{ "id": 1472350, "name": "THOMAS SCHMIDT et al., Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. AMERITECH ILLINOIS et al., Defendants-Appellants", "name_abbreviation": "Schmidt v. Ameritech Illinois", "decision_date": "2002-03-29", "docket_number": "No. 1\u201401\u20140463", "first_page": "1020", "last_page": "1042", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "329 Ill. App. 3d 1020" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "165 Ill. 2d 150", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 483571 ], "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "174" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/165/0150-01" ] }, { "cite": "188 Ill. 2d 565", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "appeal allowed" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "109 Ill. App. 2d 6", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 1594801 ], "year": 1969, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "14" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/109/0006-01" ] }, { "cite": "295 Ill. App. 3d 873", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 45750 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "886" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/295/0873-01" ] }, { "cite": "303 Ill. App. 3d 935", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 511331 ], "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "942" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/303/0935-01" ] }, { "cite": "308 Ill. App. 3d 393", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 261339 ], "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "412" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/308/0393-01" ] }, { "cite": "124 Ill. 2d 226", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3217866 ], "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "243" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/124/0226-01" ] }, { "cite": "248 Ill. App. 3d 562", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2946454 ], "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "567" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/248/0562-01" ] }, { "cite": "298 Ill. 192", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 5031667 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "197" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/298/0192-01" ] }, { "cite": "61 Ill. 2d 31", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2965355 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/61/0031-01" ] }, { "cite": "12 Ill. 2d 588", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2778876 ], "year": 1958, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "595" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/12/0588-01" ] }, { "cite": "138 Ill. 2d 404", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5577071 ], "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "414" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/138/0404-01" ] }, { "cite": "184 Ill. 2d 109", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 926970 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "116" }, { "page": "116" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/184/0109-01" ] }, { "cite": "163 Ill. 2d 33", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 478219 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "81" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/163/0033-01" ] }, { "cite": "282 Ill. App. 3d 262", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 159493 ], "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "271" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/282/0262-01" ] }, { "cite": "291 Ill. App. 3d 265", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 456141 ], "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "285-86" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/291/0265-01" ] }, { "cite": "324 Ill. App. 3d 1047", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 256321 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1072" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/324/1047-01" ] }, { "cite": "22 Ill. 2d 73", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2791226 ], "year": 1961, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "87" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/22/0073-01" ] }, { "cite": "74 Ill. 2d 172", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2994390 ], "weight": 5, "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "186" }, { "page": "188" }, { "page": "189" }, { "page": "187-88" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/74/0172-01" ] }, { "cite": "193 Ill. 2d 490", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 963696 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "497" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/193/0490-01" ] }, { "cite": "318 Ill. App. 3d 984", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 279506 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "990" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/318/0984-01" ] }, { "cite": "292 Ill. App. 3d 267", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1725088 ], "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "279" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/292/0267-01" ] }, { "cite": "806 F.2d 749", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 1655975 ], "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "756", "parenthetical": "held that an employer was liable for defamation related to suspected employee misconduct and termination of employee without conducting an investigation" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/806/0749-01" ] }, { "cite": "368 F. Supp. 426", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F. Supp.", "case_ids": [ 5637581 ], "year": 1974, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f-supp/368/0426-01" ] }, { "cite": "31 Ill. App. 3d 423", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2708111 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1975, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "427-28" }, { "page": "425" }, { "page": "425" }, { "page": "428" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/31/0423-01" ] }, { "cite": "47 U.S.C. \u00a7 222", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "U.S.C.", "weight": 2, "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(d)(2)" }, { "page": "(d)(2)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "18 U.S.C. \u00a7 2511", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "U.S.C.", "weight": 6, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(2)(a)(i)" }, { "parenthetical": "a" }, { "parenthetical": "a" }, { "page": "(2)(a)(i)" }, { "parenthetical": "a" }, { "page": "(2)(a)(i)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "443 N.W.2d 382", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.W.2d", "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "384", "parenthetical": "holding that a privacy right is \"not absolute in nature, but rather is limited by those rights which arise from social conditions, including the business relationships of the parties\" (emphasis omitted)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "178 Mich. App. 230", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Mich. App.", "case_ids": [ 2312760 ], "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "234", "parenthetical": "holding that a privacy right is \"not absolute in nature, but rather is limited by those rights which arise from social conditions, including the business relationships of the parties\" (emphasis omitted)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/mich-app/178/0230-01" ] }, { "cite": "96 Ill. App. 3d 367", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 12132792 ], "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "369", "parenthetical": "employer \"had a qualified right to make appropriate internal checks concerning the job conduct of its employees\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/96/0367-01" ] }, { "cite": "173 Ill. App. 3d 251", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3478031 ], "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "260" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/173/0251-01" ] }, { "cite": "204 Ill. App. 3d 302", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2574356 ], "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "310" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/204/0302-01" ] }, { "cite": "151 Ill. 2d 445", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3292317 ], "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "454" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/151/0445-01" ] }, { "cite": "158 Ill. App. 3d 438", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3578099 ], "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "444" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/158/0438-01" ] }, { "cite": "273 