{ "id": 79467, "name": "In re J.J. et al., Minors and Respondents-Appellees (The People of the State of Illinois, Petitioner-Appellee, v. L.W., Respondent-Appellant)", "name_abbreviation": "People v. L.W.", "decision_date": "2001-12-24", "docket_number": "No. 1-00-1501", "first_page": "70", "last_page": "80", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "327 Ill. App. 3d 70" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "307 Ill. App. 3d 541", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 173531 ], "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "551" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/307/0541-01" ] }, { "cite": "205 Ill. App. 3d 497", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2567223 ], "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "512" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/205/0497-01" ] }, { "cite": "173 Ill. 2d 167", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 147606 ], "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "186" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/173/0167-01" ] }, { "cite": "185 Ill. 2d 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 121963 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "43" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/185/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "196 Ill. 2d 181", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 351282 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "208" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/196/0181-01" ] }, { "cite": "42 Ill. 2d 201", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2846784 ], "year": 1969, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/42/0201-01" ] }, { "cite": "174 Ill. App. 3d 732", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3514678 ], "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "734" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/174/0732-01" ] }, { "cite": "212 Ill. App. 3d 849", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2599999 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "878-79" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/212/0849-01" ] }, { "cite": "303 Ill. App. 3d 190", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 511410 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "195" }, { "page": "195" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/303/0190-01" ] }, { "cite": "66 Ill. 2d 515", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5463503 ], "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "520" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/66/0515-01" ] }, { "cite": "286 Ill. App. 3d 99", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1544404 ], "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "101" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/286/0099-01" ] }, { "cite": "112 Ill. 2d 48", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5539137 ], "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "51" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/112/0048-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1051, "char_count": 23582, "ocr_confidence": 0.705, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.120923094043276e-07, "percentile": 0.7645181244157478 }, "sha256": "d3d79ba76600b66e9354660f9713a7b96f5123366777b22fc1c83bdd1ff77d5e", "simhash": "1:5a9a9c281fc563e1", "word_count": 3744 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:55:57.852492+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "In re J.J. et al., Minors and Respondents-Appellees (The People of the State of Illinois, Petitioner-Appellee, v. L.W., Respondent-Appellant)." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE McBRIDE\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nFollowing a hearing on a petition by the Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) to appoint a guardian of the person of the minors and its motion to vacate DCFS\u2019 guardianships, terminate ward-ships and close the minors\u2019 cases, the trial court granted the petition and the motion, finding that the best interests of J.J. and T.R. would be served by private guardianships with their maternal aunt. Respondent L.W, the children\u2019s mother, contends that the court\u2019s determination was against the manifest weight of the evidence.\nThe evidence in the record shows that J.J. was born on May 4, 1989, and T.R. was born on November 17, 1995. On March 19, 1997, petitions for adjudication of wardship were filed alleging that they were neglected based on their injurious environment and that T.R. was additionally neglected due to lack of care. At a temporary custody hearing held the following day, the evidence established that on March 14, 1997, T.R. swallowed several prescription antidepressant pills and became comatose. L.W. attempted to treat T.R. with a spoonful of castor oil and then put her to bed with a bottle of milk. She did not call an ambulance until three hours later when T.R. had difficulty breathing. T.R. remained in a coma for 22 days.\nThe parties stipulated to prior incidents where LW\u2019s negligence or passivity caused her children to be injured. On June 28, 1993, J.J. was permanently injured when he shot himself in the face with a handgun found on respondent\u2019s living room floor. As a result, J.J. was blinded in one eye, was brain damaged and paralyzed on one side of his body. Previously, on January 8, 1991, another child of LW, 2Vs-month-old JW, died from shaken baby syndrome after being abused by her biological father.