{ "id": 79319, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. SEAN C. DONNELLY, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Donnelly", "decision_date": "2002-02-21", "docket_number": "No. 3-01-0336", "first_page": "1101", "last_page": "1106", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "327 Ill. App. 3d 1101" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "657 N.E.2d 732", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "276 Ill. App. 3d 80", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 927694 ], "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/276/0080-01" ] }, { "cite": "640 N.E.2d 657", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 4, "year": 1994, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "266 Ill. App. 3d 341", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 887218 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1994, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/266/0341-01" ] }, { "cite": "521 N.E.2d 884", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1988, "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "122 Ill. 2d 50", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5549752 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1988, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/122/0050-01" ] }, { "cite": "640 N.E.2d 657", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1994, "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "266 Ill. App. 3d 341", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 887218 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1994, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/266/0341-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 398, "char_count": 10578, "ocr_confidence": 0.716, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.03580807328026e-08, "percentile": 0.0025850927988465737 }, "sha256": "6f7848306ab50fef1195417ec9bbbd19c2935b3f6209748fbd011baced0dc8f8", "simhash": "1:cafa2095c54e8587", "word_count": 1743 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:55:57.852492+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. SEAN C. DONNELLY, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE SLATER\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThe defendant, Sean C. Donnelly, was arrested for driving under the influence of alcohol (625 ILCS 5/11 \u2014 501(a)(2) (West 2000)) on January 28, 2001. His driver\u2019s license was summarily suspended based on the arrest. The defendant filed a motion to dismiss his summary suspension, which was denied. The defendant appealed. We affirm.\nThe defendant filed a motion to dismiss his statutory summary suspension on March 14, 2001, the day before the suspension began. In his motion, the defendant alleged that the police officer\u2019s sworn report was defective because it did not indicate the method of service.\nA hearing was held on the defendant\u2019s motion on March 15, 2001. At the hearing, the defendant presented the sworn report. The report indicated that the defendant was served notice of his summary suspension on January 28, 2001. However, neither the box on the report which indicated the defendant was served with personal notice of the suspension nor the box which indicated that the defendant was served with notice of the suspension by mail was marked.\nThe State presented the testimony of Illinois State Police Trooper Shrake, the officer who arrested the defendant. The trooper testified that he served the defendant with notice of his summary suspension on the date that he arrested the defendant for driving under the influence. He did not mark either box regarding method of service on the bottom of the sworn report, nor did he ever attempt to amend the report after it was submitted to the Secretary of State\u2019s office.\nJudge Thomas Dunn found that the officer\u2019s sworn report was not defective and dismissed the defendant\u2019s motion.\nOn March 19, 2001, the defendant filed a motion to strike the officer\u2019s sworn statement on the grounds that it was not filed in accordance with Supreme Court Rule 137 (155 Ill. 2d R. 137). After hearing the defendant\u2019s argument, Judge Raymond Bolden denied the defendant\u2019s motion.\nThe defendant now appeals the dismissal of both his motions.\nThe defendant first argues that his statutory summary suspension should be dismissed because the police officer\u2019s sworn report was defective and this defect deprived the court of jurisdiction over him.\nUnder Illinois law, if a driver is arrested for driving under the influence, his driver\u2019s license is summarily suspended. 625 ILCS 5/11\u2014 501.1(c) (West 2000). By statute, this suspension begins 46 days after the defendant receives notice that his license will be suspended. 625 ILCS 5/11 \u2014 501.1(g) (West 2000). When a police officer writes a citation for driving under the influence, he is also required to serve the driver with notice that his license will be summarily suspended. 625 ILCS 5/11 \u2014 501.1(f) (West 2000). The police officer files a sworn report indicating the defendant\u2019s blood-alcohol content with the Secretary of State\u2019s office. 625 ILCS 5/11 \u2014 501.1(d) (West 2000). Once this report is received by the Secretary of State\u2019s office, that office confirms the statutory summary suspension by mailing the defendant a notice of the effective date of the suspension. 626 ILCS 5/11 \u2014 501.1(h) (West 2000). If an officer fails to indicate in the sworn report when the defendant was served with notice of the statutory summary suspension, the report is defective and the court is deprived of jurisdiction. People v. Palacios, 266 Ill. App. 3d 341, 640 N.E.2d 657 (1994).\nThe defendant, relying on Palacios, contends that the sworn report was defective because it did not indicate whether he was served in person or by mail. He argues that this defect deprived the court of jurisdiction and rendered his statutory summary suspension void.\nIn Palacios, the defendant was arrested for driving under the influence. The sworn report completed by the police officer did not indicate either the day that notice was served or how the defendant was served with notice. Nevertheless, the Secretary of State\u2019s office, upon receipt of the report, assumed that the defendant was given notice on the arrest date listed on the report. The Secretary of State\u2019s office notified the defendant that his license would be suspended. The defendant contested the suspension, arguing that he was not given notice of the summary suspension. The appellate court held that a sworn report that did not indicate when the defendant was served with notice of the statutory summary suspension was defective. Palacios, 266 Ill. App. 3d 341, 640 N.E.2d 657. The court concluded that the sworn report did not provide a sufficient basis for summary suspension of the defendant\u2019s driving privileges and affirmed the trial court\u2019s rescission of the suspension. Palacios, 266 Ill. App. 3d 341, 640 N.E.2d 657.