{ "id": 1472368, "name": "In re MARRIAGE OF CLAYTON KIRKPATRICK, Petitioner Appellee, and BARBARA KIRKPATRICK, Respondent-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "In re Marriage of Kirkpatrick", "decision_date": "2002-04-18", "docket_number": "No. 2\u201400\u20141411", "first_page": "202", "last_page": "213", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "329 Ill. App. 3d 202" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "90 Ill. App. 3d 649", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3159646 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "653" }, { "page": "653" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/90/0649-01" ] }, { "cite": "131 Ill. App. 3d 119", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3436621 ], "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "122" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/131/0119-01" ] }, { "cite": "255 Ill. App. 3d 374", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2991306 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "390" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/255/0374-01" ] }, { "cite": "36 Ill. App. 3d 508", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2630071 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1976, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "510-11", "parenthetical": "wife stayed away for health reasons on doctor's advice" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/36/0508-01" ] }, { "cite": "55 Ill. App. 3d 286", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3408445 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "289", "parenthetical": "record showed complainant encouraged spouse's vacation until dispute over payment for it" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/55/0286-01" ] }, { "cite": "132 Ill. App. 3d 439", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3443753 ], "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "441" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/132/0439-01" ] }, { "cite": "149 Ill. 2d 190", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5599792 ], "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "195" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/149/0190-01" ] }, { "cite": "198 Ill. 2d 21", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 29953 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "40" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/198/0021-01" ] }, { "cite": "198 Ill. 2d 249", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 29937 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "257" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/198/0249-01" ] }, { "cite": "198 Ill. 2d 156", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 29939 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "163" }, { "page": "163" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/198/0156-01" ] }, { "cite": "24 Ill. App. 3d 436", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5309699 ], "year": 1974, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "440-41" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/24/0436-01" ] }, { "cite": "44 Ill. App. 3d 519", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2811188 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1976, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "527-28" }, { "page": "527", "parenthetical": "husband did not prove that wife refused to accompany him when he moved because of his job" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/44/0519-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 961, "char_count": 27849, "ocr_confidence": 0.745, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.5828155114230504e-08, "percentile": 0.28698738806779855 }, "sha256": "f1e5812c6303679424306be3a2ac1f76e0d2bec50cc34a64f5d77d953403f3cc", "simhash": "1:0be6ec0866cd41f6", "word_count": 4449 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T18:00:16.668960+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "In re MARRIAGE OF CLAYTON KIRKPATRICK, Petitioner Appellee, and BARBARA KIRKPATRICK, Respondent-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE O\u2019MALLEY\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nRespondent, Barbara Kirkpatrick, appeals from a judgment of dissolution of marriage that dissolved the bonds of matrimony between respondent and petitioner, Clayton Kirkpatrick. The judgment was based on the trial court\u2019s finding that respondent was guilty of extreme and repeated mental cruelty toward petitioner. Respondent contends that the trial court erred in making its finding because (1) her conduct in merely leaving petitioner was not mental cruelty but at most was desertion for less than one year which, under the specific provisions of the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act (Act) (750 ILCS 5/101 et seq. (West 2000)), does not constitute a proper ground for the dissolution of a marriage and (2) the trial court\u2019s finding of extreme and repeated mental cruelty was against the manifest weight of the evidence. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.