{ "id": 2183355, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ROBERT JONES, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Jones", "decision_date": "2002-02-20", "docket_number": "No. 1\u201401\u20140093", "first_page": "233", "last_page": "243", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "328 Ill. App. 3d 233" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "749 N.E.2d 1078", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2001, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "322 Ill. App. 3d 164", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 126365 ], "year": 2001, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/322/0164-01" ] }, { "cite": "747 N.E.2d 1", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2001, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "319 Ill. App. 3d 881", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1527785 ], "year": 2001, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/319/0881-01" ] }, { "cite": "740 N.E.2d 377", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2000, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "317 Ill. App. 3d 573", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1026052 ], "year": 2000, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/317/0573-01" ] }, { "cite": "755 N.E.2d 1058", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "2nd Dist." } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "324 Ill. App. 3d 557", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 256303 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "562-63", "parenthetical": "2nd Dist." }, { "page": "563" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/324/0557-01" ] }, { "cite": "326 Ill. App. 3d 590", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1281409 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "592", "parenthetical": "3rd Dist." }, { "page": "592-93" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/326/0590-01" ] }, { "cite": "752 N.E.2d 1195", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "5th Dist." } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "323 Ill. App. 3d 429", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 171764 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "5th Dist." }, { "page": "434" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/323/0429-01" ] }, { "cite": "511 N.E.2d 1289", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1987, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "159 Ill. App. 3d 46", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3611586 ], "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "51-52" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/159/0046-01" ] }, { "cite": "502 N.E.2d 399", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "there was a substantial similarity between two shootings where both occurred within several blocks and within four hours of each other; both involved a small caliber gun; and both victims were shot in the head despite the fact they had cooperated with their assailant" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "151 Ill. App. 3d 510", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3541228 ], "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "519-20" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/151/0510-01" ] }, { "cite": "329 N.E.2d 473", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1975, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "28 Ill. App. 3d 815", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5410798 ], "year": 1975, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "819" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/28/0815-01" ] }, { "cite": "414 N.E.2d 1355", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1981, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "92 Ill. App. 3d 525", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5537178 ], "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "533" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/92/0525-01" ] }, { "cite": "592 N.E.2d 240", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "the introduction of other crimes evidence is proper to bolster the defendant's identification when the identity of the defendant is at issue" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "227 Ill. App. 3d 607", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5793952 ], "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "613", "parenthetical": "the introduction of other crimes evidence is proper to bolster the defendant's identification when the identity of the defendant is at issue" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/227/0607-01" ] }, { "cite": "583 N.E.2d 515", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1991, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "145 Ill. 2d 353", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5596242 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "372-73" }, { "page": "373" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/145/0353-01" ] }, { "cite": "728 N.E.2d 638", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2000, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "312 Ill. App. 3d 673", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 411724 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "681" }, { "page": "681" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/312/0673-01" ] }, { "cite": "648 