{ "id": 79341, "name": "In re MARRIAGE OF CATHERINE MURPHY, n/k/a Catherine M. Madonia, Petitioner-Appellee, and MICHAEL R. MURPHY, Respondent-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "In re Marriage of Murphy", "decision_date": "2002-02-06", "docket_number": "No. 4-01-0292", "first_page": "845", "last_page": "855", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "327 Ill. App. 3d 845" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "185 F.3d 850", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.3d", "case_ids": [ 11586057 ], "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "859", "parenthetical": "noting that litigants who win less than 10% of their initial demand are deemed not to be prevailing parties" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f3d/185/0850-01" ] }, { "cite": "1996 Ill. Laws 4060", "category": "laws:leg_session", "reporter": "Ill. Laws", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "562 N.E.2d 168", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "170" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "138 Ill. 2d 242", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5576546 ], "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "247-48" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/138/0242-01" ] }, { "cite": "737 N.E.2d 1099", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1110" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "316 Ill. App. 3d 770", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1096634 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "782" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/316/0770-01" ] }, { "cite": "723 N.E.2d 280", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "286" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "309 Ill. App. 3d 779", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 349631 ], "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "787" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/309/0779-01" ] }, { "cite": "223 F.3d 585", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.3d", "case_ids": [ 11240924 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "592", "parenthetical": "in which the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals recognized that a distinction exists between merely \"prevailing\" and \"substantially prevailing]\" under section 13 of the Motor Vehicle Franchise Act (815 ILCS 710/13 (West 2000)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f3d/223/0585-01" ] }, { "cite": "589 F. Supp. 150", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F. Supp.", "case_ids": [ 3678308 ], "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "153" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f-supp/589/0150-01" ] }, { "cite": "607 F.2d 339", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 1431828, 3785037 ], "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "356" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/607/0339-01", "/us-app-dc/197/0025-01" ] }, { "cite": "532 U.S. 598", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 9301812 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "603", "parenthetical": "a prevailing party is one who receives \"at least some relief on the merits of his claim\"" }, { "page": "862", "parenthetical": "a prevailing party is one who receives \"at least some relief on the merits of his claim\"" }, { "page": "1839-40", "parenthetical": "a prevailing party is one who receives \"at least some relief on the merits of his claim\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/532/0598-01" ] }, { "cite": "506 U.S. 103", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11925002 ], "weight": 15, "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "111" }, { "page": "503" }, { "page": "573" }, { "page": "111-12" }, { "page": "503" }, { "page": "573" }, { "page": "112" }, { "page": "504" }, { "page": "573" }, { "page": "114" }, { "page": "505" }, { "page": "574" }, { "page": "115" }, { "page": "505-06" }, { "page": "575" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/506/0103-01" ] }, { "cite": "5 U.S.C. \u00a7 552", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "U.S.C.", "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(a)(4)(E)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "U.S.C.", "year": 1994, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1988", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "U.S.C.", "weight": 2, "year": 1994, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "461 U.S. 424", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11298707 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "433" }, { "page": "50" }, { "page": "1939" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/461/0424-01" ] }, { "cite": "694 N.E.2d 1044", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1047", "parenthetical": "citing Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433, 