{ "id": 79408, "name": "AMERICAN NATIONAL BANK AND TRUST COMPANY OF CHICAGO, Guardian of the Estate of Gustavo Estriveros, a Minor and Disabled Person, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. THE COUNTY OF COOK, Defendant-Appellee", "name_abbreviation": "American National Bank & Trust Co. v. County of Cook", "decision_date": "2001-12-28", "docket_number": "No. 1-00-3731", "first_page": "212", "last_page": "221", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "327 Ill. App. 3d 212" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "174 Ill. 2d 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 223608 ], "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "37" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/174/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "113 Ill. 2d 219", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3173826 ], "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "228" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/113/0219-01" ] }, { "cite": "139 Ill. 2d 323", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5573989 ], "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "335" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/139/0323-01" ] }, { "cite": "306 Ill. App. 3d 392", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1336089 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "402-03" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/306/0392-01" ] }, { "cite": "315 Ill. App. 3d 42", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 980639 ], "weight": 5, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "45" }, { "page": "45-47" }, { "page": "47" }, { "page": "53" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/315/0042-01" ] }, { "cite": "191 Ill. 2d 493", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 229719 ], "weight": 11, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "508" }, { "page": "510-11" }, { "page": "510" }, { "page": "512" }, { "page": "496-98" }, { "page": "497" }, { "page": "499" }, { "page": "499" }, { "page": "512" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/191/0493-01" ] }, { "cite": "183 Ill. 2d 342", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 209971 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "349" }, { "page": "349" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/183/0342-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 858, "char_count": 23216, "ocr_confidence": 0.737, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.1701956434310833e-07, "percentile": 0.5861920907357919 }, "sha256": "962fe588cfc094730d11924589181fcc69c9e2eeb74b7b86af5659fc26521775", "simhash": "1:87f64406bc5e94d5", "word_count": 3613 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:55:57.852492+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "AMERICAN NATIONAL BANK AND TRUST COMPANY OF CHICAGO, Guardian of the Estate of Gustavo Estriveros, a Minor and Disabled Person, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. THE COUNTY OF COOK, Defendant-Appellee." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE O\u2019BRIEN\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nPlaintiffs, American National Bank & Trust Company, as guardian of the estate of Gustavo Estriveros, and Gloria Estriveros, individually, appeal the order of the circuit court granting summary judgment for defendant, the County of Cook, on plaintiffs\u2019 medical malpractice action. On appeal, plaintiffs argue that the circuit court erred in holding that sections 6 \u2014 105 and 6 \u2014 106(a) of the Local Governmental and Governmental Employees Tort Immunity Act (Tort Immunity Act) (745 ILCS 10/6 \u2014 105, 6 \u2014 106(a) (West 2000)) immunize defendant from liability. We reverse and remand.\nGloria Estriveros (plaintiff) received her prenatal care at defendant\u2019s medical clinic. On October 3, 1986, plaintiff went to defendant\u2019s medical clinic for an ultrasound, which showed that plaintiff\u2019s baby was in a \u201ctransverse he,\u201d meaning that the baby was lying perpendicular to his mother\u2019s body.\nA baby in a transverse lie position cannot be delivered vaginally, because there is no part of the baby\u2019s body to form a wedge to lead the way through the cervix. Further, a woman who goes into labor in such a condition runs the risk of a cord prolapse, meaning that the umbilical cord slips through the cervix and can no longer pulsate, thereby depriving the baby of oxygen and nourishment.