\nThe parties were married in Illinois on January 8, 2000. On June 25, 2000, petitioner filed a petition for the dissolution of the marriage. The petition alleged (1) that irreconcilable differences had caused the irretrievable breakdown of the marriage and (2) that, without cause or provocation by petitioner, respondent had been guilty of extreme and repeated mental cruelty toward petitioner. On November 13, 2000, at the start of an evidentiary hearing on the petition, the trial court granted respondent\u2019s motion for judgment on the pleadings with respect to the part of the petition based on the allegation of irreconcilable differences. The hearing then proceeded only on the allegation of extreme and repeated mental cruelty. In order to adequately address respondent\u2019s contention that the trial court\u2019s finding was against the manifest weight of the evidence, we set out in some detail the testimony and other evidence presented at the hearing.\nAt the evidentiary hearing, petitioner testified that his date of birth was January 8, 1915. Petitioner did not know respondent\u2019s age. January 8, 2000, the date of the wedding, was a Saturday. After the wedding, the parties returned immediately to petitioner\u2019s house in Glen Ellyn. According to petitioner, on the Wednesday following the wedding, respondent left his house and went to live in her own house in Barrington. When respondent left, she told petitioner that she needed a rest and that she wanted to take a vacation. Respondent took virtually all of her possessions with her.\nRespondent had been petitioner\u2019s caretaker for about six months prior to the marriage. As petitioner\u2019s caretaker, respondent lived at petitioner\u2019s house and her duties included shopping, cooking, and cleaning. Petitioner hired respondent to live at his house \u201cregularly.\u201d However, during the time that she was petitioner\u2019s caretaker, respondent was frequently absent from petitioner\u2019s house from Saturday night until Monday morning. Petitioner paid respondent $40,000 per year to be his caretaker.\nPetitioner further testified that, prior to the marriage, when respondent was his caretaker, he gave respondent a charge card. Petitioner told respondent that she could use the charge card to purchase groceries for his household. After the marriage, respondent asked petitioner if she could continue to use the charge card. Petitioner told respondent, \u201cyes, but don\u2019t abuse it.\u201d Petitioner had no knowledge as to whether respondent used the charge card between the time of the wedding on Saturday and the time respondent left his house the following Wednesday. Petitioner believed that after respondent left she used the charge card to purchase a new furnace, new air conditioning, and a new hot water heater for her home in Barrington. The charges for these items totaled more than $7,000. Petitioner had no interest in respondent\u2019s home in Barrington. Petitioner subsequently canceled respondent\u2019s credit card.\nPetitioner further testified that after respondent moved out of his house she never came back. After respondent left, petitioner attempted to telephone respondent at her home in Barrington but got no response from respondent for several weeks. Petitioner first attempted to call respondent shortly after she left. Over the next several weeks, petitioner made \u201cfour or five\u201d unsuccessful attempts to call respondent. During this period, petitioner did not receive any calls, letters, or notes from respondent.\nPetitioner further testified that before respondent left she offered no explanation as to why she was leaving other than that she needed a vacation. In response to petitioner\u2019s queries as to how long respondent was planning to be gone, respondent stated that \u201cshe didn\u2019t know.\u201d When respondent left petitioner\u2019s home, she took her keys to petitioner\u2019s house and a garage door opener with her. About a week after respondent left, a neighbor of petitioner found the keys and the garage door opener in the neighbor\u2019s mailbox. There was no note with these items and petitioner did not receive any communication from respondent regarding the keys and the garage door opener.\nPetitioner further testified that before respondent left she did not complain to him about anything that he had done. Petitioner could not recall any controversies between him and -respondent that occurred between the time that they were married and the time that respondent left. Petitioner acknowledged that respondent did not like his adult children from a prior marriage, that respondent did not want to have anything to do with his children, and that respondent did not want his children to come to petitioner\u2019s house.\nPetitioner further testified that at the time of his marriage to respondent he had medical problems. Petitioner\u2019s medical problems included trouble with his spine and legs, heart problems, and problems related to a prior series of strokes. Petitioner was under the care of physicians for these problems. Because of these medical problems, petitioner\u2019s physicians had recommended that he have a full-time caretaker. A full-time caretaker was necessary because petitioner\u2019s physicians had advised him that if he had another stroke it could be fatal unless he received immediate attention. Petitioner had discussed this need for full-time care with respondent. It was petitioner\u2019s expectation that if he married respondent she would be with him 24 hours a day. Petitioner believed that respondent understood this expectation.\nPetitioner further testified that when respondent left she did not make any arrangements to have someone else take care of him. Immediately after respondent left, one or the other of petitioner\u2019s sons came to petitioner\u2019s home from time to time to check on petitioner. However, petitioner was without full-time care. Petitioner subsequently hired another full-time caretaker.