\nAt the conclusion of the hearing, the court found probable cause to believe that both children were neglected and that it was a matter of urgent and immediate necessity that they be removed from the custody of their parents. DCFS placed the children with their maternal aunt and uncle as foster parents.\nA psychological examination of L.W. was ordered at the March 20, 1997, hearing. The examination rated her IQ at 67, placing her at the first percentile as compared to others in her age range. Tests revealed that her verbal, comprehension, perceptual, organizational, fine-motor and visual-motor abilities were deficient. Her academic skills were rated at a low to middle elementary school level. The report concluded:\n\u201c[L.W] should not be assuming primary care of her children, as she does not have the intellectual or personality resources to be an effective caretaker. It is advised that another close family member, relative or friend assume this job. By placing [L.W] in a position of responsibility and/or authority, the children\u2019s safety and well-being remain at risk.\u201d\nOn December 18, 1997, following an adjudicatory hearing, the court found J.J. and T.R. neglected due to lack of care, an injurious environment, and substantial risk of physical injury. Following a dispositional hearing on January 30, 1998, the court found L.W unable to care for, protect, train or discipline the children, and ordered that the children be made wards of the court, making DCFS guardian with the right to place them.\nOn May 18, 1998, the court entered a permanency order having the goal of returning the children home pending a status hearing. On April 16, 1999, following a permanency hearing, the court entered a permanency order modifying the goal to private guardianship. In August 1999, DCFS filed motions to vacate the children\u2019s guardian-ships, terminate their wardships and close their cases, and requested subsidized private guardianship for the children with their maternal aunt and uncle. The motions stated that the two children had been living with their aunt and uncle for more than two year\u2019s and had a strong, mutual attachment to them. The motions also noted that efforts to reunite the children with L.W had failed because she had not cooperated with the services provided for her.\nOn December 6, 1999, L.W filed a motion for the appointment of a court-appointed special advocate (CASA) and for a parenting assessment report.\nIn a January 1999 report, L.W.\u2019s therapist, Edward Landreth, stated that he had terminated therapy because she \u201ccould not grasp the concept of psychotherapy nor productively benefit from it,\u201d but instead became defensive and accused DCFS of causing all of her problems. He recommended that the children not be returned to L.W. because she did not accept responsibility for her past inadequate care of the children and had not developed a plan for supervising them in the future.\nOn January 12, 2000, the court held a hearing on the pending motions, stating that it would first hear the motions filed by DCFS because they had been filed months prior to L.W\u2019s motion.\nWister Coleman testified that he had been the DCFS caseworker for J.J. and T.R. since the time that they were removed from L.W.\u2019s home in March 1997. In addition to many of the facts already stated above, Coleman testified that although L.W complied with all the services requested of her by DCFS, she did not meet any of the requirements of the services. He stated that in September 1999, the permanency goal for J.J. and T.R was changed from returning them to their home to private guardianship because several reports and evaluations of L.W. demonstrated that she did not have the intellectual or personality resources to be an effective caretaker. Coleman believed that respondent had no understanding of child development and was incapable of parenting. After holding a meeting to determine whether a \u201csafety plan\u201d could be established to allow the children to return home, he had determined such a plan was inappropriate because he received no commitment from L.W.\u2019s parents or church.\nColeman also testified that the children\u2019s maternal aunt and uncle, Darlene and Kenneth Blanks, had bonded with the children, loved them and were willing to become their guardians. They were both adept at caring for J.J.\u2019s special needs which resulted from the shooting. Coleman stated the Blanks told him that on many occasions respondent had behaved inappropriately while visiting the children by attempting to take the children away from their home, and when the Blanks stopped her, she became verbally aggressive with them and the children. They described respondent\u2019s visits as disruptive and unbearable. Coleman testified that although the children generally enjoyed visiting with respondent, they had become disgusted and upset with the fact that respondent continued to disrupt their home and create emotional problems for them. Coleman stated that during a clinical staffing, respondent had made ominous and threatening gestures toward him and an administrator, thereby terminating the meeting. Coleman testified that Darlene Blanks told him that despite respondent\u2019s behavior, she believed that they would be able to structure a visitation plan for her. In Coleman\u2019s opinion, appointing Kenneth and Darlene Blanks as guardians of the children was in the children\u2019s best interests.\nEdward Landreth testified that he had provided therapy to respondent between July and November 1998. At the time that he was treating her, he was completing his doctoral internship and had been working under the supervision of a senior doctor at Interaction Dynamics for 19 months. Landreth had a bachelor\u2019s degree in general psychology, a master\u2019s degree in clinical psychology, and a master\u2019s degree in clinical social work. He had been employed in the field of psychology since 1990.