{ "id": 2183319, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. DENNIS TOWNSELL, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Townsell", "decision_date": "2002-02-27", "docket_number": "No. 3\u201400\u20140302", "first_page": "616", "last_page": "620", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "328 Ill. App. 3d 616" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "333 Ill. App. 3d 1092", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 486156 ], "year": 2001, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/333/1092-01" ] }, { "cite": "198 Ill. 2d 68", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 29934 ], "year": 2001, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/198/0068-01" ] }, { "cite": "194 Ill. 2d 580", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "year": 2001, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "318 Ill. App. 3d 128", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 279586 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "noting that an extended-sentencing provision for involuntary manslaughter stated a distinct offense" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/318/0128-01" ] }, { "cite": "526 U.S. 227", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11133049 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "holding that three separate offenses were established by a criminal statute containing a regular sentencing provision and two extended-sentencing provisions" }, { "parenthetical": "holding that three separate offenses were established by a criminal statute containing a regular sentencing provision and two extended-sentencing provisions" }, { "parenthetical": "holding that three separate offenses were established by a criminal statute containing a regular sentencing provision and two extended-sentencing provisions" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/526/0227-01" ] }, { "cite": "327 Ill. App. 3d 973", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 79457 ], "year": 2002, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/327/0973-01" ] }, { "cite": "331 Ill. App. 3d 323", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1209212 ], "year": 2002, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/331/0323-01" ] }, { "cite": "318 Ill. App. 3d 607", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 279674 ], "year": 2000, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/318/0607-01" ] }, { "cite": "319 Ill. App. 3d 949", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1527758 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2001, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/319/0949-01" ] }, { "cite": "326 Ill. App. 3d 882", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1281456 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2001, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/326/0882-01" ] }, { "cite": "323 Ill. App. 3d 554", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 171681 ], "year": 2001, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/323/0554-01" ] }, { "cite": "196 Ill. 2d 269", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 351226 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "refusing to apply the waiver doctrine to an Apprendi claim" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/196/0269-01" ] }, { "cite": "298 Ill. App. 3d 260", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1073550 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "involving a waiver argument based on the fact that the defendant had entered a guilty plea" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/298/0260-01" ] }, { "cite": "315 Ill. App. 3d 1017", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 980699 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "involving a waiver argument based on the defendant's failure to raise his claim below" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/315/1017-01" ] }, { "cite": "530 U.S. 466", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 9413911 ], "weight": 9, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "490" }, { "page": "455" }, { "page": "2362-63" }, { "page": "494" }, { "page": "457" }, { "page": "2365" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/530/0466-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 517, "char_count": 8929, "ocr_confidence": 0.776, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.03580807328026e-08, "percentile": 0.0768683811295562 }, "sha256": "e995b668e313a9088db3ceeb362ab6581597269f94480934944c73470468a30b", "simhash": "1:1dab6d0ea85eb8c7", "word_count": 1472 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:11:21.532369+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. DENNIS TOWNSELL, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE HOLDRIDGE\ndelivered, the opinion of the court:\nThe State charged Dennis Townsell with first degree murder. