{ "id": 2183292, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. STEVEN SAWCZENKO, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Sawczenko", "decision_date": "2002-04-12", "docket_number": "No. 2\u201400\u20141358", "first_page": "888", "last_page": "899", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "328 Ill. App. 3d 888" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "318 Ill. App. 3d 719", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 279503 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "733-34" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/318/0719-01" ] }, { "cite": "318 Ill. App. 3d 1189", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 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App. 3d 933", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1281458 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "939" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/326/0933-01" ] }, { "cite": "701 N.E.2d 1063", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1075" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "189 Ill. 2d 690", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "year": 2000, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "312 Ill. App. 3d 346", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 411640 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "350" }, { "page": "350" }, { "page": "350" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/312/0346-01" ] }, { "cite": "309 Ill. App. 3d 595", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 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App. 3d 663", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2873635 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "667" }, { "page": "667" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/259/0663-01" ] }, { "cite": "183 Ill. 2d 366", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 209962 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "380" }, { "page": "381" }, { "page": "387-89" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/183/0366-01" ] }, { "cite": "174 Ill. 2d 410", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 223616 ], "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "418" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/174/0410-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 906, "char_count": 25475, "ocr_confidence": 0.761, "pagerank": { "raw": 8.042699867555911e-08, "percentile": 0.46591654571366903 }, "sha256": "8decd8777bee41319299ae236e459e1add4a4599e914c87f966ba4b62b54f7f2", "simhash": "1:bb2bf61f570eddf5", "word_count": 4192 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:11:21.532369+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. STEVEN SAWCZENKO, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE KAPALA\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nDefendant, Steven Sawczenko, appeals from an order of the circuit court of Du Page County summarily dismissing his second postconviction petition without an evidentiary hearing. For the reasons that follow, we reverse and remand.\nI. FACTS\nOn September 12, 1994, defendant pleaded guilty to aggravated battery to a peace officer (720 ILCS 5/12 \u2014 4(b)(6) (West 1992)). The trial court sentenced defendant to 5 years\u2019 imprisonment to be served consecutively to a 20-year prison term for a separate, unrelated offense. On October 7, 1994, defendant filed a pro se motion to withdraw his plea of guilty and vacate the judgment. Subsequently, defendant appeared before the trial court and withdrew that motion. Defendant did not file a .direct appeal of his conviction or sentence.\nOn September 11, 1997, defendant filed a pro se postconviction petition pursuant to the Post-Conviction Hearing Act (Act) (725 ILCS 5/122 \u2014 1 et seq. (West 1996)) supported by his own affidavit. In the petition, defendant alleged that he was on psychotropic medication at the time he entered his plea of guilty; that there was a bona fide doubt as to his fitness to stand trial due to this medication; that he was entitled to a fitness hearing; and that the assistant State\u2019s Attorney handling his case knew he was medicated, yet failed to inform the trial court. Defendant asserted that his right to due process of law under the United States Constitution was violated because he was denied a fitness hearing and that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to request a fitness hearing on his behalf.\nAfter counsel was appointed, defendant filed an amended postcon-viction petition. On October 21, 1998, the State filed a motion to dismiss defendant\u2019s postconviction petition. Judge Thomas E. Galium denied the motion to dismiss on January 27, 1999, ruling that defendant was entitled to a hearing on the allegations he raised regarding the psychotropic medication he was taking at the time he pleaded guilty.