{ "id": 79324, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JAVIER M. BELTRAN, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Beltran", "decision_date": "2002-02-22", "docket_number": "No. 2-00-0846", "first_page": "685", "last_page": "694", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "327 Ill. App. 3d 685" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "321 Ill. App. 3d 923", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 132411 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "931" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/321/0923-01" ] }, { "cite": "66 Ill. 2d 551", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5463653 ], "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "566" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/66/0551-01" ] }, { "cite": "41 Ill. App. 3d 205", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2488845 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1976, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "207-08" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/41/0205-01" ] }, { "cite": "239 Ill. App. 3d 1027", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5148245 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1030" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/239/1027-01" ] }, { "cite": "161 Ill. 2d 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 783181 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "51" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/161/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "253 Ill. App. 3d 184", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5425511 ], "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "188" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/253/0184-01" ] }, { "cite": "295 Ill. App. 3d 160", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 45696 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "167" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/295/0160-01" ] }, { "cite": "708 A.2d 806", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "A.2d", "case_ids": [ 11820932, 11820753, 11820695, 281209, 281214 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "814", "parenthetical": "because transfer hearing determines only \"the appropriate forum for the adjudicatory proceeding,\" burden on minor \"does not violate the maxim that the Commonwealth is charged with proving each element of an offense\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/a2d/708/0806-03", "/a2d/708/0806-02", "/a2d/708/0806-01", "/pa/550/0669-01", "/pa/550/0668-01" ] }, { "cite": "271 Kan. 733", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Kan.", "case_ids": [ 613073 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "738", "parenthetical": "\"The presumption does not improperly shift the burden of proof to the defendant on any elements of the offenses\"" }, { "page": "618", "parenthetical": "\"The presumption does not improperly shift the burden of proof to the defendant on any elements of the offenses\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/kan/271/0733-01" ] }, { "cite": "539 N.W.2d 408", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.W.2d", "case_ids": [ 10710924 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "413" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nw2d/539/0408-01" ] }, { "cite": "197 Ill. 2d 88", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 259033 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "93", "parenthetical": "\"shall\" is \"a clear expression of legislative intent to impose a mandatory obligation\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/197/0088-01" ] }, { "cite": "181 Ill. 2d 133", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 821404 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "142" }, { "page": "144-47" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/181/0133-01" ] }, { "cite": "285 U.S. 312", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1175193 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1932, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "329" }, { "page": "780" }, { "page": "362" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/285/0312-01" ] }, { "cite": "387 U.S. 1", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11333627 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1967, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "13" }, { "page": "538" }, { "page": "1436" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/387/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "397 U.S. 358", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 12054393 ], "weight": 9, "year": 1970, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "367-68" }, { "page": "377" }, { "page": "1074-75" }, { "page": "358-59" }, { "page": "372" }, { "page": "1069-70" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/397/0358-01" ] }, { "cite": "83 