76 L. Ed. 2d 40, 50, 103 S. Ct. 1933, 1939 (1983), for the proposition that a \"prevailing party\" need only have prevailed on any one significant issue and received some of the benefit they sought in filing suit" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "296 Ill. App. 3d 236", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 222561 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "240", "parenthetical": "citing Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433, 76 L. Ed. 2d 40, 50, 103 S. Ct. 1933, 1939 (1983), for the proposition that a \"prevailing party\" need only have prevailed on any one significant issue and received some of the benefit they sought in filing suit" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/296/0236-01" ] }, { "cite": "513 N.E.2d 1056", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1063" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "161 Ill. App. 3d 54", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3466120 ], "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "63-64" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/161/0054-01" ] }, { "cite": "684 F. Supp. 514", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F. Supp.", "case_ids": [ 7399497 ], "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "523" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f-supp/684/0514-01" ] }, { "cite": "576 N.E.2d 250", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "253" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "216 Ill. App. 3d 90", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5289117 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "94" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/216/0090-01" ] }, { "cite": "726 N.E.2d 687", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "694" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "311 Ill. App. 3d 853", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 415299 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "861" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/311/0853-01" ] }, { "cite": "709 N.E.2d 1281", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1288", "parenthetical": "holding that a \"substantially prevailing\" party must show that (1) prosecution of the action was \"reasonably necessary\" to obtain the information sought, and (2) a causal nexus exists between the action and the agency's surrender of the information" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "304 Ill. App. 3d 778", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 564610 ], "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "786", "parenthetical": "holding that a \"substantially prevailing\" party must show that (1) prosecution of the action was \"reasonably necessary\" to obtain the information sought, and (2) a causal nexus exists between the action and the agency's surrender of the information" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/304/0778-01" ] }, { "cite": "687 N.E.2d 126", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "129" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "292 Ill. App. 3d 1059", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1725104 ], "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1063" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/292/1059-01" ] }, { "cite": "483 N.E.2d 1229", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1235" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "108 Ill. 2d 286", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3129637 ], "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "299-300" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/108/0286-01" ] }, { "cite": "693 N.E.2d 379", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "383" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "181 Ill. 2d 552", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 821411 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "562" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/181/0552-01" ] }, { "cite": "749 N.E.2d 448", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "461" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "322 Ill. App. 3d 582", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 126381 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "598" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/322/0582-01" ] }, { "cite": "631 N.E.2d 893", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1994, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "259 Ill. App. 3d 336", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2871936 ], "year": 1994, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/259/0336-01" ] }, { "cite": "753 N.E.2d 1264", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1266" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "324 