{
  "id": 1472353,
  "name": "BARBARA SAICHEK, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. MALGORZATA LUPA, a/k/a Margaret Lupa, et al., Defendants-Appellees",
  "name_abbreviation": "Saichek v. Lupa",
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  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "BARBARA SAICHEK, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. MALGORZATA LUPA, a/k/a Margaret Lupa, et al., Defendants-Appellees."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "JUSTICE O\u2019BRIEN\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nPlaintiff, Barbara Saichek, appeals an order of the circuit court granting defendant Malgorzata Lupa\u2019s section 2 \u2014 619 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 619 (West 1998)) motion to dismiss plaintiffs negligence complaint based on a satisfaction/release of judgment that plaintiff executed with codefendant Valentin Zdunkevich. On appeal, plaintiff contends that the court erred in granting the motion to dismiss where plaintiff executed the satisfaction/release of judgment only as to Zdunkevich, and plaintiff did not intend to release her claim against Lupa. We reverse and remand for further proceedings.\nPlaintiff sustained injuries when the cab in which she was riding, driven by Zdunkevich, collided with a car driven by Lupa. Plaintiff filed a two-count complaint, with count I alleging Lupa\u2019s negligence in causing the collision and count II alleging negligence on the part of Zdunkevich. While Lupa filed an answer to the complaint, Zdunkevich defaulted when he did not file an appearance or any other response. The case was assigned for a prove-up of damages and the court entered a default judgment against Zdunkevich in the amount of $40,792. Plaintiff then filed an action against American Country Insurance Company (American Country), Zdunkevich\u2019s insurer, to collect on the judgment. After American Country agreed to pay the judgment for $40,792 plus costs, plaintiff executed a satisfaction/release of judgment as to American Country and Zdunkevich. The satisfaction/release of judgment specifically states that it pertains to the release of judgment \u201centered only against Valentin N. Zdunkevich & American Country Insurance\u201d and the \u201ccause remains pending as to defendant Malgor-zata Lupa.\u201d (Emphasis added.)\nLupa then filed a section 2 \u2014 619 motion to dismiss plaintiffs complaint against Lupa based on the satisfaction/release of judgment. The trial court granted Lupa\u2019s motion, stating:\n\u201c[Tjhere has been a judicial determination to the amount of damages [plaintiff] suffered during this car accident. Because the damages are capped at $40,792 under that Holman case, *** that\u2019s the cap of her damages. She\u2019s gotten every penny, plus costs and interest. There is nothing that could proceed against Lupa.\u201d\nPlaintiff filed this timely appeal.\nThe sole issue on appeal is whether the trial court erred in granting Lupa\u2019s motion to dismiss when the satisfaction/release of judgment executed by plaintiff specifically stated it released the judgment \u201conly\u201d against Zdunkevich and American Country. The standard of review for motions to dismiss is de nova. Nowak v. St. Rita High School, 197 Ill. 2d 381, 389 (2001).\nOur case is similar to Holman v. Simborg, 152 Ill. App. 3d 453 (1987). In Holman, the plaintiff filed a two-count complaint against the defendants to recover damages for injuries he sustained while working on the roof of a building owned and managed by defendants. Holman, 152 Ill. App. 3d at 454. Count I was based upon defendants\u2019 negligence, and count II charged defendant\u2019s liability under the Structural Work Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 48, pars. 60 through 69). Holman, 152 Ill. App. 3d at 454. The trial court granted defendants\u2019 motion for a directed finding on the Structural Work Act count, and the cause proceeded to trial on the negligence count. Holman, 152 Ill. App. 3d at 454. On August 17, 1982, the jury returned a verdict in favor of plaintiff, finding plaintiff suffered total damages in the amount of $116,371. The jury also found plaintiff 65% comparatively negligent and reduced the award accordingly to $40,730. Holman, 152 Ill. App. 3d at 454-55. The plaintiff in Holman appealed the directed finding. The appellate court remanded the cause for a new trial on defendants\u2019 liability under the Structural Work Act with damages fixed at $116,371 \u201ctotal damages\u201d found by the original jury verdict. Holman, 152 Ill. App. 3d at 455.\nPrior to the trial on remand, the plaintiff accepted a payment by defendants of $40,730 plus interest in satisfaction of the August 17 judgment on the negligence count. Holman, 152 Ill. App. 3d at 455. The court issued an order stating that plaintiff, \u201c \u2018having received full satisfaction and payment of the judgment of August 17, 1982, releases the judgment.