\nSeveral treatment options are available for a woman with a baby in the transverse lie position, depending on how far the baby is from term. First, the doctor can monitor the mother over a period of time to see if the baby changes position inside her womb. Second, the doctor can perform an external version, a procedure in which the doctor physically moves the baby by pressing on the mother\u2019s abdominal wall. Third, the doctor can perform a cesarean section (C-section) at fetal maturity.'\nHere, doctors monitored plaintiffs condition as her pregnancy proceeded. On December 4, plaintiff was seen by Doctor David Baum at defendant\u2019s clinic. Doctor Baum charted that plaintiffs baby was in the cephalic position, meaning that the baby was positioned with its head down in the womb. On December 11, plaintiff was seen by defendant\u2019s second-year resident, Doctor Vernita Tucker, who charted that plaintiffs baby was in the transverse lie position. On December 18, plaintiff was seen in Cook County Hospital by Doctor Pang, who charted that the baby was in the vertex position, meaning that its head was down and thus, was not in the transverse lie position. However, plaintiff also underwent an ultrasound on December 18 which showed that the baby was in the transverse lie position. On December 23, plaintiff was examined at defendant\u2019s clinic by Doctor Elias Sabbagha, who charted that the baby was in a transverse lie.\nOn January 6, plaintiff again was seen by Doctor Vernita Tucker, defendant\u2019s second-year resident. Doctor Tucker performed a Leopold\u2019s maneuver on plaintiff, i.e., she manipulated plaintiffs abdomen in order to feel for the baby\u2019s position. Doctor Tucker determined that the baby was cephalic, meaning that he was positioned head-first or head down, and, thus, was no longer in a transverse lie. Doctor Tucker also charted that plaintiff was \u201cstatus post external version,\u201d meaning that an external version had been performed on plaintiff two weeks earlier. However, Doctor Tucker admitted in her deposition that there was nothing in plaintiffs medical records to indicate that an external version had been performed two weeks prior to January 6. When asked why she had charted that plaintiff was \u201cpost external version,\u201d Doctor Tucker indicated some uncertainty, as she could not remember the specifics of the January 6 examination; Doctor Tucker stated that she \u201cassume[d]\u201d plaintiff must have told her about the external version.\nPlaintiff went into labor on January 27, 1987. Doctor Sabbagha, who was charting the delivery, stated that the baby was in a footling breech position; however, plaintiffs\u2019 expert, Doctor Allan Charles, testified that based on his review of all the records, the baby was in the transverse he position.\nDoctors performed an emergency C-section on plaintiff because a cord prolapse had occurred. The baby was born with severe brain damage resulting from the prolapsed cord.\nPlaintiffs brought a medical malpractice action against defendant, alleging that defendant acted negligently by: (1) improperly disregarding the diagnosis that the baby was in a transverse lie; (2) failing to properly manage the diagnosed condition of a transverse lie; (3) improperly assuming that the external version had been performed to treat the transverse lie; (4) failing to properly determine whether an external version had been performed; (5) failing to consult attending staff about the existing diagnosis of a transverse lie; (6) failing to have attending staff review plaintiffs care and treatment; (7) failing to admit plaintiff to the hospital on January 6; (8) improperly instructing plaintiff to go home on January 6; and (9) failing to see that an external version or C-section was performed prior to the cord prolapse.\nPlaintiffs\u2019 expert, Doctor Charles, opined that defendant\u2019s agent, Doctor Tucker, acted negligently on January 6 by: (1) incorrectly assessing the position of the baby and failing to recognize that the baby was in a transverse lie or breech position; (2) failing to perform a non-stress test or ultrasound to confirm the position of the baby; (3) incorrectly assuming that an external version had been performed; and (4) failing to consult with her attending physician.\nDefendant filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that, even assuming Doctor Charles\u2019 opinions were correct, defendant was immune from liability based on sections 6 \u2014 105 and 6 \u2014 106 of the Tort Immunity Act. Section 6 \u2014 105 states:\n\u201cNeither a local public entity nor a public employee acting within the scope of his employment is liable for injury caused by the failure to make a physical or mental examination, or to make an adequate physical or mental examination of any person for the purpose of determining whether such person has a disease or physical or mental condition that would constitute a hazard to the health or safety of himself or others.