\nPetitioner further testified that for years prior to his marriage to respondent he had been on various medications. After respondent left, petitioner began taking additional medications that he had not previously taken. One of these medications was Zoloft. Petitioner testified that he was taking Zoloft for \u201cdepression and a few other things, loss of memory, unconscious fears of things and things like that where I was not cogitating very well.\u201d Before respondent left, petitioner had not suffered from such mental difficulties. Petitioner presented a document that was described as a document that a pharmacist gave petitioner when he obtained the Zoloft. The document was admitted into evidence. Petitioner also began taking another medication after respondent left. This medication, which petitioner could not recall the name of, was for the relief of tensions. Petitioner described his physical condition since respondent left by stating, \u201c[w]ell, I\u2019m an old man and my health continues to erode and I think probably I\u2019m less capable of living well than I was at that time.\u201d\nPetitioner further testified that he never received an explanation from respondent as to why she left his home on the Wednesday following their wedding. After respondent left, petitioner first talked to respondent in a telephone conversation with her about three or four weeks later. Petitioner and respondent subsequently had several additional telephone conversations. During one of these conversations, petitioner asked respondent if she was coming back. Respondent stated that she wanted to come back but did not know when that -would be. During one of these phone calls, respondent asked petitioner about the possibility of repairing the marriage. Petitioner testified that he ducked the question and respondent then hung up. In subsequent calls and letters, respondent stated that she wanted to return to petitioner\u2019s home. However, respondent never returned. Petitioner testified that it was his desire to have his marriage dissolved.\nOn cross-examination, petitioner acknowledged that during the entire time that he knew respondent, both before and after the marriage, respondent never acted toward him in anything other than a loving, caring manner. After respondent left, petitioner never told respondent that he wanted her to come back with him. Petitioner explained that after respondent left he began taking Zoloft for the troubles that he was having with his brain, which \u201cwasn\u2019t functioning very well.\u201d Petitioner considered respondent\u2019s leaving to be a factor in his brain not functioning very well because he was upset by her leaving and her refusal to talk to him for several weeks. Petitioner testified that he married respondent because he thought it would be a good marriage and because he \u201cfigured if she was married she would stay with [him], whereas before she would spend a lot of time in Bar-rington.\u201d Petitioner\u2019s principal concern after respondent left was that respondent was no longer in his house to take care of him. Petitioner estimated his net worth to be about $12 million.\nPetitioner acknowledged that he signed an answer to a bill of particulars that respondent had filed. At respondent\u2019s request, the trial court took judicial notice of one of petitioner\u2019s answers to the bill of particulars. (We conclude that the trial court viewed the answer as a judicial admission.) That answer stated, \u201cpetitioner takes several prescription medications for various physical ailments; [hjowever, none are directly related to the emotional tension suffered as a result of the petitioner\u2019s failed marriage.\u201d\nOn examination by petitioner\u2019s attorney, respondent testified that her date of birth was February 3,1939. After respondent and petitioner were married, respondent initially stayed with petitioner in his house. However, respondent was currently residing in her own house in Bar-rington. According to respondent, she left petitioner\u2019s house on the Thursday following the wedding. Respondent testified that she tried to come back the following Sunday. On that Sunday, respondent went to petitioner\u2019s house. However, when respondent arrived at petitioner\u2019s house she did not go in because, based on the cars parked in the driveway, respondent believed that all of petitioner\u2019s children were in the house. Respondent walked up to the front door but decided not to go in because \u201cit would just be nothing but yelling and screaming. I didn\u2019t want any part of it.\u201d Respondent has not gone back to petitioner\u2019s house since that Sunday. Respondent acknowledged that she dropped her keys to petitioner\u2019s house and her garage door opener in the mail box of one of petitioner\u2019s neighbors.\nAfter leaving petitioner, respondent went to stay at her house in Barrington. Respondent subsequently used the credit card that she had received from petitioner to purchase a furnace and air conditioning for her house in Barrington. Respondent used the credit card because the furnace went out and respondent did not have any other money. Respondent testified that her purchase of the furnace and the air conditioning was a package deal.