Ill. 2d 67", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5473462 ], "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "74" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/83/0067-01" ] }, { "cite": "403 U.S. 528", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 12027325 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1971, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "545-46" }, { "page": "661" }, { "page": "1986" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/403/0528-01" ] }, { "cite": "76 Ill. 2d 289", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2982988 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "301-02" }, { "page": "302" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/76/0289-01" ] }, { "cite": "515 U.S. 506", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1564227 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "510" }, { "page": "449" }, { "page": "2313" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/515/0506-01" ] }, { "cite": "196 Ill. 2d 518", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 351227 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "526" }, { "page": "531-32" }, { "page": "536" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/196/0518-01" ] }, { "cite": "321 Ill. App. 3d 937", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 132451 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "943" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/321/0937-01" ] }, { "cite": "530 U.S. 466", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 9413911 ], "weight": 9, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "477" }, { "page": "447" }, { "page": "2356" }, { "page": "490" }, { "page": "455" }, { "page": "2362-63" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/530/0466-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 917, "char_count": 20654, "ocr_confidence": 0.749, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.1735490576352858e-07, "percentile": 0.7714916970062733 }, "sha256": "2d06742bec98db8aa9e21833646466d32a3434182ab8a3ec337354408b960391", "simhash": "1:79ad1448ed54947d", "word_count": 3430 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:55:57.852492+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JAVIER M. BELTRAN, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE CALLUM\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThe State petitioned to adjudicate defendant, Javier M. Beltran, a delinquent minor. Then, pursuant to section 5 \u2014 805(2) of the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (the Act) (705 ILCS 405/5 \u2014 805(2) (West 1998)), the State moved to prosecute defendant under the criminal law. The juvenile court granted that motion, and a jury convicted defendant of three counts of attempted first-degree murder (720 ILCS 5/8 \u2014 4(a), 9 \u2014 1(a)(1) (West 1998)) and three counts of aggravated discharge of a firearm (720 ILCS 5/24 \u2014 1.2(a)(2) (West 1998)). On two of the attempt counts, the trial court sentenced defendant to consecutive prison terms totaling 21 years. On the remaining counts, the court imposed concurrent eight-year sentences. Defendant appeals, arguing that (1) section 5 \u2014 805(2) of the Act violated his right to due process of law (U.S. Const., amend. XIV); (2) the trial court erred in instructing the jury on accountability; (3) the convictions of aggravated discharge of a firearm violated the one-act, one-crime rule; and (4) the imposition of consecutive sentences violated defendant\u2019s due process rights (U.S. Const., amend. XIV; Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 147 L. Ed. 2d 435, 120 S. Ct. 2348 (2000)). We affirm in part and vacate in part.\nI. FACTS\nIn its petition for adjudication, the State alleged that defendant had committed multiple counts of attempted first-degree murder, a Class X felony (720 ILCS 5/8 \u2014 4(c)(1) (West 1998)), and aggravated discharge of a firearm. On the date of the alleged offenses, defendant was 15 years old. In its motion to prosecute, the State asserted the existence of probable cause to believe the petition\u2019s allegations. See 705 ILCS 405/5 \u2014 805(2)(a) (West 1998).\nAt a hearing, the State presented evidence to establish probable cause, and the juvenile court found it sufficient. After the presentation of additional evidence, the court determined that defendant had the burden to rebut the presumption that he should be prosecuted. See 705 ILCS 405/5 \u2014 805(2)(a) (West 1998). The court considered the statutory factors (705 ILCS 405/5 \u2014 805(2)(b) (West 1998)) and concluded that the presumption stood. Accordingly, the court granted the State\u2019s motion.