{ "id": 2875426, "name": "The People of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Oscar Suarez, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Suarez", "decision_date": "1975-11-26", "docket_number": "No. 74-277", "first_page": "689", "last_page": "693", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "33 Ill. App. 3d 689" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "61 Ill.2d 580", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2965915 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/61/0580-01" ] }, { "cite": "38 Ill.2d 255", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2861845 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "258" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/38/0255-01" ] }, { "cite": "57 Ill.2d 264", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5407802 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "267" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/57/0264-01" ] }, { "cite": "272 N.E.2d 423", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "133 Ill.App.2d 885", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2474417 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/133/0885-01" ] }, { "cite": "264 N.E.2d 898", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "279 N.E.2d 53", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "22 Ill.App.3d 206", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2941321, 2948414 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/22/0206-02", "/ill-app-3d/22/0206-01" ] }, { "cite": "3 Ill.App.3d 699", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2840777 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/3/0699-01" ] }, { "cite": "24 Ill.App.3d 504", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 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Oscar Suarez, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Mr. PRESIDING JUSTICE RECHENMACHER\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThis appeal presents only one question \u2014 the sufficiency of the indictment charging the defendant with the crime of which he was convicted.\nThe defendant was charged with theft of property worth over $150. After a jury trial he was convicted and sentenced to the penitentiary for a term of not less than 1 nor more than 3 years.\nIn this appeal the defendant contends his conviction is void because the .indictment charging him with the offense of theft omitted the word \u201cunauthorized\u201d in charging that he had obtained control over the 1973 automobile in question.\nSectim 16 \u2014 1(a)(1) of the Criminal Code (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1973, ch. 38, par. 16\u20141(a)(1)) defines theft as follows:\n\u201cA person commits theft when he knowingly:\n(a) Obtains or exerts unauthorized control over property of the owner; [and]\n(1) Intends to deprive the owner permanently of the use or benefit of the property;\u201d\nThe actual indictment having omitted the word \u201cunauthorized\u201d from the above language, it is contended by the defendant that the indictment did not charge a crime, inasmuch as the manner of obtaining control over the property in question is an essential element of the offense of theft.\nThe circumstances related by the defendant in his statement to the police show that the defendant and two other youths, younger than himself, traveled from Chicago to Woodstock on the train on the day of the crime and that at least one of the other two had the intention of stealing an automobile when they started out. After they arrived in Woodstock they inquired of a police officer the directions to a place known as Pleasant Farm. Sometime after receiving these directions one of the boys noticed a car on the street with the ignition key in it. He got into the car, picked up the defendant and the other boy and proceeded toward Wisconsin in the car. They were apprehended by the police near Walworth, Wisconsin, and returned to Woodstock. Subsequently, the defendant\u2019s attorney entered into plea negotiations with the State and indicated a plea of guilty would be entered, but at the hearing on the guilty plea the defendant\u2019s statements to the court as to his guilt were so equivocal that the trial court refused to accept the guilty plea and defendant was ordered to stand trial. At his trial the defendant contended he did not know the automobile had been stolen but the jury\u2014 quite logically \u2014 believed otherwise and he was found guilty.