\nRespondent denied any knowledge of petitioner\u2019s attempts to call her after she left him. Respondent acknowledged that she had caller ID in her home but testified that it did not always work. After respondent\u2019s furnace went out, respondent lived with her daughter for a while. Respondent testified that she tried to call petitioner about once a week after she left him but got no answer.\nOn examination by her own attorney, respondent explained why she left the keys and the garage door opener in the mailbox of one of petitioner\u2019s neighbors as follows:\n\u201cBecause his kids were cruel and mean to me starting the very next morning after we got married, calling, making accusations, demands. They wanted a lie detector test.\nI mean they just made life so miserable and unbearable that I just couldn\u2019t handle it, and that\u2019s not \u2014 I thought Curt would at least stand up for me, but he took their sides in everything, and they were calling me a thief over a set, dumb set of dishes that couldn\u2019t even have been worth a hundred dollars.\nAnd then the pressure got so bad on me that I just left, and I thought it would settle down if I left and he could have a talk with them and get everything under some kind of control.\nHe was running to see his attorney, he was running \u2014 I wasn\u2019t allowed to answer the telephone. He wanted me just to sit inside the house, not go anyplace.\nSo I felt like I was just forced out of there. And I put the keys in the mailbox. I was going to come back and all his kids were there and I thought, oh no, it\u2019s just more problems than its worth.\u201d\nOn additional direct examination by her attorney, respondent testified that when she left petitioner she did not plan on it being a permanent move. Respondent still wanted to come back to petitioner and hoped that it could be worked out. Respondent introduced a letter into evidence that she asked her attorney to write to petitioner\u2019s attorney about a week after she left petitioner. In the letter, respondent requested a reconciliation meeting.\nIn rebuttal testimony, petitioner testified that his children were not against his marriage to respondent. Petitioner had talked to all of his children and they had accepted the marriage. Petitioner denied any knowledge of his children being angry with respondent the morning after the wedding or being angry with or harassing respondent at any other time after the wedding.\nOn cross-examination, petitioner acknowledged that he was not always present in every room of his house with his children when they were in the house. On redirect examination, petitioner testified that respondent never indicated to him that his children were harassing her. Respondent told petitioner only that she did not like his children.\nThe trial court found that petitioner had proved by good and sufficient evidence the allegation in the petition that respondent was guilty of extreme and repeated mental cruelty. In making its finding, the trial court commented:\n\u201cThe essence of this case is, in fact, on grounds. The petitioner has alleged that the respondent has been guilty of extreme and repeated mental cruelty without any cause or provocation on his part.\nThe essence of mental cruelty is the effect upon the petitioner and its effect on the mental and physical well-being of the party who is allegedly exposed to mental cruelty.\nIn this case given Mr. Kirkpatrick\u2019s physical condition and his frailties and Mrs. Kirkpatrick\u2019s knowledge of those infirmities, knowledge of his need for constant and continuing care, it is the Court\u2019s finding that leaving with no word as to when she will return, how he is to care for himself, [without] making any alternative arrangements for his care and making no arrangements for his needs constitutes mental cruelty. The fact that it continued constitutes repeated mental cruelty.\nThe Court is certainly able to infer that the effect on anyone in the condition of Mr. Kirkpatrick would be debilitating and would have a deleterious effect on him.\u201d\nThe trial court subsequently entered a judgment dissolving the parties\u2019 marriage. Respondent filed a timely notice of appeal.\nOn appeal, respondent contends that she is entitled to the reversal of the trial court\u2019s finding that she was guilty of extreme and repeated mental cruelty and to the vacation of the judgment of dissolution. Respondent argues that the trial court erred in making the finding because (1) her conduct in merely leaving petitioner was not mental cruelty but at most was desertion for less than one year which, under the specific provisions of the Act, could not constitute a proper ground for the dissolution; and (2) even if merely leaving one\u2019s spouse could constitute extreme and repeated mental cruelty, the trial court\u2019s finding that her conduct in merely leaving petitioner constituted extreme and repeated mental cruelty was against the manifest weight of the evidence.\nRespondent\u2019s first argument based on the provisions of the Act consists of several subarguments. Respondent initially argues that the real basis of the trial court\u2019s finding was desertion rather than extreme and repeated mental cruelty. In support of this position, respondent correctly notes that Illinois courts have defined extreme and repeated mental cruelty as:\n\u201c[A]n unprovoked \u2018course of abusive and humiliating treatment, calculated or obviously of the nature to torture, discommode, or render miserable the life of the opposite spouse, which conduct actually affects the physical or mental health of the spouse.\u2019 \u201d Graham v. Graham, 44 Ill. App. 3d 519, 527-28 (1976), quoting Gregory v. Gregory, 24 Ill. App. 3d 436, 440-41 (1974).