Ill. App. 3d 742", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 258665 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "745-46" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/273/0742-01" ] }, { "cite": "202 Ill. App. 3d 976", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2587764 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "981" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/202/0976-01" ] }, { "cite": "176 Ill. App. 3d 886", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3589392 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "894" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/176/0886-01" ] }, { "cite": "36 Ill. App. 3d 1006", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2633447 ], "year": 1976, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "Fourth District, not recognizing the cause of action" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/36/1006-01" ] }, { "cite": "284 Ill. App. 3d 983", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1260328 ], "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "993", "parenthetical": "Fifth District, expressly recognizing the cause of action" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/284/0983-01" ] }, { "cite": "50 Ill. App. 3d 480", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5643138 ], "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "Fifth District, impliedly recognizing the cause of action" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/50/0480-01" ] }, { "cite": "305 Ill. App. 3d 1027", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1208101 ], "year": 1999, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/305/1027-01" ] }, { "cite": "141 Ill. App. 3d 786", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3497627 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "789" }, { "page": "789" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/141/0786-01" ] }, { "cite": "126 Ill. 2d 411", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5556950 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "416-17" }, { "page": "416-17" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/126/0411-01" ] }, { "cite": "323 Ill. App. 3d 733", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 171624 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "735", "parenthetical": "matters of law are reviewable de nova" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/323/0733-01" ] }, { "cite": "172 Ill. 2d 358", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 55989 ], "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "371" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/172/0358-01" ] }, { "cite": "139 Ill. 2d 476", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5574231 ], "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "489" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/139/0476-01" ] }, { "cite": "123 Ill. 2d 113", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5550782 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "127" }, { "page": "128" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/123/0113-01" ] }, { "cite": "176 Ill. 2d 82", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 544913 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "92", "parenthetical": "holding that it was not unreasonable for plaintiffs, when faced with conflicting appellate authority, to rely upon the authority from their home appellate district" }, { "page": "92" }, { "page": "94-95", "parenthetical": "Harrison, J., specially concurring, joined by Heiple, C.J." } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/176/0082-01" ] }, { "cite": "311 Ill. App. 3d 573", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 415423 ], "weight": 6, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "578" }, { "page": "578" }, { "page": "578" }, { "page": "578" }, { "page": "575" }, { "page": "578" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/311/0573-01" ] }, { "cite": "72 Ill. App. 3d 642", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5581793 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "646" }, { "page": "646-47" }, { "page": "646-47", "parenthetical": "First District, not recognizing the cause of action" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/72/0642-01" ] }, { "cite": "115 F.3d 501", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.3d", "case_ids": [ 11979876 ], "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "506" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f3d/115/0501-01" ] }, { "cite": "29 U.S.C. \u00a7 185", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "U.S.C.", "year": 1994, "opinion_index": 0 } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1800, "char_count": 54797, "ocr_confidence": 0.763, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.1925868490900173e-07, "percentile": 0.7739860509242045 }, "sha256": "733f14f9be50b93dfff05b414b2bc7db0dc62be66832dcfb3aa68f2cf826a032", "simhash": "1:3184f5a6bd37f0fb", "word_count": 8933 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T18:00:16.668960+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THOMAS SCHMIDT et al., Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. AMERITECH ILLINOIS et al., Defendants-Appellants." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE GREIMAN\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThomas Schmidt, while on disability leave from Ameritech for an injury unconnected to his employment, lied to his employer at least three times about going on a fishing trip. The employer then sought to determine his whereabouts by an intense investigation which included the examination and use of his personal telephone records. After being discharged, Thomas, his wife and his wife\u2019s employer filed suit on August 23, 1995, alleging that the defendants\u2019 conduct in 1994 constituted a cause of action entitled \u201cunreasonable intrusion upon seclusion\u201d and a second cause of action entitled \u201cprivate facts made public.\u201d The circuit court directed a verdict on the \u201cprivate facts made public\u201d cause of action against the plaintiffs, who have not appealed that ruling.\nOn December 2, 1999, the circuit court submitted the one remaining issue \u2014 intrusion upon seclusion \u2014 to a jury, which returned a verdict against Ameritech. This appeal followed. Because we find that the facts presented in this case do not satisfy the elements of the tort of unreasonable intrusion upon seclusion, we reverse.\nThomas was employed with defendant Ameritech as a customer service technician. His wife, coplaintiff Cynthia Schmidt (Cynthia), was not an Ameritech employee, nor was Jeri Lynn Richie (Richie), who became the third plaintiff in this case. Richie was the owner of Reflections Salon of Beauty, a hair salon where Cynthia worked, and all three were Ameritech customers.\nOn June 26, 1994, Thomas injured his knee in an accident unrelated to his employment and claimed to be unable to work. Amer-itech\u2019s policy with respect to such disabilities provided Thomas\u2019 absence from work automatically converted to disability leave after seven consecutive sick days. Consequently, he was compensated under Ameritech\u2019s disability benefit policy until he returned to work on August 4, 1994.\nUnder his union\u2019s seniority system, he previously had put in for a Canadian fishing vacation during the week of July 15 through July 24, 1994, and his supervisor had approved the request. However, Amer-itech\u2019s disability policy provided that taking a vacation while also collecting disability is prohibited without written authorization. Amer-itech reminded Thomas of this restriction in a July 5, 1994, letter. Undeterred, he and his wife left for their previously planned fishing vacation even though he remained collecting disability. What is more, he lied to Ameritech at least three times concerning his whereabouts: first, he lied to his supervisor, Herb Mazanke, before he left on vacation; second, he again lied to Mazanke on the day of his return home; and third, he lied to a group of Ameritech managers, including Mazanke, on the day of his return to work.\nDuring Thomas\u2019 disability leave, Mazanke became suspicious of Thomas\u2019 conduct. Because Mazanke was aware of Thomas\u2019 plans to go fishing in Canada in July, he suspected that Thomas might leave town impermissibly. Accordingly, Mazanke began an investigation to determine whether Thomas was guilty of misconduct. On July 14, 1994, Mazanke sent two managers to Thomas\u2019 home. Those managers waited in the Schmidts\u2019 driveway for Thomas to return home and instructed him to call Mazanke. During the call, Mazanke requested the telephone number and location of Thomas\u2019 physical therapist and discussed the possible restrictions on his work when he returned. When the telephone number that Thomas had provided for his physical therapist did not work, Mazanke again called Thomas and reminded him that his planned vacation was inappropriate while he was on disability.