{ "id": 1472329, "name": "KATHLEEN MAFFETT et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. THURMAN J. BLISS et al., Defendants-Appellees", "name_abbreviation": "Maffett v. Bliss", "decision_date": "2002-04-23", "docket_number": "No. 4\u201401\u20140569", "first_page": "562", "last_page": "578", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "329 Ill. App. 3d 562" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "433 N.E.2d 253", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "258", "parenthetical": "determining whether evidence is cumulative of other evidence involves a determination whether the \"new\" evidence adds anything to what was already before the jury" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "89 Ill. 2d 273", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5493996 ], "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "284", "parenthetical": "determining whether evidence is cumulative of other evidence involves a determination whether the \"new\" evidence adds anything to what was already before the jury" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/89/0273-01" ] }, { "cite": "754 N.E.2d 839", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "849" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "324 Ill. App. 3d 114", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 256282 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "125" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/324/0114-01" ] }, { "cite": "485 N.E.2d 1369", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 11041556 ], "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1375", "parenthetical": "in which the Indiana Appellate Court held that the fact that a police officer described weather and road conditions 25 minutes after the accident went to the weight to be accorded the testimony and not to its admissibility" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ne2d/485/1369-01" ] }, { "cite": "56 A.L.R.3d 575", "category": "reporters:specialty", "reporter": "A.L.R. 3d", "year": 1974, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00a7\u00a7 2, 3" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "424 F.2d 1176", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 2251239 ], "year": 1970, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "citing cases" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/424/1176-01" ] }, { "cite": "17 Ill. App. 136", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App.", "case_ids": [ 867311 ], "year": 1885, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "140-41", "parenthetical": "holding that because the weather conditions on the night of accident were \"material as bearing upon the question of *** negligence,\" weather observations taken at intervals during the day and night, both before and after the accident, should have been admitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app/17/0136-01" ] }, { "cite": "545 N.E.2d 150", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "152" }, { "page": "152" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "188 Ill. App. 3d 1078", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2690865 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1081" }, { "page": "1081" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/188/1078-01" ] }, { "cite": "57 A.L.R.3d 713", "category": "reporters:specialty", "reporter": "A.L.R. 3d", "year": 1974, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00a7 3" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "634 N.E.2d 1276", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1279" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "261 Ill. App. 3d 1068", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5371312 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1072" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/261/1068-01" ] }, { "cite": "568 N.E.2d 46", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "50" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "209 Ill. App. 3d 128", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2541458 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "135" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/209/0128-01" ] }, { "cite": "718 N.E.2d 628", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "639" }, { "page": "639" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "307 Ill. App. 3d 449", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 173611 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "463" }, { "page": "463" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/307/0449-01" ] }, { "cite": "680 N.E.2d 747", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "748" }, { "page": "750" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "288 Ill. App. 3d 408", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1597003 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "409-10" }, { "page": "412" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/288/0408-01" ] }, { "cite": "641 N.E.2d 1240", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1244" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "267 Ill. App. 3d 201", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 333183 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "206" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/267/0201-01" ] }, { "cite": "733 N.E.2d 1275", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 4, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1279" }, { "page": "1280" }, { "page": "1281" }, { "page": "1281" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "192 Ill. 2d 49", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 453258 ], "weight": 4, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "57" }, { "page": "59" }, { "page": "60" }, { "page": "60" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/192/0049-01" ] }, { "cite": "621 N.E.2d 1046", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1050", "parenthetical": "offered evidence is relevant if it renders a matter in issue more or less probable in light of logic and experience" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "251 Ill. App. 3d 244", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2959705 ], "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "250", "parenthetical": "offered evidence is relevant if it renders a matter in issue more or less probable in light of logic and experience" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/251/0244-01" ] }, { "cite": "740 N.E.2d 9", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "18", "parenthetical": "\"even if the evidence is arguably relevant it may still be excluded if it would confuse the issues or tend to mislead the