\nRespondent next asserts that petitioner failed to present any evidence that she engaged in such conduct toward petitioner. In support of this assertion, respondent maintains that the record shows that she never threatened to harm, never verbally abused, and never even argued with petitioner. Respondent also points to petitioner\u2019s own testimony that she always acted in a caring, loving way toward him. Based on this record, respondent argues that it is apparent that her leaving petitioner\u2019s home \u2014 i.e., her \u201cdesertion\u201d rather than any mental cruelty by her toward petitioner \u2014 must have been the sole basis of the trial court\u2019s ruling.\nRespondent next points to section 401(a)(1) of the Act (750 ILCS 5/401(a)(l) (West 2000)) and argues that certain language in section 401(a)(1) shows that the trial court\u2019s ruling was erroneous. The language in section 401(a)(1) that respondent relies on (the subject language) provides:\n\u201c(a) The court shall enter a judgment of dissolution of marriage if *** one of the following grounds for dissolution has been proved:\n(1) That, without cause or provocation by the petitioner: the respondent *** has wilfully deserted or absented himself or herself from the petitioner for the space of one year, *** or has been guilty of extreme and repeated physical or mental cruelty ***.\u201d 750 ILCS 5/401(a)(l) (West 2000).\nBased on the subject language, respondent argues that the trial court\u2019s finding of mental cruelty violates one of the fundamental rules of statutory construction. According to respondent, the rule requires that where a general statutory provision and a specific statutory provision both relate to the same subject, the specific provision controls and should be applied (specificity rule). In respondent\u2019s view, in a case such as this case, a correct application of the specificity rule to the subject language would result in the language that explicitly and specifically addresses desertion controlling over the more general provisions that address mental cruelty.\nRespondent further argues that when the statute is construed in this way it is clear that the language addressing desertion should control whether her leaving petitioner, which she characterizes as a desertion, constituted a sufficient ground for the dissolution. Respondent concludes that the trial court erred because her desertion of petitioner was for less than one year and section 401(a)(1) provides that desertion is a sufficient ground for dissolution only if it was \u201cfor the space of one year\u201d (750 ILCS 5/401(a)(1) (West 2000)).\nRespondent\u2019s argument requires us to construe section 401(a)(1) of the Act (750 ILCS 5/401(a)(1) (West 2000)). Familiar principles guide us when construing a statute.\nThe primary goal of statutory construction is to ascertain and give effect to the true intent of the legislature. In re Marriage of Kates, 198 Ill. 2d 156, 163 (2001). The best evidence of legislative intent is the language in the statute, which should be given its plain and ordinary meaning. M.A.K. v. Rush-Presbyterian-St. Luke\u2019s Medical Center, 198 Ill. 2d 249, 257 (2001). It is presumed that the legislature did not intend absurdity, inconvenience, or injustice in enacting the statute. Burger v. Lutheran General Hospital, 198 Ill. 2d 21, 40 (2001).\nOur supreme court has stated the specificity rule as follows: where there are two statutory provisions, one of which is general and designed to apply to cases generally, and the other is particular and relates to only one subject, the particular provision prevails. Hernon v. E.W. Corrigan Construction Co., 149 Ill. 2d 190, 195 (1992). Generally, this specificity rule is applied when the two provisions are in conflict. See Brown v. Mason, 132 Ill. App. 3d 439, 441 (1985). Statutory construction is a question of law and our review therefore is de novo. Kates, 198 Ill. 2d at 163.\nIn this case, we agree with parts of respondent\u2019s argument. However, we disagree with respondent\u2019s overall conclusion. We agree with respondent that the language of section 401(a)(1) that specifically addresses desertion plainly applies when desertion by itself, with nothing more, is the alleged statutory ground for a dissolution. However, we disagree with respondent\u2019s argument that the specificity rule therefore applies in this case and requires her conduct to be evaluated as a desertion under the Act. Respondent does not explain how the language she relies on precludes the use of conduct such as a spouse\u2019s leaving a marriage or a separation as a factor in one of the other grounds for dissolution. We can discern nothing in the language that precludes the use of a leaving or a separation as a factor when one of the other statutory grounds for dissolution is alleged.\nHere, petitioner did not base his petition for the dissolution of the marriage on respondent\u2019s alleged desertion. Rather, petitioner based the petition on respondent\u2019s alleged mental cruelty. It is true that respondent\u2019s leaving petitioner is a significant factor in the alleged mental cruelty. However, the alleged mental cruelty is not based on the leaving, per se. Instead, the alleged mental cruelty is based on the effects of the leaving on petitioner. As we read the Act, the specificity rule does not preclude such an allegation.