N.E.2d 1015", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "271 Ill. App. 3d 427", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 249270 ], "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "432" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/271/0427-01" ] }, { "cite": "704 N.E.2d 393", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1998, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "184 Ill. 2d 370", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 926974 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "385" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/184/0370-01" ] }, { "cite": "402 N.E.2d 238", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "79 Ill. 2d 129", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3070395 ], "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "137" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/79/0129-01" ] }, { "cite": "473 N.E.2d 840", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1984, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "105 Ill. 2d 22", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3141932 ], "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "62" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/105/0022-01" ] }, { "cite": "751 N.E.2d 10", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2001, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "322 Ill. App. 3d 747", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 126391 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "757" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/322/0747-01" ] }, { "cite": "449 N.E.2d 821", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "96 Ill. 2d 176", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3115107 ], "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "182" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/96/0176-01" ] }, { "cite": "758 N.E.2d 366", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2001, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "325 Ill. App. 3d 926", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 570828 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "937" }, { "page": "937" }, { "page": "938" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/325/0926-01" ] }, { "cite": "530 U.S. 466", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 9413911 ], "weight": 6, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "476" }, { "page": "447" }, { "page": "2355" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/530/0466-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1015, "char_count": 22911, "ocr_confidence": 0.767, "pagerank": { "raw": 9.886472798775986e-08, "percentile": 0.5350788791161184 }, "sha256": "04e8e5105bd12c8b0514b1fb43dcfb5b5f95c4d09820d28d628f37d54f4a7a20", "simhash": "1:02162e5279c9bfad", "word_count": 3880 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:11:21.532369+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ROBERT JONES, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE WOLFSON\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nIf anything, Robert Jones was a model of consistency. The evidence in this case showed he used the same car with the same license plate when he committed three similar armed robberies within four hours in the same general area of Chicago.\nHe was tried for the first of the three armed robberies. The State was allowed to introduce evidence of the other two armed robberies in order to prove his identity in the charged offense.\nFollowing a bench trial, the defendant was found guilty of the armed robbery of Elaine Ramos Rackos and sentenced to serve a term of natural life imprisonment as an habitual offender pursuant to the provisions of the Habitual Criminal Act (720 ILCS 5/33B \u2014 1 et seq. (West 1994)).\nThe defendant appeals, contending (1) the trial court erred in allowing the State to present evidence of other crimes, and (2) the mandatory life sentence provisions of the Habitual Criminal Act (the Act) (720 ILCS 5/33B \u2014 1 et seq. (West 1994)) are unconstitutional under Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 147 L. Ed. 2d 435, 120 S. Ct. 2348 (2000). We affirm.\nFACTS\nBefore trial, the trial court made a ruling that is the basis of the first issue on appeal: the trial court said, over defense objection, it would allow the State to present evidence the defendant used a white Ford Tempo with license plate number LWJ 457 in the uncharged armed robberies of Tim Sallee and Sutha Suesuntisook. The Ford Tempo was alleged to be the same car the defendant used four hours earlier in his armed robbery of Elaine Ramos Rackos. The robberies of Sallee and Suesuntisook would come in as other uncharged crimes evidence, relevant to the defendant\u2019s \u201cidentity and presence\u201d at the scene of the robbery of Rackos.\nThe trial then began.\nAt trial, Elaine Ramos Rackos testified that on March 1, 1995, at about 8 p.m., she was walking to her car after shopping at the Target store located at 2656 North Elston. As she was putting her shopping bags into her car, she heard a car stop suddenly behind her. She turned and saw the defendant get out of his car and run toward her with a gun in his hand. Although the defendant had partially covered the gun with a \u201cwhite-ish yellow towel,\u201d Rackos could see its barrel.