jury\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "317 Ill. App. 3d 41", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1026067 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "53", "parenthetical": "\"even if the evidence is arguably relevant it may still be excluded if it would confuse the issues or tend to mislead the jury\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/317/0041-01" ] }, { "cite": "701 N.E.2d 1107", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1116" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "296 Ill. App. 3d 416", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 222646 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "430" }, { "page": "430" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/296/0416-01" ] }, { "cite": "626 N.E.2d 190", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "194", "parenthetical": "\"Even relevant evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by such factors as prejudice, confusion, or potential to mislead the jury\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "157 Ill. 2d 304", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 778577 ], "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "313", "parenthetical": "\"Even relevant evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by such factors as prejudice, confusion, or potential to mislead the jury\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/157/0304-01" ] }, { "cite": "704 N.E.2d 403", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1998, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "184 Ill. 2d 328", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 926960 ], "year": 1998, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/184/0328-01" ] }, { "cite": "684 N.E.2d 1344", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1350" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "292 Ill. App. 3d 242", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1725095 ], "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "251" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/292/0242-01" ] }, { "cite": "706 N.E.2d 55", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "59" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "302 Ill. App. 3d 364", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1352857 ], "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "367" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/302/0364-01" ] }, { "cite": "632 N.E.2d 322", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "324", "parenthetical": "rebuttal evidence is admissible \"if it tends to explain, repel, contradict or disprove the testimony of a witness\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "260 Ill. App. 3d 866", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2865685 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "870", "parenthetical": "rebuttal evidence is admissible \"if it tends to explain, repel, contradict or disprove the testimony of a witness\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/260/0866-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1490, "char_count": 42002, "ocr_confidence": 0.77, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.5048509511409517e-07, "percentile": 0.666323403410778 }, "sha256": "7695558f33ab2badaa29ed32869d136946c3c503fa79413a9c4fb3ced8bd1dc4", "simhash": "1:ba70d28a375cee62", "word_count": 6971 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T18:00:16.668960+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "KATHLEEN MAFFETT et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. THURMAN J. BLISS et al., Defendants-Appellees." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE STEIGMANN\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nIn August 1998, plaintiffs, Kathleen and Matthew Maffett, sued defendants, Thurman and James Bliss, for injuries Kathleen sustained when her minivan collided with a bean head attached to James\u2019 combine, which was being driven by Thurman. (A bean head is a 2IV2-foot-wide raised steel platform used to harvest crops.) Following a January 2001 jury trial, the jury returned a verdict in favor of the Blisses and against the Maffetts.\nThe Maffetts appeal, arguing that (1) the trial court erred by (a) excluding the testimony of certain witnesses regarding the fog and visibility near the time of the accident, (b) refusing to allow rebuttal evidence regarding visibility and fog, (c) allowing evidence regarding Kathleen\u2019s prior vision problems, (d) permitting the Blisses to cross-examine one of the Maffetts\u2019 expert witnesses using various journal articles without having timely disclosed those articles during discovery, (e) permitting the Blisses to impeach one of the Maffetts\u2019 expert witnesses with a note the witness had written to himself regarding Kathleen\u2019s symptoms of post-traumatic stress disorder, (f) allowing the Blisses to cross-examine one of the Maffetts\u2019 expert witnesses regarding Kathleen\u2019s postaccident alcohol consumption, (g) allowing the Blisses to cross-examine the Maffetts regarding Kathleen\u2019s postacci-dent legal gambling activities, and (h) denying the Maffetts\u2019 motions for a new trial and for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (judgment n.o.v.); (2) the Blisses\u2019 counsel violated the court\u2019s order barring evidence that police had not ticketed Thurman for a traffic violation as a result of the accident; and (3) James violated the court\u2019s order barring evidence regarding the Blisses\u2019 financial status. We reverse and remand for a new trial.\nI. BACKGROUND\nOn the morning of October 14, 1996, Kathleen was driving her minivan west on 1600 North Road in McLean County. At the same time, Thurman was driving James\u2019 combine east on 1600 North Road. At around 7:35 a.m., Kathleen\u2019s minivan collided with the combine\u2019s bean head, which was raised between two or four feet off the roadway and hanging over into Kathleen\u2019s lane of traffic. The collision occurred over a culvert with cement side abutments and yellow-and-black-striped obstacle signs marking the sides of the culvert. As a result of the collision, Kathleen sustained very serious injuries.\nIn August 1998, the Maffetts filed a four-count complaint against the Blisses, alleging (1) negligence on the part of both Thurman and James (counts I and II) and (2) loss of consortium (counts III and IV), which they later amended.\nThe evidence at the January 2001 jury trial showed the following. On October 14, 1996, Kathleen woke up at 6:30 a.m. She typically left her house at 7:15 a.m. However, on that morning, she left her house earlier than usual after noticing that it was foggy. Kathleen secured her son in her car, turned on her headlights, and began driving to her baby-sitter\u2019s house. On the way there, the fog got \u201cthicker.