Ill. App. 3d 213", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 256304 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "216" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/324/0213-01" ] }, { "cite": "686 N.E.2d 1246", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1253", "parenthetical": "deference given to trial court in awarding attorney fees" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "292 Ill. App. 3d 914", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1725133 ], "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "923", "parenthetical": "deference given to trial court in awarding attorney fees" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/292/0914-01" ] }, { "cite": "732 N.E.2d 613", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "621", "parenthetical": "determination that work performed was \"necessary\"" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "315 Ill. App. 3d 319", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 980637 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "328", "parenthetical": "determination that work performed was \"necessary\"" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/315/0319-01" ] }, { "cite": "149 N.E.2d 399", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1958, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "405" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "17 Ill. App. 2d 87", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5183053 ], "year": 1958, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "100" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/17/0087-01" ] }, { "cite": "748 N.E.2d 271", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "279", "parenthetical": "employing a secondary definition" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "321 Ill. App. 3d 211", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 132332 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "219-20", "parenthetical": "employing a secondary definition" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/321/0211-01" ] }, { "cite": "1996 Ill. Laws 4054", "category": "laws:leg_session", "reporter": "Ill. Laws", "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "1996 Ill. Laws 4055", "category": "laws:leg_session", "reporter": "Ill. Laws", "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "85 Ill. B.J. 410", "category": "journals:journal", "reporter": "Ill. B.J.", "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "hereinafter Hopkins" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "521 N.E.2d 121", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "128" }, { "page": "128", "parenthetical": "\"outcome determinative\" test is predicated on the absence of any benefit to the party prosecuting the appeal; the expenses of an unsuccessful appeal are not \"necessarily incurred\"" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "167 Ill. App. 3d 294", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3473921 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "304" }, { "page": "305" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/167/0294-01" ] }, { "cite": "476 N.E.2d 1109", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1116" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "132 Ill. App. 3d 71", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3443335 ], "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "81" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/132/0071-01" ] }, { "cite": "1996 Ill. Laws 4060", "category": "laws:leg_session", "reporter": "Ill. Laws", "opinion_index": 1 } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1073, "char_count": 23427, "ocr_confidence": 0.749, "pagerank": { "raw": 6.087085966315723e-08, "percentile": 0.375600662432443 }, "sha256": "aa3a25865cc761b3be63a16e70b239f8072de2d59e6eedd3549221cb24b2f8b1", "simhash": "1:f926387627615ca3", "word_count": 3870 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:55:57.852492+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "In re MARRIAGE OF CATHERINE MURPHY, n/k/a Catherine M. Madonia, Petitioner-Appellee, and MICHAEL R. MURPHY, Respondent-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE STEIGMANN\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nSection 508(a)(3.1) of the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act (Act) (750 ILCS 5/508(a)(3.1) (West 2000)) provides that a trial court may award attorney fees for \u201c[t]he prosecution of any claim on appeal (if the prosecuting party has substantially prevailed).\u201d This case presents the issue of what the phrase \u201csubstantially prevailed\u201d means as used in that section.