defendant secretly confined B.W.\n2. Child Abduction\nA person commits child abduction when he intentionally lures or attempts to lure a child under the age of 16 into a motor vehicle without the consent of the child\u2019s parent for other than a lawful purpose. 720 ILCS 5/10 \u2014 5(b)(10) (West 1998).\nDefendant argues the evidence is insufficient to show he lured B.W onto the bus coming' from campus. We disagree.\nWhile the State points to another instance where defendant lured the victim into a vehicle, the evidence was also sufficient with respect to the bus incident. The term \u201clure\u201d is commonly defined as \u201can inducement to pleasure or gain\u201d and \u201centicement.\u201d Merriam-Webster\u2019s Collegiate Dictionary 694 (10th ed. 1998). In determining whether defendant lured B.W. onto the bus, we must examine the totality of the circumstances. Here, defendant told B.W he (1) was a police officer, (2) had adopted B.W, and (3) could keep the police from arresting B.W. for running away. Further, after learning B.W. liked dogs, defendant told B.W they were going to go to Rockford where defendant had a house with dogs. Those statements lured and enticed B.W. to remain with defendant at all times, including getting onto the bus with defendant. Thus, based on these facts, a rational trier of fact could have found defendant lured B.W. onto the bus beyond a reasonable doubt.\nB. Extended-term Sentences\nDefendant also asserts he was not eligible to receive extended-term sentences for false personation of a police officer, child abduction, and aggravated criminal sexual abuse. Specifically, he contends his convictions all arose from the same course of conduct, and thus he could only receive an extended-term sentence on the offenses within the most serious class, i.e., Class X felonies.\nSection 5 \u2014 8\u20142(a) of the Unified Code governs the imposition of extended-term sentences and provides:\n\u201cA judge shall not sentence an offender to a term of imprisonment in excess of the maximum sentence authorized by [sjection 5 \u2014 -8\u20141 for the class of the most serious offense of which the offender was convicted unless the factors in aggravation set forth in paragraph (b) of [s]ection 5 \u2014 5\u20143.2 were found to be present.\u201d 730 ILCS 5/5 \u2014 8\u20142(a) (West 1998).\nThe Supreme Court of Illinois has interpreted this section to mean a defendant convicted of multiple offenses may be sentenced to an extended-term sentence only on those offenses within the most serious class. People v. Jordan, 103 Ill. 2d 192, 205-06, 469 N.E.2d 569, 575 (1984). However, extended-term sentences may be imposed \u201con separately charged, differing class offenses that arise from unrelated courses of conduct.\u201d People v. Coleman, 166 Ill. 2d 247, 257, 652 N.E.2d 322, 327 (1995).\nIn People v. Bell, 196 Ill. 2d 343, 351-52, 751 N.E.2d 1143, 1147-48 (2001), the Supreme Court of Illinois held, in determining whether a defendant\u2019s multiple offenses are part of an \u201cunrelated course of conduct\u201d for the purposes of section 5 \u2014 8\u20142(a), courts must consider whether a substantial change in the nature of the criminal objective was present. If a substantial change exists, the defendant\u2019s offenses are part of an \u201cunrelated course of conduct,\u201d and extended sentences may be imposed on differing classes. However, if no substantial change is shown, the defendant\u2019s offenses are not part of an \u201cunrelated course of conduct,\u201d and extended-term sentences may be imposed only on those offenses within the most serious class. Bell, 196 Ill. 2d at 351-52, 751 N.E.2d at 1147-48.\nWhen imposing the extended-term sentences, the trial court in this case was without the guidance of Bell. However, in determining consecutive sentences under section 5 \u2014 8-\u20144(a) of the Unified Code, the trial court found all of the offenses were committed as part of a single course of conduct during which no substantial change in the nature of the criminal objective occurred. That finding was not contested by either party, and thus we accept it for the purposes of this appeal. Based on the trial court\u2019s finding the offenses were part of a single course of conduct, those offenses cannot be part of an \u201cunrelated course of conduct.