\nOn February 19, 1999, the State filed an answer to defendant\u2019s postconviction petition. On November 1, 1999, defendant appeared before Judge Kathryn E. Creswell with his attorney. Defendant\u2019s attorney informed the trial court that defendant was moving to withdraw his postconviction petition \u201cbased on some legal research that [defendant] has done, as well as some religious beliefs.\u201d Defendant\u2019s attorney also indicated that defendant understood that the trial court had previously ruled that he was entitled to an eviden-tiary hearing on his petition. The trial court asked defendant if what his attorney said was true, and defendant responded, \u201cYes, that is correct.\u201d When asked if he was taking any type of prescription medication at that time, defendant said, \u201cNot at all.\u201d The trial court asked defendant if he understood that if he withdrew his petition he would be foreclosed from pursuing any issues or claims of error at a future date. Defendant said, \u201cI do[,] your Honor.\u201d Defendant also told the trial court that he understood that the State\u2019s motion to dismiss his petition had been denied and that if he withdrew his petition there would be no evidentiary hearing. Finally, when the trial court told defendant that he would have to serve out the rest of his sentence and that would be the end of it, defendant said, \u201cI understand.\u201d With that, the trial court allowed defendant to withdraw his postconviction petition and remanded defendant to the custody of the Illinois Department of Corrections.\nOn August 18, 2000, defendant filed a second petition for postcon-viction relief. Defendant alleged various claims of ineffective assistance of postconviction counsel. In addition, defendant alleged that, although he was not on any medication when he withdrew the prior postconviction petition, he was not in a proper frame of mind to make that decision. Defendant alleged that \u201cextreme religiousism [szc]\u201d due to insomnia led him to believe that he was to withdraw his postconviction petition \u201cby divine providence.\u201d Defendant also requested the reinstatement of the claims he made in his first postconviction petition.\nOn November 13, 2000, defendant appeared before Judge Perry R. Thompson at a status hearing on his second postconviction petition. The trial court asked defendant what he was asking for in his petition and defendant said he wished to \u201c[rjeinstate the post conviction [sic] petition on the same issues that it was originally raised and additional issues on the supplemental petition.\u201d When asked for the State\u2019s position, the assistant State\u2019s Attorney declined to participate. The trial court told defendant that he had read defendant\u2019s first and second postconviction petitions and reviewed the file. The trial court then confirmed the procedural details with defendant before concluding, \u201cI frankly don\u2019t see a basis for relief here under the [P]ost[-][C]onviction [Hearing] [A]ct, so I am going to deny it.\u201d The assistant State\u2019s Attorney then asked the trial court if he was finding the latest pleading frivolous. The trial court responded that the pleading \u201c[d]oes not state a basis upon which a [sic] relief can be drawn upon the act. Draw an order, denied.\u201d The trial court entered a written order stating in pertinent part:\n\u201cIT IS HEREBY ORDERED: upon examination of petition by this Court there is a finding said petition is frivolous and patently without merit pursuant to 725 ILCS 5/122 \u2014 2.1.\u201d\nDefendant timely appeals from that order.\nII. DISCUSSION\nA. Stage-One Dismissal\nDefendant first contends that the trial court erred by summarily dismissing his second postconviction petition, which sought to reinstate the first petition, where his first petition had been found to warrant an evidentiary hearing. The State argues that the second petition was properly dismissed. A brief discussion of the three procedural stages of the Act is warranted.\nAt stage one, section 122 \u2014 2.1 directs the trial court to dismiss the petition if the petitioner is sentenced to imprisonment and if the court determines that \u201cthe petition is frivolous or is patently without merit.\u201d 725 ILCS 5/122 \u2014 2.1(a)(2) (West 2000). Section 122 \u2014 2.1(a) requires the court to examine the petition and enter an order \u201c[w]ithin 90 days after the filing and docketing of each petition.