\nThe defendant ran up to Rackos and pointed the gun at her stomach. He said, \u201cDon\u2019t move. Don\u2019t do anything,\u201d and demanded money from her. Rackos said the defendant was right in her face and the parking lot was \u201cvery well lit.\u201d\nRackos opened her wallet and gave the defendant about $70. After she told the defendant she had no more money, the defendant ran to his car and drove away. As he drove away, Rackos looked at his car, specifically its license plate, then ran into Target and told the security people, \u201cI was mugged in the parking lot.\u201d She kept repeating the license plate number over and over.\nWhen police arrived at the Target store, Rackos gave them the license plate number \u201cLWJ 457.\u201d\nRackos testified that one month later, on April 3, 1995, she went to Area 5 to view a lineup. When the curtains were opened, she recognized the defendant. \u201cThat is him,\u201d she said. She identified Robert Jones as the man who robbed her.\nOn cross-examination, Rackos insisted that she had seen a gun during the robbery. She said, \u201cHe had a gun underneath a towel.\u201d She denied telhng the police she saw an \u201cunknown, possible handgun barrel.\u201d She insisted she had told the police a man with a gun robbed her.\nRackos also denied she told the police the man who robbed her was \u201c30 years old.\u201d She said she was not that specific. She said she told the police, \u201cThe man was in his 30\u2019s.\u201d And she denied she told the police the man who robbed her was exactly 6 feet tall. She recalled she told them \u201che was taller than me. *** He was more than 6 feet tall.\u201d\nRackos admitted she did not tell the police the man who robbed her had a scar or a defined mustache. Instead, she told them, \u201cHe had some sort of marks on his face\u201d and \u201cstubbles.\u201d\nTim Sallee drove fuel tankers for W Smith Cartage Company. His job was to deliver gasoline to gas stations. On March 1, 1995, at about 11:55 p.m., roughly four hours after the Rackos robbery, Sallee was at the Gelanias Shell service station on the corner of Halsted and Wright-wood. He was unloading gasoline from his fuel tanker when a man he identified as the defendant Robert Jones robbed him at gunpoint.\nSallee testified the first time he saw the defendant was when the defendant drove into the gas station from Halsted. He was driving a Ford Tempo. He drove the Tempo past Sallee\u2019s fuel tanker, toward the gas station store, exited the gas station on Wrightwood, reentered the gas station from another driveway on Halsted, and finally stopped the car parallel to two fuel pumps next to Sallee\u2019s tanker. The defendant then exited the Tempo, stepped between the two fuel pumps, and asked Sallee for change.\nSallee told the defendant he had no change. The defendant replied, \u201cI got something to show you,\u201d and showed Sallee a handgun. Sallee could see the grip, the chamber, and part of the barrel. Sallee said the defendant used a \u201cdirty old yellow kitchen towel\u201d to cover part of the handgun.\nThe defendant, pointing the handgun at Sallee\u2019s hip, said, \u201cGive me the money.\u201d Before Sallee could respond, the defendant put his left hand on Sallee\u2019s right shoulder and turned him toward the fuel tanker. He forced Sallee to face the tanker and rest his hands on the rocker panel of the tanker\u2019s door.\nThe defendant, holding the gun in his right hand, used his left hand to frisk Sallee\u2019s coat pockets, front chest shirt pockets, waistband, and front pants pockets. The defendant then reached into Sallee\u2019s left rear pants pocket and removed Sallee\u2019s wallet. He handed Sallee his wallet and ordered Sallee to open it. Sallee did.\nSallee gave the defendant $5 from his wallet. The defendant then asked \u201cwhere the truck money was.\u201d Sallee responded, \u201cWe don\u2019t carry money on the trucks.\u201d The defendant replied, \u201cDon\u2019t make me pop you.\u201d Sallee told him \u201cif he pulled the trigger, he\u2019d blow us both off the corner.\u201d\nThe defendant returned to the Ford Tempo and drove northbound on Halsted. Sallee said the license plate on the Tempo was \u201cLWJ 457.\u201d\nSutha Suesuntisook had a home at 2742 North California. On March 2, 1995, at about 12:10 a.m., minutes after the Sallee robbery, Suesuntisook was parking her car in a three-car parking garage next to her home when a man in a white car pulled into her garage and blocked her in. She identified him as the defendant, Robert Jones. She testified the defendant got out of his car, pulled out a handgun, and demanded money from her.\nSuesuntisook started to grab change from the coin tray in the car, but the defendant said, \u201cNot that money.\u201d He demanded \u201creal money.\u201d She gave the defendant a $5 bill and some singles, totaling about $10. Suesuntisook said the defendant then took her car and left behind his white car.\nDetective Fernando E. Montilla, a Chicago police robbery specialist, testified he had been assigned to the robbery of Elaine Rackos Ramos on March 1, 1995. Detective Montilla said he recovered a beige Ford Tempo, license plate number LWJ 457, from the area where Sue-suntisook said she was robbed. He also said defendant Robert Jones was a suspect in all three robberies and was identified by Rackos, Sallee, and Suesuntisook in three different lineups held on April 3, 1995.