\nA grand jury indicted defendant. At trial, the State presented the following evidence relevant to our analysis. Eloy Cerenil (Eloy) testified that on April 10, 1999, about 8:15 p.m., he was in his driveway with Rolando Cerenil (Rolando) and Arturo Garcia. Eloy heard gunfire, and a bullet hit him. The bullet penetrated his spine and left him paralyzed from the waist down. He did not see who shot him.\nRolando testified that he heard six or seven shots. Defendant was the shooter, and Adam Luna was with him.\nGarcia testified that defendant fired five shots and that Luna was at his side, also holding a gun. A bullet grazed Garcia. Defendant and Luna ran off.\nAfter defendant presented evidence of an alibi, the State proffered a jury instruction on accountability (see Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions, Criminal, No. 5.03 (4th ed. 2000)). Defendant objected, arguing that there had been no \u201cindication of accountability.\u201d Nevertheless, relying on People v. Testa, 261 111. App. 3d 1025 (1994), the trial court found the instruction appropriate because the evidence suggested that two people were \u201cacting together\u201d in the shooting.\nIn denying his posttrial motion, the court rejected defendant\u2019s constitutional attack on section 5 \u2014 805(2) of the Act. Pursuant to section 5 \u2014 8\u20144(a) of the Unified Code of Corrections (the Code) (730 ILCS 5/5 \u2014 8\u20144(a) (West 1998)), the court imposed consecutive sentences upon finding that defendant inflicted \u201csevere bodily injury\u201d and committed his offenses \u201cas part of a single course of conduct during which there was no substantial change in the nature of the criminal objective.\u201d 730 ILCS 5/5 \u2014 8\u20144(a) (West 1998). In denying defendant\u2019s motion to reconsider, the court declined to merge the aggravated discharge counts into the attempt counts. Defendant appealed.\nII. SECTION 5 \u2014 805(2) OF THE ACT\nDefendant argues that, in two respects, section 5 \u2014 805(2) violates due process. First, he asserts that the statute runs afoul of Apprendi. Although he did not raise that claim in the trial court, a constitutional challenge may be raised at any time. People v. Vilces, 321 Ill. App. 3d 937, 943 (2001). Second, he contends that the statute shifts to the minor an impermissible burden. The trial court rejected that claim, but our review is de novo. See People v. Carney, 196 Ill. 2d 518, 526 (2001).\nA. The Statute\nIn general, when the State petitions for an adjudication of delinquency, the minor is subject only to the sanctions available under the Act. See 705 ILCS 405/5 \u2014 120 (West 1998). The most serious of those sanctions is the minor\u2019s commitment to the juvenile division of the Department of Corrections until his twenty-first birthday. See 705 ILCS 405/5 \u2014 750 (West 1998). However, in some circumstances, the State may move the juvenile court to transfer the case to the criminal court, allowing the State to pursue the sanctions available under the criminal law. Depending on the facts, a transfer may be mandatory (705 ILCS 405/5 \u2014 805(1) (West 1998)), presumptive (705 ILCS 405/5\u2014 805(2) (West 1998)), or discretionary (705 ILCS 405/5 \u2014 805(3) (West 1998)). Here, the State obtained a presumptive transfer under section 5 \u2014 805(2).\nTo seek a presumptive transfer, the State must allege that (1) the minor committed, e.g., a Class X felony (other than armed violence) or aggravated discharge of a firearm; and (2) the minor was at least 15 years old. 705 ILCS 405/5 \u2014 805(2)(a) (West 1998). If the juvenile court finds \u201cprobable cause to believe that the allegations *** are true,\u201d there arises a \u201crebuttable presumption\u201d that the case should be transferred. 705 ILCS 405/5 \u2014 805(2) (a) (West 1998). The court then \u201cshall enter an order permitting prosecution under the criminal laws\u201d unless, after considering several enumerated factors, the court finds \u201cclear and convincing evidence that the minor would be amenable to the care, treatment, and training programs available through the facilities of the juvenile court.\u201d 705 ILCS 405/5 \u2014 805(2)(b) (West 1998).\nB. Apprendi\nIn this now-famous case, the defendant pleaded guilty to a second-degree offense. Ordinarily, such an offense was punishable by 5 to 10 years\u2019 imprisonment. However, under New Jersey\u2019s \u201chate crime\u201d law, the trial court could impose a sentence of up to 20 years if it found, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the defendant\u2019s purpose had been to intimidate the victim because of, e.g., the victim\u2019s race. In Apprendi, the trial court made such a finding and sentenced the defendant to 12 years\u2019 imprisonment.