\u201d 725 ILCS 5/122 \u2014 2.1(a) (West 2000). Section 122 \u2014 2.1 does not contemplate any input from the State by responsive pleading or otherwise. See People v. Gaultney, 174 Ill. 2d 410, 418 (1996). Under section 122 \u2014 2.1, the trial court is concerned merely with determining whether the petition\u2019s allegations sufficiently demonstrate a constitutional infirmity that would necessitate relief under the Act. People v. Coleman, 183 Ill. 2d 366, 380 (1998). At the first stage, the trial court does not rule on the merits of the petition; rather, the trial court simply decides if the petition on its face is frivolous or patently without merit. People v. Oury, 259 Ill. App. 3d 663, 667 (1994). In order to withstand dismissal at stage one, the postconviction petition need only contain a simple statement that presents the gist of a constitutional claim for relief that is meritorious when considered in view of the record. Oury, 259 Ill. App. 3d at 667. If a petition is not dismissed under section 122 \u2014 2.1, then it is to be docketed and considered in accordance with sections 122 \u2014 4 through 122 \u2014 6 of the Act. 725 ILCS 5/122 \u2014 2.1(b) (West 2000).\nAt stage two, section 122 \u2014 4 provides for the appointment of counsel if the petitioner has no means to procure counsel. 725 ILCS 5/122 \u2014 4 (West 2000). Also at stage two, section 122 \u2014 5 directs that the State shall either answer or move to dismiss the petition. 725 ILCS 5/122 \u2014 5 (West 2000). At this stage, the trial court must determine whether the petition and any accompanying documents make a substantial showing of a constitutional violation. See Coleman, 183 Ill. 2d at 381.\nFinally, at stage three, section 122 \u2014 6 gives the trial court the discretion to hold a hearing and provides that the court may receive proof by affidavits, depositions, oral testimony or other evidence. 725 ILCS 5/122 \u2014 6 (West 2000).\nIn this case, the trial court dismissed defendant\u2019s postconviction petition at stage one. Our review of the trial court\u2019s dismissal of defendant\u2019s postconviction petition at stage one of the proceedings under the Act is de novo. People v. Edwards, 197 Ill. 2d 239, 247 (2001).\n1. Timeliness\nDefendant urges us to conclude that the proceedings on the second petition must be treated as proceedings on the first petition for timeliness purposes because the second petition was intended to reinstate and supplement the earlier petition. We cannot so conclude.\nIf we were to consider defendant\u2019s second postconviction petition a motion to reinstate his first, we would find the motion to reinstate untimely. On November 1, 1999, the trial court granted defendant\u2019s motion to withdraw his first petition as is permitted under section 122 \u2014 5 of the Act (725 ILCS 5/122 \u2014 5 (West 1998)). On August 18, 2000, more than nine months later, defendant filed his second petition. A trial court loses jurisdiction to vacate or modify its judgment 30 days after entry of judgment unless a timely postjudgment motion is filed. Beck v. Stepp, 144 Ill. 2d 232, 238 (1991). If a postconviction petitioner were allowed to reinstate a previously withdrawn petition at any time, the Act\u2019s prescribed time limits for requesting postconviction relief (725 ILCS 5/122 \u2014 1(c) (West 2000)) would be nullified.\nAs to the timeliness of defendant\u2019s second petition, section 122 \u2014 1(c) of the Act sets forth the applicable time limitation for filing a postconviction petition:\n\u201cNo proceedings under this Article shall be commenced more than 6 months after the denial of a petition for leave to appeal or the date for filing such a petition if none is filed or more than 45 days after the defendant files his or her brief in the appeal of the sentence before the Illinois Supreme Court (or more than 45 days after the deadline for the filing of the defendant\u2019s brief with the Illinois Supreme Court if no brief is filed) or 3 years from the date of conviction, whichever is sooner, unless the petitioner alleges facts showing that the delay was not due to his or her culpable negligence.\u201d 725 ILCS 5/122 \u2014 1(c) (West 2000).\nSince defendant filed no direct appeal, the triggering event in this case was defendant\u2019s conviction on September 12, 1994, making the filing deadline September 12, 1997. Defendant acknowledges that his second petition was not filed until almost six years after his conviction but argues that, because the trial court\u2019s stage-one dismissal was not predicated upon the untimeliness of the second petition, we cannot affirm the dismissal on that basis. Defendant concludes that any argument as to his culpable negligence should occur at stage two, where he could be appointed counsel and permitted to amend his petition. The State argues that defendant\u2019s second petition was untimely and we should affirm the trial court\u2019s first-stage dismissal on that basis even though the trial court did not, contending that we may affirm for any reason warranted by the record, regardless of the reasons relied on by the lower court (People v. Caballero, 179 Ill. 2d 205, 211 (1997)).