\nOn cross-examination, Detective Montilla said that the defendant\u2019s height was 6 feet 3 inches, that he weighed 180 pounds, and that he was 43 years old. Detective Montilla noted his arrest report showed the defendant had a scar on his left cheek.\nThe defendant called, in his defense, three witnesses \u2014 three police officers. First, Officer Barbara LeBron testified she responded to Tim Sallee\u2019s call for police to 2600 North Halsted. Sallee had reported he was held up. Officer LeBron said that during her interview of Sallee, he did not tell her the robber threatened to \u201cpop him.\u201d\nSecond, Officer Annette Ruiz testified she was called to a gas station on North California to interview Sutha Suesuntisook. Suesunti-sook had reported she was robbed. Officer Ruiz said Suesuntisook could not remember whether the man who robbed her had any marks or scars on his face because everything happened so quickly.\nFinally, Officer John Nowik testified he was called to the Target Store at 2656 North Elston to interview Elaine Ramos Rackos. Officer Nowik noted in his police report that Rackos told him she was robbed by a man, 30 years old, holding an \u201cunknown possible handgun barrel.\u201d On cross-examination, Officer Nowik said he used the word \u201cunknown\u201d to signify Rackos did not know whether it was a handgun or a pistol. He added that in two other places in his police report he noted an armed robbery had occurred and that Rackos did not express any doubt that a gun was pointed at her during the course of her robbery.\nAfter hearing closing arguments, the trial court found the defendant guilty of armed robbery. At the sentencing hearing, the State petitioned for imposition of a natural life sentence pursuant to the Habitual Criminal Act. The trial court concluded that under the Habitual Criminal Act, the appropriate sentence in this case was natural life, without the possibility of parole.\nThis appeal followed.\nDECISION\nOther Crimes Evidence\nOther uncharged crimes evidence is admissible if relevant for any purpose other than to show the defendant\u2019s disposition or propensity to commit crime. People v. Bedoya, 325 Ill. App. 3d 926, 937, 758 N.E.2d 366 (2001), citing People v. McKibbins, 96 Ill. 2d 176, 182, 449 N.E.2d 821 (1983). Examples of relevant purpose include modus operandi, intent, identity, motive, or absence of mistake. Bedoya, 325 Ill. App. 3d at 937. The list is not exclusive.\nEvidence is relevant if it has any tendency to make the existence of a fact that is of consequence in the case more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence. People v. Green, 322 Ill. App. 3d 747, 757, 751 N.E.2d 10 (2001). When the trial court finds some relevance in the other crimes evidence, it must then conduct a balancing test. Relevant evidence should be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. People v. Stewart, 105 Ill. 2d 22, 62, 473 N.E.2d 840 (1984).\nThe danger of presenting evidence to establish the defendant\u2019s propensity to commit a crime is that it \u201coverpersuades the jury, which might convict the defendant only because it feels he or she is a bad person deserving punishment.\u201d People v. Lindgren, 79 Ill. 2d 129, 137, 402 N.E.2d 238 (1980).\nThe admissibility of other crimes evidence rests within the sound discretion of the trial court and will not be overturned absent a clear abuse of discretion. People v. Placek, 184 Ill. 2d 370, 385, 704 N.E.2d 393 (1998). \u201c[T]he trial court should not permit a \u2018mini-trial\u2019 of the other, uncharged offense, but should allow only that which is necessary to \u2018illuminate the issue for which the other crime was introduced.\u2019 \u201d Bedoya, 325 Ill. App. 3d at 938, quoting People v. Nunley, 271 Ill. App. 3d 427, 432, 648 N.E.2d 1015 (1995).\nThe defendant contends the trial court erred by allowing the State to present evidence relating to the armed robberies of Tim Sallee and Sutha Suesuntisook. Specifically, the defendant contends the evidence was \u201cadmitted only to show Mr. Jones\u2019 propensity [to commit crimes] and to enhance the credibility of the complainant.\u201d\nThe State responds the court properly admitted the evidence of two other robberies because that evidence was relevant to establishing the defendant\u2019s identity under a modus operandi theory. We agree.\n\u201cThe modus operandi exception has been described as circumstantial evidence of identity on the basis that crimes committed in a similar manner suggest a common author and strengthens the identification of the defendant.\u201d People v. Shief, 312 Ill. App. 3d 673, 681, 728 N.E.2d 638 (2000). Where such evidence is offered to prove modus operandi, \u201cthere must be a high degree of identity between the facts of the crime charged and the other offense in which the defendant was involved.\u201d People v. Illgen, 145 Ill. 2d 353, 372-73, 583 N.E.2d 515 (1991).\n\u201cWhile a persuasive showing of similarity must be made, the test is not one of \u2018 \u201cexact, rigorous identity,\u201d \u2019 since \u2018 \u201csome dissimilarity will always exist between independent crimes.\u201d \u2019 [Citations.]\u201d Sheif, 312 Ill. App. 3d at 681. The offenses must generally share features that are highly distinctive, unique, or peculiar so as to trademark the acts as the handiwork of the same person. Illgen, 145 Ill. 2d at 373.