\u201d After dropping off her son, Kathleen put her seat belt back on, backed out of the baby-sitter\u2019s driveway, and drove west on 1600 North Road toward the site of the accident. Due to head trauma sustained in the accident, Kathleen did not recall anything that happened after backing out of the baby-sitter\u2019s driveway.\nAs a result of the accident, Kathleen sustained fractures of her forehead, nose, jaw, left hand, wrist, and forearm; severe facial lacerations, a concussion, and damage to her femoral nerve. She has permanent facial scarring, was unable to bend her left wrist, and lost her senses of taste and smell. Kathleen also stated that since the accident, she had experienced episodes of confusion and panic, and she had been diagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder. She further stated that because of her injuries, she was unable to enjoy certain hobbies and ordinary activities.\nOn cross-examination, Kathleen acknowledged that she had encountered combines over culverts on previous occasions. In those situations, either she or the farmer stopped before the culvert and allowed the other person to pass. She also acknowledged that a reasonable person would reduce her speed where visibility was \u201csomewhat reduced\u201d on a country road during harvest season. Kathleen further stated that she had prior vision problems.\nLouis Saunier, a volunteer firefighter, testified that at around 7:45 a.m. on October 14, 1996, he was working at his body shop in Cooks-ville when he received an emergency call regarding the accident. He drove about four minutes to the accident scene and tried to stabilize Kathleen until other emergency workers arrived.\nRoyce Kraft, a volunteer firefighter and farmer, received a page at 7:58 a.m. that morning regarding the accident. He arrived at the scene around 8:11 a.m. and observed that the combine\u2019s bean head was resting on the minivan and Kathleen was pinned in the van.\nPaula Hammond, a volunteer emergency medical technician, was at her home in Anchor sometime before 8 a.m. when she received an emergency call regarding the accident. She drove to the fire station in Colfax and then rode in an ambulance to the accident scene. Hammond stated that it took her a little longer than usual to get to the fire station that morning because of the fog, and when she arrived at the accident scene, it was \u201cvery foggy.\u201d Upon arriving on the scene, Hammond helped stabilize Kathleen until emergency workers extricated her from the minivan. Kathleen was then transported by helicopter to the hospital.\nRobert Brown, a sergeant with the McLean County sheriffs department, received a call sometime between 8:30 a.m. and 9 a.m. on October 14, 1996, to go to the accident scene and reconstruct the accident. When he arrived at the scene about 30 minutes later, he noted that it was \u201cvery foggy.\u201d After discussing the accident investigation with other police officers, Brown formulated the opinion that based on the fog and the location of the accident, \u201cthe head on the combine was protruding into the van\u2019s lane.\u201d He also stated as follows: \u201cI knew it was very foggy on my way [to the accident scene] and just in my mind, I kind of thought fog might have something to do with this accident.\u201d\nBrown acknowledged that he did not know what the visibility conditions were like when the collision occurred. He also stated that if a witness testified that visibility at the time of the accident was one-quarter mile (1,320 feet), he would have no reason to dispute the witness. Brown did not have an opinion regarding what the weather conditions were at Thurman\u2019s house when Thurman left on the morning of the accident.\nCarl Boyd, a sergeant with the McLean County sheriffs department, was called to the accident scene from Bloomington. Although he did not recall what time he arrived, he remembered that he was delayed because it was very foggy. When he arrived at the scene, it was \u201cvery thick with fog.\u201d Boyd noticed that the minivan was facing west and was far over to the right side of its lane. The combine was facing east and the bean head was across the entire width of the roadway. According to Boyd, Thurman told him that the fog was patchy and appeared to get worse when Thurman turned onto 1600 North Road on the morning of the accident.\nBoyd acknowledged that he was not near the scene of the accident when it occurred, and he did not know what the weather conditions were at that time. He also stated that if Thurman testified that visibility at the time of the accident was one-quarter mile, Boyd would have no reason to dispute that testimony.\nWilliam Kinsella testified that on the day of the accident, he lived approximately 870 feet from the accident site. He stated that 1600 North Road was a blacktop, rural road that was busy from around 6:30 a.m. until 8:30 a.m. Soon after the accident, Thurman knocked on Kinsella\u2019s door and told him about the accident. Kinsella telephoned 9-1-1, and then he and Thurman drove to the accident scene, which was about two or three minutes away. Kinsella stated that it was foggy as they drove to the scene. After they arrived at the scene, emergency workers began arriving within about two minutes. Thurman told Kin-sella that weather conditions were clear when Thurman left his house that morning.\nPeggy Bliss, who was married to Thurman in October 1996 (they had since divorced), testified that between 5:30 a.m. and 6 a.m. on October 14, 1996, James called Thurman and asked him to drive the combine from Peggy and Thurman\u2019s house in rural Towanda to one of James\u2019 fields. Peggy was concerned about the \u201cpatchy fog\u201d and asked Thurman to wait until the fog lifted. James called about 45 or 50 minutes later and asked Thurman why he had not left. When Thurman left shortly thereafter, Peggy noticed that it was still \u201cfoggy, patchy.\u201d\nPeggy acknowledged that on the morning of the accident, she could \u201ckind of see\u201d her neighbor\u2019s house, which was about one-quarter mile away from her house. She also acknowledged that she was six miles from the accident scene at the time the accident occurred, and she did not know what the weather conditions were like when the collision occurred.