\u201d 745 ILCS 10/6 \u2014 105 (West 2000).\nSection 6 \u2014 106(a) states:\n\u201cNeither a local public entity nor a public employee acting within the scope of his employment is liable for injury resulting from diagnosing or failing to diagnose that a person is afflicted with mental or physical illness or addiction or from failing to prescribe for mental or physical illness or addiction.\u201d 745 ILCS 10/6 \u2014 106(a) (West 2000).\nSection 6 \u2014 106(d) states:\n\u201cNothing in this section exonerates a public employee from liability for injury proximately caused by his negligent or wrongful act or omission in administering any treatment prescribed for mental or physical illness or addiction or exonerates a local public entity whose employee, while acting in the scope of his employment, so causes such an injury.\u201d 745 ILCS 10/6 \u2014 106(d) (West 2000).\nThe circuit court granted defendant\u2019s motion for summary judgment. Plaintiffs filed this timely appeal.\nSummary judgment is appropriate when, viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file reveal that no genuine issues of material fact exist and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Ragan v. Columbia Mutual Insurance Co., 183 Ill. 2d 342, 349 (1998). The standard of review in cases involving summary judgment is de novo. Ragan, 183 Ill. 2d at 349.\nDefendant argues that summary judgment was appropriately entered in its favor because plaintiffs\u2019 allegations of negligence are premised on Doctor Tucker\u2019s failure to correctly diagnose the baby\u2019s position on January 6. Defendant argues that the circuit court correctly determined that it was immune under section 6 \u2014 106(a) of the Tort Immunity Act for such a failure to diagnose.\nWe disagree. In Michigan Avenue National Bank v. County of Cook, 191 Ill. 2d 493 (2000), our supreme court considered section 6 \u2014 106(a), which immunizes local public entities and their employees for the failure to diagnose, and section 6 \u2014 106(d), which holds public employees responsible for negligently prescribing or administering treatment which causes injury. The court noted the well-settled rule that where the statutory language is clear and unambiguous, the court must give it effect as written, without reading into it limitations or conditions that the legislature did not express. Michigan Avenue National Bank, 191 Ill. 2d at 508. The court found no ambiguity in the words \u201cdiagnosis\u201d and \u201ctreatment\u201d as used in section 6 \u2014 106 and therefore accorded those words their plain and ordinary meaning. Michigan Avenue National Bank, 191 Ill. 2d at 510-11. The court noted that Webster\u2019s dictionary defines \u201cdiagnosis\u201d as an \u201c \u2018investigation or analysis of the cause or nature of a condition, situation, or problem,\u2019 \u201d and that Black\u2019s Law Dictionary defines \u201cdiagnosis\u201d as \u201c \u2018[t]he determination of a medical condition (such as disease) by physical examination or by study of its symptoms.\u2019 \u201d Michigan Avenue National Bank, 191 Ill. 2d at 510, quoting Webster\u2019s Third New International Dictionary 622 (1993), and Black\u2019s Law Dictionary 464 (7th ed. 1999). The court noted Sloan-Dorland\u2019s definition of \u201ctreatment\u201d as \u201c \u2018[t]he management and care of a patient for the purpose of combating disease or disorder.\u2019 \u201d Michigan Avenue National Bank, 191 Ill. 2d at 512, quoting Sloan-Dorland Annotated Medical-Legal Dictionary 746 (1987).\nDoctor Tucker\u2019s actions on January 6 did not constitute \u201cdiagnosis,\u201d as she did not examine plaintiff in order to investigate, analyze, or determine plaintiffs medical condition. Rather, Doctor Tucker was already aware of plaintiffs medical condition, as she testified that she had read the note from plaintiffs most recent visit to defendant\u2019s obstetrical clinic on December 23, in which Doctor Sabbagha wrote that plaintiffs baby was in the transverse lie position. Defendant\u2019s own expert, Doctor Michael Socol, testified that the transverse lie diagnosis was the \u201cexisting diagnosis\u201d at the time plaintiff was seen by Doctor Tucker on January 6. Thus, Doctor Tucker\u2019s actions on January 6 consisted of treating by caring for and managing plaintiffs previously diagnosed known condition. Under section 6 \u2014 106(d), public employees are liable for injuries caused by negligently prescribing or administering treatment; accordingly, the circuit court erred in granting summary judgment for defendant pursuant to section 6 \u2014 106.