\nThe Supreme Court determined that, in essence, the \u201chate crime\u201d law allowed the trial court to find, by a preponderance of the evidence, an element of the defendant\u2019s crime. Such a procedure violated the defendant\u2019s due process right to \u201c \u2018a jury determination that [he] is guilty of every element of the crime with which he is charged, beyond a reasonable doubt.\u2019 \u201d See Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 477, 147 L. Ed. 2d at 447, 120 S. Ct. at 2356, quoting United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 510, 132 L. Ed. 2d 444, 449, 115 S. Ct. 2310, 2313 (1995). Thus, the Court held that, \u201c[o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.\u201d Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490, 147 L. Ed. 2d at 455, 120 S. Ct. at 2362-63.\nHere, defendant submits the following. When the State petitioned to adjudicate him delinquent, he faced a sanction no greater than commitment until his twenty-first birthday. However, after the juvenile court found (1) probable cause to believe the State\u2019s allegations and (2) a lack of clear and convincing evidence of defendant\u2019s amenability to the juvenile court\u2019s facilities, defendant faced (and ultimately received) a much greater sanction. Thus, in violation of Apprendi, the maximum penalty was increased upon facts that were not submitted to a jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.\nSuperficially, defendant appears to proffer a valid application of Apprendi. Nevertheless, his argument fails because he attempts to divorce the case\u2019s holding from its legal basis. New Jersey\u2019s \u201chate crime\u201d law violated due process because, as the accused in a criminal prosecution, the defendant had the right to have a jury determine, beyond a reasonable doubt, the facts that established the maximum penalty. A hearing under section 5 \u2014 805(2), however, is a juvenile proceeding. Thus, whether defendant was denied due process depends on the standards applicable to those proceedings, rather than those applicable to criminal prosecutions. See People v. Taylor, 76 Ill. 2d 289, 301-02 (1979).\nIt is well established that, in a juvenile proceeding, due process does not require a jury. See McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 545-46, 29 L. Ed. 2d 647, 661, 91 S. Ct. 1976, 1986 (1971); People ex rel. Carey v. Chrastka, 83 Ill. 2d 67, 74 (1980). As for the standard of proof, due process requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt during the adjudicatory stage of a juvenile proceeding (In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 367-68, 25 L. Ed. 2d 368, 377, 90 S. Ct. 1068, 1074-75 (1970)), i.e., the stage at which \u201c \u2018a determination is made as to whether a juvenile is a \u201cdelinquent\u201d as a result of alleged misconduct on his part, with the consequence that he may be committed to a state institution\u2019 \u201d (Winship, 397 U.S. at 358-59, 25 L. Ed. 2d at 372, 90 S. Ct. at 1069-70, quoting In re Application of Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 13, 18 L. Ed. 2d 527, 538, 87 S. Ct. 1428, 1436 (1967)). However, that standard does not apply to the dispositional stage of a juvenile proceeding. See Win-ship, 397 U.S. at 359 n.l, 25 L. Ed. 2d at 372 n.l, 90 S. Ct. at 1070 n.l.\nA hearing under section 5 \u2014 805(2) is dispositional, not adjudicatory. That is, the hearing determines not the minor\u2019s guilt but the forum in which his guilt may be adjudicated. Taylor, 76 Ill. 2d at 302. Thus, although the juvenile court made findings that exposed him to a greater sanction, defendant had no due process right to have a jury make those findings beyond a reasonable doubt. Because Apprendi bears only on the process due in criminal proceedings, the case is simply inapplicable here.\nC. Burdens\nDefendant asserts that, once the juvenile court finds probable cause to believe the State\u2019s allegations, section 5 \u2014 805(2) invokes a mandatory rebuttable presumption that shifts to the minor the burden of proof. On this basis, too, defendant contends that the statute violates due process.\nWe first note that section 5 \u2014 805(2) does not expressly place a burden on the minor. However, it expressly invokes a \u201crebuttable presumption\u201d (705 ILCS 405/5 \u2014 805(2)(a) (West 1998)), and a rebut-table presumption necessarily shifts the burden of proof (see Heiner v. Donnan, 285 U.S. 312, 329, 76 L. Ed. 772, 780, 52 S. Ct. 358, 362 (1932)). Thus, once the presumption arose, the juvenile court correctly inferred that defendant had the statutory burden to rebut it.\nWe further note that defendant correctly labels this a mandatory presumption, rather than a permissive one. A permissive presumption allows but does not require the fact finder to infer the presumed fact. A mandatory presumption, on the other hand, is one that the fact finder may not reject. People v. Watts, 181 Ill. 2d 133, 142 (1998). Section 5 \u2014 805(2) states that, unless the presumption is rebutted, the juvenile court \u201cshall enter an order permitting prosecution under the criminal laws.