\nOn July 21, 1994, Mazanke called Ameritech\u2019s benefits department to determine if it had received the needed documentation from Thomas. After being told that it had no return date for Thomas, Mazanke again called him at home, received no answer, and left a message for Thomas to return his call. Mazanke\u2019s supervisor authorized a visit to Thomas\u2019 home for the following day and told Mazanke to contact Ameritech\u2019s security department to track down Thomas.\nOn July 22, Thomas called home to check his messages and found a message from Mazanke. Thereafter, that morning, Thomas called Mazanke and left a message. Mazanke, however, did not receive Thomas\u2019 message until afternoon because he was conducting the home visit at Thomas\u2019 home. During that visit, Mazanke parked on the street and knocked on the front and side doors, waited a few minutes, but got no response. While at the door, he noticed that some mail and newspapers had gathered on the porch. After lunch, Mazanke returned to Thomas\u2019 home and again knocked on all of the doors and received no response. He then left another message advising Thomas that he was at his house and questioning him as to his whereabouts.\nOn July 25,1994, the Schmidts returned home. Thomas telephoned Mazanke to inform Mazanke that Thomas had seen his doctor that day and had been released to return to work on August 4, 1994. Mazanke demanded to know where Thomas had been on July 22, 1994, at the time he returned Mazanke\u2019s call. Again, Thomas lied and told Mazanke that the telephone call had been placed from Thomas\u2019 home. At that point, Mazanke knew that Thomas was untruthful about his whereabouts because Mazanke and another Ameritech manager physically were at the Schmidts\u2019 house at the time that Thomas called Mazanke.\nMazanke advised Thomas\u2019 union representative, Tony Tellez, of the issues of concern. On August 4, 1994, Thomas returned to work and Mazanke immediately called him into a meeting to discuss his whereabouts on the dates of July 15 through July 24, 1994. Present at this meeting were Mazanke, Thomas, Tellez, and another member of Ameritech\u2019s management, Doug Kotlinski. Thomas again stated that he had been home on that date, so it was impossible for Mazanke to have visited his home that day. Thomas then was told that he was being suspended pending Ameritech\u2019s investigation into the circumstances of his disability leave.\nOn August 11, 1994, Mazanke and Bill Gerlich from the Amer-itech Security Group reviewed the \u201cmessage unit detail\u201d (MUD) records for the number assigned to Thomas. At trial, Gerlich testified that MUD records would show if outgoing calls were made from the Schmidts\u2019 telephone on the dates in question. On that date, Mazanke and Gerlich also reviewed Ameritech\u2019s \u201cdirectory fine records\u201d (DLR), which provide \u201ctelephone book\u201d information such as name and address, and directory account trouble history (DATH) reports, which would show whether their telephone was out of service or otherwise malfunctioning. In addition, Mazanke and Gerlich reviewed Amer-itech\u2019s DLR reports for several other telephone accounts whose numbers had been frequently called from the Schmidts\u2019 home phone location. This included accessing and using the phone records of Cynthia\u2019s employer, i.e., Richie and her hair salon. Ameritech asserted that it reviewed those records after Thomas\u2019 deceitful answers to determine whether any calls had been made to the Schmidt home. Lastly, Ameritech reviewed its billing records for the AT&T card registered to Thomas.\nBased on the information that Mazanke and Gerlich gained through their review of the telephone records, on August 11, 1994, Gerlich contacted the resort in Canada where the Schmidts had apparently stayed. On August 15, 1994, he contacted the kennel where the Schmidts had boarded their dog. Because he had reason to believe the Schmidts were fishing in Canada, he contacted the Ontario Department of Natural Resources to obtain a copy of Thomas\u2019 fishing license. Gerlich also contacted the Chicago police department and asked them to use their computer system to check on the license plates of vehicles parked in the Schmidts\u2019 driveway. A call was also placed to the Schmidts\u2019 local post office to determine the time that the Schmidts\u2019 mail was delivered to their home each day.\nOn August 24, 1994, Thomas again was ordered to appear at a meeting. There, he was told by Mazanke and Gerlich that Ameritech knew the resort where he and his wife had spent their vacation, that Ameritech knew where he and his wife had boarded their dog, and that Ameritech knew the locations of the convenience store pay phone in Eau Claire, Wisconsin, that he had used when placing his last phone call while en route home from Canada. He was told by Mazanke and Gerlich that they had obtained that information by their review of Ameritech\u2019s MUD records for the telephone number listed to him. Thomas was then fired.\nImmediately thereafter, he filed a grievance with the company. The grievance went to arbitration, and Thomas was ordered to be reinstated. However, the arbitrator found that because Thomas had attempted to mislead Ameritech while he was away on his fishing trip, he was refused a year\u2019s back pay that he sought.\nPlaintiffs then filed suit to redress Ameritech\u2019s alleged invasions of their privacy. Defendants removed the action to federal court, claiming that plaintiffs\u2019 claims were preempted by section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act (29 U.S.C. \u00a7 185 (1994)). On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit concluded that because section 301 did not apply, there was no independent basis for federal jurisdiction. Schmidt v. Ameritech Corp., 115 F.3d 501, 506 (7th Cir. 1997). Accordingly, it remanded the case to the circuit court. As previously stated, the trial court entertained only one count \u2014 that of unreasonable intrusion upon seclusion. The sole basis for plaintiffs\u2019 claim on this count was Ameritech\u2019s allegedly improper review of the Schmidts\u2019 and of Richie\u2019s hair salon\u2019s telephone accounts. After a trial, the jury returned a verdict (1) in favor of defendants Mazanke and Gerlich and against the plaintiffs, and (2) against defendant Amer-itech and in favor of the plaintiffs. The jury found Ameritech liable to Thomas, Cynthia, and Richie for compensatory damages of $75,000, $75,000, and $10,000, respectively, and imposed $5 million in punitive damages. Ameritech\u2019s motion for judgment n.o.v., for a new trial, and for remittitur was denied, and Ameritech now appeals. Plaintiffs did not, however, appeal the circuit court\u2019s grant of the directed verdict on their claim for private facts made public.\nAmeritech first argues that the trial court improperly imposed judgment and penal sanctions for conduct that was (1) not actionable in this appellate district at the time it took place, (2) not actionable at any time during the trial, and (3) not actionable at the time that judgment was entered. In fact, Ameritech claims, the tort for which it was held liable has been rejected by this district as an unrecognizable cause of action since 1979. See Kelly v. Franco, 72 Ill. App. 3d 642, 646 (1st Dist. 1979). The Kelly court noted that the law in Illinois was inconsistent on this issue and held that even if it were to recognize the cause of action, the plaintiff\u2019s allegations were insufficient to support a cause of action for unreasonable intrusion upon seclusion. Kelly, 72 Ill. App. 3d at 646-47.\nFurther, Ameritech asserts that it was not until January 13, 2000 \u2014 after the trial and the entry of judgment \u2014 that this court began to recognize the tort of unreasonable intrusion upon seclusion. See Johnson v. K mart Corp., 311 Ill. App. 3d 573, 578 (2000). Accordingly, it argues, because the court in Johnson was the first to recognize this cause of action in the First District, the trial court in the present case improperly retroactively applied the prescripts of that tort against Ameritech\u2019s prior conduct.\nAmeritech bases its argument on the notion that because this tort has never been recognized explicitly by this district, and because circuit courts are bound by the decisions of the appellate court of the district in which they sit (see Aleckson v. Village of Round Lake Park, 176 Ill. 2d 82, 92 (1997) (holding that it was not unreasonable for plaintiffs, when faced with conflicting appellate authority, to rely upon the authority from their home appellate district)), the circuit court in this case erred in holding Ameritech liable for conduct that was not actionable in the first district.