{ "id": 2875455, "name": "The People of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Pearl Di Nunzio, Defendant-Appellee", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Di Nunzio", "decision_date": "1975-11-26", "docket_number": "No. 74-373", "first_page": "697", "last_page": "699", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "33 Ill. App. 3d 697" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "1 Ill.App.3d 949", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5313621 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/1/0949-01" ] }, { "cite": "9 Ill.App.3d 475", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2844575 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "478" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/9/0475-01" ] }, { "cite": "48 Ill.2d 232", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2906378 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/48/0232-01" ] }, { "cite": "43 Ill.2d 334", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2842660 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "338" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/43/0334-01" ] }, { "cite": "358 Ill. 426", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 5279484 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "428" }, { "page": "428" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/358/0426-01" ] }, { "cite": "51 Ill.2d 17", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5392168 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "22" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/51/0017-01" ] }, { "cite": "9 Ill.App.3d 726", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2849514 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/9/0726-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 390, "char_count": 5889, "ocr_confidence": 0.732, "pagerank": { "raw": 8.138363859351185e-08, "percentile": 0.4712575906935115 }, "sha256": "28ef95ea732381c2cb20fcc48d795319e35a2851a2656b263ddafa21edd4abb4", "simhash": "1:3d8f4d5279a6b993", "word_count": 980 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T15:25:47.184380+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "The People of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Pearl Di Nunzio, Defendant-Appellee." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Mr. PRESIDING JUSTICE RECHENMACHER\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThe State appeals from an order entered by the trial court on defendant\u2019s motion suppressing all statements, admissions and confessions made by defendant to an investigator for the State\u2019s Attorney of Du Page County, and suppressing all gambling equipment (3 slot machines) seized at defendant\u2019s beauty shop. We reverse and remand.\nThe evidence presented at the hearing on defendant\u2019s motion established that on February 13, 1974, at about 1 p.m., Ms. Mattson, an investigator for the State\u2019s Attorney, went to defendant\u2019s beauty parlor in Warrenville (without a search warrant) to confirm the existence of slot machines there. She had prior information that the slot machines were there but no knowledge as to where in the shop they were located.\nThe beauty parlor, a \u201cbusiness place,\u201d consists of one large room with a partition. At the rear of this large room the partition has an open, undraped doorway or \u201carchway,\u201d about three feet wide (which was not equipped with a door). No slot machines were visible when she entered the front portion of the shop. The only person present was one who she assumed was a customer, \u201cunder the dryer.\u201d During the period of about ten minutes (after which defendant appeared) Ms. Mattson walked to that archway. While standing there she saw the slot machines on the right (the nearest of which was less than one foot from the archway) and the washroom on the left. She passed through, used the washroom and returned to the front of the shop and looked at clothes that were for sale \u201changing on racks.\u201d Defendant then arrived.\nMs. Mattson had her hair washed by defendant. During that period she conversed with defendant about the slot machines, and Ms. Mattson testified that defendant told her that customers played them. Ms. Matt-son then asked the defendant several questions, i.e., whether the machines work, if \u201ccustomers played them,\u201d and asked if she could play them herself. Defendant answered these questions in the affirmative. Ms. Mattson then did play the machines.\nDefendant testified that she did not give permission to enter the rear portion of the premises or to play the machines and that prior to Ms. Mattson\u2019s visit at the shop her business was by appointment only. When asked if' customers used the washroom she answered, \u201cThey usually ask to use it.\u201d\nSubsequently, a search warrant was issued based on .Ms. Mattson\u2019s information and the slot machines were seized. Defendant was arrested and charged with the offense of keeping gambling devices in violation of section 28 \u2014 1(a)(3) of the Criminal Code (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1973, ch. 38, par. 28\u20141(a)(3)). After hearing, the trial court granted defense motions to suppress the gambling equipment seized and defendant\u2019s statements, resulting in this appeal by the State.\nThe State contends that there was no search here because the slot machines were in plain view and could be easily observed by any person standing in a location (ie., the archway in the partition) readily accessible to the public. We agree.\nDefendant\u2019s beauty shop was a walk-in type of business establishment, open and available to the public. In the front part defendant obviously greeted her customers (whether they came in by appointment or not). There, defendant had clothes for sale on a rack, and apparently hair washing and drying was done there. From the open archway anyone can view the \u201cback room\u201d and its contents, including the slot machines. There also is located the washroom which is available for use by any of defendant\u2019s customers. In the back portion of the shop, defendant also testified, she does \u201csetting of the hair\u201d; she also uses it for \u201ctints and hair dyes and spray nets, so nobody gets hurt if anything is mixing or exploding.\u201d (And, of course, she used it for the slot machines which were visible from the open archway.)\nIt is clear from this record that in the case at bar there was no prying into hidden places and no search (People v. Vagil, 9 Ill.App.3d 726; People v. Bombacino, 51 Ill.2d 17, 22). The gambling devices seized fall within the \u201cplain view\u201d doctrine. In People v. Marvin, 358 Ill. 426, 428, the Supreme Court said:\n\u201cA search implies a prying into hidden places for that which is concealed, and it is not a search to observe that which is open to view. A search implies an invasion and quest with some sort of force, either actual or constructive.\u201d (358 Ill. 426, 428.)\nThis language was quoted with approval in City of Decatur v. Kushmer, 43 Ill.2d 334, 338.\nIn the case at bar the investigator had no appointment and was accepted as a customer, without appointment. During the time she was receiving her hair wash defendant spoke freely, voluntarily and without any coercion. It is well settled that Miranda warnings are not necessary when police conduct a general, on-the-scene questioning as to facts surrounding a crime. (People v. Parks, 48 Ill.2d 232, 237 and People v. Tolefree, 9 Ill.App.3d 475, 478.) Defendant was not in custody or under any type of restraint, and there was no custodial interrogation when her statements were made. Her responses were made voluntarily and were not the product of close interrogation by the investigator and would be admissible (see People v. Hall, 1 Ill.App.3d 949). Under these circumstances no Miranda warnings were required.\nTherefore, the trial judge erred in suppressing the gambling equipment and tire statements of the defendant, and this cause is reversed and remanded.\nReversed and remanded.\nT. MORAN and DIXON, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "Mr. PRESIDING JUSTICE RECHENMACHER" } ], "attorneys": [ "John J. Bowman, State\u2019s Attorney, of Wheaton (Malcolm Smith, Assistant State\u2019s Attorney, of counsel), for the People.", "A. E. Botti, of Wheaton, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "The People of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Pearl Di Nunzio, Defendant-Appellee.\n(No. 74-373;\nSecond District (2nd Division)\nNovember 26, 1975.\nJohn J. Bowman, State\u2019s Attorney, of Wheaton (Malcolm Smith, Assistant State\u2019s Attorney, of counsel), for the People.\nA. E. Botti, of Wheaton, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0697-01", "first_page_order": 725, "last_page_order": 727 }