{ "id": 1281408, "name": "In re MARRIAGE OF STEPHEN A. CRAIG, Petitioner-Appellant, and STEPHANIE J. CRAIG, Respondent-Appellee", "name_abbreviation": "In re Marriage of Craig", "decision_date": "2002-01-24", "docket_number": "No. 4-01-0583", "first_page": "1127", "last_page": "1131", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "326 Ill. App. 3d 1127" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "713 N.E.2d 259", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "266" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "305 Ill. App. 3d 897", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1208077 ], "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "906" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/305/0897-01" ] }, { "cite": "615 N.E.2d 1165", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1171" }, { "page": "1171" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "244 Ill. App. 3d 577", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5100940 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "583" }, { "page": "583-84" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/244/0577-01" ] }, { "cite": "574 N.E.2d 1257", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1260-61" }, { "page": "1261" }, { "page": "1261" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "215 Ill. App. 3d 378", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5294228 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "383" }, { "page": "383" }, { "page": "383" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/215/0378-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 457, "char_count": 8141, "ocr_confidence": 0.828, "pagerank": { "raw": 6.770845263994211e-08, "percentile": 0.41093573409106093 }, "sha256": "671dabf6c237645f8c17171bd6516b6a1fad6c2e8a69d4a89b0f394c6aa7b773", "simhash": "1:8be9960e3746bfb8", "word_count": 1315 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:10:13.053989+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "In re MARRIAGE OF STEPHEN A. CRAIG, Petitioner-Appellant, and STEPHANIE J. CRAIG, Respondent-Appellee." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "PRESIDING JUSTICE McCULLOUGH\ndelivered the opinion of the court;\nOn June 12, 2000, the trial court entered a judgment dissolving the marriage between petitioner, Stephen A. Craig, and respondent, Stephanie J. Craig, and on March 19, 2001, a judgment on the remaining issues of dissolution of marriage, granting custody, of Roman Andrew Lynn Craig, born August 23, 1995, to Stephanie and awarding the marital residence to Stephanie. Stephen appeals, arguing that the trial court erred in (1) granting custody of Roman to Stephanie and (2) awarding the marital residence to Stephanie. We affirm.\nThe record reflects that the trial court heard testimony over the course of four days, November 8, 2000, November 9, 2000, February 8, 2001, and February 9, 2001, and from over 25 witnesses. Stephen and Stephanie met in August 1992 and began living together in December 1992. Their son, Roman, was born on August 23, 1995. The parties married in July 1997 and separated in March 2000. The trial court entered a judgment dissolving the marriage between Stephen and Stephanie on June 12, 2000.\nStephen is 32 years old and employed by the Department of Corrections, Danville, Illinois, and also as a naval reservist. Stephanie is 26 years old and operates a day care center, licensed by the Department of Children and Family Services, in the marital home. Although both parties have participated in Roman\u2019s care, Stephanie has served as the primary caregiver of Roman since his birth.\nVarious witnesses testified as to incidents of inappropriate conduct exhibited by Stephanie. The parties are well aware of the evidence presented and it need not be set forth in detail.\nOn March 19, 2001, the trial court entered a judgment on remaining issues of dissolution of marriage, granting custody of Roman to Stephanie and awarding the marital residence to Stephanie. This appeal followed.\nStephen argues that the trial court erred in granting custody of Roman to Stephanie. The determination of child custody rests largely within the broad discretion of the trial court and its decision at trial will not be disturbed on appeal unless it is against the manifest weight of the evidence or unless the trial court abused its discretion. In re Marriage of Apperson, 215 Ill. App. 3d 378, 383, 574 N.E.2d 1257, 1260-61 (1991). Great deference must be accorded to that decision since the trial court is in a superior position to judge the credibility of witnesses and determine the needs of the child. Apperson, 215 Ill. App. 3d at 383, 574 N.E.2d at 1261.\nSection 602 of the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act (Dissolution Act) (750 ILCS 5/101 through 802 (West 1998)) provides that the trial court \u201cshall determine custody in accordance with the best interest of the child\u201d and \u201cshall consider all relevant factors\u201d set forth in section 602. 750 ILCS 5/602(a) (West 1998).\nThe court shall not consider conduct of a present or proposed custodian that does not affect her relationship to the child. 