\nLandreth\u2019s therapy goals for respondent included establishing a therapeutic relationship, increasing her decision-making skills and coping abilities, dealing with separation from her children, and helping her understand and take responsibility for her role in the injuries to her three children. Landreth found that respondent\u2019s cognitive ability was very low. Additionally, she suffered from a long-term, persistent depression (which he termed \u201cdysthymic\u201d disorder), and her cognitive limitations seemed to prevent her from coping with her problems or from thinking in abstract terms. After 17 therapy sessions, respondent made such little progress in achieving her necessary goals that Landreth terminated the sessions. Landreth advised the court that respondent had also made little progress when she attended 20 sessions with a prior therapist, Miko Anderson. Landreth stated that he believed that respondent should not regain custody of the children because she was not capable of protecting and monitoring them, could not predict or anticipate danger, and had difficulty making decisions or plans.\nWhen Landreth was asked his opinion of evaluations prepared in September 1999 and February 2000 by Maisha Hamilton-Bennett from Hamilton Wholistic Healthcare, Ltd., which recommended that the children be returned to respondent, he responded that he was concerned about the reports because the first report was based on only two sessions with respondent, and the second on only seven sessions. He did not believe that the results of Hamilton-Bennett\u2019s psychological tests were accurate because they were dramatically improved over the results respondent received in 1997 from similar tests administered by Great Lakes Services. He stated that during his counseling sessions with respondent, he found her behavior to be consistent with the 1997 test results. Additionally, Hamilton-Bennett\u2019s recommendations were based only upon information provided by respondent and the fact that respondent attended church. Landreth believed that although respondent\u2019s relationship with her pastor may help her emotionally, it alone would not help her cognitive abilities or improve her coping, planning and decision-making skills.\nOn cross-examination, Landreth admitted that although the prior therapist requested psychological testing for respondent, Interaction Dynamics never tested her and that such testing would have been helpful in his diagnosis of respondent. He also admitted that he made his recommendations regarding placement of the children without observing respondent interact with them. In fact, he never observed her interact with anyone. Landreth testified that dysthymic disorder is generally treated with individual psychotherapy, and although there could be medical intervention, such intervention was more common with other types of depression. He was unaware of whether a psychiatric evaluation was ever prepared regarding respondent and admitted that such an evaluation might have shown that she was eligible for medical treatment. Landreth admitted that he did not establish a therapeutic relationship with respondent and that she might have progressed better if she had been referred to a different therapist.\nOn redirect examination, Landreth stated that neither a good relationship with her therapist nor medication would improve respondent\u2019s cognitive ability. He also stated that although there was always a possibility that respondent could at some time parent her children, it was more likely that, at the time of the hearing, respondent still did not have the capability to make decisions that would protect her children from danger.\nLashanda Shaw testified in respondent\u2019s behalf that she was respondent\u2019s daughter-in-law and had resided with her \u201coff and on\u201d from 1993 through 1996. Respondent behaved appropriately with children, kept a clean house and did not leave medications or guns within the reach of children. Respondent took proper care of Shaw\u2019s children while Shaw was at work.\nRespondent testified that although she kept her appointments with Landreth, he made her feel uncomfortable because he told her that he could not help her, that she needed an attorney, and that DCFS wanted to take her children. After Landreth terminated her therapy, she began counseling with her church pastor and continued the counseling every Tuesday for seven months.\nPamela Johnson, a public school nurse who had received CASA training, testified that in the summer of 1999 she met respondent in church. After reviewing respondent\u2019s case file, she referred respondent to Dr. Hamilton-Bennett in order to help her regain custody of her children. Johnson accompanied respondent to at least three visits with J.J. and T.R. at the Blanks\u2019 home. Each time, Darlene Blanks yelled at respondent and the children and, at one visit, announced that respondent would no longer be allowed to visit the children. She also threatened to call DCFS regarding J.J. and told respondent that she would never see her children again. Mrs. Blanks also objected to respondent\u2019s involvement with her church. On cross-examination, Johnson admitted that not only was she no longer a volunteer for CASA, her supervisor had terminated her from the program because of her inappropriate behavior regarding respondent\u2019s case. She admitted that she was not testifying in any official capacity, but only as a friend.