\nI. BACKGROUND\nIn November 1992, the trial court dissolved the marriage of petitioner, Catherine Murphy (now Madonia), and respondent, Michael R. Murphy, and awarded physical custody of their child, Robert, to Catherine, subject to Michael\u2019s visitation. The court also divided the marital estate, which included a large personal injury settlement, and awarded Catherine $600 in monthly child support. Catherine appealed the court\u2019s decision, and this court affirmed (In re Marriage of Murphy, 259 Ill. App. 3d 336, 631 N.E.2d 893 (1994)).\nIn January 1994, while her appeal was pending, Catherine filed a petition to modify child support, alleging that an increase in Michael\u2019s salary constituted a substantial change in circumstances. In November 1998, the trial court entered an order increasing Michael\u2019s monthly child support obligation to $850. Catherine appealed that order, arguing that the trial court erred (1) in modifying Michael\u2019s support obligation by (a) applying the law-of-the-case doctrine and refusing to consider as part of Michael\u2019s net income the $90,000 annuity payments he received pursuant to the personal injury settlement, (b) deviating downward from the statutory support guidelines, and (c) making the increased support obligation retroactive only to January 1998; and (2) by refusing to award her attorney fees. This court agreed that the trial court had erred by awarding child support in an amount lower than the statutory minimum (750 ILCS 5/505(a)(l) (West 1998)) and remanded the cause for further proceedings. As to Catherine\u2019s remaining issues, this court affirmed the trial court\u2019s judgment. In re Marriage of Murphy, No. 4 \u2014 99\u20140215 (January 10, 2000) (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23).\nIn September 2000, Catherine filed a motion for attorney fees incurred in prosecuting her appeal. Catherine attached her attorney\u2019s billing records to the motion, showing a total cost of over $7,000.\nIn October 2000, the trial court conducted a hearing to address (1) Catherine\u2019s motion for attorney fees incurred in prosecuting her appeal, (2) this court\u2019s order on remand, and (3) Michael\u2019s petition for rule to show cause demanding that Catherine pay her share of some of Robert\u2019s medical expenses. The only testimony directly related to Catherine\u2019s motion for attorney fees was as follows:\n\u201cQ. [CATHERINE\u2019S ATTORNEY]: And now, [Catherine], when you prosecuted the appeal, did you incur attorney\u2019s fees?\nA. [CATHERINE]: Yes, I did.\nQ. And have you paid those attorney\u2019s fees?\nA. No. I paid some of them, part of them. Not all of them.\nQ. And you entered into an agreement with me for an hourly rate as set forth in our motion?\nA. Yes, I did.\u201d\nNo evidence was presented regarding the parties\u2019 financial circumstances. However, Catherine\u2019s attorney argued as follows: \u201cThe [c]ourt has the parties\u2019 affidavits and incomes available to them from the time which this motion was arranged. I trust that the [c]ourt can review the motion and its prior evidence and the record and make an appropriate determination.\u201d\nFollowing the hearing, the trial court ordered, in pertinent part, as follows:\n\u201cUpon consideration of all statutory factors, the [c]ourt awards to [Catherine\u2019s attorney] the sum of $1,750.00 for attorney fees on appeal. *** The court having taken into account the continuous litigation between the parties and the need to resolve outstanding matters for the appropriate administration of justice directs that taking into further account the fact that [Michael] owes $848 in unpaid child support plus $1[,]750 in attorneys fees for a sum of $2,598 and that [Catherine] owes to [Michael] the sum of $1,974.82 in unpaid medical expenses, directs that [Michael] pay to [Catherine] the sum of $623.82 within 30 days.\u201d\nIn January 2001, Michael filed a posttrial motion and supporting memorandum arguing, in pertinent part, that the trial court erred by ordering him to pay a portion of Catherine\u2019s attorney fees on appeal. In March 2001, the trial court denied Michael\u2019s motion. Michael appeals, arguing only that the trial court erred by ordering him to pay a portion of the attorney fees Catherine incurred in prosecuting her appeal. We reverse.\nII. THE ATTORNEY FEE AWARD\nMichael argues that the trial court erred by ordering him to pay a portion of Catherine\u2019s attorney fees on appeal when she did not (1) substantially prevail on appeal or (2) show that she was unable to pay her own attorney fees. Because we agree with Michael\u2019s first argument, we need not address his second.\nAttorney fees are generally the responsibility of the party who incurred them. In re Marriage of Hasabnis, 322 Ill. App. 3d 582, 598, 749 N.E.2d 448, 461 (2001). However, section 508 of the Act allows a trial court, at its discretion, to award attorney fees under certain circumstances. 