\u201d (Emphasis added.) 705 ILCS 405/5\u2014 805(2)(b) (West 1998). In other words, unless the presumption is rebutted, the court must accept the presumed fact that a transfer is warranted. Thus, the presumption is mandatory. See People v. O\u2019Brien, 197 Ill. 2d 88, 93 (2001) (\u201cshall\u201d is \u201ca clear expression of legislative intent to impose a mandatory obligation\u201d).\nA mandatory rebuttable presumption violates due process when it relieves the State of its burden to prove the elements of a crime. Watts, 181 Ill. 2d at 144-47. However, in considering statutes similar to section 5 \u2014 805(2), courts across the country have unanimously upheld such presumptions. For example, in In re Welfare ofL.J.S., 539 N.W.2d 408 (Minn. App. 1995), the Minnesota Court of Appeals addressed a virtually identical statute. The court noted that the presumption at issue does not shift the burden of proof on the elements of an offense. Instead, the presumption \u201cmerely determines which court will try the case and evaluate the elements of the offense.\u201d (Emphasis added.) L.J.S., 539 N.W2d at 413; see also State v. Coleman, 271 Kan. 733, 738, 26 P.3d 613, 618 (2001) (\u201cThe presumption does not improperly shift the burden of proof to the defendant on any elements of the offenses\u201d); Commonwealth v. Cotto, 708 A.2d 806, 814 (Pa. Super. 1998) (because transfer hearing determines only \u201cthe appropriate forum for the adjudicatory proceeding,\u201d burden on minor \u201cdoes not violate the maxim that the Commonwealth is charged with proving each element of an offense\u201d).\nAs we noted in the preceding section, our own supreme court has recognized that a transfer hearing resolves only whether the adjudicatory proceeding will occur in the juvenile forum. Taylor, 76 111. 2d at 302. The court has further noted that a minor has no constitutional right to be adjudicated in that forum. People v. J.S., 103 111. 2d 395, 402 (1984). Indeed, the legislature chose to create the juvenile court (J.S., 103 111. 2d at 402), and the legislature could choose to abolish it. See Coleman, 271 Kan. App. 2d at 736, 26 E3d at 616 (\u201cThe special treatment of juvenile offenders *** results from statutory authority, which can be withdrawn\u201d). Thus, the legislature was free to impose on the minor the burden to prove that he belongs in that forum. Regardless of whether he meets that burden, the State retains the ultimate burden to prove the elements of the crime, and the minor is afforded due process of law.\nIII. ACCOUNTABILITY\nNext, defendant argues that the State failed to submit sufficient evidence to justify instructing the jury on accountability. He asserts that the evidence showed that he was guilty as a principal or not guilty at all. We disagree.\nA defendant is legally accountable for another\u2019s conduct when, before or during the commission of a crime, and with the intent to promote or facilitate the commission of that crime, he solicits, aids, abets, agrees, or attempts to aid the other in the planning or commission of the crime. 720 ILCS 5/5 \u2014 2(c) (West 1998); Testa, 261 Ill. App. 3d at 1030. An instruction on the issue is justified if the State submits even the \u201cslightest\u201d evidence to support a theory of accountability. Testa, 261 Ill.App. 3d at 1030. Such evidence, along with evidence that the defendant acted as a principal, is sufficient to support an instruction on each theory, even if the State advanced only one in its case in chief. Testa, 261 Ill. App. 3d at 1030. We may reverse a trial court\u2019s decision to issue a jury instruction only if the court abused its discretion. People v. Kidd, 295 Ill. App. 3d 160, 167 (1998).\nDefendant notes that only two witnesses identified a specific shooter and that both identified defendant. No one testified that shots were fired by anyone else for whom defendant could have been accountable. Thus, defendant concludes, no evidence justified an instruction on accountability.\nWe acknowledge the absence of any direct evidence that anyone but defendant fired shots. However, evidence of accountability may be circumstantial. People v. Cooks, 253 Ill. App. 3d 184, 188 (1993). Garcia testified that, as defendant fired his shots, Luna was at his side, holding a gun. Furthermore, Garcia stated that defendant fired five shots, but Rolando testified that he heard six or seven. Thus, although no one saw Luna fire his gun, the jury could have inferred that he did so. The jury then could have determined that, to the extent that Luna was guilty as a principal, defendant was guilty as an accessory.