\nPlaintiffs respond that, in 1988, the supreme court announced that it is fundamental in Illinois that the decisions of an appellate court are binding on all circuit courts, regardless of locale. People v. Harris, 123 Ill. 2d 113, 127 (1988). In 1990, the court reiterated that there is but one appellate court in the State of Illinois and denounced the notion that appellate court decisions are binding only on the trial courts within that district. People v. Layhew, 139 Ill. 2d 476, 489 (1990). Moreover, in 1996, the supreme court again reminded litigants that there is only one appellate court and warned litigants that where the appellate court\u2019s pronouncements on an issue are unsettled or express conflicting views, a defendant cannot rely upon only one of those conflicting views and ignore the other views. People v. Granados, 172 Ill. 2d 358, 371 (1996).\nThe circuit court\u2019s decision to recognize this tort and apply it to Ameritech is a legal matter that is entitled to no deference on review. White v. City of Aurora, 323 Ill. App. 3d 733, 735 (2001) (matters of law are reviewable de nova). Moreover, the issue of retroactive application is a question of law and is also subject to de nova review.\nInitially, we note that the Illinois Supreme Court has never explicitly recognized a cause of action for intrusion into seclusion. In Lovgren v. Citizens First National Bank of Princeton, 126 Ill. 2d 411 (1989), the supreme court discussed this tort as articulated by the Restatement (Second) of Torts (1977) and Prosser & Keeton on Torts (W Keeton, Prosser & Keeton on Torts \u00a7 117 (5th ed. 1984)), but stated that its discussion did not imply a recognition of the action by the court. Lovgren, 126 Ill. 2d at 416-17.\nHowever, as Johnson noted with regard to the appellate court cases, some districts have recognized this cause of action:\n\u201cThe Third District recognized the intrusion upon seclusion tort in Melvin v. Burling, 141 Ill. App. 3d 786 (1986). In Melvin, the court set out four elements that a plaintiff must plead and prove to state a cause of action for intrusion upon seclusion: (1) an unauthorized intrusion or prying into the plaintiffs seclusion; (2) an intrusion that is offensive or objectionable to a reasonable person; (3) the matter upon which the intrusion occurs is private; and (4) the intrusion causes anguish and suffering. Melvin, 141 Ill. App. 3d at 789. See also the Second District case of Benitez v. KFC National Management Co., 305 Ill. App. 3d 1027 (1999), recognizing a cause of action for unreasonable intrusion upon the seclusion of another.\u201d Johnson, 311 Ill. App. 3d at 578.\nSee also Bank of Indiana v. Tremunde, 50 Ill. App. 3d 480 (1977) (Fifth District, impliedly recognizing the cause of action); Davis v. Temple, 284 Ill. App. 3d 983, 993 (1996) (Fifth District, expressly recognizing the cause of action); but c.f. Bureau of Credit Control v. Scott, 36 Ill. App. 3d 1006 (1976) (Fourth District, not recognizing the cause of action); Kelly, 72 Ill. App. 3d at 646-47 (First District, not recognizing the cause of action).\nThe Johnson court also looked at the First District\u2019s encounters with the tort of unreasonable intrusion upon seclusion since Kelly. Specifically, it noted that in Mucklow v. John Marshall Law School, 176 Ill. App. 3d 886 (1988), Miller v. Motorola, Inc., 202 Ill. App. 3d 976 (1990), and Dwyer v. American Express Co., 273 Ill. App. 3d 742 (1995), this district found that the plaintiffs allegations did not satisfy the first element of Melvin, but failed to express a view as to the conflict regarding the recognition of the intrusion-upon-seclusion cause of action, i.e., it never said that the cause of action did not exist. Johnson, 311 Ill. App. 3d at 578, citing Mucklow, 176 Ill. App. 3d at 894, Miller, 202 Ill. App. 3d at 981, and Dwyer, 273 Ill. App. 3d at 745-46.\nIn assessing Mucklow, Miller, and Dwyer, the Johnson court placed great weight upon the fact that those decisions explicitly applied Melvin\u2019s four elements despite a reluctance to forcefully declare the tort\u2019s existence. Because those decisions ultimately rested on the fact that the tort\u2019s elements were not properly satisfied under Melvin, such a reluctance is, at any rate, understandable. Unlike those cases, however, the court in Johnson found all the elements to exist. Accordingly, as it was the first court in the First District since the issuance of Kelly to find that a plaintiff adequately demonstrated the tort\u2019s four elements, the Johnson court was the first to \u201cexpressly recognize a cause of action for the tort of invasion of privacy by intrusion upon seclusion in this state.\u201d Johnson, 311 Ill. App. 3d at 578.\nWe agree with Johnson that this district\u2019s prior application of the four elements of the tort \u2014 without ever specifically asserting that a cause of action for intrusion upon seclusion exists \u2014 constitutes at least a peripheral prior judicial acceptance of the tort. In other words, we think that Johnson did not establish, or claim to establish, a new principle of law and was not a case of first impression. This necessarily means that it did not and could not overrule prior rulings of the First District (i.e., Kelly, 72 Ill. App. 3d 642). Accordingly, as the Johnson court applied the prescripts of the tort that it found previously had been actionable in the First District, it is also impossible for Johnson to be applied retroactively in the case at bar. Indeed, the facts giving rise to the complaint in Johnson took place during 1992-93, even well before the facts giving rise to the instant suit. Johnson, 311 Ill. App. 3d at 575.\nIt appears uncertain whether the supreme court\u2019s decision in Aleckson superceded Granados and the similar line of reasoning in Harris and Lay hew. Two supreme court justices apparently believe that was the case:\n\u201cBecause there is only one appellate court, a decision by any division of that court is binding precedent on all circuit courts throughout the state, regardless of locale. People v. Harris, 123 Ill. 2d 113, 128 (1988). That being so, I fail to see how the majority can hold \u2018that when conflicts arise amongst the districts, the circuit court is bound by the decisions of the appellate court of the district in which it sits.\u2019 176 Ill. 2d at 92. Such a rule makes sense in the federal judiciary, where there are various courts of appeal which are autonomous, but it is wholly inconsistent with the principle that the appellate court in Illinois is a single body whose decisions are binding on every circuit court in the state.\nGiven the unitary nature of the Illinois appellate court and the reach of its decisions, what circuit courts should be doing is following the most recent appellate court decision on point. That is so even if the decision conflicts with a prior decision of an appellate court division located within the circuit court\u2019s particular district. The geography is simply irrelevant.\u201d Aleckson, 176 Ill. 2d at 94-95 (Harrison, J., specially concurring, joined by Heiple, C.J.).\nRegardless of whether Aleckson overruled the line of reasoning employed in Granados, however, we agree with Johnson that the First District previously has recognized the cause of action for intrusion upon seclusion. Accordingly, our inquiry as to the viability of the tort ceases because we agree with Johnson that the cause of action was in place (albeit obliquely) at the time of Ameritech\u2019s conduct.\nA finding that the cause of action has been recognized is, of course, not a finding that the tort\u2019s elements have been satisfied. Accordingly, Ameritech\u2019s next argument is that plaintiffs, as a matter of law, failed to prove at least two elements of the offense, thereby rendering the jury\u2019s verdict for unreasonable intrusion upon seclusion against the manifest weight of the evidence. Under the manifest weight of the evidence standard, we will not examine whether the evidence could have supported a verdict for the appellants but whether a contrary verdict is clearly evident. Tedrowe v. Burlington Northern, Inc., 158 Ill. App. 3d 438, 444 (1987). In other words, the lower court\u2019s verdict will be reversed only if an opposite conclusion is clearly evident or when the findings of the jury are motivated by passion or prejudice or appear arbitrary or unsubstantiated by the evidence. Maple v. Gustafson, 151 Ill. 2d 445, 454 (1992).\nAs stated, the Melvin court found the following elements necessary to be pied and proven by the plaintiff to establish the tort of intrusion upon seclusion: (1) an unauthorized intrusion or prying into the plaintiffs seclusion; (2) an intrusion that is offensive or objectionable to a reasonable person; (3) the matter upon which the intrusion occurs is private; and (4) the intrusion causes anguish and suffering. Melvin, 141 Ill. App. 3d at 789, adopted by Johnson, 311 Ill. App. 3d at 578.