750 ILCS 5/508(a) (West 2000); In re Marriage of Minear, 181 Ill. 2d 552, 562, 693 N.E.2d 379, 383 (1998), quoting In re Marriage of Bussey, 108 Ill. 2d 286, 299-300, 483 N.E.2d 1229, 1235 (1985). Pursuant to section 508(a)(3.1) of the Act, fees may be awarded in connection with \u201c[t]he prosecution of any claim on appeal (if the prosecuting party has substantially prevailed).\u201d 750 ILCS 5/508(a)(3.1) (West 2000). Statutes that provide for an award of attorney fees are in derogation of common law and must be strictly construed. Ardt v. State of Illinois, 292 Ill. App. 3d 1059, 1063, 687 N.E.2d 126, 129 (1997). Thus, before awarding a party attorney fees for the prosecution of her appeal, the trial court must determine \u2014 as a threshold matter \u2014 whether the party \u201csubstantially prevailed\u201d on appeal. What it means to \u201csubstantially prevail\u201d on appeal under the Act has never been considered by a court of review. Thus, this case presents a question of first impression.\nA. \u201cPrevailing Parties\u201d \u2014 Illinois Law\nThe following Illinois statutes allow for attorney fee awards to \u201csubstantially prevailing\u201d parties: (1) section ll(i) of Illinois\u2019 Freedom of Information Act (Illinois FOIA) (5 ILCS 140/ll(i) (West 2000)); (2) section 3(d) of the Open Meetings Act (5 ILCS 120/3(d) (West 2000)); and (3) section 13 of the Motor Vehicle Franchise Act (Franchise Act) (815 ILCS 710/13 (West 2000)). The phrase \u201csubstantially prevailing\u201d has been construed only under the Illinois FOIA; however, that construction is specifically tailored'to that statute and thus provides us with little guidance. See, e.g., Duncan Publishing, Inc. v. City of Chicago, 304 Ill. App. 3d 778, 786, 709 N.E.2d 1281, 1288 (1999) (holding that a \u201csubstantially prevailing\u201d party must show that (1) prosecution of the action was \u201creasonably necessary\u201d to obtain the information sought, and (2) a causal nexus exists between the action and the agency\u2019s surrender of the information).\nIllinois courts have generally defined a \u201cprevailing\u201d party for the purposes of a fee-shifting provision as one who (1) \u201cis successful on any significant issue in the action and achieves some benefit in bringing suit,\u201d (2) receives a judgment in his favor, or (3) achieves an affirmative recovery. Med+Plus Neck & Back Pain Center, S.C. v. Noffsinger, 311 Ill. App. 3d 853, 861, 726 N.E.2d 687, 694 (2000). Relying on federal law, Illinois courts have also held that \u201c[t]o qualify as a prevailing party, a plaintiff must succeed in obtaining some relief from the defendant against whom attorney fees are sought.\u201d (Emphasis added.) Community Consolidated School District No. 54 v. Illinois State Board of Education, 216 Ill. App. 3d 90, 94, 576 N.E.2d 250, 253 (1991), citing Max M. v. Illinois State Board of Education, 684 F. Supp. 514, 523 (N.D. Ill. 1988); see also Brewington v. Illinois Department of Corrections, 161 Ill. App. 3d 54, 63-64, 513 N.E.2d 1056, 1063 (1987); Becovic v. City of Chicago, 296 Ill. App. 3d 236, 240, 694 N.E.2d 1044, 1047 (1998) (citing Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433, 76 L. Ed. 2d 40, 50, 103 S. Ct. 1933, 1939 (1983), for the proposition that a \u201cprevailing party\u201d need only have prevailed on any one significant issue and received some of the benefit they sought in filing suit).\nB. \u201cPrevailing Parties\u201d \u2014 the Federal Experience\nCertain federal statutes allow attorney fee awards to \u201cprevailing\u201d or \u201csubstantially prevailing\u201d parties. Most notably, section 1988 of the Civil Rights Attorney Fee\u2019s Awards Act of 1976 (Awards Act) (42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1988 (1994)) provides that courts may award attorney fees to prevailing parties in enforcement actions under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 (1994)) and other federal statutes. Similarly, section 552 of the Freedom of Information Act (federal FOIA) (5 U.S.C. \u00a7 552(a)(4)(E) (1994)) provides that courts may award attorney fees to parties who \u201csubstantially prevail\u201d against the United States in actions brought under the federal FOIA.\nAccording to the United States Supreme Court, \u201cto qualify as a prevailing party, a civil rights plaintiff must obtain at least some relief on the merits of his claim.\u201d Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103, 111, 121 L. Ed. 2d 494, 503, 113 S. Ct. 566, 573 (1992). \u201c[A] plaintiff \u2018prevails\u2019 when actual relief on the merits of his claim materially alters the legal relationship between the parties by modifying the defendant\u2019s behavior in a way that directly benefits the plaintiff.