\nThe trial court has the authority to dismiss a postconviction petition for untimeliness after its initial review under section 122\u2014 2.1(a) of the Act (725 ILCS 5/122 \u2014 2.1(a) (West 2000)). People v. Wright, 189 Ill. 2d 1, 11 (1999); People v. Parham, 318 Ill. App. 3d 818, 821 (2001). However, the issue presented here is whether a stage-one dismissal of a postconviction petition can be affirmed on appeal on the ground that the petition was untimely, when, in fact, the trial court did not address the subject of timeliness.\nWe begin our analysis of this issue by reviewing our supreme court\u2019s holding in Wright. The trial court in Wright dismissed defendant\u2019s postconviction petition at stage two of the proceedings on the State\u2019s motion to dismiss, which did not raise the issue of the petition\u2019s timeliness. Wright, 189 Ill. 2d at 5. After concluding that the time limit in the Act is to be considered a statute of limitations and not a jurisdictional requirement (Wright, 189 Ill. 2d at 10), the court said:\n\u201cBy not raising [the issue of timeliness] until the cause was on appeal, the State has effectively precluded defendant from seeking to amend his petition to allege facts demonstrating that the late filing was not caused by his culpable negligence. While we recognize that section 122 \u2014 1 requires the defendant to allege the facts demonstrating a lack of culpable negligence, we do not believe that this requirement allows the State to wait until an appeal to raise an affirmative defense that the defendant may be able to avoid by amending his petition. By failing to raise this issue below, the State has waived its right to argue that defendant\u2019s petition is untimely.\nIn reaching this conclusion, we caution that we are not limiting the trial court\u2019s ability, during the court\u2019s initial review of noncapital petitions [citation], to dismiss the petition as untimely. The import of our decision is simply that matters relating to the timeliness of a defendant\u2019s petition should first be considered in the trial court, either upon a motion by the State or pursuant to the duty imposed upon the trial court by section 122 \u2014 2.1(a)(2).\u201d Wright, 189 Ill. 2d at 11-12.\nThe Wright court summed the issue up by stating, \u201cThus, if the State wishes to challenge the timeliness of a defendant\u2019s petition, it should raise that argument first in the trial court, where any amendments can be made and factual disputes resolved.\u201d Wright, 189 Ill. 2d at 12.\nThere is a split of authority in the appellate court on the issue of whether the timeliness of a postconviction petition is properly considered on appeal where the trial court summarily dismissed the petition at stage one of the proceedings on a basis other than timeliness.\nThe Third District in People v. Arias, 309 Ill. App. 3d 595, 597 (1999), held that if timeliness is not addressed by the trial court then it cannot be addressed by the appellate court. Arias, 309 Ill. App. 3d at 597. In Arias, the trial court dismissed defendant\u2019s petition at stage one without ruling on the timeliness of the petition. Arias, 309 Ill. App. 3d at 596. Defendant argued that, because the trial court did not rule that the petition was late, he was denied the opportunity to allege facts showing the lateness was not due to his culpable negligence. Arias, 309 Ill. App. 3d at 597. The Arias court accepted this argument, concluding that the time limitation in the Act is considered an affirmative defense that, if not raised in the trial court, is waived. Arias, 309 Ill. App. 3d at 597, citing Wright, 189 Ill. 2d at 11.\nThe Fourth District in the case of People v. Boclair, 312 Ill. App. 3d 346, 350 (2000), appeal allowed, 189 Ill. 2d 690 (2000), concluded differently. In Boclair, like this case and Arias, defendant\u2019s petition was dismissed at stage one of the proceedings and the State, therefore, had no opportunity to raise the timeliness issue in the trial court. Boclair, 312 Ill. App. 3d at 350. The Boclair court simply held:\n\u201cIt is our responsibility to make a de novo assessment of the petition (People v. Coleman, 183 Ill. 2d 366, 387-89, 701 N.E.2d 1063, 1075 (1998)), and nothing in Wright precludes us from considering whether the defendant\u2019s petition comports with the requirements of the Act.\u201d Boclair, 312 Ill. App. 3d at 350.\nIn Parham, this court concluded that the holding in Arias \u201cadhered to the Wright mandate by concluding that timeliness cannot be addressed for the first time on appeal\u201d (Parham, 318 Ill. App. 3d at 824), and that the holding in \u201cBoclair failed to comport with Wright because the timeliness objection was raised and decided for the first time on appeal\u201d (Parham, 318 Ill. App. 3d at 825). We continue to believe that Arias is the better-reasoned opinion.