{
  "id": 1281480,
  "name": "BRUCE A. RICE, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. THE BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF ADAMS COUNTY et al., Defendants-Appellants",
  "name_abbreviation": "Rice v. Board of Trustees",
  "decision_date": "2002-01-24",
  "docket_number": "No. 4-01-0327",
  "first_page": "1120",
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    "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.",
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    "name": "Illinois Appellate Court"
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    "name_long": "Illinois",
    "name": "Ill."
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:10:13.053989+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
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  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "BRUCE A. RICE, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. THE BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF ADAMS COUNTY et al., Defendants-Appellants."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "PRESIDING JUSTICE McCULLOUGH\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nOn January 7, 1999, plaintiff, Bruce A. Rice, filed a complaint against defendants, the Board of Trustees of Adams County, Illinois (Board), and the County of Adams, Illinois (County), and an amended complaint on May 18, 1999, alleging a failure by the Board to comply with the Open Meetings Act (Act) (5 ILCS 120/1 through 6 (West 1998)). Plaintiff sought an order voiding a resolution adopted by the Board. The resolution provided for an alternative benefit program for elected county officers (ECO) pursuant to section 7 \u2014 145.1 of the Illinois Pension Code (40 ILCS 5/7 \u2014 145.1 (West 1998)). Plaintiff and defendants filed motions for summary judgment. On May 10, 2000, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of plaintiff, declaring the actions of the Board in adopting the resolution null and void. On March 16, 2001, the trial court entered an order denying defendants\u2019 motion for reconsideration. Defendants appeal the grant of summary judgment for plaintiff. We affirm.\nThe entry of summary judgment is appropriate where there are no questions of fact and judgment can be entered as a matter of law. County of Knox ex rel. Masterson v. The Highlands, L.L.C., 188 Ill. 2d 546, 550-51, 723 N.E.2d 256, 260 (1999), quoting 735 ILCS 5/2\u2014 1005(c) (West 1998). The interpretation of a statute is a matter of law for the court and properly decided by summary judgment. County of Knox, 188 Ill. 2d at 551, 723 N.E.2d at 260. Courts of review consider the entry of summary judgment de novo. County of Knox, 188 Ill. 2d at 551, 723 N.E.2d at 260.\nIt is the intent of the Act to protect the citizen\u2019s right to know. The Act requires an agenda for each regular meeting of a public body, the agenda to be posted at the principal office of the public body and at the location where the meeting is to be held and at least 48 hours in advance of the holding of the meeting. 5 ILCS 120/2.02(a) (West 1998). The portion of the Act at issue in the present case provides that \u201c[t]he requirement of a regular meeting agenda shall not preclude the consideration of items not specifically set forth in the agenda.\u201d (Emphasis added.) 5 ILCS 120/2.02(a) (West 1998).\nThe agenda in the present case, dated November 10, 1998, provides for 34 items, 25 of which appear to be the reports of various individuals. Item No. 32 references \u201cNEW BUSINESS.\u201d We find also in the record agendas dated September 8, 1998, and October 13, 1998. They are, in appearance, nearly identical to the agenda dated November 10, 1998.\nThe minutes of the meeting held November 10, 1998, provide that, under \u201cNEW BUSINESS,\u201d a Mr. Heidbreder stated \u201cthere is another resolution to present.\u201d The resolution, providing for an alternative benefit program for ECO pursuant to section 7 \u2014 145.1 of the Illinois Pension Code, was read aloud, and Mr. Heidbreder \u201cmoved to adopt.\u201d A discussion was had and sufficient affirmative votes carried the motion.\nDefendants acknowledge that the alternative benefit program for ECO was not specifically set forth in the agenda. Defendants argue, however, that pursuant to section 2.02 of the Act, \u201cthe consideration of\u2019 an item not specifically set forth in the agenda references an opportunity for action by the public body. 5 ILCS 120/2.02(a) (West 1998). We disagree. In County of Knox, 188 Ill. 2d at 556, 723 N.E.2d at 263, the supreme court opined:\n\u201cThe fundamental rule of statutory interpretation is to give effect to the intention of the legislature. A court first looks to the words of the statute. The language of the statute is the best indication of the legislative intent. When the statutory language is clear, it must be given effect without resort to other tools of interpretation. In interpreting a statute, it is never proper for a court to depart from plain language by reading into a statute exceptions, limitations, or conditions which conflict with the clearly expressed legislative intent.\u201d\nThe Act, in setting forth the policy, provides:\n\u201cIt is the public policy of this State that public bodies exist to aid in the conduct of the people\u2019s business and that the people have a right to be informed as to the conduct of their business. In order that the people shall be informed, the General Assembly finds and declares that it is the intent of this Act to ensure that the actions of public bodies be taken openly and that their deliberations be conducted openly.\nThe General Assembly further declares it to be the public policy of this State that its\u2018citizens shall be given advance notice of and the right to attend all meetings at which any business of a public body is discussed or acted upon in any way.\u201d 5 ILCS 120/1 (West 1998).\nThe Act references the \u201cactions of public bodies\u201d and, in a separate reference, \u201ctheir deliberations,\u201d and also \u201cbusiness *** discussed\u201d and, in a separate reference, business \u201cacted upon.\u201d We find \u201cthe consideration of\u2019 items not specifically set forth in the agenda to be in the nature of deliberations and discussion and not actions taken.\nWe do not find the item \u201cNEW BUSINESS\u201d to provide sufficient advance notice to the people of a resolution providing for an alternative benefit program for ECO. We note also a reference in the minutes of the meeting held November 10, 1998, that \u201cseveral years ago this was discussed,\u201d contrary to the Board\u2019s assertion of \u201cnew\u201d business.\nDefendants also argue that the ECO who chose to participate in the alternative benefit program are not bound by the judgment declaring the actions of the Board, in adopting the resolution, null and void because they were not made parties to the suit. On May 10, 2000, the trial court held that defendants\u2019 actions, \u201cin adopting the resolution approving the ECO Plan, as taken on November 10, 1998, are herewith declared null and void.\u201d The \u201cpension rights\u201d referenced by defendants have no force, binding power, or validity.\nFor the reasons stated above, we affirm the trial court\u2019s judgment.\nAffirmed.\nKNECHT and STEIGMANN, JJ\u201e concur.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "PRESIDING JUSTICE McCULLOUGH"
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Barney S. Bier, State\u2019s Attorney, of Quincy (Robert E. Daidone, Assistant State\u2019s Attorney, of counsel), for appellants.",
      "John T. Inghram IV, of Inghram & Inghram, of Quincy, for appellee.",
      "Dennis W. Gorman, of Schmiedeskamp, Robertson, Neu & Mitchell, of Quincy, for amicus curiae."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "BRUCE A. RICE, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. THE BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF ADAMS COUNTY et al., Defendants-Appellants.\nFourth District\nNo. 4 \u2014 01\u20140327\nOpinion filed January 24, 2002.\nBarney S. Bier, State\u2019s Attorney, of Quincy (Robert E. Daidone, Assistant State\u2019s Attorney, of counsel), for appellants.\nJohn T. Inghram IV, of Inghram & Inghram, of Quincy, for appellee.\nDennis W. Gorman, of Schmiedeskamp, Robertson, Neu & Mitchell, of Quincy, for amicus curiae."
  },
  "file_name": "1120-01",
  "first_page_order": 1138,
  "last_page_order": 1142
}