\nDr. Robert Aherin, a farm safety expert at the University of Illinois, testified as the Maffetis\u2019 expert that an operator of a combine has the right to transport his equipment on public roadways. Combine operators also have a responsibility to assure that (1) the combine is readily recognized as a piece of farm equipment through lighting, markings, and visibility; and (2) other vehicle operators are allowed to use their traffic lane free from obstruction. Aherin stated that it is not reasonable to expect farmers to move equipment during the harvest season when it is foggy. He opined that if a careful and prudent combine operator encounters fog where visibility is not good (that is, less than 1,000 feet), he should move off the roadway if the combine is protruding into the oncoming traffic lane. Aherin also stated that even though no state law or regulation requires lighting on the bean head itself, safety experts have long recommended that when someone is moving equipment that is wider than the main transporting unit, fights should be placed on the extremities of the unit, particularly on the far left. The fighting should be adequate enough to allow approaching drivers to determine the width of the equipment.\nAherin also testified that the portion of 1600 North Road near the accident site was a fairly level roadway with a wide shoulder on most portions of the road. He stated that there were adequate places to pull over a combine along the roadway. Aherin acknowledged that if visibility were at least 1,000 feet, it is within regulation and appropriate for a farmer to move his combine from one field to another on a country roadway without removing the bean head. He also acknowledged that if visibility were at least 1,000 feet, an approaching driver would have sufficient time to see and react to a combine.\nDr. Ronald Ruhl, a professional engineer and an accident reconstruction expert, testified as the Maffetts\u2019 expert that 1600 North Road is a secondary road that is 16 feet wide. (A normal two-lane road is 24 feet wide.) He stated that there are two creeks near the portion of the road at the accident site, which makes the area conducive to fog formation. Ruhl also stated that the combine had fights on the cab but no fights or reflectors on the bean head. He estimated that prior to the accident, Kathleen was traveling between 40 and 50 miles per hour. He further estimated that at the time of the collision, her speed was less than 10 miles per hour, if not zero, and her minivan was near the other side of the culvert. Upon impact, the combine was just starting to cross the culvert, and the force of the impact pushed Kathleen\u2019s minivan back five or six feet.\nRuhl opined that the cause of the accident was the \u201cambushing\u201d of Kathleen\u2019s minivan by the combine, which had moved into the center of the roadway within about four seconds and blocked the entire roadway with the bean head. Ruhl explained that the term \u201cambush\u201d means that the combine had an unfit bean head and headlights on the cab that were spaced laterally at approximately the same distance as a truck\u2019s headlights. This configuration resulted in confusion to approaching drivers, who would perceive a normal width vehicle in the oncoming lane. Ruhl opined that Kathleen did not do anything that caused the accident.\nRuhl acknowledged that it would have been acceptable for Thurman to operate the combine on the roadway if visibility was 1,000 feet. He also acknowledged that if visibility was 1,000 feet at the time of the accident, Kathleen could have seen the combine\u2019s headlights.\nSeveral physicians, including Dr. Stephen Sabol, an oral and max-illofacial surgeon, Dr. Herman Dick, a neurologist, and Dr. Chris Dangles, an orthopedist, testified about Kathleen\u2019s various injuries and their treatment of her following the accident.\nDr. Douglas Bey, Kathleen\u2019s treating psychiatrist, testified that on June 22, 2000, he sent Kathleen a letter setting out what she had told him during their first session. That letter stated, in part, that Kathleen had told Bey that she lost her peripheral vision and had a blind spot in her left eye. Bey further stated that his review of Dick\u2019s reports and deposition indicated that \u201cthere was no restriction on [Kathleen\u2019s] driving.\u201d\nThurman testified that he left his home sometime before 7 a.m. on October 14, 1996. He intended to drive the combine to James\u2019 field near Cooksville. Thurman turned on the combine\u2019s fights, including two flashing amber fights. When he left his house, visibility was about one mile. When he was about two miles away from the accident site, it became foggy. When he turned onto 1600 North Road, it was still foggy, with visibility more than one-quarter of a mile. Thurman stated that he met two cars on the roadway and pulled off to let them go by without any problems.\nWhen Thurman first saw Kathleen\u2019s minivan, he was two or three seconds, or about 50 feet, away from the culvert. He kept his eyes on Kathleen\u2019s headlights, slowed down, and got in the middle of the road to cross the culvert. As he approached the culvert, he slowed down to four or five miles per hour and calculated that he could get across the culvert and out of the way before Kathleen\u2019s vehicle reached the culvert. When he realized the oncoming vehicle was not going to stop in time, he stopped the combine and was trying to shift it into reverse when the collision occurred. Thurman expected the oncoming vehicle to slow down because that was what usually happened when a vehicle approached his combine. He assumed that if he saw approaching vehicles, the drivers of those vehicles also saw the combine. Thurman did not notice the oncoming vehicle slowing down and did not realize until after the accident that Kathleen left skid marks measuring 137 feet.\nThurman acknowledged that the bean head stuck out into the oncoming traffic lane and did not have any lights on it. He also acknowledged that when he encountered fog on the morning of the accident, he decided to continue because he \u201ccould see fine.\u201d Just prior to the accident, he saw headlights coming over a hill that was one-quarter mile away from the culvert. Although he did not know how fast Kathleen was traveling, he believed that she was \u201cgoing at a high rate of speed.\u201d Thurman further acknowledged that he was not sure whether the combine was stopped, barely moving forward, or barely moving backward at the moment of impact. He denied having pulled off the roadway earlier that morning because of the foggy conditions.\nDr. Daniel Metz, a professional engineer in vehicle dynamics and accident reconstruction, testified for the Blisses that (1) there was not enough physical evidence to conduct \u201cany kind of a serious [accident] reconstruction;\u201d and (2) based on his review of the physical evidence, no one was at fault in this accident. Metz opined that no one could \u201cactually reconstruct the events of that morning [of the accident] in terms of fog density to perfection.