\nThe instant case is distinguishable from Palacios. Here, unlike Palacios, the sworn report indicated that the defendant was served with notice of his statutory summary suspension on January 28, 2001, the date of his arrest. The Secretary of State\u2019s office had a sufficient basis for suspending the defendant\u2019s driving privileges. Therefore, we agree with the trial court that the sworn report was not defective and the court had jurisdiction over the defendant.\nThe defendant next argues that his suspension should be dismissed because the sworn report did not comply with Supreme Court Rule 137. This rule requires that all pleadings, motions and \u201cother papers\u201d filed in the court be signed by a party or a party\u2019s attorney. 155 Ill. 2d R. 137. The State is required to comply with this rule just like any other litigant. 155 Ill. 2d R. 137.\nThe defendant asserts, citing Palacios, that in a statutory summary suspension proceeding, the police officer\u2019s sworn report acts like a complaint in a civil case in that it initiates the defendant\u2019s driver\u2019s license suspension. Palacios, 266 Ill. App. 3d 341, 640 N.E.2d 657. The sworn report, he argues, is an \u201cother paper\u201d within the meaning of Supreme Court Rule 137. Since it is the State and not the police officer who is a party to the statutory summary suspension action, the defendant contends that the officer\u2019s signature on the report does not meet the requirements of Rule 137. The defendant concludes that the lack of an attorney\u2019s signature requires that the sworn report be stricken.\nThe defendant\u2019s argument is not persuasive. The statutory summary suspension of a driver\u2019s license is an administrative action taken by the Secretary of State\u2019s office to keep dangerous drivers off the roads. People v. Lent, 276 Ill. App. 3d 80, 657 N.E.2d 732 (1995). The police officer\u2019s sworn report is the action which begins the administrative process of a driver\u2019s license suspension. It does not initiate any court proceeding. In fact, it is the defendant\u2019s motion to rescind a statutory summary suspension that begins any court proceeding on the matter. We hold that the police officer\u2019s sworn report is not a pleading or \u201cother paper\u201d within the meaning of Supreme Court Rule 137. Therefore, the trial court properly dismissed the defendant\u2019s motion to strike.\nFor the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court of Will County is affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nMcDADE, J., concurs.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE SLATER" }, { "text": "JUSTICE HOLDRIDGE,\ndissenting;\nI would find that the trial court erred in denying the defendant\u2019s motion to strike the officer\u2019s sworn report pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 137. 155 Ill. 2d R. 137.1 therefore respectfully dissent.\nOn appeal, the defendant relies upon People v. Badoud, 122 Ill. 2d 50, 521 N.E.2d 884 (1988), and People v. Palacios, 266 Ill. App. 3d 341, 640 N.E.2d 657 (1994), for the proposition that the officer\u2019s sworn report in a summary suspension proceeding is analogous to a complaint in an ordinary civil proceeding. The defendant reasons that because the officer is an agent of the State, and the State is represented by an attorney, the sworn report must be signed by an attorney for the State in compliance with Rule 137.1 agree.\nThe court in Badoud indicated that in a proceeding to rescind a summary suspension, an officer\u2019s sworn report serves a function analogous to a complaint in an ordinary civil proceeding. Badoud, 122 Ill. 2d 50, 521 N.E.2d 884. In Palacios, this court stated that the officer\u2019s sworn report plays a unique role in a summary suspension hearing because, like a complaint in a civil case, it is the jurisdictional step that starts the proceeding. Palacios, 266 Ill. App. 3d 341, 640 N.E.2d 657.\nIn the present case, the officer\u2019s sworn statement was the first jurisdictional step in a civil summary suspension proceeding. The officer was an agent of the State of Illinois, which is represented by the office of the State\u2019s Attorney. The officer\u2019s sworn statement is a pleading, motion, or other paper of a party represented by the State\u2019s Attorney. Therefore, under Rule 137,1 would find that this pleading, motion, or other paper must be signed by a State\u2019s Attorney or it may be stricken.\nI do not believe that requiring the State\u2019s Attorney to sign an officer\u2019s sworn statement represents an onerous burden on law enforcement officers. Rule 137 already requires the officer to submit a copy of the sworn statement to the circuit court of venue and the Secretary of State. I would hold that the plain language of Rule 137 requires this pleading, motion, or other paper in a civil matter to be signed by the attorney of record, who is the State\u2019s Attorney, before being submitted to the circuit court.\nI note that Rule 137 also permits the absence of an attorney\u2019s signature on a pleading, motion, or other paper to be cured by the prompt signature of the attorney of record as soon as the omission is brought to the attention of that attorney. In this case, I would reverse the denial of the defendant\u2019s motion to strike and remand the matter to the circuit court with instructions that the State\u2019s Attorney may promptly sign the officer\u2019s sworn statement as soon as this omission is brought to the State\u2019s Attorney\u2019s attention.\nFor the foregoing reasons, I would reverse the ruling of the Will County circuit court and remand the matter with directions. I therefore dissent.", "type": "dissent", "author": "JUSTICE HOLDRIDGE," } ], "attorneys": [ "Ted R Hammel, of Hammel Law Offices, PC., of Joliet, and Terrence J. Wallace, of Far ano, Wallace & Doherty, of Palos Hills,, for appellant.", "Jeff Tomczak, State\u2019s Attorney, of Joliet (John X. Breslin and Nancy Rink Carter, both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. SEAN C. DONNELLY, Defendant-Appellant.\nThird District\nNo. 3-01-0336\nOpinion filed February 21, 2002.\nHOLDRIDGE, J., dissenting.\nTed R Hammel, of Hammel Law Offices, PC., of Joliet, and Terrence J. Wallace, of Far ano, Wallace & Doherty, of Palos Hills,, for appellant.\nJeff Tomczak, State\u2019s Attorney, of Joliet (John X. Breslin and Nancy Rink Carter, both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "1101-01", "first_page_order": 1119, "last_page_order": 1124 }