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 38, par. 9\u20141(a)(1). In the charging instrument, the State specifically alleged that on February 18, 1991, without lawful justification and with intent to kill, Townsell caused Terry Biscontine\u2019s death by shooting, stabbing, and choking him. Townsell pled guilty to the charge. At his sentencing hearing in August of 1991, the judge extended his prison term to 100 years under subsection 5 \u2014 5\u2014 3.2(b)(2) of the Unified Code of Corrections, which authorized such extension \u201c[if] the court [found] that the offense was accompanied by exceptionally brutal or heinous behavior indicative of wanton cruelty.\u201d Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 38, par. 1005-5\u20143.2(b)(2).\nIn Apprendi v. New Jersey, the United States Supreme Court held that \u201c[o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.\u201d Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490, 147 L. Ed. 2d 435, 455, 120 S. Ct. 2348, 2362-63 (2000). In this direct appeal from his sentence, Townsell claims that extension of his prison term based on the \u201cbrutal or heinous\u201d element of subsection 5\u20145\u20143.2(b)(2) violated the rule announced in Apprendi. We agree.\nInitially, the State argues that Townsell has waived his claim because he (1) failed to raise it below, and (2) entered a guilty plea. In either instance, the waiver doctrine is a limitation on the parties only, and we will overlook a waiver in appropriate situations. See People v. Dunlap, 315 Ill. App. 3d 1017 (2000) (involving a waiver argument based on the defendant\u2019s failure to raise his claim below); People v. McCaskill, 298 Ill. App. 3d 260 (1998) (involving a waiver argument based on the fact that the defendant had entered a guilty plea). Considering the gravity of Townsell\u2019s claim, we decline to apply the waiver doctrine here. See People v. Wagener, 196 Ill. 2d 269 (2001) (refusing to apply the waiver doctrine to an Apprendi claim).\nThe State also argues that Apprendi is inapplicable because Townsell\u2019s 100-year prison term does not exceed the prescribed statutory maximum penalty for first degree murder. The State supports this argument by citing People v. Vida, 323 Ill. App. 3d 554 (2001), where a panel of the Appellate Court, First District, concluded that the maximum sentence for first degree murder is natural life imprisonment. We disagree with this conclusion. See People v. Lee, 326 Ill. App. 3d 882 (2001).\nIn Apprendi the Supreme Court stated that the \u201crelevant inquiry\u201d is whether the required finding (e.g., that a murder was brutal or heinous) \u201cexpose[s] the defendant to a greater punishment than that authorized by the jury\u2019s guilty verdict.\u201d Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 494, 147 L. Ed. 2d at 457, 120 S. Ct. at 2365. At the time of Townsell\u2019s sentencing hearing, the greatest punishment a judge could impose based on a guilty verdict for first degree murder was 60 years in prison. Compare Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 38, par. 1005\u20148\u20141(a)(1)(a) (prescribing a prison term of 20 to 60 years), with Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 38, pars. 1005\u20148\u20141(b), (c) (authorizing natural life imprisonment, but only upon a finding of elements additional to those required for a guilty verdict). That fact has not changed in the meantime. See 730 ILCS 5/5 \u2014 8\u20141(a)(1)(a) (West 2000); People v. Nitz, 319 Ill. App. 3d 949 (2001). Thus, for Apprendi purposes, the prescribed statutory maximum penalty for first degree murder is a 60-year prison term. See Nitz, 319 Ill. App. 3d 949; People v. Armstrong, 318 Ill. App. 3d 607 (2000).\nThe State further argues that Apprendi is inapplicable because Townsell\u2019s conviction resulted from a guilty plea. This argument is based on the fact that when Townsell pled guilty he relinquished his right to a jury trial, which right the State describes as \u201cthe constitutional foundation of Apprendi.\u201d We note that Townsell entered his guilty plea more than nine years before Apprendi was decided. This fact raises serious questions about whether any of his plea-related relinquishments encompass the constitutional right announced in Apprendi. Furthermore, the State did not include a \u201cbrutal or heinous\u201d element in the charging instrument. Townsell thus did not relinquish his jury trial right with respect to that element when he pled guilty. See People v. Fields, 331 Ill. App. 3d 323 (2002); People v. Kidd, 327 Ill. App. 3d 973 (2002). In any event, the holding in Apprendi certainly can apply to defendants who plead guilty; after all, Apprendi himself was convicted based on a guilty plea.