\u201d See Bell, 196 Ill. 2d at 351-52, 751 N.E.2d at 1147-48. Accordingly, defendant was only eligible for an extended-term sentence on the offenses within the most serious class. Child abduction and false personation of a peace officer are Class 4 felonies (720 ILCS 5/10 \u2014 5(d), 32 \u2014 5.1 (West 1998)), and aggravated criminal sexual abuse is a Class 2 felony (720 ILCS 5/12 \u2014 16(g) (West 1998)). Thus, all three offenses are in a less serious class than the Class X felonies, i.e, predatory criminal sexual assault and aggravated kidnaping (720 ILCS 5/12 \u2014 14.1(b)(1), 10 \u2014 2(b) (West 1998)). While defendant does not challenge the imposition of an extended-term sentence on obstructing justice, a Class 4 felony (720 ILCS 5/31 \u2014 4(d)(1) (West 1998)), the trial court found all of the offenses were committed as part of a single course of conduct, including obstructing justice. We accept the court\u2019s finding even though we may have ruled differently. Accordingly, defendant was not eligible for extended-term sentencing on his child abduction, false personation of a peace officer, aggravated criminal sexual abuse, and obstructing justice convictions.\nC. Consecutive Sentences\nLast, defendant argues the consecutive sentencing provisions of sections 5 \u2014 8\u20144(a) and 5 \u2014 8\u20144(b) of the Unified Code violate his rights to due process and trial by jury. We disagree.\nIn support of his argument, defendant cites the United State\u2019s Supreme Court decision in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 147 L. Ed. 2d 435, 120 S. Ct. 2348 (2000). The Supreme Court of Illinois has held Apprendi concerns are not implicated by consecutive sentencing under both sections 5 \u2014 8\u20144(a) (People v. Carney, 196 Ill. 2d 518, 531-32, 752 N.E.2d 1137, 1144-45 (2001)) and 5 \u2014 8\u20144(b) CPeople v. Wagener, 196 Ill. 2d 269, 282, 752 N.E.2d 430, 439 (2001)). Accordingly, defendant\u2019s consecutive sentences under sections 5 \u2014 8\u20144(a) and 5 \u2014 8\u20144(b) are constitutional.\nWhile defendant does not raise this issue, we note the trial court did not have the authority to impose a consecutive sentence for the aggravated criminal sexual abuse conviction under section 5 \u2014 8\u2014 4(b) of the Unified Code. Where consecutive sentences are prohibited under section 5 \u2014 8\u20144(a) of the Unified Code, the trial court cannot impose consecutive sentences under section 5 \u2014 8\u20144(b) of the Unified Code. People v. Fritz, 225 Ill. App. 3d 624, 628, 588 N.E.2d 307, 310 (1992). Section 5 \u2014 8\u20144(a) prohibits the imposition of consecutive sentences for offenses committed as part of a single course of conduct except for those offenses specified in the section. 730 ILCS 5/5 \u2014 8\u2014 4(a) (West 1998). Because the trial court found all of the offenses were committed as part of a single course of conduct, the trial court was prohibited from imposing a consecutive sentence under section 5- \u2014 8\u2014 4(b). Thus, the sentence for aggravated criminal sexual abuse must be a concurrent sentence.\nIII. CONCLUSION\nFor the reasons stated, we vacate the trial court\u2019s imposition of extended-term sentences for defendant\u2019s child abduction, false person-ation of a peace officer, aggravated criminal sexual abuse, and obstructing justice convictions and remand with directions to resentence defendant on those convictions in accordance with section 5 \u2014 8\u20141 of the Unified Code (730 ILCS 5/5 \u2014 8\u20141 (West 1998)). We also vacate the trial court\u2019s imposition of a consecutive sentence for the aggravated criminal sexual abuse conviction and remand with directions to resentence defendant to a concurrent sentence in accordance with section 5 \u2014 8\u20144(a) of the Unified Code (730 ILCS 5/5 \u2014 8\u20144(a) (West 1998)). Defendant\u2019s convictions and sentences are affirmed in all other respects.\nAffirmed in part and vacated in part; cause remanded with directions.\nMYERSCOUGH and COOK, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE TURNER" } ], "attorneys": [ "Daniel D. Yuhas and Jenifer L. Johnson, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Springfield, for appellant.", "John C. Piland, State\u2019s Attorney, of Urbana (Norbert J. Goetten, Robert J. Biderman, and Jeffrey K. Davison, all of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JOHN E. GEORGE, Defendant-Appellant.\nFourth District\nNo. 4 \u2014 00\u20140607\nOpinion filed January 14, 2002.\nDaniel D. Yuhas and Jenifer L. Johnson, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Springfield, for appellant.\nJohn C. Piland, State\u2019s Attorney, of Urbana (Norbert J. Goetten, Robert J. Biderman, and Jeffrey K. Davison, all of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "1096-01", "first_page_order": 1114, "last_page_order": 1123 }