\nDefendant argues that since the baby was mobile inside plaintiffs womb, each prenatal examination (including Doctor Tucker\u2019s examination on January 6) involved a separate and independent diagnosis to determine whether the baby was still in the transverse lie position. We disagree. When plaintiff walked into Doctor Tucker\u2019s examination room on January 6, Doctor Tucker was already aware that plaintiff was pregnant and that her baby had been diagnosed as being in a transverse lie position. During that January 6 examination, Doctor Tucker monitored and treated plaintiffs known condition by examining plaintiff\u2019s records and performing the Leopold maneuver to determine the baby\u2019s current position. The issue is whether said treatment was negligently performed. As discussed, defendant is liable for any negligent treatment administered by its agent, Doctor Tucker.\nDefendant argues that Michigan Avenue National Bank v. County of Cook, 191 Ill. 2d 493 (2000), and Mabry v. County of Cook, 315 Ill. App. 3d 42 (2000), compel a result different than the one reached here. We disagree. In Michigan Avenue National Bank, Collins visited Cook County Hospital on several occasions from September 1986 to February 1987 concerning lumps and pain in her breast, among other gynecological ailments. Michigan Avenue National Bank, 191 Ill. 2d at 496-98. In October 1986, Collins was diagnosed with fibrocystic breast disease and advised to follow up for appointments to monitor the condition. Michigan Avenue National Bank, 191 Ill. 2d at 497. In July 1988, a lump in Collins\u2019 breast was diagnosed as cancerous; eventually the cancer spread, and Collins died in November 1989. Michigan Avenue National Bank, 191 Ill. 2d at 499. Plaintiffs filed a medical malpractice action against defendants (the county and its physicians), alleging that defendants were negligent for failing to order a mammogram, failing to adequately perform examinations and tests on Collins, failing to perform a biopsy, failing to diagnose Collins\u2019 breast cancer, and failing to administer proper and appropriate medical and nursing care to Collins. Michigan Avenue National Bank, 191 Ill. 2d at 499. The supreme court affirmed the grant of summary judgment to defendants. The court held:\n\u201cBecause the gravamen of plaintiffs action against defendants is that defendants\u2019 failure either to perform examinations or to adequately perform examinations led to defendant\u2019s failure to diagnose Collins\u2019 breast cancer, which, in turn, proximately caused her death, the immunity provided to local public entities and their public employees in section 6 \u2014 105 and subsection (a) of section 6 \u2014 106 applies.\u201d Michigan Avenue National Bank, 191 Ill. 2d at 512.\nIn Mabry, Ms. Pinkston went to the emergency room of Cook County Hospital on April 30, 1992, complaining of dizziness and shortness of breath. Mabry, 315 Ill. App. 3d at 45. She was diagnosed and treated for asthma and respiratory distress. Mabry, 315 Ill. App. 3d at 45-47. Ms. Pinkston died from a pulmonary embolism on May 3, 1992. Mabry, 315 Ill. App. 3d at 47. Plaintiff filed a medical malpractice action against defendants, the County of Cook and Cook County Hospital. The appellate court reversed a jury verdict in favor of plaintiff, holding:\n\u201c[LJike Michigan Avenue National Bank, we believe that plaintiffs entire cause of action is premised on defendants\u2019 failure to diagnose the pulmonary embolism and the failure to conduct physical examination tests that would have enabled the County physicians to discover that Pinkston had a pulmonary embolism. Accordingly, the defendants are immune from liability under sections 6 \u2014 105 and 6 \u2014 106(a).\u201d Mabry, 315 Ill. App. 3d at 53.\nIn contrast to Michigan Avenue National Bank and Mabry, here there was testimony (from Doctor Charles) that plaintiff had been correctly diagnosed as having a baby in the transverse lie position; thus, unlike Michigan Avenue National Bank and Mabry, the present case involves negligent treatment of a known medical condition, as opposed to a failure to diagnose. As discussed, defendant is not immune for any negligent treatment.