{ "id": 2183316, "name": "PALOS COMMUNITY HOSPITAL et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. ILLINOIS HEALTH FACILITIES PLANNING BOARD et al., Defendants-Appellees", "name_abbreviation": "Palos Community Hospital v. Illinois Health Facilities Planning Board", "decision_date": "2002-03-08", "docket_number": "No. 1\u201401\u20142199", "first_page": "336", "last_page": "342", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "328 Ill. App. 3d 336" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "158 Ill. 2d 391", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 780274 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "397" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/158/0391-01" ] }, { "cite": "316 Ill. App. 3d 1097", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1096635 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1106" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/316/1097-01" ] }, { "cite": "278 Ill. App. 3d 90", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1156897 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "97" }, { "page": "97" }, { "page": "97" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/278/0090-01" ] }, { "cite": "262 Ill. App. 3d 266", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2849744 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "273" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/262/0266-01" ] }, { "cite": "319 Ill. App. 3d 761", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1527746 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "766" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/319/0761-01" ] }, { "cite": "196 Ill. 2d 391", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 351256 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "397" }, { "page": "397" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/196/0391-01" ] }, { "cite": "321 Ill. App. 3d 92", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 132456 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "96" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/321/0092-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 610, "char_count": 13951, "ocr_confidence": 0.785, "pagerank": { "raw": 5.5762723058596954e-08, "percentile": 0.35022524479226397 }, "sha256": "0e3b08f5853f2a3e78c61ee7e7ca70c076dd9f2c669ceafa49d312b1159600c0", "simhash": "1:6f8f573248cb202c", "word_count": 2245 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:11:21.532369+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "PALOS COMMUNITY HOSPITAL et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. ILLINOIS HEALTH FACILITIES PLANNING BOARD et al., Defendants-Appellees." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE O\u2019BRIEN\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nWe consider whether the Illinois Health Facilities Planning Act (Act) (20 ILCS 3960/1 et seq. (West 2000)) requires plaintiffs to obtain a permit from the Illinois Health Facilities Planning Board (Board) before constructing a free-standing health and fitness center (center). We believe not and reverse the circuit court.\nPalos Community Hospital (Hospital) filed an application for a permit pursuant to the Act to construct a free-standing health and fitness center on a parcel of land separate from the Hospital. The Board issued an initial denial of the Hospital\u2019s application, and the Hospital timely requested an administrative hearing. While its application was still pending before the Board, the Hospital restructured its corporate form and created a new parent corporation, the St. George Corporation, and a new wholly owned subsidiary of the parent corporation, the St. George Wellness Center. The St. George Wellness Center began construction of a center on the parcel of land without waiting for the Board\u2019s final decision on the permit application.\nThe Board then began a formal investigation into whether the construction of the center violated the permit requirement in the Act. The Board issued a subpoena duces tecum to the Hospital, St. George Corporation, and the St. George Wellness Center (collectively referred to as plaintiffs) for information and documents relating to the construction and financing of the center.