\u201d He also opined that it was appropriate for Thurman to have the combine on the roadway at the time of the accident. Metz based that opinion on Thurman\u2019s testimony that visibility was one-quarter mile at the time of the accident. Metz also stated that the flashing amber lights on the cab of the combine made the combine more conspicuous. Metz stated that he did not agree or disagree with Ruhl\u2019s opinion that the combine ambushed Kathleen\u2019s minivan.\nMetz acknowledged that the configuration of lights on the front of a combine could fool oncoming drivers regarding the width of the vehicle they were approaching.\nOn this evidence, the jury returned a verdict in favor of the Blisses and against the Maffetts. This appeal followed.\nII. ANALYSIS\nA. The Maffetts\u2019 Claim That the Trial Court Erred by Refusing To Allow the Testimony of Saunier, Kraft, and Hammond Regarding Their Observations of the Fog and Visibility\nThe Maffetts first argue that the trial court erred by refusing to allow the testimony of Saunier, Kraft, and Hammond regarding their observations of the fog and visibility near the time of the accident, both as they approached the accident scene and at the scene. In response, the Blisses argue that the proffered testimony was cumulative and not relevant. We agree with the Maffetts.\n1. The Proffered Testimony\nThe Blisses filed a motion in limine seeking to exclude \u201cany and all testimony regarding visibility immediately before and at the time of the accident, except testimony from the parties *** [and] any testimony regarding the visibility that existed at any time subsequent to the accident.\u201d The trial court reserved its ruling on the motion until the Maffetts proffered their witnesses.\nAt trial, the trial court refused to admit the testimony of Saunier, Hammond, and Kraft regarding their observations of the fog and visibility near the time of the accident, as they approached the accident scene, and at the scene. The court determined that this testimony was not relevant because the proffered witnesses (1) were not present at the scene at the exact time of the accident to observe the fog and visibility, and (2) did not observe the fog and visibility along the specific route Thurman traveled on the morning of the accident. (During Brown\u2019s testimony, the trial court stated that it had reconsidered its ruling and allowed Brown to testify regarding visibility and fog at the accident scene upon Brown\u2019s arrival. The court later allowed Boyd and Kinsella to testify as to their observations of the fog and visibility at the accident site.)\nSaunier testified in an offer of proof that he was the first emergency worker to arrive on the scene several minutes after the collision. He was in Cooksville, which was four minutes north of the accident site, when he received the emergency call. He testified that visibility en route to the scene was between 100 and 120 feet because the roads south of Cooksville were \u201cshrouded with fog.\u201d When he turned onto 1600 North Road, he found that it also was \u201cfogged in.\u201d His top speed driving to the scene was 45 miles per hour. The poor visibility did not improve and was consistent as he drove to the accident site.\nHammond, an emergency medical technician, testified in an offer of proof that as she approached the accident site from the west, the fog \u201cclosed in\u201d on her. She arrived on the scene a couple of minutes before she first took Kathleen\u2019s vital signs at 8:10 a.m. Hammond stated that a helicopter out of Peoria would not fly to the accident scene because of the fog and lack of visibility. A helicopter flown in from Champaign had trouble locating the accident site and had to be guided in by voice because of the limited visibility. Hammond could not recall when that helicopter arrived.\nKraft testified in an offer of proof that just before 8 a.m. on the morning of the accident, he left his house in Normal and traveled to the accident site. As he got closer to the scene, the fog became \u201cthicker.\u201d As he got nearer to the accident site, there were spots where visibility was 100 feet or less. When he arrived at the scene at 8:11 a.m., visibility was one-eighth of a mile. He also stated that a helicopter had a difficult time landing because of the fog. Kraft, who is a farmer, would not have taken his combine out on the road \u201cprobably\u201d because of the poor visibility.\n2. Analysis\nGenerally, each party is entitled to present evidence that is relevant to its theory of the case. Koonce v. Pacilio, 307 Ill. App. 3d 449, 463, 718 N.E.2d 628, 639 (1999). \u201cEvidence is relevant if it tends to either prove a fact in controversy or render a matter in issue more or less probable ***.\u201d Galowich v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 209 Ill. App. 3d 128, 135, 568 N.E.2d 46, 50 (1991). Further, negligence may be established by using either direct or circumstantial evidence. Circumstantial evidence is the proof of facts and circumstances from which a jury may infer other connected facts that usually and reasonably follow, according to their common experience. Barker v. Eagle Food Centers, Inc., 261 Ill. App. 3d 1068, 1072, 634 N.E.2d 1276, 1279 (1994). The admission of evidence lies within the trial court\u2019s discretion, and a reviewing court will not disturb the trial court\u2019s ruling absent an abuse of discretion. Koonce, 307 Ill. App. 3d at 463, 718 N.E.2d at 639.\nWeather reports and observations are generally held to be admissible in most jurisdictions. See generally D. Feld, Weather Reports and Records as Evidence, 57 A.L.R.3d 713, \u00a7 3 (1974). This rule is followed in Illinois. See Loughnane v. City of Chicago, 188 Ill. App. 3d 1078, 1081, 545 N.E.2d 150, 152 (1989). Weather reports and observations have been held to be admissible where they had a tendency to refute testimony of the weather conditions on a particular date, even though readings or observations were not made at the exact moment of the accident. See Chicago & Northwestern Ry. Co. v. Trayes, 17 Ill. App. 136, 140-41 (1885) (holding that because the weather conditions on the night of accident were \u201cmaterial as bearing upon the question of *** negligence,\u201d weather observations taken at intervals during the day and night, both before and after the accident, should have been admitted). In addition, the distance from the location of the weather observations to the accident scene affects only the weight, not the admissibility, of the weather reports and observations. Loughnane, 188 Ill. App. 3d at 1081, 545 N.E.2d at 152; see Celanese Corp. v. Van dalia Warehouse Corp., 424 F.2d 1176, 1180 n.2 (7th Cir. 1970) (citing cases). Moreover, lay witnesses\u2019 observations of weather conditions, including fog and visibility, have been held to be admissible. See 1 R. Steigmann, Illinois Evidence Manual \u00a7 7:03, at 360 (3d ed. .1995) (\u201cOpinions of ordinary witnesses have been received about *** the state of the weather and like facts ***\u201d); D. Feld, Admissibility of Nonexpert Opinion Testimony as to Weather Conditions, 56 A.L.R.3d 575 \u00a7\u00a7 2, 3 (1974); see also Williams v. Graber, 485 N.E.2d 1369, 1375 (Ind. App. 1985) (in which the Indiana Appellate Court held that the fact that a police officer described weather and road conditions 25 minutes after the accident went to the weight to be accorded the testimony and not to its admissibility).