\nRackos\u2019 identification of the defendant as her robber was the material issue in the case. During the cross-examination of Rackos, defense counsel challenged her identification of the defendant. Further, throughout opening and closing remarks, defense counsel questioned the strength of the State\u2019s evidence regarding the identity of the defendant and argued that, ultimately, the evidence was insufficient to show the defendant was Rackos\u2019 robber. See People v. Bowman, 227 Ill. App. 3d 607, 613, 592 N.E.2d 240 (1992) (the introduction of other crimes evidence is proper to bolster the defendant\u2019s identification when the identity of the defendant is at issue).\nThe question, then, is whether the record demonstrates the requisite similarity between the other crimes and the charged offense so as to trademark all the crimes as the handiwork of the defendant.\nIn People v. Sheif, 312 Ill. App. 3d 673, 728 N.E.2d 638 (2000), evidence of the defendant\u2019s other crimes was relevant to establishing his identity under the modus operandi theory where, in a prosecution for armed robbery and attempted aggravated criminal sexual assault, both the charged offenses and the other crimes involved attacks on young women located in the same geographical area and occurring within the same two-week period; the offender in each case wore clothing strikingly similar to clothing recovered from the defendant\u2019s possession; the offender threatened to shoot each victim if she failed to comply with his demands of money and sex; and each victim identified the defendant as her assailant in a pretrial lineup and later at trial.\nIn People v. de la Fuente, 92 Ill. App. 3d 525, 533, 414 N.E.2d 1355 (1981), evidence of a robbery that occurred 15 minutes before the robbery charged was admissible as relevant to establish the defendant\u2019s identification, presence, intent, knowledge, and design, because the two robberies occurred within three blocks of another; both robberies involved the use of a small handgun as a bludgeon by the wielder; and the descriptions of the perpetrators of both robberies were nearly identical.\nIn People v. Allen, 28 Ill. App. 3d 815, 819, 329 N.E.2d 473 (1975), evidence of an attempted robbery was, in the prosecution for armed robbery, admissible on the issue of the defendant\u2019s identification and scheme or design where, among other things, both the attempted robbery and the crime charged occurred within about one hour of each other in contiguous suburbs; the witness to the attempted robbery and the victim of the crime charged described the weapon used as a pistol; the witness described the automobile used in the attempted robbery as being the same color and make as that stolen from the victim of the crime charged; and both the victim of the crime charged and the witness to the attempted robbery testified that the robbers asked the same question about the location of the highway before displaying a gun.\nSimilarly, here, each incident involved the armed robbery of a person located in the same geographical area; each incident occurred during a four-hour period \u2014 from 8 p.m. on March 1, 1995, to 12:10 a.m. on March 2, 1995 \u2014 ; each victim was initially approached while alone and near his or her vehicle; each victim gave the robber money after he demanded it in a similar way; each victim\u2019s description of the robber to the police immediately after the incidents, while somewhat different, represented a reasonably close description of the defendant; and each victim identified the defendant as the robber in a pretrial lineup and later at trial.\nA feature we find distinctive in each offense is the robber\u2019s use of a light-colored Ford Tempo with the license plate number LWJ 457. Both Rackos and Sallee testified to seeing the license plate number, and Detective Montilla testified to recovering a Ford Tempo with the same license plate number from the area where Suesuntisook said she was robbed.\nWhile differences in the uncharged other crimes and the charged offenses exist \u2014 e.g., the robber\u2019s gun was covered with a \u201cdirty old yellow\u201d kitchen towel or a \u201cwhite-ish yellow\u201d towel in the robberies of Rackos and Sallee but not Suesuntisook\u2014, the similarities of these crimes, when viewed together, are sufficiently distinctive to support the inference the defendant was the robber in each case. See People v. Lee, 151 Ill. App. 3d 510, 519-20, 502 N.E.2d 399 (1986) (there was a substantial similarity between two shootings where both occurred within several blocks and within four hours of each other; both involved a small caliber gun; and both victims were shot in the head despite the fact they had cooperated with their assailant); and People v. Bryan, 159 Ill. App. 3d 46, 51-52, 511 N.E.2d 1289 (1987) (substantial similarities were found among three robberies where all took place on the same block, within the same 12-day period; the defendant used the same type of gun; he wore the same clothing; he gave similar commands; he escaped in the same direction; and he approached women who were initially alone).\nWe find the trial court did not abuse its discretion by allowing the State to present evidence of the other uncharged crimes for purposes of establishing the defendant\u2019s identity.\nThe defendant also contends: \u201cIf, however, this court should find some degree of testimony was permissible to show identity and presence, the State still improperly elicited from Sallee and Suesuntisook extraneous and prejudicial detail.