\nThe requisites for the sufficiency of an indictment are enunciated in section 111 \u2014 3 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1973, ch. 38, par. 111\u20143). The Illinois Supreme Court has held that the indictment must apprise the defendant clearly of the charge against him so he may prepare his defense accordingly and to guard against the possibility of double jeopardy by describing the particular offense so precisely that the defendant could not be tried again for the same crime. (People v. Ross (1968), 41 Ill.2d 445, 448; People ex rel. Miller v. Pate (1969), 42 Ill.2d 283, 285; People v. Harvey (1973), 53 Ill.2d 585.) Indictments must, therefore, be exact in charging the particular crime and also must, by their language, charge an act which is defined by the State as being a crime. In the case before us it is clear that if the defendant and his companions had been authorized to use and control the automobile in question they would not be guilty of theft. Therefore, since the indictment does not state they were not authorized, it is the defendant\u2019s contention the indictment does not charge a crime and no valid conviction can be had under such indictment.\nWhile the fundamental purposes of an indictment remain the same, court decisions have reflected relaxations as to the niceties of pleadings generally over the past few years, including the technicalities dispensed with by the Civil Practice Act and have had their effect on the more technical aspects of indictments, so that the fundamental purposes thereof have been emphasized at the expense of traditional but nonessential wording. This trend is noticeable in recent decisions of our Supreme Court, e.g., People v. Harvey (1973), 53 Ill.2d 585 (where the court decided an indictment for aggravated battery was valid although it omitted the statutory words \u201cwithout legal justification\u201d); People v. Mahle (1974), 57 Ill.2d 279 (where an indictment for deceptive practices was upheld against a contention that it was defective in not sufficiently identifying the persons deceived); People v. Gallo (1973), 54 Ill.2d 343 (in which an indictment for intimidation was not held void although it omitted the phrase \u201cwithout legal justification\u201d in stating the communication of a threat); People v. Gregory (1974), 59 Ill.2d 111 (where a burglary indictment omitted to state the ownership of the building and that entry was \u201cknowingly\u201d made); People v. Pujoue (1975), 61 Ill.2d 335 (in which the Supreme Court held that when attacked for the first time on appeal (as is the case here), a complaint is sufficient if it apprised the accused of the precise offense charged with sufficient specificity to prepare his defense and allow pleading a resulting conviction as a bar to future prosecution arising out of the same conduct).\nWhile the Supreme Court cases noted above are not on the precise point raised here as to the omission of the word \u201cunauthorized\u201d in a theft indictment, they confirm a trend noted in the opinion of the First Appellate District in People v. Wade (1970), 131 Ill.App.2d 415, which involved the exact point raised in the case before us. There the defendants were charged with theft under section 16 \u2014 1(a)(1) of the Criminal Code, exactly as here and, as here, they indicated the indictment omitted the word \u201cunauthorized\u201d in stating that the defendants \u201cknowingly obtained control\u201d over the property stolen. After noting the State\u2019s argument that \u201cthe trend today is to be concerned more with the substantive rights of the accused and less with rigid technicalities, especially those dealing with pleading, and that the complaints here adequately informed the defendants of the nature and elements of the offense charged,\u201d the court said:\n\u201cWe conclude that the complaint herein did state the offense of theft in compliance with Chapter 38, section 16 \u2014 1(a)(1), sufficiently for defendants to know the nature and elements of the offense and to be able to prepare their defense. Here, the failure to include the word unauthorized/ while not desirable, was not a substantial defect and was not a necessary element' so as to render the complaint fatally defective.\u201d 131 Ill.App.2d 415, 418.\nIn People v. Miller, 24 Ill.App.3d 504, in reversing its previous opinion expressed in People v. Stewart, 3 Ill.App.3d 699, the court (5th Dist.) noted the increasingly liberal trend as to pleadings in indictments and said, in upholding an indictment which omitted the word \u201cunauthorized\u201d:\n\u201cIn accordance with our conclusion in White, [People v. White, 22 Ill.App.3d 206] and in adherence with the supreme court, decisions reviewed herein, we conclude that our holding in People v. Stewart, 3 Ill.App.3d 699, 279 N.E.2d 53, is not here applicable. Consequently, we adopt the position espoused by the court in People v. Wade, 131 Ill.App.2d 415, 264 N.E.2d 898, and followed by this court in People v. Hayes, 133 Ill.App.2d 885, 272 N.E.2d 423. Having thus decided, we hold that the information in the instant case, which charged the defendant with \u2018the offense of Theft/ was not fatally defective for its failure to allege that defendant\u2019s acquisition of control over property in question was \u2018unauthorized.