\nInitially, however, we think that Melvin\u2019s recitation of the tort\u2019s elements, as adopted by Johnson, incorrectly states the requirement that the defendant\u2019s alleged intrusion merely be \u201coffensive or objectionable to a reasonable person.\u201d This is in direct contrast to the requirement recognized by the Restatement of Torts and adopted by the supreme court in Lovgren that the standard of conduct to which this tort applies is highly offensive. See Lovgren, 126 Ill. 2d at 416-17, citing Restatement (Second) of Torts \u00a7 652B, at 378 (1977). Accordingly, we find that to succeed in adequately pleading and proving a cause of action for unreasonable intrusion upon seclusion, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the intrusion is not only offensive, but highly offensive to a reasonable person.\nBecause the circuit court rejected Ameritech\u2019s proposed instruction regarding this matter, we find that Ameritech was greatly prejudiced. As Ameritech notes, \u201c[ejach party *** has the right to have the jury instructed on its theory of the case, and the circuit court, in the exercise of its discretion, must instruct the jury on all issues which it finds have been raised by the evidence presented.\u201d Marin v. American Meat Packing Co., 204 Ill. App. 3d 302, 310 (1990). Where a party is prejudiced by the denial of an instruction, a new trial is warranted. Alden Press, Inc. v. Block & Co., 173 Ill. App. 3d 251, 260 (1988). Consequently, if we did not find the plaintiffs\u2019 case to be otherwise unsound, we would reverse and remand for a new trial. At any rate, Ameritech also claims that the plaintiffs failed to show that its investigation of Thomas\u2019 conduct was unauthorized (element 1) and that anguish and suffering were caused by the intrusion (element 4).\nAmeritech claims that three provisions of state and federal law authorize Ameritech\u2019s investigation. First, it was authorized by the employer/employee relationship that existed between Thomas and Ameritech. See Fascian v. Bratz, 96 Ill. App. 3d 367, 369 (1981) (employer \u201chad a qualified right to make appropriate internal checks concerning the job conduct of its employees\u201d); Saldana v. Kelsey-Hayes Co., 178 Mich. App. 230, 234, 443 N.W.2d 382, 384 (1989) (holding that a privacy right is \u201cnot absolute in nature, but rather is limited by those rights which arise from social conditions, including the business relationships of the parties\u201d (emphasis omitted)). Second, it was authorized by Illinois law, which has found that an organization\u2019s review of its own records is not an unreasonable intrusion upon seclusion. See Dwyer, 273 Ill. App. 3d 742; Mucklow, 176 Ill. App. 3d 886. Third, it was authorized by federal telecommunications law, which recognizes that telecommunications companies ought to be able to review their own records for business reasons and specifically exempts their review of the phone records they keep from certain privacy-related prohibitions. See 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 2511(2)(a)(i) (2000); 47 U.S.C. \u00a7 222(d)(2) (Supp. 1996). Of the three, Ameritech\u2019s concluding point is probably the most compelling.\nIn short, Ameritech asserts that two federal statutes have recognized the occasional need that telecommunications companies have to consult the telephone records they keep by allowing them to review those records when they have deemed it necessary to protect their \u201crights or property.\u201d The Electronic Communications Privacy Act, a criminal statute, expressly exempts from the statute\u2019s prohib\u00edtians the company\u2019s \u201cuse [of] that communication *** while engaged in any activity which is a necessary incident *** to the protection of the rights or property of the provider of that service.\u201d 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 2511 (2) (a) (i) (2000). Ameritech also claims that the Telecommunications Act of 1996 also recognizes and protects this same need. 47 U.S.C. \u00a7 222(d)(2) (Supp. 1996). However, as plaintiffs note, because the Telecommunications Act of 1996 was enacted two years after the conduct in question, it cannot provide the protection sought by Ameritech for its conduct in 1994. Accordingly, we agree with the circuit court that the Telecommunications Act is inapplicable.\nThe circuit court, however, refused to let federal statutory law play any role in this case. Ameritech argues that in the court\u2019s denial of its motion to dismiss (and in its motion in limine and proffered jury instruction), the court erroneously concluded that federal communications law is applicable only in connection with the provision of telephone service, even though the statute itself states that it relates to the provision of service or \u201crights or property.\u201d 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 2511 (2) (a) (i) (2000). This, Ameritech claims, was reversible error, as those statutes expressly authorized its conduct.\nPlaintiffs, of course, respond that the federal communications law to which Ameritech cites did not authorize its conduct. It notes that the trial court, in deciding Ameritech\u2019s motion to dismiss plaintiffs complaint, found that the information used by Ameritech in the present case was not used to protect Ameritech from fraud or deception in its provision of services. Instead, the court found that Ameritech used customer records to track an employee for purposes entirely unrelated to the provision of electronic communications services.\nWe are not persuaded by plaintiffs\u2019 arguments regarding the Electronic Communications Privacy Act. Apparently, the plaintiffs and the trial court agree that the protection of section 2511 (2) (a) (i) of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act is applicable only if Ameritech consults its records in the course of providing electronic communications services or to protect Ameritech from fraud or deception in its provision of services. The statute, however, lists activities undertaken \u201cincident to the rendition of [its] service\u201d as only one way to access the statute\u2019s protection. 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 2511(2)(a)(i) (2000). Indeed, as Ameritech points out, the statute also allows Ameritech to use its records to protect its rights and property. The section, in its entirety, reads:\n\u201c(2)(a)(i) It shall not be unlawful under this chapter for an operator of a switchboard, or an officer, employee, or agent of a provider of wire or electronic communication service, whose facilities are used in the transmission of a wire or electronic communication, to intercept, disclose, or use that communication in the normal course of his employment while engaged in any activity which is a necessary incident to the rendition of his service or to the protection of the rights or property of the provider of that service, except that a provider of wire communication service to the public shall not utilize service observing or random monitoring except for mechanical or service quality control checks.\u201d (Emphasis added.) 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 2511 (2)(a)(i) (2000).\nIt appears that the trial court was correct in its decision to disallow the evidence of this statute as proper authorization of Ameritech\u2019s actions where those activities were clearly not \u201cincident to the rendition of [its] service.\u201d However, the trial court should not have ended its inquiry there. It also should have determined whether Ameritech\u2019s conduct was a necessary incident to the protection of its rights or property, where the term \u201crights or property\u201d includes Ameritech\u2019s monetary resources. See People v. Smith, 31 Ill. App. 3d 423, 427-28 (1975), citing United States v. DeLeeuw, 368 F. Supp. 426 (E.D. Wis. 1974).\nIn Smith, the defendant allegedly illegally used a \u201cblue box\u201d to place long distance calls and bypass the telephone company\u2019s billing procedures. Smith, 31 Ill. App. 3d at 425. In order to nab the defendant, the telephone company\u2019s security manager recorded a number of dial tones that were abnormal and indicated illegal use. Smith, 31 Ill. App. 3d at 425. This court held:\n\u201cThe nonrandom, nonservice observing recordation of long-distance numbers dialed by defendant was therefore necessary to Illinois Bell\u2019s rendering of telephone service, and was necessary to protect the rights and property of the company. Such monitoring was therefore authorized by 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 2511(2)(a)(i).\u201d Smith, 31 Ill. App. 3d at 428.