\u2019 \u201d (Emphasis omitted.) Holman, 152 Ill. App. 3d at 455. The cause proceeded to trial on the Structural Work Act count and the jury rendered a verdict in favor of plaintiff for $75,641, the difference between total damages of $116,371, and the $40,730 paid to plaintiff in satisfaction of judgment on the negligence count. Holman, 152 Ill. App. 3d at 455.\nThe defendants appealed, contending that the payment made in satisfaction of the negligence claim operated as a full satisfaction of plaintiffs injury claim. Holman, 152 Ill. App. 3d at 455-56. The appellate court disagreed, holding that \u201cthe intent of the parties [was] of central importance\u201d (Holman, 152 Ill. App. 3d at 456) and:\n\u201cTo determine the intent of the parties, it is necessary to examine the language of the order of satisfaction and release in light of the circumstances existing at the time of the transaction. [Citation.] The record shows that at the time the order was entered, both parties were aware that the cause had been remanded for a new trial on the issue of liability under the Structural [Work] Act count. There was no question that the defendants, having abandoned their appeal on the amount of the negligence judgment, owed the plaintiff at the very least the amount paid pursuant to the order. It was under these circumstances that the plaintiff insisted on qualifying the language of the order to include a statement that it was intended to encompass only the \u2018judgment of August 17, 1982.\u2019 We therefore conclude that the qualifying language contained in the order, when considered in light of the parties\u2019 knowledge that a second trial would take place, establishes that the plaintiff did not intend to accept the payment as full satisfaction of his injury claim.\u201d Holman, 152 Ill. App. 3d at 456-57.\nHere, plaintiffs claim for damages alleged one count of negligence against Lupa and another negligence count against Zdunkevich. Plaintiff subsequently executed a satisfaction/release of judgment for $40,792 \u201conly\u201d as to Zdunkevich and his insurer, American Country, specifically stating that the \u201ccause remains pending as to defendant Malgorzata Lupa.\u201d As in Holman, the qualifying language contained in the order, when considered in light of the parties\u2019 knowledge that plaintiffs claim alleged one count of negligence against Lupa and one count of negligence against Zdunkevich, demonstrates that plaintiff did not intend for the $40,792 payment to constitute full satisfaction of her injury claim.\nDefendant Lupa contends that the $40,792 assessed in plaintiffs prove-up constitutes total damages and plaintiff, having received the entire amount from Zdunkevich, is entitled to only one full satisfaction of her injury. Lupa argues that if plaintiff recovers additional damages from her, plaintiff would receive double recovery for her injury.\nLupa\u2019s concern here is unfounded. As discussed above, plaintiff did not intend for the payment to constitute full satisfaction of her claim. Further, the record does not contain a transcript of the prove-up of damages to support Lupa\u2019s contention that the prove-up addressed the total damages of the plaintiff. The clear language of the order, absent any evidence to the contrary in the record, shows that plaintiff intended the payment to constitute only partial satisfaction of her claim. Therefore, the satisfaction/release of judgment executed against Zdunkevich and American Country does not bar plaintiff from pursuing her claim against Lupa. See Holman, 152 Ill. App. 3d at 456.\nFurther, a defendant has a right to a setoff of plaintiffs settlement with a joint tortfeasor and the defendant may raise this right at any time. Kipnis v. Meltzer, 253 Ill. App. 3d 67, 69 (1993). Any judgment entered against a nonsettling defendant will be reduced by the setoff amount, even if the plaintiffs award is reduced to zero. Kipnis, 253 Ill. App. 3d at 68. Thus, any judgment awarded to plaintiff against Lupa will be reduced by $40,792, the amount plaintiff recovered in her judgment against Zdunkevich. Such a setoff ehminates the possibility that plaintiff will recover double damages for her injury.\nFor the foregoing reasons, we reverse the circuit court and remand for further proceedings.\nReversed and remanded.\nBUCKLEY and O\u2019HARA FROSSARD, JJ., concur.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "JUSTICE O\u2019BRIEN"
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Robert B. Morton, of Chicago, for appellant.",
      "O\u2019Hagan Smith & Amundsen, L.L.C., of Chicago (Michael Resis and James S. Smith, of counsel), for appellees."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "BARBARA SAICHEK, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. MALGORZATA LUPA, a/k/a Margaret Lupa, et al., Defendants-Appellees.\nFirst District (6th Division)\nNo. 1\u201401\u20142843\nOpinion filed April 26, 2002.\nRobert B. Morton, of Chicago, for appellant.\nO\u2019Hagan Smith & Amundsen, L.L.C., of Chicago (Michael Resis and James S. Smith, of counsel), for appellees."
  },
  "file_name": "1059-01",
  "first_page_order": 1077,
  "last_page_order": 1081
}