750 ILCS 5/602(b) (West 1998); In re Marriage of Phillips, 244 Ill. App. 3d 577, 583, 615 N.E.2d 1165, 1171 (1993). Although it is improper for a court to presume harm to a child based on the parents\u2019 allegedly immoral conduct, evidence bearing on the stability of the child\u2019s environment is obviously relevant. Phillips, 244 Ill. App. 3d at 583-84, 615 N.E.2d at 1171. Stephen argues that \u201cit is a combination of the conduct involving the exhibitionism and sexual behavior and the current living arrangement which establishes the lack of stability which Roman needs in his life.\u201d\nIn a decision letter to counsel, prepared February 15, 2001, the trial court referenced the various factors identified in section 602 of the Dissolution Act and noted its consideration of each of the factors in the instant case. The trial court noted the \u201cgreat amount of evidence *** presented to the court on Stephanie\u2019s moral indiscretions.\u201d The trial court observed that most of Stephen\u2019s testimony involved the \u201cmoral indiscretions\u201d of Stephanie. Stephen offered little testimony about \u201chis interaction and interrelationship with Roman and his desire to spend quality time with Roman.\u201d Further, the trial court found Stephen\u2019s reaction to Stephanie\u2019s behavior \u201ctroubling.\u201d The trial court opined:\n\u201c[E]vents that may have otherwise been forgotten have been publicized and emphasized by [Stephen]. Not only has [Stephen] displayed the incriminating photographs of [Stephanie] to family members, he also published them to others in the community *** and in the presence of Roman.\u201d\nThe trial court found that Stephanie had established a willingness and an ability to facilitate and encourage a close and continuing relationship between Roman and his father. Although the trial court did not condone Stephanie\u2019s behaviors, the trial court found that \u201cthese moral indiscretions do not affect [Stephanie\u2019s] relationship with Roman.\u201d\nWe do not find the trial court\u2019s grant of custody to Stephanie to be an abuse of discretion. As we stated in Apperson, in custody cases, seldom is either parent shown to be .perfect. Apperson, 215 Ill. App. 3d at 383, 574 N.E.2d at 1261. We do agree with the trial court that the conduct that Stephanie has chosen to engage in is \u201ctroubling\u201d and demonstrates \u201ca deficiency in the maturity and sensibility expected of parents as role models to their children.\u201d\nStephen suggests, in the alternative, a modification of the visitation schedule. Stephen argues that the visitation schedule is not in Roman\u2019s best interest and that, under the temporary order, Stephen enjoyed visitation with Roman each week, from Thursday evening to Sunday afternoon. We note that Stephen does not work on Thursday and Friday. The trial court ordered that Stephen:\n\u201cshall have the following specified rights of visitation:\n(1) Beginning on Wednesday, February 21, 2001, and every other Wednesday thereafter, from 4:00 p.m. to 8:00 p.m.\n(2) Beginning on Wednesday, February 28, 2001, and every other Wednesday thereafter, from 4:00 p.m. to Friday at 8:00 p.m.\n(3) Beginning on Friday, February 23, 2001, and every other weekend thereafter, from 4:00 p.m. on Friday to 8:00 p.m. on Sunday.\n(4) Petitioner may have other visitation, if the parties so agree.\u201d\nFurther, the trial court provided for holiday visitation and summer visitation.\nThis court will not disturb a trial court\u2019s decision regarding visitation unless the decision was against the manifest weight of the evidence, manifestly unjust, or there was a clear abuse of discretion. Stockton v. Oldenburg, 305 Ill. App. 3d 897, 906, 713 N.E.2d 259, 266 (1999). The order provides for Stephanie to retain custody of Roman. over some weekends, days that Stephen is required to work. We do not find the trial court\u2019s decision to be against the manifest weight of the evidence, manifestly unjust, or a clear abuse of discretion.\nStephen next argues that the trial court erred in awarding the marital residence to Stephanie. Stephen asserts that he should be awarded custody of Roman and \u201cthe home that Roman grew up with.\u201d Stephen contends that Stephanie is not able to maintain the home. A court shall divide the marital property without regard to marital misconduct in just proportions, considering all relevant factors, including the desirability of awarding the family home to the spouse having custody of the children. 750 ILCS 5/503(d)(5), (d)(9) (West 1998). We do not find that the trial court erred in awarding the marital residence to Stephanie, given that she was awarded custody of Roman. Moreover, Stephanie operates a day care facility, licensed by the Department of Children and Family Services, from the home, garnering necessary familial income while providing for Roman\u2019s needs.\nFor the reasons stated, we affirm the trial court\u2019s judgment.\nAffirmed.\nCOOK and TURNER, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "PRESIDING JUSTICE McCULLOUGH" } ], "attorneys": [ "Richard M. Kash, Jr., of Fruin, Garst & Kash, of Paris, for appellant.", "E. Robert Anderson, of Kreckman & Anderson, of Paris, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "In re MARRIAGE OF STEPHEN A. CRAIG, Petitioner-Appellant, and STEPHANIE J. CRAIG, Respondent-Appellee.\nFourth District\nNo. 4 \u2014 01\u20140583\nOpinion filed January 24, 2002.\nRichard M. Kash, Jr., of Fruin, Garst & Kash, of Paris, for appellant.\nE. Robert Anderson, of Kreckman & Anderson, of Paris, for appellee." }, "file_name": "1127-01", "first_page_order": 1145, "last_page_order": 1149 }