\nThe issues of visibility and fog were of critical importance and highly disputed in this case. We agree with the Maffetts that the jury could have reasonably inferred from the testimony of Saunier, Hammond, and Kraft (regarding their observations of the visibility and fog near the time of the accident, both as they approached the accident scene and at the scene) that Thurman\u2019s assessment of the fog and visibility before and at the time of the collision was improbable. We recognize that the record shows that Saunier arrived on the scene approximately 15 minutes after the accident, and Hammond and Kraft arrived within about 35 or 40 minutes of the accident. However, the mere fact that the witnesses were not present at the exact moment the accident occurred does not require exclusion of their testimony.\nWe conclude that this evidence was sufficiently relevant under the facts of this case that it should have been admitted. The weight and value to be given this evidence should have been left to the trier of fact. See Hiscott v. Peters, 324 Ill. App. 3d 114, 125, 754 N.E.2d 839, 849 (2001). Accordingly, we hold that the trial court abused its discretion by refusing to allow the testimony of Saunier, Hammond, and Kraft regarding their observations of the fog and visibility near the time of the accident, as they approached the accident scene, and at the scene.\nHowever, we cannot conclude that the trial court abused its discretion by refusing to admit Hammond\u2019s and Kraft\u2019s testimony regarding the difficulty that one of the helicopters had in landing. Neither Hammond nor Kraft testified in the offer of proof as to when that incident occurred.\nIn so holding, we reject the Blisses\u2019 contention that the proffered testimony of Saunier, Hammond, and Kraft regarding the fog and visibility was merely cumulative of the testimony of Brown, Boyd, and Kinsella, which the trial court allowed after reconsidering its ruling. The proffered testimony was sufficiently different in terms of the time and place of their observations, as well as their descriptions of the fog and visibility, as not to be repetitive. Further, a claim that evidence was cumulative is less persuasive in a case like this, in which the plaintiff is unable to remember the events leading up to the accident. See generally Ostendorf v. International Harvester Co., 89 Ill. 2d 273, 284, 433 N.E.2d 253, 258 (1982) (determining whether evidence is cumulative of other evidence involves a determination whether the \u201cnew\u201d evidence adds anything to what was already before the jury).\nBecause the issues of visibility and fog were of such critical importance in this case, we conclude that the trial court\u2019s refusal to admit the testimony of Saunier, Hammond, and Kraft regarding their observations of the visibility and fog near the time of the accident, both as they approached the accident scene and at the scene, prejudiced the Maffetts. This prejudice was demonstrated during closing argument, when the Blisses\u2019 attorney commented that there was \u201cno evidence that the [Maffetts] ha[d] presented that [Thurman\u2019s] assessment of the situation was wrong.\u201d The Blisses\u2019 attorney also argued repeatedly that the Maffetts had offered no explanation as to why Kathleen had not seen the combine.\nWe further conclude that the prejudice to the Maffetts was exacerbated by the trial court\u2019s refusal to allow Saunier, Hammond, and Kraft to testify on rebuttal regarding their observations of the visibility and fog near the time of the accident, as they approached the accident scene, and at the scene. Such testimony would have directly contradicted the testimony of Thurman and Metz regarding visibility at the time of the collision. See People ex rel. Mendez v. Villa, 260 Ill. App. 3d 866, 870, 632 N.E.2d 322, 324 (1994) (rebuttal evidence is admissible \u201cif it tends to explain, repel, contradict or disprove the testimony of a witness\u201d).\nB. The Maffetts\u2019 Claim That the Trial Court Erred by Admitting Evidence Regarding Kathleen\u2019s Prior Vision Problems\nThe Maffetts also argue that the trial court erred by admitting evidence regarding Kathleen\u2019s prior vision problems. We agree.\nInitially, we reject the Blisses\u2019 claim that the Maffetts have forfeited this issue on appeal by failing to object to Bey\u2019s testimony regarding Kathleen\u2019s prior vision problems. Although the Maffetts did not object to Bey\u2019s testimony, they objected to Kathleen\u2019s testimony regarding her prior vision problems. In addition, the forfeiture doctrine is an admonition to the litigant, not a limitation on the authority of the reviewing court. Harris v. Cropmate Co., 302 Ill. App. 3d 364, 367, 706 N.E.2d 55, 59 (1999). We thus address the Maffetts\u2019 argument on the merits.\nIrrelevant evidence is not admissible. Clemons v. Mechanical Devices Co., 292 Ill. App. 3d 242, 251, 684 N.E.2d 1344, 1350 (1997), aff\u2019d, 184 Ill. 2d 328, 704 N.E.2d 403 (1998); M. Graham, Cleary & Graham\u2019s Handbook of Illinois Evidence \u00a7 402.1, at 188 (7th ed. 1999) (hereinafter Handbook of Illinois Evidence). Even relevant evidence may contain drawbacks of sufficient importance to call for its exclusion, including unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, and misleading the jury. Handbook of Illinois Evidence \u00a7 403.1, at 189; see Gill v. Foster, 157 Ill. 2d 304, 313, 626 N.E.2d 190, 194 (1993) (\u201cEven relevant evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by such factors as prejudice, confusion, or potential to mislead the jury\u201d). Thus, if a piece of evidence has slight probative value, any prejudicial effect on the jury may require exclusion. \u201cMoreover, if the evidence is merely confusing and creates uncertainty, that alone may suffice to tip the balance in favor of exclusion when the information sought to be presented contains negligible probative value.