\nPlaintiffs then filed a six-count complaint in the circuit court against the Board. Count I sought a declaratory judgment that the plaintiffs were not required to comply with the Act\u2019s permit requirement. Count II sought a declaratory judgment that the Board has no authority to regulate or investigate the St. George Wellness Center or the St. George Corporation. Count III sought a declaratory judgment that the Board lacked the discretion to deny plaintiffs\u2019 application for a permit for the construction of the center. Count IV sought a declaratory judgment that the Board had violated the Hospital\u2019s rights to due process and equal protection. Count V sought a declaration that the Board\u2019s function violates due process. Count VI sought a declaration that the Board\u2019s denial of the permit application was arbitrary and capricious and against the manifest weight of the evidence.\nThe Board filed a complaint to temporarily restrain and enjoin plaintiffs from constructing the center until a valid permit was issued by the Board. The trial court consolidated the Board\u2019s complaint with the plaintiffs\u2019 declaratory judgment action and denied the Board\u2019s motion for a temporary restraining order. The Board then voluntarily dismissed its complaint.\nPlaintiffs moved for summary judgment on count I of their declaratory judgment action and sought to quash the subpoena duces tecum-, the Board moved to dismiss plaintiffs\u2019 complaint pursuant to sections 2 \u2014 615 and 2 \u2014 619 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 615, 2 \u2014 619 (West 2000)). The trial court denied plaintiffs\u2019 summary judgment motion and their motion to quash the subpoena duces tecum, granted the Board\u2019s motion to dismiss pursuant to section 2 \u2014 619, and directed plaintiffs to comply with the subpoena. Plaintiffs filed this timely appeal. The Illinois Hospital & Health Systems Association filed an amicus curiae brief in support of plaintiffs\u2019 appeal.\nOn appeal, plaintiffs argue that the trial court erred in granting the Board\u2019s section 2 \u2014 619 motion to dismiss and in denying plaintiffs\u2019 motion for partial summary judgment. Although the denial of a motion for summary judgment is not ordinarily appealable, such a denial is reviewable where, as here, the case is on appeal from a motion to dismiss which has been granted, there has been no evidentiary hearing or trial, and the party seeking such review has not prevented or avoided hearing or trial. Rose v. Pucinski, 321 Ill. App. 3d 92, 96 (2001). In reviewing the circuit court\u2019s grant of the Board\u2019s section 2 \u2014 619 motion to dismiss and the denial of plaintiffs\u2019 motion for partial summary judgment, the relevant issues on appeal are the same: (1) whether a genuine issue of material fact exists; and (2) whether the movant was entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Guzman v. C.R. Epperson Construction, Inc., 196 Ill. 2d 391, 397 (2001). The standard of review is de novo. Guzman, 196 Ill. 2d at 397; 100 W. Monroe Partnership v. Carlson, 319 Ill. App. 3d 761, 766 (2001).\nThere are no genuine issues of material fact here. The issue is one of law: whether the Act requires plaintiffs to obtain a permit from the Board prior to constructing the center.\nThe resolution of this issue requires us to construe the Act. Because the construction of a statute is a question of law, the Board\u2019s construction of the Act is not binding and we may independently construe the Act. Metro Utility Co. v. Illinois Commerce Comm\u2019n, 262 Ill. App. 3d 266, 273 (1994).\nThe primary rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and give effect to the true intent of the legislature. Augustus v. Estate of Somers, 278 Ill. App. 3d 90, 97 (1996). In determining legislative intent, a court should consider the statutory language first. Augustus, 278 Ill. App. 3d at 97. Where the language of the statute is clear, it will be given effect without resort to other aids for construction. Augustus, 278 Ill. App. 3d at 97. If the words used in a statute are ambiguous or if the meaning is unclear, the court may consider the legislative history as an aid to construction. Armstrong v. Hedlund Corp., 316 Ill. App. 3d 1097, 1106 (2000).\nFirst, when is a permit necessary?\nSection 5 of the Act plainly and unambiguously provides that a permit is necessary only for construction of a \u201chealth care facility\u201d:\n\u201cAfter effective dates set by the State Board, no person shall construct, modify or establish a health care facility *** without first obtaining a permit or exemption from the State Board. ***\nA permit or exemption shall be obtained prior to the acquisition of major medical equipment or to the construction or modification of a health care facility which:\n(a) requires a total capital expenditure in excess of the capital expenditure minimum; or\n(b) substantially changes the scope or changes the functional operation of the facility; or\n(c) changes the bed capacity of a health care facility ***.