\nRespondent\u2019s reliance on Voss v. Voss, 55 Ill. App. 3d 286 (1977), Graham v. Graham, 44 Ill. App. 3d 519 (1976), and Matthews v. Matthews, 36 Ill. App. 3d 508 (1976), as additional support for her statutory construction argument does not change our conclusion. In each of these cases, the trial court granted a request for dissolution on the ground of mental cruelty and the appellate court reversed the judgment of dissolution. Respondent cites these cases as examples of the appellate court holding that desertion for less than one year does not constitute mental cruelty. Respondent also urges us to regard these cases as authority for the proposition that a desertion of less than one year cannot be considered as a factor in a determination of mental cruelty.\nWe are not persuaded that these cases stand for such a proposi-tian. Voss, Graham, and Matthews each involved an alleged desertion or separation in the context of a claim of mental cruelty. It is true that in each of these cases the appellate court reversed a finding of mental cruelty. However, none of the reversals was because the appellate court held that the desertion or separation could not be a factor in determining whether mental cruelty was proved. Rather, in each of these cases the appellate court determined that the effect of the desertion or separation in that particular case had not been proved. See Voss, 55 Ill. App. 3d at 289 (record showed complainant encouraged spouse\u2019s vacation until dispute over payment for it); Graham, 44 Ill. App. 3d at 527 (husband did not prove that wife refused to accompany him when he moved because of his job); Matthews, 36 Ill. App. 3d at 510-11 (wife stayed away for health reasons on doctor\u2019s advice).\nFor all these reasons, we conclude that respondent\u2019s statutory construction argument does not require the reversal of the trial court\u2019s finding.\nRespondent next argues that the trial court\u2019s finding was against the manifest weight of the evidence. In support of this argument, respondent asserts that there was no evidence that her leaving petitioner (1) was cruel to petitioner or (2) had any effect on petitioner\u2019s physical or mental health.\nAlong with several other grounds for dissolution, the Act provides for dissolution upon proof that, \u201cwithout cause or provocation by the petitioner,\u201d the respondent \u201chas been guilty of extreme and repeated *** mental cruelty.\u201d 750 ILCS 5/401(a)(1) (West 2000). We have set forth above the Illinois courts\u2019 definition of mental cruelty.\nThe determination of the issue of grounds for the dissolution of a marriage is a matter for the trial court, and the trial court\u2019s finding will not be disturbed unless it is against the manifest weight of the evidence. In re Marriage of Jerome, 255 Ill. App. 3d 374, 390 (1994). Because a determination of whether the evidence constitutes sufficient proof of mental cruelty depends on the circumstances of each case, and because the assessment of the evidence is best done by the trial court, great deference is given to a trial court\u2019s finding that the evidence was sufficient to establish the ground of mental cruelty. Hollo v. Hollo, 131 Ill. App. 3d 119, 122 (1985).\nWhether a respondent\u2019s alleged misconduct constituted mental cruelty is determined primarily by the effect of the alleged misconduct on the complaining party. In re Marriage of Semmler, 90 Ill. App. 3d 649, 653 (1980). Therefore, a trial court\u2019s determination is necessarily highly individualized and depends on the total factual background of each case. Semmler, 90 Ill. App. 3d at 653.\nIn this case, the trial court\u2019s comments show that it appropriately focused on the effect of respondent\u2019s alleged misconduct on petitioner\u2019s mental and physical well-being. The record shows that respondent was well aware of petitioner\u2019s frailties and petitioner\u2019s need for constant care. Nonetheless, respondent left petitioner without indicating whether or when she would return and without making alternative arrangements for petitioner\u2019s care. The trial court inferred from the evidence that respondent\u2019s conduct was debilitating to petitioner and had a deleterious effect on him. The trial court therefore concluded that this conduct constituted mental cruelty and that its continuation constituted repeated mental cruelty.\nIn view of the entire factual background of this case, we cannot say that the trial court\u2019s determination that respondent\u2019s conduct constituted extreme and repeated mental cruelty was against the manifest weight of the evidence.\nThe judgment of the circuit court of Du Page County is affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nMcLAREN and BYRNE, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE O\u2019MALLEY" } ], "attorneys": [ "Charles A. Valente and Colby M. Green, both of Krasnow, Sanberg, Corn-blath & Hobbs, of Chicago, for appellant.", "Thomas M. Newman and James E. Olguin, both of Peregrine, Stime, Newman, Ritzman & Bruckner, Ltd., of Wheaton, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "In re MARRIAGE OF CLAYTON KIRKPATRICK, Petitioner Appellee, and BARBARA KIRKPATRICK, Respondent-Appellant.\nSecond District\nNo. 2\u201400\u20141411\nOpinion filed April 18, 2002.\nCharles A. Valente and Colby M. Green, both of Krasnow, Sanberg, Corn-blath & Hobbs, of Chicago, for appellant.\nThomas M. Newman and James E. Olguin, both of Peregrine, Stime, Newman, Ritzman & Bruckner, Ltd., of Wheaton, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0202-01", "first_page_order": 220, "last_page_order": 231 }