\nAt trial, it was undisputed that Ameritech policy prohibits employees from taking a vacation while also collecting disability without written authorization. In fact, the disability plan itself provides that an employee on disability may not leave town without written authorization from three sources: the employee\u2019s physician, Ameritech\u2019s benefits committee, and the case manager. The purpose behind such a restriction seems clear: if an employee is collecting disability payments while he or she is, for all purposes, on vacation and is not having that vacation time deducted from his or her yearly allotment, then that person is actually receiving \u201cdouble vacation time.\u201d It was undisputed that Thomas not only violated this policy, but lied about violating it as well.\nThe result of engaging in such a practice is that Ameritech unnecessarily would be depleting its monetary resources to fund an employee\u2019s vacation twice over, if and when that employee then decides to take an \u201cofficial\u201d vacation and has that vacation time deducted from his or her account. In other words, Ameritech essentially would be funding the equivalent of two employees\u2019 vacations while only receiving the benefit of one employee\u2019s work. Because Ameritech\u2019s investigation into an unnecessary depletion of its monetary resources necessarily involves a protection of its rights and property, especially in light of Thomas\u2019 admittedly deceitful actions, we find that Amer-itech\u2019s conduct was authorized and protected specifically by this statute. Accordingly, because plaintiffs cannot demonstrate that Amer-itech\u2019s conduct was unauthorized, i.e., the first element of the tort, we find that the jury\u2019s verdict in favor of the plaintiffs was against the manifest weight of the evidence. The partial dissent\u2019s disinclination to extend the statutory authorization of Ameritech\u2019s dealings with Richie is, at least, understandable. However, where the plain language of the statute never sets a limit on whose records a telecommunications company may review in the course of protecting its rights and property, Richie\u2019s records \u2014 like the Schmidts\u2019 \u2014 are fair game. We simply cannot read a limitation into the statute.\nAs an aside, we also think it possible that Ameritech\u2019s conduct was reasonable in light of federal case law that requires an employer to conduct a documented investigation into an employee\u2019s alleged misdeeds before the employer may discipline that employee. See Babb v. Minder, 806 F.2d 749, 756 (7th Cir. 1986) (held that an employer was liable for defamation related to suspected employee misconduct and termination of employee without conducting an investigation). However, given our finding that Ameritech\u2019s conduct was, at least, authorized by federal law, we need not reach that conclusion. While our inquiry could end here, we choose to address the remaining issues because of their significance to this relatively untested cause of action.\nThe second element of the intrusion upon seclusion tort that Ameritech claims was not proven beyond a reasonable doubt is the requirement that the intrusion caused anguish and suffering. In fact, Ameritech claims, the plaintiffs have failed to prove the existence of any actual damage whatsoever. Rather, Ameritech argues that all of Thomas and Cynthia\u2019s evidence regarding damages was attributed to their feelings of sadness surrounding the loss of Thomas\u2019 job and not to the intrusion. And, because anyone seeking recovery under the unreasonable intrusion upon seclusion tort must prove that the intrusion caused anguish and suffering, Ameritech asserts that plaintiffs\u2019 claim must fail.\nIn support of this argument, Ameritech points to Thomas\u2019 testimony that he was \u201cscared\u201d at the August 4, 1994, meeting and that he was \u201cdepressed\u201d as a result of his suspension on that date. He also testified that he felt \u201cterrible\u201d when he informed his wife about the suspension. Ameritech claims that even Thomas\u2019 counsel phrased his questions in terms of Thomas\u2019 loss of his job, not Ameritech\u2019s review of his phone records:\n\u201cQ. Tom, after you were fired how did you feel?\nA. Like everything was gone.\u201d\nAs with Thomas, Ameritech claims, there is no evidence of any injury to Cynthia arising from the intrusion, as all evidence related to her anguish came from the testimony of her husband and from Richie, and it related to Thomas\u2019 job status, not the intrusion. For example, Thomas testified that, when he told Cynthia of his suspension on August 4, she \u201ccried,\u201d left work, and was upset. He also testified that after his suspension, Cynthia was depressed, upset, and \u201ccrying all the time.\u201d Richie\u2019s testimony, Ameritech claims, was likewise related to Thomas\u2019 suspension and firing.\nIn addition, Ameritech asserts that none of the evidence that plaintiffs presented of mental anguish or suffering was sufficient to meet the standard for actual damages. Under Illinois law, a plaintiff must prove actual injury in the form of, for example, medical care, an inability to sleep or work, or a loss of reputation and integrity in the community in order to recover damages for torts such as intrusion upon seclusion. See Gibson v. Philip Morris, Inc., 292 Ill. App. 3d 267, 279 (1997). Injury is not presumed. Restatement (Second) of Torts \u00a7 652H(b) (1977).\nIn the present case, therefore, Ameritech claims that not only was Thomas\u2019 claimed anguish unrelated to Ameritech\u2019s review of its phone records, but he admitted that he sought no medical or psychological assistance for any anguish or suffering. He also admitted that he never complained to Ameritech or any state or federal agency that Ameritech had invaded his privacy. Ameritech also asserts that the evidence of Cynthia\u2019s injuries was limited to her feeling upset and depressed because of her husband\u2019s suspension. As for Richie, she testified that, upon learning that Ameritech had accessed the phone records, she was \u201cinfuriated\u201d and felt that a trust had been broken. Further, she claimed that the incident caused her to use her work phone less for personal calls and to advise her employees not to use the business phone for personal calls. However, Ameritech claims, there is no evidence that this hurt her business. Like Thomas, Richie also conceded that she never sought medical or psychological assistance and that she was not precluded from any work or social activity because of her alleged emotional suffering.\nPlaintiffs respond that they need not prove that Ameritech\u2019s intrusion upon their seclusion was the only cause, nor the last or latest cause, of their anguish and suffering. Rather, they argue, it is sufficient if it concurs with some other cause acting at the same time, which in combination with it, causes the injury. Based upon the proximate cause standard, which was set forth in the jury instructions, plaintiffs claim that the record reflects the jury\u2019s conclusion that Ameritech\u2019s intrusion upon their seclusion was the proximate cause of plaintiffs\u2019 injuries.\nAs plaintiffs conceded during oral arguments, the Schmidts experienced depression, fits of crying, and a disturbed marital relationship purely as a result of the loss of Thomas\u2019 job. While the Schmidts claim that the loss of Thomas\u2019 job was directly caused by Ameritech\u2019s intrusion upon their seclusion, we think the evidence conclusively shows otherwise. Thomas lost his job because he lied. Moreover, as plaintiffs concede, Ameritech already had more than enough evidence to build a sound case for discharging Thomas prior to the intrusion. Consequently, regardless of whether the pain and suffering experienced by the Schmidts was sufficient to meet the standard for actual damages, it was still attributable only to the loss of Thomas\u2019 job and would have occurred even if Ameritech never reviewed any of the Schmidts\u2019 records. Accordingly, we cannot say and the record does not reflect that the intrusion was the proximate cause of the Schmidts\u2019 claimed suffering. Without any further allegations of pain and suffering, therefore, we find the jury\u2019s determination that the Schmidts\u2019 pain and suffering was caused by the intrusion to be against the manifest weight of the evidence.