\u201d\nWe disagree. Only enough evidence to establish the required similarities was presented. There was no unnecessary detail.\nThis was a bench trial. The trial court said it was allowing the other crimes evidence to show the defendant\u2019s \u201cidentity and presence,\u201d not his \u201cpropensity to commit the crime.\u201d Both were issues in the case. The trial court did not abuse its discretion.\nSentencing\nThe defendant\u2019s final contention is that his life sentence is unconstitutional under Apprendi. In Apprendi, the Supreme Court held that any fact, other than a prior conviction, that increases the maximum penalty for a crime must be charged in an indictment, submitted to a fact finder, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 476, 147 L. Ed. 2d at 447, 120 S. Ct. at 2355.\nThe defendant committed a Class X felony, for which the maximum prison sentence is 30 years. See 730 ILCS 5/5 \u2014 8\u20141(a)(3) (West 2000). He was sentenced to life imprisonment, however, because the court found him to be an habitual criminal. See 720 ILCS 5/33B \u2014 1(a), (e) (West 2000). Section 33B \u2014 1 of the Habitual Criminal Act provides as follows:\n\u201c \u00a7 33B \u2014 1. (a) Every person who has been twice convicted in any state or federal court of an offense that contains the same elements as an offense now classified in Illinois as a Class X felony, criminal sexual assault, aggravated kidnapping or first degree murder, and is thereafter convicted of a Class X felony, criminal sexual assault or first degree murder, committed after the 2 prior convictions, shall be adjudged an habitual criminal.\n(b) The 2 prior convictions need not have been for the same offense.\n(c) Any convictions which result from or are connected with the same transaction, or result from offenses committed at the same time, shall be counted for the purposes of this Section as one conviction.\n(d) This Article shall not apply unless each of the following requirements are satisfied:\n(1) the third offense was committed after the effective date of this Act;\n(2) the third offense was committed within 20 years of the date that judgment was entered on the first conviction, provided, however, that time spent in custody shall not be counted;\n(3) the third offense was committed after conviction on the second offense;\n(4) the second offense was committed after conviction on the first offense.\n(e) Except when the death penalty is imposed, anyone adjudged an habitual criminal shall be sentenced to life imprisonment.\u201d 720 ILCS 5/33B \u2014 1 (West 2000).\nHere, the defendant met all of the conditions for a mandatory natural life sentence under the Act, rather than the normal Class X sentencing range, which is from 6 to 30 years.\nRecently, courts in the Fifth, Third, and Second Districts of the Illinois Appellate Court held the Act does not violate Apprendi. See People v. Pickens, 323 Ill. App. 3d 429, 752 N.E.2d 1195 (2001) (5th Dist.); Morissette v. Briley, 326 Ill. App. 3d 590, 592 (2001) (3rd Dist.); People v. Boston, 324 Ill. App. 3d 557, 562-63, 755 N.E.2d 1058 (2001) (2nd Dist.).\nIn their Apprendi analysis, the courts drew analogies between the recidivism provisions in section 33B \u2014 1 and the recidivism provisions of section 5 \u2014 5\u20143(c)(8) (730 ILCS 5/5 \u2014 5\u2014 3(c)(8) (West 2000)).\nSection 5 \u2014 5\u20143(c)(8) requires a defendant to be sentenced as a Class X offender if he has been convicted of two Class 2 or greater felonies and then is convicted of a Class 1 or Class 2 felony. 730 ILCS 5/5 \u2014 5\u20143(c)(8) (West 2000). Section 5 \u2014 5\u20143(c)(8) does not violate Apprendi. People v. Lathon, 317 Ill. App. 3d 573, 740 N.E.2d 377 (2000); People v. Dixon, 319 Ill. App. 3d 881, 747 N.E.2d 1 (2001); People v. Watson, 322 Ill. App. 3d 164, 749 N.E.2d 1078 (2001).\nSection 33B \u2014 1 is not unconstitutional under Apprendi. because, like section 5 \u2014 5\u20143(c)(8), \u201cA provision that requires punishment enhancement based upon the existence of prior convictions does not run afoul of Apprendi.\u201d Pickens, 323 Ill. App. 3d at 434. Accord Morissette, 326 Ill. App. 3d at 592-93; Boston, 324 Ill. App. 3d at 563.\nWe concur with Pickens, Morissette, and Boston. We hold section 33B \u2014 1 does not violate Apprendi, and we affirm the trial court\u2019s sentencing order.\nCONCLUSION\nWe affirm the trial court\u2019s judgment.\nAffirmed.\nHALL, EJ, and SOUTH, J., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE WOLFSON" } ], "attorneys": [ "Rita A. Fry, Public Defender, of Chicago (Marjorie F. Davis, Assistant Public Defender, of counsel), for appellant.", "Richard A. Devine, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Renee Goldfarb, Annette Collins, and Ayesha Khan, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ROBERT JONES, Defendant-Appellant.\nFirst District (3rd Division)\nNo. 1\u201401\u20140093\nOpinion filed February 20, 2002.\nRita A. Fry, Public Defender, of Chicago (Marjorie F. Davis, Assistant Public Defender, of counsel), for appellant.\nRichard A. Devine, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Renee Goldfarb, Annette Collins, and Ayesha Khan, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0233-01", "first_page_order": 251, "last_page_order": 261 }