\nDefendant relies on People v. Williams, 161 Ill. 2d 1 (1994), People v. Crowder, 239 Ill. App. 3d 1027 (1993), and People v. Lusietto, 41 Ill. App. 3d 205 (1976). However, in each case, the State presented no evidence to even suggest that the defendant could have been guilty as an accessory rather than a principal. See Williams, 161 Ill. 2d at 51; Crowder, 239 Ill. App. 3d at 1030; Lusietto, 41 Ill. App. 3d at 207-08. As we explained, that is not the case here. The trial court did not err in instructing the jury on accountability.\nIV ONE ACT, ONE CRIME\nDefendant asserts that his convictions of aggravated discharge of a firearm arose from the same physical act as his convictions of attempted first-degree murder. Thus, he concludes, the aggravated discharge convictions must be vacated under the one-act, one-crime rule. See People v. King, 66 Ill. 2d 551, 566 (1977). The State agrees, and so do we.\nIn People v. Crespo, No. 86556 (February 16, 2001), the defendant stabbed the victim three times in rapid succession. The defendant was charged with, and convicted of, armed violence and aggravated battery. The supreme court held that, although the multiple stabbings could have supported the separate convictions, the State did not apportion the crimes among the various wounds, either in the indictment or at trial. Because the State portrayed the defendant\u2019s conduct as a single attack, multiple convictions were untenable.\nCrespo controls. Here, defendant and Luna fired a series of shots at three victims. Against each victim, defendant was charged with, and convicted of, a count of attempt and a count of aggravated discharge. However, as to each victim, the indictment did not specify which shots supported which charge. Similarly, at trial, the State did not distinguish among the shots. Thus, against each victim, defendant committed a single act that supported only a single conviction. Because aggravated discharge of a firearm is less serious than attempted first-degree murder, we vacate the aggravated discharge convictions. See People v. Amaya, 321 Ill. App. 3d 923, 931 (2001).\nV CONSECUTIVE SENTENCES\nFinally, defendant attacks section 5 \u2014 8\u20144(a) of the Code, the basis for his consecutive sentences. He notes that, to invoke section 5 \u2014 8\u20144(a), the trial court found that he inflicted \u201csevere bodily injury\u201d and committed his crimes \u201cas part of a single course of conduct during which there was no substantial change in the nature of the criminal objective.\u201d 730 ILCS 5/5 \u2014 8\u20144(a) (West 1998). He concludes that, under Apprendi, due process required those facts to be submitted to a jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.\nIn Carney, 196 Ill. 2d at 531-32, the supreme court foreclosed defendant\u2019s argument:\n\u201cWhile, undeniably, a defendant who receives consecutive sentences will serve a longer period of imprisonment than a defendant who receives identical concurrent sentences, this fact alone does not make Apprendi applicable. The application by a judge of the factors identified in section 5 \u2014 8\u20144(a) of the Code determines only the manner in which a defendant will serve his sentences for multiple offenses. The defendant is not exposed to punishment beyond that authorized by the jury\u2019s verdict, provided that the sentence for each separate offense does not exceed the maximum permitted by statute for that offense.\u201d\nThe court concluded \u201cthat consecutive sentences imposed under section 5 \u2014 8\u20144(a) of the Code do not violate the due process rights of defendants and that the Supreme Court\u2019s Apprendi decision does not apply to such sentences.\u201d Carney, 196 Ill. 2d at 536.\nIn accordance with Carney, we reject defendant\u2019s argument.\nVI. CONCLUSION\nFor these reasons, we vacate defendant\u2019s convictions of aggravated discharge of a firearm. In all other respects, the judgment of the circuit court of Kane County is affirmed.\nAffirmed in part and vacated in part.\nGEIGER and BYRNE, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE CALLUM" } ], "attorneys": [ "Daniel M. Kirwan and Edwin J. Anderson, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Mt. Vernon, for appellant.", "Meg G\u00f3recki, State\u2019s Attorney, of St. Charles (Stephen E. Norris and T. David Purcell, both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JAVIER M. BELTRAN, Defendant-Appellant.\nSecond District\nNo. 2-00-0846\nOpinion filed February 22, 2002.\nDaniel M. Kirwan and Edwin J. Anderson, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Mt. Vernon, for appellant.\nMeg G\u00f3recki, State\u2019s Attorney, of St. Charles (Stephen E. Norris and T. David Purcell, both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0685-01", "first_page_order": 703, "last_page_order": 712 }