\u201d Farrar, 506 U.S. at 111-12, 121 L. Ed. 2d at 503, 113 S. Ct. at 573; see also Buckhannon Board & Care Home, Inc. v. West Virginia Department of Health & Human Resources, 532 U.S. 598, 603, 149 L. Ed. 2d 855, 862, 121 S. Ct. 1835, 1839-40 (2001) (a prevailing party is one who receives \u201cat least some relief on the merits of his claim\u201d). Even a plaintiff who is awarded only nominal damages is a prevailing party under section 1988 of the Awards Act (42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1988 (1994)). Farrar, 506 U.S. at 112, 121 L. Ed. 2d at 504, 113 S. Ct. at 573. The degree to which a plaintiff prevails goes not to the question of eligibility for an award of attorney fees, but to the determination of the reasonable amount to be awarded. Farrar, 506 U.S. at 114, 121 L. Ed. 2d at 505, 113 S. Ct. at 574. As the Farrar Court explained, \u201c[i]n some circumstances, even a plaintiff who formally \u2018prevails\u2019 under \u00a7 1988 should receive no attorney\u2019s fees at all. A plaintiff who seeks compensatory damages but receives no more than nominal damages is often such a prevailing party.\u201d Farrar, 506 U.S. at 115, 121 L. Ed. 2d at 505-06, 113 S. Ct. at 575.\nWhen the District of Columbia Court of Appeals was called upon to construe the term \u201csubstantially prevail\u201d under the federal FOIA, it declined to clearly define the term but doubted \u201cthat plaintiffs could be said to have \u2018substantially prevailed\u2019 if they, like Pyrrhus, have won a battle but lost the war.\u201d Goland v. Central Intelligence Agency, 607 F.2d 339, 356 (D.C. Cir. 1978). (Although subsequent cases have more clearly defined what it means to \u201csubstantially prevail\u201d under the federal FOIA, the definition of that phrase as used in the federal FOIA is specifically tailored to that act. See Lovell v. Department of Justice, 589 F. Supp. 150, 153 (D.D.C. 1984).) See also Tuf Racing Products, Inc. v. American Suzuki Motor Corp., 223 F.3d 585, 592 (7th Cir. 2000) (in which the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals recognized that a distinction exists between merely \u201cprevailing\u201d and \u201csubstantially prevailing]\u201d under section 13 of the Motor Vehicle Franchise Act (815 ILCS 710/13 (West 2000)) (concluding that \u201csubstantially prevailing\u201d parties shall be awarded reasonable attorney fees), but declined to clarify the distinction).\nC. The Act\nIf a \u201cprevailing party\u201d in a lawsuit is one who has prevailed merely in part, then one may logically conclude that to \u201csubstantially prevail\u201d requires something more. \u201cIn interpreting a statute, the primary goal is to give effect to the intention of the legislature, and the primary source to determine that intent is the language of the statute itself.\u201d Phoenix Bond & Indemnity Co. v. Pappas, 309 Ill. App. 3d 779, 787, 723 N.E.2d 280, 286 (1999). \u201cSubstantial\u201d is defined in the dictionary as meaning \u201cconsiderable in quantity,\u201d \u201csignificantly great,\u201d or \u201cbeing largely but not wholly that which is specified.\u201d Merriam-Webster\u2019s Collegiate Dictionary 1170 (10th ed. 2000). Thus, to \u201csubstantially prevail\u201d would mean to prevail to a \u201csignificant\u201d degree, or to \u201clargely,\u201d even if not \u201cwholly,\u201d prevail.\nWe presume that the legislature enacts laws with full knowledge of existing laws and the construction those laws have been given by the courts that have construed them. People ex rel. Klaeren v. Village of Lisle, 316 Ill. App. 3d 770, 782, 737 N.E.2d 1099, 1110 (2000); State of Illinois v. Mikuseh, 138 Ill. 2d 242, 247-48, 562 N.E.2d 168, 170 (1990). Thus, when the legislature elects to use terms of art, as here regarding \u201cprevailing\u201d and \u201csubstantially prevailing,\u201d it does so in the context of preexisting law, and the legislature is presumed to know how courts have previously construed those terms.\nSection 508(a)(3.1) was added to the Act by the enactment of Public Act 89 \u2014 712, which took effect on June 1, 1997. Pub. Act 89\u2014 712 \u00a7 5, eff. June 1, 1997 (1996 Ill. Laws 4060). We thus presume that the legislature was familiar with the construction courts had previously given to the term \u201cprevail\u201d and opted to require instead that a party \u201csubstantially\u201d prevail to prevent application of the lower threshold for \u201cprevailing\u201d that had been applied in other contexts. If the legislature had used the word \u201cprevailed,\u201d we would not hesitate to conclude that (1) even a partial victory on appeal would entitle an appellant to attorney fees under the Act and (2) the degree of the appellant\u2019s success goes to the determination of a reasonable award. However, in light of the legislature\u2019s decision to allow attorney fees under section 508(a)(3.1) of the Act only to those appellants who \u201csubstantially prevail\u201d on appeal, we are compelled to consider the degree of the appellant\u2019s success as an eligibility threshold.