\nThe unfairness identified in Wright, brought about by considering the timeliness of a postconviction petition for the first time on appeal, is that it denies petitioner the opportunity to amend his petition to allege facts demonstrating a lack of culpable negligence. Wright, 189 Ill. 2d at 11. Several recent appellate court decisions contemplate a petitioner\u2019s ability to amend a postconviction petition to plead a lack of culpable negligence in response to a dismissal based upon untimeliness. See People v. Stewart, 326 Ill. App. 3d 933 (2001); People v. Scullark, 325 Ill. App. 3d 876 (2001).\nIn Scullark, the First District concluded that \u201cWright thus indicates that if the petition is unsuccessful due to a failure to include allegations of a lack of culpable negligence, the petitioner must be given an opportunity to amend.\u201d Scullark, 325 Ill. App. 3d at 881. The Scullark court reasoned as follows:\n\u201c[E]ven if it is necessary for the allegations to be included in the petition, petitioner need not allege a lack of culpable negligence at the outset, as the petition may be later amended to include such allegations. Wright, 189 Ill. 2d at 11, 723 N.E.2d at 237. The Act provides that the \u2018court may in its discretion make such order as to amendment of the petition *** as shall be appropriate, just and reasonable and as is generally provided in civil cases.\u2019 725 ILCS 5/122 \u2014 5 (West 1998). Generally, when a party asks to amend a complaint, leave to do so is freely given. \u2018A circuit court abuses its discretion if it refuses to allow a plaintiff to amend his complaint when a cause of action can be stated if the complaint is amended.\u2019 [Citation.]\u201d Scullark, 325 Ill. App. 3d at 880.\nIn this case, the trial court dismissed defendant\u2019s second petition at stage one without considering the petition\u2019s timeliness, including whether defendant alleged a lack of culpable negligence in filing the petition late. In adherence with the holding in Wright, and because the amendment of a postconviction petition after a stage-one dismissal is appropriate, we conclude that we cannot consider the timeliness of defendant\u2019s second postconviction petition for the first time on appeal. Our holding, however, does not preclude the State from raising the timeliness of defendant\u2019s second petition at stage-two proceedings on remand.\n2. Successive Postconviction Petition\nDefendant calls our attention to the fact that his second petition could be considered an improper successive postconviction petition, but argues that we should not construe it in that way. The State makes no argument as to the successiveness of defendant\u2019s second petition. Although the trial court did not articulate the successiveness of defendant\u2019s second postconviction petition as a basis for dismissal, we are not precluded from affirming op that basis in the way we are with respect to untimeliness. See Caballero, 179 Ill. 2d at 211 (generally, a reviewing court may affirm for any reason warranted by the record, regardless of the reasons stated by the lower court). At any rate, we conclude that, in this case, a stage-one dismissal on successiveness grounds would be improper.\nThe Act contemplates the filing of one petition. Caballero, 179 Ill. 2d at 211. A petitioner is to get one complete opportunity to show that his constitutional rights were substantially denied. People v. Lieberman, 186 Ill. App. 3d 277, 280-81 (1989). However, the trial court may allow the filing of successive petitions when proceedings on a petition were deficient in some fundamental way. Lieberman, 186 Ill. App. 3d at 281.\nNothing in the record indicates that the proceedings on defendant\u2019s first postconviction petition were deficient. However, in defendant\u2019s second postconviction petition, he alleges that counsel appointed to represent him on his first petition was ineffective for allowing him to withdraw his petition without conferring with him sufficiently. We believe that this sufficiently alleges a deficiency in the proceedings on defendant\u2019s first postconviction petition.\nB. The Merits of Defendant\u2019s Second Postconviction Petition\nHaving determined that we cannot consider the timeliness of the second petition and that it is not an improper successive petition, we turn to the merits of defendant\u2019s second petition. In reviewing the trial court\u2019s stage-one dismissal, we must determine whether the allegations in defendant\u2019s second petition, taken as true and liberally construed, present the gist of a constitutional claim. See Edwards, 197 Ill. 2d at 244.\nDefendant contends that his second postconviction petition should have survived stage one of the proceedings because it incorporated the allegations in his first postconviction petition. Defendant argues that his first postconviction petition contained allegations sufficient to raise the gist of a constitutional claim, i.e., that there was a bona fide doubt as to his fitness when he entered his guilty plea; that he was denied the fitness hearing he was entitled to pursuant to section 104\u2014 21(a) of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (725 ILCS 5/104\u2014 21(a) (West 1994)); and that his attorney was ineffective when he failed to invoke his right to a fitness hearing. The State responds by contending that our supreme court in People v. Mitchell, 189 Ill. 2d 312 (2000), announced that a defendant receiving psychotropic medication does not have a constitutional right to a fitness hearing.