\nWith regard to Richie, however, the evidence shows that she was infuriated and emotionally upset because Ameritech had broken the trust she placed in the company \u2014 not because Thomas lost his job. Furthermore, she noted at trial that, as a result of Ameritech\u2019s conduct, she changed her own phone use and the phone use of her business and her staff. Unlike the Schmidts, we find that Richie adequately demonstrated a causal relationship between her suffering and anguish and Ameritech\u2019s intrusion. With regard to whether she presented sufficient evidence of actual damages, the facts regarding her change in her business phone use were properly before the jury. Accordingly, while we agree that the findings of the jury as to Richie\u2019s damages appear a bit thin, they are substantiated by the evidence. Regardless of whether we may have found otherwise, because we have no indication that such findings were motivated by passion or prejudice, we find that the jury\u2019s conclusion as to this element of Richie\u2019s cause of action was proper. Admittedly, however, such a finding is irrelevant in fight of our holding that none of the plaintiffs were able to establish the tort\u2019s first element relating to unauthorized intrusion.\nHaving examined whether the elements of the tort were met, we then turn to the issue of damages. While we choose to address this issue because of its significance to the unreasonable intrusion upon seclusion tort, we wish to make clear that our determination on this matter also will not affect the ultimate outcome of our holdings above. In so doing, we find that even if we were to have found that the plaintiffs had pied and proved all the necessary elements of their cause of action, part of the compensatory damage award was against the manifest weight of the evidence and the entire punitive damage award was in error.\nOn appeal from the denial of a motion for new trial on compensatory damages, the standard of review is whether the verdict was against the manifest weight of the evidence. Hollowell v. Wilder Corp. of Delaware, 318 Ill. App. 3d 984, 990 (2001). As to the propriety of those damages, the supreme court has found that under the plain and ordinary meaning of the word:\n\u201cCompensatory damages are \u2018[djamages sufficient in amount to indemnify the injured person for the loss suffered.\u2019 Black\u2019s Law Dictionary 394 (7th ed. 1999). Damages in turn are \u2018[mjoney claimed by, or ordered to be paid to, a person as compensation for loss or injury (the plaintiff seeks $8,000 in damages from the defendant).\u2019 Black\u2019s Law Dictionary 393 (7th ed. 1999). In light of these definitions, the plain meaning of the term \u2018compensatory damages\u2019 is a monetary award paid to a person as compensation for loss or injury.\u201d In re Consolidated Objections to Tax Levies of School District No. 205, 193 Ill. 2d 490, 497 (2000).\nIn this case, therefore, the compensatory damages should have been restricted to compensating plaintiffs only for the intrusion they suffered. As previously stated, Thomas testified at trial that he and his wife felt violated or depressed only because he had been fired. As noted above, Ameritech had plenty of evidence to discipline Thomas without relying on any of the plaintiffs\u2019 phone records. Consequently, because we find that the jury compensated both Cynthia and Thomas for the loss of his job and not for the review of the phone records, we find that the damage award to the Schmidts was against the manifest weight of the evidence. However, because Richie was able to demonstrate that her actual damages directly resulted from Ameritech\u2019s prying into her phone records, we find that the jury\u2019s damage award to her was supported by the manifest weight of the evidence.\nRegarding the imposition of punitive damages, the parties disagree as to our standard of review. Arguing that this issue is governed by a de nova standard, Ameritech notes the supreme court\u2019s holding in Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc., 74 Ill. 2d 172 (1978), that \u201cthe preliminary question of whether the facts of a particular case justify the imposition of punitive damages is properly one of law.\u201d Kelsay, 74 Ill. 2d at 186, citing Knierim v. Izzo, 22 Ill. 2d 73, 87 (1961).\nIn response, plaintiffs note this court\u2019s decision in LID Associates v. Dolan, 324 Ill. App. 3d 1047 (2001), which held that \u201c[t]he decision to submit the issue of punitive damages to the jury is a matter reserved to the circuit court and its decision will not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion.\u201d LID Associates, 324 Ill. App. 3d at 1072. See also Proctor v. Davis, 291 Ill. App. 3d 265, 285-86 (1997); Duignan v. Lincoln Towers Insurance Agency, Inc., 282 Ill. App. 3d 262, 271 (1996). Further confounding this issue is the fact that the supreme court has also stated that because the measurement of punitive damages is a jury question, that determination will not be reversed unless it is against the manifest weight of the evidence. Martin v. Heinold Commodities, Inc., 163 Ill. 2d 33, 81 (1994). Compare Cirrincione v. Johnson, 184 Ill. 2d 109, 116 (1998).\nIn resolving this issue, we adhere to the supreme court\u2019s language in Cirrincione:\n\u201cWhile the question of whether punitive damages can be awarded for a particular cause of action is a matter of law (Loitz v. Remington Arms Co., 138 Ill. 2d 404, 414 (1990)), the question of whether a defendant\u2019s conduct was sufficiently willful or wanton to justify the imposition of punitive damages is for the jury to decide (Smith v. Hill, 12 Ill. 2d 588, 595 (1958)).\u201d Cirrincione, 184 Ill. 2d at 116.\nHere, Ameritech is contesting both whether punitive damages can be awarded for this action and whether its conduct was sufficiently willful or wanton to justify the imposition of punitive damages. Of course, where a court of review finds that punitive damages were improperly awarded for a particular cause of action in the first place, the inquiry need not proceed any further. We find that to be the case here.\nIn Kelsay, the supreme court noted that \u201c[bjecause of their penal nature, punitive damages are not favored in the law, and the courts must take caution to see that punitive damages are not improperly or unwisely awarded.\u201d Kelsay, 74 Ill. 2d at 188. There, the court first recognized a cause of action for retaliatory discharge. However, it refused to uphold the circuit court\u2019s imposition of punitive damages because it would be \u201cextremely unfair\u201d to impose punishment for a cause of action that did not exist when the conduct took place. Kelsay, 74 Ill. 2d at 189. In so finding, the court stated that the penal nature of punitive damages renders them improper in cases involving novel causes of action:\n\u201c[W]e are compelled to conclude that the award for $25,000 as punitive damages was improper. As we have noted, the function of punitive damages is similar to that of a criminal penalty, i.e., as a punishment to the wrongdoer and as a means to deter such a wrongdoer and others from committing like offenses in the future. (See Mattyasovszky v. West Towns Bus Co. (1975), 61 Ill. 2d 31.) Because of their penal nature, punitive damages are not favored in the law, and the courts must take caution to see that punitive damages are not improperly or unwisely awarded. (See Eshelman v. Rawalt (1921), 298 Ill. 192, 197.) Adherence to this rule compels us to conclude that punitive damages should not be awarded where, as here, the cause of action forming the basis for their award is a novel one.\u201d Kelsay, 74 Ill. 2d at 187-88.\nIn keeping with the principles of fundamental fairness espoused in Kelsay, we are compelled in this case to find that punitive damages were improperly awarded for this cause of action due to the confusion and disagreement surrounding the tort\u2019s existence in the First District. While we held above that the trial court properly recognized the cause of action for unreasonable intrusion upon seclusion due to the First District\u2019s prior recognition of the tort, we still acknowledged that the recognition in Miller, Mucklow, and Dwyer was only \u201cperipheral\u201d and \u201coblique.\u201d Moreover, when the supreme court addressed the tort\u2019s existence in Lovgren, it specifically refused to decide the issue. Accordingly, because the dispute surrounding the issue of the tort\u2019s existence was at least tenable on both sides, we find that it would be fundamentally unfair to punish Ameritech for conduct that it could not know definitively was actionable. This, of course, is not to say that Ameritech\u2019s conduct was not and could not have been actionable in tort, as we have held. Rather, we are simply holding that where Ameritech could not have known, with certainty, that its conduct was actionable, it would be unfair to assess damages that are in the nature of a criminal penalty.