\nD. The Present Case\nLike those who have grappled with the issue before us, we cannot definitively say what the term \u201csubstantially prevail\u201d means in all cases. However, we are confident that whatever it means, Catherine did not substantially prevail on her appeal. In that appeal, Catherine argued that the trial court erred (1) in modifying Michael\u2019s support obligation by (a) applying the law-of-the-case doctrine and refusing to consider Michael\u2019s $90,000 annuity payments as part of his net income, (b) deviating downward from the statutory child support guidelines, and (c) making the increased support obligation retroactive only to January 1998 rather than January 1997; and (2) by refusing to award her attorney fees.\nBy prevailing on the second of her four issues on appeal (that the trial court erred by deviating downward from the statutory guidelines), Catherine gained an additional $132 per month in child support. Had she also prevailed on her first argument regarding Michael\u2019s annuity payments, she would have been entitled to monthly child support payments of an additional $1,500. Had Catherine prevailed on her argument regarding retroactivity, the modified child support award would have been retroactive to January 1997, and she would have been entitled to either (1) another $1,584 ($132 per month for one year), or (2) another $19,584 (had she prevailed on her first and second issues). Because the record does not show the amount that Catherine originally sought for attorney fees, we cannot assess what she would have gained had she prevailed on her final claim. Nevertheless, Catherine obtained a mere fraction of the relief she sought and, thus, did not \u201csubstantially prevail.\u201d\nWe stress that our determination that Catherine did not substantially prevail is not based on the mere fact that she prevailed on only one out of four contentions raised. Rather, our analysis measures the relief sought against the relief obtained on appeal. To substantially prevail \u2014 that is, to \u201clargely but not wholly\u201d prevail \u2014 suggests that one has to obtain at least 50% of the relief she seeks. Cf Perlman v. Zell, 185 F.3d 850, 859 (7th Cir. 1999) (noting that litigants who win less than 10% of their initial demand are deemed not to be prevailing parties).\nBecause Catherine did not substantially prevail on appeal, she was not entitled to recover attorney fees under section 508(a)(3.1) of the Act (750 ILCS 5/508(a)(3.1) (West 2000)), and the trial court abused its discretion by ordering Michael to pay a portion of those fees.\nIII. CONCLUSION\nFor the reasons stated, we reverse the trial court\u2019s judgment.\nReversed.\nKNECHT, J., concurs.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE STEIGMANN" }, { "text": "JUSTICE COOK,\ndissenting:\nI respectfully dissent and would affirm the decision of the trial court.\nPrior to the 1997 amendments, section 508 specifically allowed the court to order any party to pay costs and attorney fees \u201cnecessarily incurred\u201d or \u201cexpected to be incurred by any party, which award shall be made in connection with *** (3) [t]he defense of an appeal of any order or judgment under this Act.\u201d 750 ILCS 5/508(a)(3) (West 1996). It has been held that former section 508 only allowed fee awards in the defense of appeals. In re Marriage of Wentink, 132 Ill. App. 3d 71, 81, 476 N.E.2d 1109, 1116 (1984). A later case disagreed with Wentink. Although section 508(a)(3) specifically referred to the defense of an appeal, the broad language of section 508(a)(1) (\u201c \u2018[t]he \u201cmaintenance or defense of any proceeding\u201d under th[is] Act\u2019 \u201d (In re Marriage of Pick, 167 Ill. App. 3d 294, 304, 521 N.E.2d 121, 128 (1988), quoting Ill. Ann. Stat., ch. 40, par. 508, at 120 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1987))) allowed recovery for the prosecution of a successful appeal. Pick, 167 Ill. App. 3d at 305, 521 N.E.2d at 128 (\u201coutcome determinative\u201d test is predicated on the absence of any benefit to the party prosecuting the appeal; the expenses of an unsuccessful appeal are not \u201cnecessarily incurred\u201d); see also 2 Gitlin on Divorce \u00a7\u00a7 19 \u2014 3(a), 19 \u2014 8 (3d ed. 2000).\nThe 1997 amendments brought about a complete overhaul of the fee provisions of the Act. D. Hopkins, \u201cLeveling the Playing Field\u201d in Divorce: Questions and Answers About the New Law, 85 Ill. B.J. 410 (1997) (hereinafter Hopkins). The 1997 amendments deleted the prospective-fee language in section 508 and replaced it with new language in section 501(c \u2014 1) dealing with interim fees. Pub. Act 89\u2014 712, \u00a7 5, eff. June 1, 1997 (1996 Ill. Laws 4055-56); Hopkins, 85 Ill. B.J. at 411-12. The 1997 amendments deal with interim attorney fees awarded from the opposing party, contribution to attorney fees from the opposing party at the conclusion of the case, and attorney fees awarded to counsel from a former client. Pub. Act 89 \u2014 712, \u00a7 5, eff. June 1, 1997 (1996 Ill. Laws -4055-56) (750 ILCS 5/508 (West 1998)). The goals of the 1997 amendments were \u201cto achieve substantial parity in parties\u2019 access to funds for litigation costs\u201d (Pub. Act 89 \u2014 712, \u00a7 5, eff. June 1, 1997 (1996 Ill. Laws 4054) (750 ILCS 5/102(5) (West 1998))) and to address conflict-of-interest concerns. Hopkins, 85 Ill. B.J. at 413.