\nRegarding the merits of Townsell\u2019s claim, in People v. Lee, 326 Ill. App. 3d 882 (2001), this court held that extension of the defendant\u2019s prison term based on the \u201cbrutal or heinous\u201d element of subsection 5 \u2014 5\u20143.2(b)(2) violated the rule announced in Apprendi. The version of subsection 5 \u2014 5\u20143.2(b)(2) involved in Lee is identical to the version under which Townsell\u2019s prison term was extended. Our holding in Lee is thus dispositive here.\nNevertheless, the State asserts that Townsell\u2019s extended sentence is not reversible under Apprendi because: (1) the judge made the \u201cbrutal or heinous\u201d finding beyond a reasonable doubt at the sentencing hearing, despite his failure to articulate the reasonable doubt standard; and (2) any error was harmless because undisputed evidence from the sentencing hearing established that the offense was brutal or heinous. These assertions fail to address the constitutional problem that necessitated Apprendi.\nSubsection 5 \u2014 5\u20143.2(b)(2) essentially creates a new offense (brutal or heinous first degree murder) that is separate from, and more severe than, ordinary first degree murder. Cf. Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 143 L. Ed. 2d 311, 119 S. Ct. 1215 (1999) (holding that three separate offenses were established by a criminal statute containing a regular sentencing provision and two extended-sentencing provisions); Apprendi, 530 U.S. 466, 147 L. Ed. 2d 435, 120 S. Ct. 2348 (noting that New Jersey\u2019s extended-sentencing statute turned a second degree offense into a first degree offense); People v. Thurow, 318 Ill. App. 3d 128 (2001) (noting that an extended-sentencing provision for involuntary manslaughter stated a distinct offense), appeal allowed, 194 Ill. 2d 580 (2001). Townsell only pled guilty to the offense stated in the charging instrument \u2014 ordinary first degree murder. It would thus be fundamentally unfair to sentence him for a more severe offense.\nWhile this appeal was pending, the State moved to amend its request for relief by adding an alternate remedy. The proposed remedy is a remand for an \u201call-inclusive\u201d resentencing hearing where the judge can consider all sentencing options, including another extended prison term. We took the State\u2019s motion with the case, and we now deny it for the reasons stated above.\nThe highest penalty Townsell can receive for the offense to which he pled guilty is 60 years in prison. We thus vacate the extended portion of his sentence and, pursuant to our authority under Supreme Court Rule 615(b)(4) (134 Ill. 2d R. 615(b)(4)), modify his prison term to 60 years.\nCONCLUSION\nThe portion of the circuit court\u2019s judgment extending Townsell\u2019s prison term is vacated, and his sentence is modified to 60 years.\nVacated in part; sentence modified.\nLYTTON, EJ., and McDADE, J., concur.\nThe State also cites People v. Ford, 198 Ill. 2d 68 (2001), and People v. Rivera, 333 Ill. App. 3d 1092 (2001), which are clearly distinguishable. In each of those cases, unlike the instant case, the defendant\u2019s extended sentence fell within a range authorized by an element that had been proved beyond a reasonable doubt.\nWe realize that Apprendi reserved the right to challenge New Jersey\u2019s extended-sentencing statute. However, that action only spared him from the type of waiver argument we have already rejected. His reservation did not somehow render the Supreme Court\u2019s holding inapplicable to other guilty plea cases where, as here, courts decline to apply the waiver doctrine.\nThese circumstances illuminate the rationale for applying Apprendi to cases involving guilty pleas. A guilty plea cannot be knowing and voluntary unless the defendant knows the offense for which he will be convicted as a consequence of entering the plea.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE HOLDRIDGE" } ], "attorneys": [ "Mark D. Fisher (argued), of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Ottawa, for appellant.", "Marshall E. Douglas, State\u2019s Attorney, of Rock Island (John X. Breslin and Gary F. Gnidovec (argued), both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. DENNIS TOWNSELL, Defendant-Appellant.\nThird District\nNo. 3\u201400\u20140302\nOpinion filed February 27, 2002.\nModified opinion filed March 28, 2002.\nMark D. Fisher (argued), of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Ottawa, for appellant.\nMarshall E. Douglas, State\u2019s Attorney, of Rock Island (John X. Breslin and Gary F. Gnidovec (argued), both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0616-01", "first_page_order": 634, "last_page_order": 638 }