\nAlthough there was some contrary evidence regarding whether or not plaintiff had been correctly diagnosed (i.e., Doctor Sabbagha\u2019s statement, contrary to Doctor Charles, that the baby was in a footling breech position at delivery and not in a transverse lie position), such conflicting evidence raises a question of material fact inappropriate for resolution by summary judgment.\nDuring oral argument on this case, defendant argued that plaintiffs\u2019 allegations of negligence primarily involve defendant\u2019s alleged failure to conduct examinations, specifically, an ultrasound or nonstress test, and the failure to prescribe treatment, specifically, an external version or C-section. Defendant argued that its alleged failure to conduct an ultrasound or nonstress test is immunized under section 6 \u2014 105, which grants immunity to a local public entity and its employees who fail to make or who make inadequate physical examinations for purposes of determining whether a person suffers from a disease or physical or mental condition. Defendant argued that its failure to prescribe an external version or C-section is immunized under section 6 \u2014 106(a), which grants immunity to local public entities and public employees for the \u201cfail[ure] to prescribe for mental or physical illness or addiction.\u201d 745 ILCS 10/6 \u2014 106(a) (West 2000). Plaintiffs responded that defendant\u2019s negligence consisted of acts of commission and omission which occurred after diagnosis and during plaintiff s treatment, and as such, fall within the ambit of section 6 \u2014 106(d). Section 6 \u2014 106(d) states that, \u201cNothing in this section exonerates a public employee from liability for injury proximately caused by his negligent or wrongful act or omission in administering any treatment prescribed for mental or physical illness ***.\u201d (Emphasis added.) 745 ILCS 10/ 6 \u2014 106(d) (West 2000).\nThe appellate court opinion in Michigan Avenue National Bank v. County of Cook, 306 Ill. App. 3d 392 (1999), is instructive. In Michigan Avenue Bank, we stated:\n\u201cArgument could be made *** that once diagnosis of a medical condition is made and treatment of that condition is prescribed and undertaken, any subsequent diagnosis required to be made as a result of that treatment, such as with respect to complications arising from medications prescribed or medical procedures performed, may not be entitled to the immunity protection of section 6 \u2014 106(a). For instance, a medication could be therapeutic for a diagnosed illness but toxic to an undiagnosed illness. Treatment of the former would require the medical professional to inquire as to common conditions of pathology that would be aggravated by the intake of medication prescribed for the diagnosed illness. Treatment of the diagnosed illness also might require the medical professional to perform further testing when adverse reactions occur as a result of the treatment prescribed for the diagnosed medical condition and to diagnose and treat any additional medical conditions that result. The making of the subsequent diagnosis would become part of the treatment prescribed for the medical condition initially diagnosed; and there would be no immunity if the subsequent diagnosis was incorrectly made (a negligent or wrongful act) or if the diagnosis was not made at all (an act of omission).\u201d Michigan Avenue Bank, 306 Ill. App. 3d at 402-03.\nFollowing the same logic here, once diagnosis of a medical condition is made and treatment of the condition is prescribed and undertaken, any subsequent prescription or examination required to be made pursuant to that condition is part of the patient\u2019s treatment. Under section 6 \u2014 106(d), in the course of administering the treatment prescribed there is no immunity if the subsequent prescription or examination was incorrectly made (a negligent or wrongful act) or if the prescription or examination was not made at all (an act of omission). See 745 ILCS 10/6 \u2014 106(d) (West 1992) (\u201c[nlothing in this section exonerates *** for injury proximately caused by *** negligent or wrongful act or omission in administering any treatment prescribed\u201d). Here, as discussed, plaintiff was diagnosed with a transverse lie prior to her examination by Doctor Tucker on January 6. The prescribed treatment consisted of regularly monitoring plaintiff\u2019s condition and performing nonstress tests, ultrasounds, and the Leopold\u2019s maneuver to determine whether the baby\u2019s position had changed and to determine whether an external version or C-section ultimately should be performed. Doctor Tucker\u2019s alleged failure to schedule or perform an ultrasound, nonstress test, external version, or C-section constituted an act of omission in administering plaintiffs prescribed treatment for the previously diagnosed transverse lie and, as such, is afforded no immunity under section 6 \u2014 106(d).