\nThe 1997 amendments retained former section 508\u2019s listing of possible proceedings in which attorney fees might be awarded. 750 ILCS 5/508(a)(l) through (a)(5) (West 1996). The amendments added a new subparagraph (3.1), apparently to resolve the dispute between Wentink and Pick, adopting the position taken in Pick. Awards may be made in connection with \u201c(3.1) The prosecution of any claim on appeal (if the prosecuting party has substantially prevailed).\u201d Pub. Act 89 \u2014 712, \u00a7 5, eff. June 1, 1997 (1996 Ill. Laws 4060) (750 ILCS 5/508(a)(3.1) (West 1998)). It is now possible to recover attorney fees for the prosecution of an appeal, but only if the party prosecuting the appeal has been successful.\nThe phrase \u201csubstantially prevailed\u201d appears to mean that it is not sufficient that the party has technically prevailed. A nominal victory is not sufficient. There must be a victory in substance, a real victory. The primary definition of \u201csubstantial\u201d is \u201cla: consisting of or relating to substance b: not imaginary or illusory: REAL, TRUE c: IMPORTANT, ESSENTIAL.\u201d Merriam-Webster\u2019s Collegiate Dictionary 1170 (10th ed. 2000); cf. In re D.F., 321 Ill. App. 3d 211, 219-20, 748 N.E.2d 271, 279 (2001) (employing a secondary definition), appeal pending, No. 91556.\nThe majority\u2019s requirement that there be an overwhelming victory before attorney fees can be awarded runs counter to the spirit of the 1997 amendments, which sought to prevent the situation where an economically disadvantaged spouse is forced to \u201ccave in\u201d to a truly unfair settlement. If we accept the majority\u2019s position, Catherine could only appeal a judgment which was grossly out of line. There would be no economic way for Catherine to appeal where the dollar value of the error was less than the cost of appeal. Catherine should have accepted the trial court\u2019s award of child support below the guidelines amount, even though \u201c[t]here seems to be no conceivable reason why the legislature should want to deny compensation for services in reversing an erroneous and therefore unjust decree.\u201d Bramson v. Bramson, 17 Ill. App. 2d 87, 100, 149 N.E.2d 399, 405 (1958).\nThe majority\u2019s new rule, that \u201cone has to obtain at least 50% of the relief she seeks\u201d (327 Ill. App. 3d at 852) before attorney fees may be awarded, is without support in the statute or the case law. If a party has a legitimate basis for appeal we should not attempt to discourage that party from raising other issues as well, even though the party thereby risks obtaining less than 50% of the relief sought. The appellate court should attempt to provide guidance on troublesome issues, not penalize parties for raising issues other than sure winners.\nFinally, the trial court determined that Catherine was entitled to attorney fees on appeal, that Catherine had \u201csubstantially prevailed\u201d in the appellate court. The trial court\u2019s determination is entitled to deference and should not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion. Lustig v. Horn, 315 Ill. App. 3d 319, 328, 732 N.E.2d 613, 621 (2000) (determination that work performed was \u201cnecessary\u201d); In re Estate of Kirk, 292 Ill. App. 3d 914, 923, 686 N.E.2d 1246, 1253 (1997) (deference given to trial court in awarding attorney fees). The argument could be made that this court is as well-qualified as the trial court to determine whether a party has \u201csubstantially prevailed\u201d on appeal. However, we have recently ruled that we have no jurisdiction over attorney fees on appeal. In re Marriage of Baylor, 324 Ill. App. 3d 213, 216, 753 N.E.2d 1264, 1266 (2001).", "type": "dissent", "author": "JUSTICE COOK," } ], "attorneys": [ "Michael R. Murphy, of Springfield, appellant pro se.", "Catherine Madonia, of Springfield, appellee pro se." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "In re MARRIAGE OF CATHERINE MURPHY, n/k/a Catherine M. Madonia, Petitioner-Appellee, and MICHAEL R. MURPHY, Respondent-Appellant.\nFourth District\nNo. 4-01-0292\nOpinion filed February 6, 2002.\nCOOK, J., dissenting.\nMichael R. Murphy, of Springfield, appellant pro se.\nCatherine Madonia, of Springfield, appellee pro se." }, "file_name": "0845-01", "first_page_order": 863, "last_page_order": 873 }