\u201d First Midwest Trust Co. v. Rogers, 296 Ill. App. 3d 416, 430, 701 N.E.2d 1107, 1116 (1998); see also Demos v. Ferris-Shell Oil Co., 317 Ill. App. 3d 41, 53, 740 N.E.2d 9, 18 (2000) (\u201ceven if the evidence is arguably relevant it may still be excluded if it would confuse the issues or tend to mislead the jury\u201d).\nFurther, as this court stated in First Midwest Trust, 296 Ill. App. 3d at 430, 701 N.E.2d at 1116:\n\u201cOne of the tests that a trial court may use when evaluating relevance is to ask how it would view this evidence if it were the trier of fact. Would the proposed evidence assist the trial court in resolving questions of fact? See Yamnitz v. William J. Diestelhorst Co., 251 Ill. App. 3d 244, 250, 621 N.E.2d 1046, 1050 (1993) (offered evidence is relevant if it renders a matter in issue more or less probable in light of logic and experience). If not, then the evidence should be excluded.\u201d\nJudged in accordance with this test, we conclude that the trial court should have excluded the evidence of Kathleen\u2019s prior vision problems. Kathleen testified that (1) she had seen a physician for a \u201cvision problem\u201d in her left eye and that three physicians had noted the problem but could do nothing for it; and (2) in 1993, she had blurry vision in her left eye, which cleared up in three or four months and never returned. Bey testified that in June 2000, Kathleen had reported to him that she had lost peripheral vision and had a blind spot in her left eye. In light of the fact that (1) the evidence of Kathleen\u2019s \u201cvision problem\u201d did not demonstrate what the problem actually was; (2) the evidence of her loss of peripheral vision and a blind spot in her left eye did not demonstrate (a) when she suffered those problems, (b) the exact nature and extent of those problems, or (c) how those problems affected her vision; (3) the evidence of blurry vision in her left eye did not recur after 1993 (three years before the accident); (4) Kathleen was a licensed driver; and (5) the only evidence before the trial court (from Dick\u2019s evidence deposition) demonstrated that Kathleen\u2019s prior vision problems were not severe enough to restrict either her driving or her ability to see the combine on the morning of the accident, we conclude that the evidence of Kathleen\u2019s prior vision problems contained negligible probative value. This evidence would have assisted the jury only marginally \u2014 if at all \u2014 in resolving the issues in this case. We further conclude that the negligible relevant import of the evidence was substantially outweighed by its prejudicial impact on the jury. We agree with the Maffetts that the evidence of Kathleen\u2019s prior vision problems was likely to confuse and mislead the jury or result in speculation on the jury\u2019s part. Indeed, the trial court itself recognized that the prejudicial effect of this evidence was \u201cpretty significant.\u201d Accordingly, we hold that the trial court erred by admitting evidence regarding Kathleen\u2019s prior vision problems.\nWe find support for our holding in Voykin v. Estate of DeBoer, 192 Ill. 2d 49, 57, 733 N.E.2d 1275, 1279 (2000), in which the supreme court rejected the \u201csame part of the body rule,\u201d describing it as \u201cnothing more than a bright-line relevancy standard\u201d that improperly presumes that a previous injury is automatically relevant to the present injury simply because it affects the same part of the body. The court held that such evidence was admissible only if it was shown to be relevant, a requirement that would usually require expert testimony:\n\u201cIn most cases, the connection between the parts of the body and past and current injuries is a subject that is beyond the ken of the average layperson. Because of this complexity, we do not believe that, in normal circumstances, a lay juror can effectively or accurately assess the relationship between a prior injury and a current injury without expert assistance. Consequently, we conclude that, if a defendant wishes to introduce evidence that the plaintiff has suffered a prior injury, whether to the \u2018same part of the body\u2019 or not, the defendant must introduce expert evidence demonstrating why the prior injury is relevant to causation, damages, or some other issue of consequence. This rule applies unless the trial court, in its discretion, determines that the natures of the prior and current injuries are such that a lay person can readily appraise the relationship, if any, between those injuries without expert assistance.\u201d Voykin, 192 Ill. 2d at 59, 733 N.E.2d at 1280.\nThe Voykin court concluded that evidence that the plaintiff had complained of \u201c \u2018neck problems\u2019 \u201d \u201c \u2018secondary to playing hockey since he was 6\u2019 \u201d should have been excluded because (1) the evidence did not demonstrate what the plaintiffs \u201c \u2018neck problems\u2019 \u201d were or when he suffered from them; and (2) nothing about the evidence had \u201cany tendency to make it less likely that defendant caused plaintiffs neck injury or that defendant caused plaintiff to suffer damages.\u201d Voykin, 192 Ill. 2d at 60, 733 N.E.2d at 1281. The court further noted that without expert testimony establishing both the nature of the plaintiffs \u201c \u2018neck problems\u2019 \u201d and the relationship between those prior problems and the plaintiffs current claim, an average juror could not readily appraise the effect of the prior problems upon the plaintiffs current claim. Voykin, 192 Ill. 2d at 60, 733 N.E.2d at 1281.\nSimilarly, in this case, (1) the evidence of Kathleen\u2019s \u201cvision problem\u201d did not demonstrate what the problem actually was; and (2) the evidence of her loss of peripheral vision and a blind spot in her left eye did not demonstrate (a) when she suffered those problems, (b) the exact nature and extent of those problems, or (c) how those problems affected her vision. Moreover, the only evidence before the trial court demonstrated that Kathleen\u2019s prior vision problems were not severe enough to restrict either her driving or her ability to see the combine on the morning of the accident.\nLike the issues of fog and visibility, Kathleen\u2019s ability to see the combine on the morning of the accident was a crucial and greatly disputed issue in this case. We thus conclude that the trial court\u2019s erroneous admission of evidence regarding Kathleen\u2019s prior vision problems prejudiced the Maffetts and denied them a fair trial. The following comments of the Blisses\u2019 attorney during closing argument simply heightened that prejudice:\n\u201cI mentioned earlier that the [Maffetts] haven\u2019t told you anything or given you a reason why [Kathleen] didn\u2019t see the combine. Dr. Bey in his note, his letter to [Kathleen] did.