\u2019\u2019\u2019 People v. Miller, 24 Ill.App.3d 504, 508.\nWe are inclined to agree with that holding in discerning a more liberal trend as to the niceties of pleading in our Supreme Court recent decisions dealing with errors or omissions in indictments and complaints. In People v. Grant, 57 Ill.2d 264, where defendant contended that the complaint charging the offense of unlawful use of weapons (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1971, ch. 38, par. 24\u20141(a)(4)) was fatally defective because it failed to state, in the language of the statute, that at the time of the offense defendant was not \u201con his own land or in his own abode,\u201d the Supreme Court said:\n\u201cAn information \u2018which charges an offense in the language of the statute is deemed sufficient when the words of tire statute so far particularize the offense that by their use alone an accused is apprised with reasonable certainty of the precise offense with which he or she is charged.\u2019 (People v. Patrick, 38 Ill.2d 255, at 258.) What is required is notice sufficient to prepare an adequate defense and clarity sufficient to allow pleading a resulting conviction as a bar to future prosecution arising out of the same conduct. (People v. Harvey, 53 Ill.2d 585, 588.) The information meets these requirements and the failure to include therein the exception provided in the statute does not render it fatally defective.\u201d 57 Ill.2d 264, 267.\nThe most recent pronouncement by the Supreme Court relative to the requirements of an indictment was in an opinion filed in People v. Dickerson, 61 Ill.2d 580. In this case the indictment charging the defendant under section 16 \u2014 1(d)(1), of the Criminal Code (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1971, ch. 38, par. 16\u20141(d)(1)) did not allege that the property had been stolen \u201cby another.\u201d The court said: \u201cThe issue is whether the omission of the word \u201cby another makes the indictment fatally defective for failing to allege all the elements of an offense. We find that it does not * * The court further said:\n\u201cSubsection 16 \u2014 1(d) is stated in the disjunctive and establishes two separate theories of theft under that subsection. In framing the second theory, tire legislature chose not to include the words \u2018by another.\u2019 In this case it was not necessary for the State to go beyond the mere statutory language in framing an indictment, since the words \u201cby another,\u2019 if added, would be superfluous and redundant.\u201d\nWe believe the trend indicated by the more recent Supreme Court decisions may be paraphrased by saying that while substantive rights must be strictly guarded in evaluating the pleadings in criminal prosecutions, the courts should be wary of roadblocks raised by pure technicalities. In the light of this concept we believe no injustice would be done the defendant by upholding the indictment in question. He was properly apprised of the act that was alleged to have been committed, that is \u201cthat he knowingly obtained control over a 1973 Chevrolet automobile VIN 1H57K3K495982, having a value exceeding $150 the property of Janice Gluth, intending to deprive Janice Gluth permanently of the use or benefit of said property.\u201d The particulars set out as to date, place and description of the car would not allow another indictment based on the same theft. The nature of the crime in this case was such as to render the omission of the word \u201cunauthorized\u201d a mere clerical oversight without prejudice to the defense.\nWe conclude, therefore, an indictment under section 16 \u2014 1(a)(1) of the Criminal Code which is otherwise proper but omits the word \"unauthorized\u201d is not thereby fatally defective.\nThe judgment of the trial court is hereby affirmed.\nJudgment affirmed.\nT. MORAN and DIXON, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "Mr. PRESIDING JUSTICE RECHENMACHER" } ], "attorneys": [ "Ralph Ruebner, of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Elgin, for appellant.", "William J. Cowlin, State\u2019s Attorney, of Woodstock (Daniel A. Mengeling, Assistant State\u2019s Attorney, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "The People of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Oscar Suarez, Defendant-Appellant.\n(No. 74-277;\nSecond District (2nd Division)\nNovember 26, 1975.\nRalph Ruebner, of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Elgin, for appellant.\nWilliam J. Cowlin, State\u2019s Attorney, of Woodstock (Daniel A. Mengeling, Assistant State\u2019s Attorney, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0689-01", "first_page_order": 717, "last_page_order": 721 }