\nIn rebuttal, Darlene Blanks denied that she threatened to call DCFS regarding J.J. or that she complained about respondent\u2019s involvement with the church.\nAt the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court found that based on all of the evidence, especially the three incidents in which her children were previously harmed and one killed, the protection of the children required that the primary caretaker be their private guardian Darlene Blanks. The court stated that \u201cthe best interest of the children here would best [be] served by private guardianship with their maternal aunt.\u201d The court specifically explained that its order did not terminate respondent\u2019s parental rights and that she retained the ability to visit with her children and be involved in their lives.\nOn appeal, respondent contends that the trial court\u2019s determination to close her case and appoint her sister as the children\u2019s private guardian was against the manifest weight of the evidence.\nInitially, we note that respondent mistakenly asserts that the facts in her case required the trial court to presume that her rights to the care, custody and control of her children were superior to the claims of any other person or entity. In support of her assertion, she cites In re Custody of Peterson, 112 Ill. 2d 48, 51 (1986), and In re Estate of Webb, 286 Ill. App. 3d 99, 101 (1996). However, both of these cases pertained to custody disputes between private parties and did not involve placement with relatives due to adjudicated findings of abuse or neglect by the children\u2019s parents. Accordingly, we find that neither case is applicable here.\nPursuant to the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (Act), in order to deprive a parent of custodial rights to children who have been adjudged wards of the court, a court must find that the parent is unfit or unable to care for, protect, train or discipline the children or is unwilling to do so. 705 ILCS 405/2 \u2014 27 (West 1998). Where child custody proceedings are brought under the Act, the juvenile court\u2019s primary concern is the best interests of the child, and to that end, the court is vested with wide discretion. In re Stilley, 66 Ill. 2d 515, 520 (1977); In re M.V., 303 Ill. App. 3d 190, 195 (1999). In such custody proceedings, a child\u2019s best interest is superior to all other factors, including the interests of the biological parents. In re Ashley K., 212 Ill. App. 3d 849, 878-79 (1991). \u201cIf the \u2018best interests\u2019 standard can be attained only by placing the child in the custody of someone other than the natural parent, it is unnecessary for the court to find the natural parent unfit to care for the child.\u201d In re J.F.K., 174 Ill. App. 3d 732, 734 (1988); People ex rel. Edwards v. Livingston, 42 Ill. 2d 201 (1969). A court of review will not disturb a trial court\u2019s determination in a child custody case unless the court exceeded its broad discretion or unless its determination is against the manifest weight of the evidence. In re M.V., 303 Ill. App. 3d at 195. A judgment is against the manifest weight of the evidence only when an opposite conclusion is clearly apparent. In re C.N., 196 Ill. 2d 181, 208 (2001).\nIn support of her argument, respondent directs our attention to the evidence showing that she complied with all services and tasks recommended by DCFS, successfully completed parenting classes where she was given a rating of four on a five-point scale, and complied with drug and alcohol assessments and random urine screens which all produced negative results. She contends that these factors demonstrated that she had sufficient cognitive ability to form a strong understanding of parenting skills. She also notes that her caseworker acknowledged that a bond existed between her and the children and that the trial court agreed with the caseworker\u2019s determination.\nAlthough it appears true that respondent complied with the various services and tasks assigned by DCFS, we do not agree with her contention that such compliance demonstrated sufficient cognitive ability to parent her children. In fact, Landreth testified that although respondent appeared for every appointment, he had to terminate his therapy sessions with her because she lacked the cognitive ability to benefit from them. Further, with respect to respondent\u2019s receiving a four-out-of-five rating in her parenting class, Wister Coleman testified that the rating was given for her overall participation and attendance, not her ability to parent. With respect to her assertion that her maternal bond with her children was alone sufficient to demonstrate that she was capable of parenting them, we find that respondent has provided no authority to support her assertion.\nRespondent next asserts that in rendering its decision, the trial court improperly considered the shaken-baby death which occurred in 1991 and J.J.\u2019s gunshot injuries in 1993 because after both incidents, DCFS never found respondent unfit or removed any children from her custody. However, respondent again cites no authority to support her assertion. Additionally, we find that the trial court was correct in determining that evidence of the past incidents was relevant to show that she lacked the cognitive ability to anticipate dangerous situations or to protect her children.\nRespondent contends that she acted properly when she gave T.R. castor oil and a bottle of milk after T.R. ingested the medication which led to her coma, and then three hours later called for emergency help. However, other than this general statement of her innocence, she provides no authority in support of her argument, and we find it to be without merit.