\u201d (Emphasis added.) 20 ILCS 3960/5 (West 2000).\nNext, what is a \u201chealth care facility\u201d?\nAlthough the Board admits in its brief and at oral argument that the center is not a \u201chealth care facility,\u201d the Act itself is dispositive.\nSection 3 of the Act defines \u201c[hjealth care facilities\u201d as:\n\u201c1. An ambulatory surgical treatment center required to be licensed pursuant to the Ambulatory Surgical Treatment Center Act;\n2. An institution, place, building, or agency required to be licensed pursuant to the Hospital Licensing Act;\n3. Skilled and intermediate long term care facilities licensed under the Nursing Home Care Act;\n4. Hospitals, nursing homes, ambulatory surgical treatment centers, or kidney disease treatment centers maintained by the State or any department or agency thereof;\n5. Kidney disease treatment centers, including a free-standing hemodialysis unit; and\n6. An institution, place, building, or room used for the performance of outpatient surgical procedures that is leased, owned, or operated by or on behalf of an out-of-state facility.\u201d 20 ILCS 3960/3 (West 2000).\nPlaintiffs\u2019 center is not within the definition of a \u201chealth care facility\u201d in section 3 of the Act (20 ILCS 3960/3 (West 2000)) and therefore no permit was necessary prior to its construction.\nThis does not end the conversation for the Board. The Board argues that a permit is necessary when construction or modification is made \u201cby or on behalf of\u2019 a health care facility and that the plaintiffs may be constructing the center \u201cby or on behalf of\u2019 a health care facility. The Board cites section 3 of the Act, which defines \u201cconstruction or modification,\u201d in relevant part, as:\n\u201c[A]ny capital expenditure made by or on behalf of a health care facility which exceeds the capital expenditure minimum.\u201d (Emphasis added.) 20 ILCS 3960/3 (West 2000).\nThe Board also cites section 3\u2019s definition of \u201ccapital expenditure\u201d:\n\u201c[A]n expenditure *** made by or on behalf of a health care facility.\u201d (Emphasis added.) 20 ILCS 3960/3 (West 2000).\nThe Board argues that it should be allowed to continue its investigation to determine whether the center is being constructed \u201cby or on behalf of\u2019 a health care facility.\nWe disagree. A statute must be interpreted as a whole, with each provision construed in connection with every other section. Bonaguro v. County Officers Electoral Board, 158 Ill. 2d 391, 397 (1994). Here, section 3 must be read in conjunction with section 5, which provides that a permit is only required prior to the construction or modification \u201cof a health care facility.\u201d 20 ILCS 3960/5 (West 2000). Read together, section 3 and section 5 provide that a permit is required when two conditions are met: (1) construction or modification is made by or on behalf of a health care facility; and (2) the construction or modification is of a health care facility. Since the construction here was not of a health care facility, no permit was required.\nThe Board next argues that a permit was required pursuant to the following language in section 5:\n\u201cA permit or exemption shall be obtained prior to *** the construction or modification of a health care facility which:\n(b) substantially changes the scope or changes the functional operation of the facility.\u201d 20 ILCS 3960/5 (West 2000).\nThe Board argues that the phrase \u201csubstantially changes the scope or changes the functional operation of the facility\u201d (20 ILCS 3960/5 (West 2000)) is a term of art which the Board has defined in its rules as follows:\n\u201c[TJhe acquisition, construction, or leasing of space, buildings, or structures for the purpose of providing outpatient surgical services on a site or location that is not within the licensed premises of the health care facility. Outpatient surgical services are those surgical procedures that are routinely performed in such settings as a hospital or ambulatory surgical treatment center, or in any room or area that is designed, equipped, and used for surgery, such as, but not limited to, a surgical suite or special procedures room. Outpatient surgical services do not include those procedures performed as part of a physician\u2019s private practice in examination or non-surgical treatment rooms.