\n[Kathleen] told Dr. Bey that she had no peripheral vision and he wrote that down twice in his report. He told \u2014 she told us on the stand that she has a blind spot in her left eye. Ask yourself ladies and gentlemen, is it reasonable conduct? Is it reasonable for a person with no peripheral vision, with a blind spot in their [sic] left eye, to be traveling down a road at fifty miles an hour during harvest when she acknowledges there are combines and implements on the road? Given those circumstances, ask yourself, has the plaintiff proven a case against [the Blisses] that [Thurman] is at fault for the fact that he is traveling four miles an hour and she is traveling at least fifty miles an hour down a country road with that type of vision problem?\u201d\nAccordingly, we reverse and remand for a new trial.\nIII. ISSUES ON REMAND\nAlthough we have determined that this case must be remanded for a new trial, the Maffetts raise other issues that may arise on remand. We address those issues separately.\nThe Maffetts\u2019 Claim That the Trial Court Erred by Permitting the Blisses To Cross-Examine Bey Using Various Journal Articles\nTh\u00e9 Maffetts also argue that the trial court erred by permitting the Blisses to cross-examine Bey using various journal articles without having timely disclosed those articles during discovery. We disagree.\nContrary to the Maffetts\u2019 contention, Supreme Court Rule 213(g) does not require that a party disclose journal articles that the party intends to use in cross-examining the opposing party\u2019s opinion witness. Indeed, none of Rule 213\u2019s disclosure requirements applies to cross-examining an opposing party\u2019s opinion witness. See 177 Ill. 2d R. 213(g). The Maffetts cite no case law holding that a party must disclose articles to be used solely during cross-examination. In this regard, we agree with what the appellate court wrote in Southern Illinois Airport Authority v. Smith, 267 Ill. App. 3d 201, 206, 641 N.E.2d 1240, 1244 (1994):\n\u201cIf the cross-examiner, to use a clich\u00e9, must telegraph his punch, cross-examination would lose its effectiveness. If complete disclosure is the optimum, would it not be more in the spirit of full disclosure to require the \u2018cross-examiner\u2019 to submit his questions to the opponent\u2019s witnesses prior to trial? By eliminating the spontaneity, we would certainly avoid surprises. We may also be limiting the ability to ascertain the truth.\u201d\nThe case upon which the Maffetts rely, Iser v. Copley Memorial Hospital, 288 Ill. App. 3d 408, 680 N.E.2d 747 (1997), is inapposite. During direct examination of the plaintiff\u2019s expert in that case, the plaintiffs attempted to elicit testimony concerning the authoritative nature of certain journal articles. Iser, 288 Ill. App. 3d at 409-10, 680 N.E.2d at 748. The appellate court held that the plaintiffs expert witness could not give a new opinion that was contrary to his deposition testimony. Iser, 288 Ill. App. 3d at 412, 680 N.E.2d at 750. The Iser court did not address the use of journal articles for purposes of cross-examination.\nIV CONCLUSION\nFor the reasons stated, we reverse the trial court\u2019s judgment and remand for a new trial consistent with the views expressed herein.\nReversed and remanded.\nKNECHT, J., concurs.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE STEIGMANN" }, { "text": "JUSTICE COOK,\nspecially concurring:\nI disagree with the majority\u2019s statement that \u201cnone of Rule 213\u2019s disclosure requirements applies to cross-examining an opposing party\u2019s opinion witness.\u201d 329 Ill. App. 3d at 577. Rule 213, as amended March 28, 2002, effective July 1, 2002, specifically recognizes that freedom to cross-examine is subject to a restriction that in multiple-party cases a cross-examiner may not elicit undisclosed information from the witness of a party with which he is aligned. Official Reports Advance Sheet No. 8 (April 17, 2002), R. 213(g), eff. July 1, 2002. I believe amended Rule 213 clarifies the existing rule and does not change it.\nOther situations may also present problems. If plaintiff decides on the day of trial not to call a witness he has previously disclosed, and defendant calls the witness instead, is plaintiff freed from compliance with Rule 213 during his cross-examination? If defendant calls a treating physician whom he has previously disclosed, and the court eventually determines that the witness is hostile and may be examined \u201cas if under cross-examination\u201d (188 Ill. 2d R. 238(b)), may the defendant continue his questioning, his \u201ccross-examination,\u201d free of the restrictions imposed by Rule 213?\nConsider another hypothetical situation closer to the facts of this case: defendant has a theory that he would like to introduce by way of an expert treatise; defendant chooses not to use his own expert to discuss the treatise because he would then have to disclose the treatise under Rule 213; instead, defendant introduces the treatise by cross-examining plaintiffs treating physician. (Amended Rule 213 recognizes that treating physicians may be independent, not strongly aligned with the plaintiff who calls them.) The focus of amended Rule 213 is away from bright-line rules and toward doing substantial justice between the parties, with trials decided on the merits. I suggest that, in the examples given, the trial court has discretion not to allow the testimony.\nThere is a tension in these cases between providing full and fair discovery and exclusion of evidence simply to enforce meaningless technicalities. The solution is not bright-line rules but a trial court which understands the objectives of Rule 213 and is able to apply them to the unique facts before it.", "type": "concurrence", "author": "JUSTICE COOK," } ], "attorneys": [ "Thomas E. Herr (argued), of Law Offices of Herr & Herr, of Pontiac, for appellants.", "Peter W Brandt (argued) of Livingston, Barger, Brandt & Schroeder, of Bloomington, and Michael E Coles, Livingston, Barger, Brandt & Schroeder, of Champaign, for appellees." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "KATHLEEN MAFFETT et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. THURMAN J. BLISS et al., Defendants-Appellees.\nFourth District\nNo. 4\u201401\u20140569\nArgued January 24, 2002.\nOpinion filed April 23, 2002.\nCOOK, J., specially concurring.\nThomas E. Herr (argued), of Law Offices of Herr & Herr, of Pontiac, for appellants.\nPeter W Brandt (argued) of Livingston, Barger, Brandt & Schroeder, of Bloomington, and Michael E Coles, Livingston, Barger, Brandt & Schroeder, of Champaign, for appellees." }, "file_name": "0562-01", "first_page_order": 580, "last_page_order": 596 }