\nShe next contends that the court improperly relied on the testimony of Edward Landreth, who had no prior experience in evaluating or counseling caregivers in child protective matters and had not yet earned a doctorate in psychology. Respondent further asserts that Landreth\u2019s opinions were not worthy of the court\u2019s consideration because he never observed her interact with her children or considered her ability to function in the workplace, where she performed as an \u201cexemplary employee\u201d as described by an employer. Additionally, Landreth\u2019s agency never conducted psychological tests on her although he admitted that such tests were requested by his predecessor and would have assisted Landreth in his diagnosis of respondent. Further, although Landreth diagnosed her as suffering from a depressive condition that could be readily treated by medication or psychotherapy, he testified that he was not aware of whether respondent was ever psychiatrically evaluated for medical treatment. Finally, she directs our attention to Landreth\u2019s admission that he never gained her trust during therapy sessions and that she might have progressed better had she been referred to another therapist whom she could trust.\nInitially, we note that the State contends that respondent has not preserved this matter for review because she never objected to Landreth\u2019s expert testimony at the hearing. Although we find that we need not address this issue (People v. Maori, 185 Ill. 2d 1, 43 (1998)), we find her contention without merit.\nIn People v. Miller, 173 Ill. 2d 167, 186 (1996), the supreme court discussed the applicable law regarding expert witnesses, stating:\n\u201cWhether an individual is an expert on a particular subject is a matter generally reserved to the sound discretion of the trial court. [Citation.] An individual will be allowed to testify as an expert if his experience and qualifications afford him knowledge which is not common to laypersons, and where such testimony will aid the trier of fact in reaching its conclusions. [Citation.] An expert need only have knowledge and experience beyond that of the average citizen. [Citation.] There is no predetermined formula for how an expert acquires specialized knowledge or experience and the expert can gain such through practical experience, scientific study, education, training or research.\u201d\nThe credibility of the expert and the weight to be given his opinion are matters to be decided by the trier of fact in light of the expert\u2019s credentials and the basis for the expert\u2019s opinion. In re L.M., 205 Ill. App. 3d 497, 512 (1990). A trial court is not required to accept the opinion of an expert when the court renders its ultimate determination. In re RM., 307 Ill. App. 3d 541, 551 (1999).\nHere, the record shows that Landreth had a bachelor\u2019s degree in general psychology, master\u2019s degrees in clinical psychology and clinical social work, and was completing work for his doctorate in clinical psychology when he treated respondent. We find that the trial court did not err in determining that his education alone qualified him as an expert in psychology. Further, he had been employed in the field of psychology for seven years prior to meeting respondent.\nRespondent asserts that before Landreth made his recommendations, he should have conducted more psychological testing, should have observed her with her children and at her workplace, should have had her evaluated for medical testing to determine if medication could have corrected her depressive disorder, and should have referred her to another therapist when respondent was not progressing with him. We find that respondent\u2019s assertions are unsupported by the record or any cited authority, and consist of mere supposition and conjecture. Further, Landreth\u2019s testimony and recommendations were fully corroborated by respondent\u2019s caseworker Wister Coleman, who had worked with respondent since the time that the children were removed from their home in March 1997.\nAccordingly, we find that the trial court did not err in determining that the best interests of J.J. and T.R. required that they be placed in the care of their maternal aunt and her husband in the form of a private guardianship.\nFor these reasons, the judgment of the circuit court of Cook County is affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nCAHILL and GORDON, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE McBRIDE" } ], "attorneys": [ "Kwame Raoul, of Chicago, for appellant.", "Richard A. Devine, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Renee Goldfarb, Jennifer Streeter, and Kathleen C. Johnses, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People.", "Patrick T. Murphy, Public Guardian, of Chicago (Charles E Golbert and Kristin Wuerffel, of counsel), guardian ad litem." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "In re J.J. et al., Minors and Respondents-Appellees (The People of the State of Illinois, Petitioner-Appellee, v. L.W., Respondent-Appellant).\nFirst District (2nd Division)\nNo. 1-00-1501\nOpinion filed December 24, 2001.\nKwame Raoul, of Chicago, for appellant.\nRichard A. Devine, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Renee Goldfarb, Jennifer Streeter, and Kathleen C. Johnses, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People.\nPatrick T. Murphy, Public Guardian, of Chicago (Charles E Golbert and Kristin Wuerffel, of counsel), guardian ad litem." }, "file_name": "0070-01", "first_page_order": 88, "last_page_order": 98 }