\u201d 77 Ill. Adm. Code \u00a7 1130.140 (2000).\nThe Board argues that \u201c[t]he rule plainly shows an intent on the part of the Board to regulate off-site surgical services not within the footprint of a health care facility\u2019s licensed premises.\u201d\nThe Board\u2019s argument is not well-taken with these facts. The center at issue here does not provide \u201coff-site surgical services\u201d and thus is not within the scope of the Board\u2019s rule or within the section 5 permit requirement.\nFinally, the Board argues that a permit was required pursuant to Public Act 91 \u2014 782 (Pub. Act 91 \u2014 782, eff. June 9, 2000 (now codified at 20 ILCS 3960/3, 5 (West 2000))), which amended the Act by exempting certain \u201cnon-clinical\u201d service areas such as chapels, gift shops, and parking lots from the Act\u2019s permit requirement. Public Act 91 \u2014 782 specifically provides that \u201c \u2018non-clinical service area\u2019 does not include health and fitness centers.\u201d Pub. Act 91 \u2014 782, eff. June 9, 2000 (now codified at 20 ILCS 3960/3 (West 2000)).\nThe Board argues that by specifically excepting health and fitness centers from the list of exempt nonclinical service areas, the legislature demonstrated its intent to subject all health and fitness centers (including free-standing health and fitness centers such as the one at issue here) to the Act\u2019s permit requirement. We disagree. Under section 5 as amended by Public Act 91 \u2014 782, a permit is still only required for \u201cconstruction or modification of a health care facility.\u201d (Emphasis added.) 20 ILCS 3960/5 (West 2000). No language within Public Act 91 \u2014 782 amends section 3\u2019s definition of \u201chealth care facilities\u201d to include plaintiffs\u2019 free-standing health and fitness center. Accordingly, no permit was required.\nWe hold that free-standing health and fitness centers are not subject to the permit requirement set forth in the Act. Therefore, we reverse the trial court\u2019s order dismissing count I of plaintiffs\u2019 complaint (which had sought a declaratory judgment that plaintiffs\u2019 center was not subject to the Act\u2019s permit requirement), and we reverse the trial court\u2019s order denying plaintiffs\u2019 motion for partial summary judgment. We enter summary judgment in favor of plaintiffs on count I of their complaint.\nBecause plaintiffs\u2019 center is not subject to the Act\u2019s permit requirement, no cause exists for the Board to investigate. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court\u2019s order denying plaintiffs\u2019 motion to quash the subpoena duces tecum.\nBecause of this disposition on count I of the complaint, the remaining counts, which sought the same relief, need not be addressed:\nFor the foregoing reasons, we reverse the circuit court.\nReversed.\nGALLAGHER, PJ., and O\u2019HARA FROSSARD, J., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE O\u2019BRIEN" } ], "attorneys": [ "Mayer Brown & Platt (Tyrone C. Fahner, Diane J. Romza-Kutz, Bettina Getz, and Thomas A. Lidbury, of counsel), Ungaretti & Harris (J. Timothy Eaton and Theodore Harman, of counsel), and Rooks Pitts & Poust, all of Chicago (Terrence M. Burns and Marc A. Primack, of counsel), for appellants.", "James E. Ryan, Attorney General, of Chicago (Joel D. Bertocchi, Solicitor General, and Karen J. Dimond, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for appellees." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "PALOS COMMUNITY HOSPITAL et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. ILLINOIS HEALTH FACILITIES PLANNING BOARD et al., Defendants-Appellees.\nFirst District (6th Division)\nNo. 1\u201401\u20142199\nOpinion filed March 8, 2002.\nMayer Brown & Platt (Tyrone C. Fahner, Diane J. Romza-Kutz, Bettina Getz, and Thomas A. Lidbury, of counsel), Ungaretti & Harris (J. Timothy Eaton and Theodore Harman, of counsel), and Rooks Pitts & Poust, all of Chicago (Terrence M. Burns and Marc A. Primack, of counsel), for appellants.\nJames E. Ryan, Attorney General, of Chicago (Joel D. Bertocchi, Solicitor General, and Karen J. Dimond, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for appellees." }, "file_name": "0336-01", "first_page_order": 354, "last_page_order": 360 }