\nOn a final note, we also wish to comment on an evidentiary issue raised by ^Ameritech. At trial, the court allowed the plaintiffs to introduce, through Thomas, evidence from arbitrator John E McGu-ry\u2019s report to show that the arbitrator had ordered Thomas to be reinstated. The court, however, prevented Ameritech from also using the report to show that Thomas had not been exonerated, but had been disciplined for lying and for his violation of the disability plan. Ameritech asserts that this ruling left the jury with the prejudicial and erroneous inference that Ameritech had punished Thomas wrongfully, because it was forced to rehire him. Once its hands were tied, Ameritech claims, the plaintiffs were then able to exploit the discrepancy when stating in their opening argument:\n\u201cWell, on the 24th of August at the meeting Ameritech fired Mr. Schmidt. *** You will learn that subsequent to that meeting there was an arbitration of a greivance [szc] filed by Mr. Schmidt and you will learn that the result of the arbitration was that Mr. Schmidt was reinstated to his position but that the arbitrator did not provide Mr. Schmidt with back pay.\u201d\nAmeritech argues that the plaintiffs returned to this theme in their closing arguments:\n\u201cI want you to think about what Tom Schmidt lost. Ameritech thinks its [szc] okay to take away a year of Tom\u2019s pay. Fine. That\u2019s Tom\u2019s punishment for his intangible harm. Now it\u2019s time to determine Ameritech\u2019s punishment for its intangible harm. A year of Tom\u2019s pay and benefits is gone and emotional harm galore. Now its Ameritech\u2019s turn.\u201d\nWithout the arbitrator\u2019s report, Ameritech claims, it was unable to counter this argument and the jury was left with the unmistakable and unrebutted impression that (1) Ameritech improperly punished Thomas by taking away a year of his life, and that (2) the arbitrator had neglected his duty to make things right, thereby leaving Thomas in need of the jury\u2019s help. This was exacerbated, Ameritech concludes, by the fact that the arbitrator found that Thomas\u2019 misconduct was severe and substantial:\n\u201cThe Grievant [szc] [Thomas] throughout this episode was deceitful and uncooperative. The Grievant [szc] had been on disability in the past. He was not a stranger to the requirements of that status. He had numerous opportunities to put his cards on the table.\nOnly at the last minute did the Grievant [szc] admit what had happened, after he and the Union had learned of the evidence that the employer had marshalled [szc].\nWe conclude that the employer was justified in disciplining the Grievant [szc].\u201d\n\u201cA trial court has the responsibility to determine the admissibility of evidence and this determination will not be overturned in the absence of a clear abuse of discretion. Patch v. Glover, 248 Ill. App. 3d 562, 567 (1993). Even if the trial court did abuse its discretion, a new trial should be ordered \u2018only when evidence improperly admitted appears to have affected the outcome of the trial.\u2019 Tzystuck v. Chicago Transit Authority, 124 Ill. 2d 226, 243 (1988).\u201d Vickers v. Abbott Laboratories, 308 Ill. App. 3d 393, 412 (1999). In other words, a new trial is necessary where the exclusion of evidence was the result of \u201cserious and prejudicial errors made at trial.\u201d Lagestee v. Days Inn Management Co., 303 Ill. App. 3d 935, 942 (1999). This is especially true where the exclusion of evidence deprives a party of the opportunity to prove its theory of the case. See Wade v. City of Chicago Heights, 295 Ill. App. 3d 873, 886 (1998).\nIn the present case, we find that, in light of the court\u2019s partial admittance of the arbitrator\u2019s ruling for plaintiffs\u2019 use, the exclusion of that report for Ameritech\u2019s use was an abuse of its discretion. \u201cGenerally when part of a conversation or statement is admitted in evidence, the entire conversation or statement relevant to the issue should be allowed.\u201d Healy v. City of Chicago, 109 Ill. App. 2d 6, 14 (1969). Here, it is clear that plaintiffs capitalized on the admittance of the arbitrator\u2019s decision in their attempt to make Thomas appear as the innocent victim, which he most certainly was not. In disallowing Ameritech the opportunity to rebut this evidence, the trial court inherently put Ameritech at the disadvantage of not being able to rebut plaintiffs\u2019 contention that Ameritech\u2019s conduct was especially unreasonable in fight of Thomas\u2019 relatively \u201charmless\u201d conduct. As it was, Thomas\u2019 conduct makes Ameritech\u2019s seem all the more reasonable. Again, if we did not find the plaintiffs\u2019 case to be otherwise unsound, we would reverse and remand for a new trial on this issue alone.\nBecause plaintiffs were not able to meet all of the required elements of the tort of unreasonable intrusion upon seclusion, i.e., they were not able to show that Ameritech\u2019s conduct was unauthorized, and because the Schmidts were not able to show that the intrusion was the proximate cause of their claimed injuries, we reverse the decision of the trial court in its entirety.\nReversed.\nQUINN, J., concurs.\nCurrently, the supreme court is reviewing the decision in Johnson v. K mart Corp., 188 Ill. 2d 565 (2000) (appeal allowed).\nCynthia Schmidt was in a coma and had been for approximately two years at the time of trial. However, her condition is unconnected to the alleged cause of action. Testimony by a spouse, coworker, or other observer regarding their observations of a plaintiff\u2019s emotional distress or anguish has been recognized as providing an evidentiary basis to establish a plaintiffs suffering. Holston v. Sisters of the Third Order of St. Francis, 165 Ill. 2d 150, 174 (1995).", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE GREIMAN" }, { "text": "JUSTICE REID,\nspecially concurring in part and dissenting in part:\nWhile I concur in part with the majority opinion, I feel compelled to write separately on a troubling aspect raised in this case. There can be no question that an employer such as Ameritech has a qualified right to protect its property interests against an employee who would commit fraud such as Schmidt did. 329 Ill. App. 3d at 1033. To that end, the qualified right arguably would allow the employer to make appropriate internal checks concerning the job conduct of its employees. 329 Ill. App. 3d at 1033. My problem with this case is the idea that Ameritech\u2019s authority to investigate potentially dishonest employees extends without limit. It does not and should not. When it comes to a dishonest employee, one who is attempting to take advantage of his position for personal gain, such as abusing the vacation time system, that employee cannot reasonably object to said employer\u2019s attempts to catch him in the lies told. It is even reasonable to extend the investigation from the employee himself to his spouse, who by the nature of her relationship to the employee is likely to be caught up in the investigation. Since the spouse shares directory line records (DLR) and message unit detail (MUD) with her husband, she has no independent basis for objecting to the use of such information as detailed in the majority opinion. I believe that is where Ameritech\u2019s authority should have ended. However, in its zealous pursuit of the truth, Ameritech accessed the phone records of Jeri Lynn Richie, merely because she is Cynthia Schmidt\u2019s employer. I believe this is outrageous. While its interest in accessing the Schmidts\u2019 phone records is arguably legitimate, Ameritech does not have the same interest in accessing Richie\u2019s records. Independent of the relationship between Cynthia Schmidt and Jeri Lynn Richie, Ameritech would likely need an order of a court of competent jurisdiction in order to independently access Richie\u2019s telephone records. It shocks the conscience to think that the door to the invasion of privacy can be opened by any such a tenuous connection.\nAdditionally, the majority identified that Richie\u2019s claimed damages were substantiated by the evidence. 329 Ill. App. 3d at 1038. Since I would hold that Richie set out the elements of the tort of intrusion upon seclusion, and the majority found her damages to.be substantiated, I believe the matter should be affirmed as to her.", "type": "concurring-in-part-and-dissenting-in-part", "author": "JUSTICE REID," } ], "attorneys": [ "Christina M. Tchen and Michele L. Walton, both of Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom, and Gail Neimann and Craig Knot, both of Ameritech Illinois, all of Chicago, for appellant.", "James T. Harrison and Clay M. Ullrick, both of Harrison Law Offices, of Woodstock, for appellees." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THOMAS SCHMIDT et al., Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. AMERITECH ILLINOIS et al., Defendants-Appellants.\nFirst District (5th Division)\nNo. 1\u201401\u20140463\nOpinion filed March 29, 2002.\nREID, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part.\nChristina M. Tchen and Michele L. Walton, both of Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom, and Gail Neimann and Craig Knot, both of Ameritech Illinois, all of Chicago, for appellant.\nJames T. Harrison and Clay M. Ullrick, both of Harrison Law Offices, of Woodstock, for appellees." }, "file_name": "1020-01", "first_page_order": 1038, "last_page_order": 1060 }