\nBefore concluding, we address plaintiffs\u2019 argument that sections 6 \u2014 105 and 6 \u2014 106(a) violate due process, equal protection, and constitute special legislation by distinguishing between patients injured by medically negligent diagnosis and patients injured by medically negligent treatment. Neither party argues that sections 6 \u2014 105 and 6 \u2014 106(a) affect a fundamental right or discriminate against a suspect class. Therefore, the rational basis test is the appropriate standard for determining plaintiffs\u2019 due process, equal protection, and special legislation challenges to sections 6 \u2014 105 and 6 \u2014 106(a). County of Bureau v. Thompson, 139 Ill. 2d 323, 335 (1990); Bernier v. Burris, 113 Ill. 2d 219, 228 (1986).\nUnder the rational basis test, judicial review of a legislative classification is limited and generally deferential. The challenged classification need only be rationally related to a legitimate state goal and if any state of facts can reasonably be conceived to justify the classification, it must be upheld. Committee for Educational Rights v. Edgar, 174 Ill. 2d 1, 37 (1996).\nHere, the legislature reasonably could have determined that some medical conditions are extremely difficult to diagnose and examine and, as such, that local public entities and their employees should be protected from liability for medically negligent diagnosis and examination. The legislature also reasonably could have determined that once an accurate medical diagnosis and/or examination is made, and the patient\u2019s condition is known and treatment prescribed, the justification for immunity no longer exists and therefore the local public entities and their employees who treat said patient owe him a duty of reasonable care and are liable for any negligent treatment. Accordingly, sections 6 \u2014 105 and 6 \u2014 106(a) are constitutional, as a rational basis exists for distinguishing between patients injured by medically negligent diagnosis and patients injured by medically negligent treatment.\nFor the foregoing reasons, we reverse the order of the circuit court granting summary judgment for defendant and remand for further proceedings.\nReversed and remanded.\nBUCKLEY, J., concurs.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE O\u2019BRIEN" }, { "text": "JUSTICE O\u2019HARA FROSSARD,\nspecially concurring:\nI write separately to make the point that where, as in this case, an accurate medical diagnosis is alleged to have been made, followed by a prescribed course of treatment, there is no exoneration from liability under subsection (d) of section 6 \u2014 106(d) of the Tort Immunity Act for injury proximately caused by a negligent or wrongful act or omission in administering any treatment prescribed.\nThe fact that an accurate medical diagnosis together with a prescribed course of treatment as the result of that diagnosis was alleged in this case distinguishes it from Mabry, where failure to diagnose was the gravamen of the alleged medical malpractice and immunity was thereby afforded under subsection (a) of section 6 \u2014 106(a) of the Tort Immunity Act.", "type": "concurrence", "author": "JUSTICE O\u2019HARA FROSSARD," } ], "attorneys": [ "Michael A. Rathsack, of Chicago (Montgomery W Mackey and Michael W. Rathsack, of counsel), for appellants.", "Richard A. Devine, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Patrick T. Driscoll, Thomas M. Burnham, and Marcie Thorp, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "AMERICAN NATIONAL BANK AND TRUST COMPANY OF CHICAGO, Guardian of the Estate of Gustavo Estriveros, a Minor and Disabled Person, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. THE COUNTY OF COOK, Defendant-Appellee.\nFirst District (6th Division)\nNo. 1-00-3731\nOpinion filed December 28, 2001.\n\u2014 Rehearing denied January 29, 2002.\nO\u2019HARA FROSSARD, J., specially concurring.\nMichael A. Rathsack, of Chicago (Montgomery W Mackey and Michael W. Rathsack, of counsel), for appellants.\nRichard A. Devine, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Patrick T. Driscoll, Thomas M. Burnham, and Marcie Thorp, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for appellee." }, "file_name": "0212-01", "first_page_order": 230, "last_page_order": 239 }