\nAt the time defendant pleaded guilty, section 104 \u2014 21(a) provided in pertinent part:\n\u201cA defendant who is receiving psychotropic drugs or other medications under medical direction is entitled to a hearing on the issue of his fitness while under medication.\u201d 725 ILCS 5/104 \u2014 21(a) (West 1994).\nThe legislature has since rewritten the statute to remove that entitlement:\n\u201cA defendant who is receiving psychotropic drugs shall not be presumed to be unfit to stand trial solely by virtue of the receipt of those drugs or medications.\u201d 725 ILCS 5/104 \u2014 21(a) (West 1996).\nIt is true that in Mitchell our supreme court held that the denial of a section 104 \u2014 21(a) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 38, par. 104\u201421(a)) fitness hearing is not in and of itself a constitutional deprivation because the administration of psychotropic medication is not equivalent to a bona fide doubt as to the accused\u2019s fitness to stand trial. Mitchell, 189 Ill. 2d at 327-31. The holding in Mitchell, however, did not alter the fact that, when a bona fide doubt of defendant\u2019s fitness is raised outside the context of section 104 \u2014 21(a), the court should rule on the issue before proceeding further and the failure to conduct an inquiry concerning competency violates the accused\u2019s constitutional right to due process of law. See Mitchell, 189 Ill. 2d at 326-27.\nThe allegations in defendant\u2019s first postconviction petition go beyond the bare allegation that he was taking psychotropic medication at the time of his guilty plea and was therefore denied a fitness hearing under the former section 104 \u2014 21(a). Defendant alleged other facts that could support a bona fide doubt of his fitness, such as his attempted suicide two days before he pleaded guilty. Defendant also alleged in his first petition that he was denied his constitutional right to the effective assistance of counsel when his trial counsel failed to request a fitness hearing. We believe that these allegations are sufficient to raise the gist of a constitutional claim. See Edwards, 197 Ill. 2d at 244. Accordingly, we hold that the trial court erred in dismissing defendant\u2019s second postconviction petition pursuant to section 122\u2014 2.1(a)(2) of the Act.\nC. Single Subject Rule\nDefendant\u2019s last contention on appeal is that Public Act 83\u2014 942 (Pub. Act 83 \u2014 942, eff. November 23, 1983), which amended the Act to allow summary dismissals of postconviction petitions after initial review by the trial court, violates the single subject rule of article iy section 8, of the Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. IV \u00a7 8). We rejected this argument in People v. Vilces, 321 Ill. App. 3d 937, 944-45 (2001). This argument has also been rejected by every other district of the appellate court that has addressed the issue. See Stewart, 326 Ill. App. 3d at 939; People v. Sharpe, 321 Ill. App. 3d 994, 997 (2001); People v. Dorris, 319 Ill. App. 3d 579, 585 (2001); People v. Jones, 318 Ill. App. 3d 1189, 1193 (2001); People v. Roberts, 318 Ill. App. 3d 719, 733-34 (2000). We continue to hold that Public Act 83\u2014 942 does not violate the single subject rule.\nIII. CONCLUSION\nFor the foregoing reasons, we reverse the circuit court\u2019s order dismissing defendant\u2019s second postconviction petition and remand the cause for further proceedings in accordance with sections 122 \u2014 4 through 122 \u2014 6 of the Act (725 ILCS 5/122 \u2014 4 through 122 \u2014 6 (West 2000)).\nReversed and remanded with directions.\nMcLAREN and BYRNE, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE KAPALA" } ], "attorneys": [ "G. Joseph Weller and Thomas A. Lilien, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Elgin, for appellant.", "Joseph E. Birkett, State\u2019s Attorney, of Wheaton (Martin E Moltz, of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), and Barry W Jacobs, of Chicago, for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. STEVEN SAWCZENKO, Defendant-Appellant.\nSecond District\nNo. 2\u201400\u20141358\nOpinion filed April 12, 2002.\nG. Joseph Weller and Thomas A. Lilien, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Elgin, for appellant.\nJoseph E. Birkett, State\u2019s Attorney, of Wheaton (Martin E Moltz, of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), and Barry W Jacobs, of Chicago, for the People." }, "file_name": "0888-01", "first_page_order": 906, "last_page_order": 917 }