{ "id": 1209203, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. ANTHONY L. JACKSON, Defendant-Appellee", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Jackson", "decision_date": "2002-06-07", "docket_number": "No. 4\u201400\u20140910", "first_page": "158", "last_page": "167", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "331 Ill. App. 3d 158" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "698 N.E.2d 233", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "236", "parenthetical": "presence of a single, empty, torn and knotted bag provided officer with probable cause to search entire vehicle because officer had knowledge of drug packaging and knew area was known for drug dealing" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "298 Ill. App. 3d 121", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1073732 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "126", "parenthetical": "presence of a single, empty, torn and knotted bag provided officer with probable cause to search entire vehicle because officer had knowledge of drug packaging and knew area was known for drug dealing" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/298/0121-01" ] }, { "cite": "683 N.E.2d 1001", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1007", "parenthetical": "factors supportive of an inference of intent to deliver include the possession of a large amount of cash" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "291 Ill. App. 3d 574", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 456216 ], "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "582", "parenthetical": "factors supportive of an inference of intent to deliver include the possession of a large amount of cash" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/291/0574-01" ] }, { "cite": "718 N.E.2d 682", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "692", "parenthetical": "false or inconsistent statements increase the strength of probable cause to arrest" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "307 Ill. App. 3d 592", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 173516 ], "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "604", "parenthetical": "false or inconsistent statements increase the strength of probable cause to arrest" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/307/0592-01" ] }, { "cite": "529 N.E.2d 63", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "66" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "174 Ill. App. 3d 818", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3517080 ], "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "822" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/174/0818-01" ] }, { "cite": "447 N.E.2d 809", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "812" }, { "page": "812", "parenthetical": "presence of a \"one-hitter box\" and hypodermic syringe gave officer probable cause to search entire vehicle" }, { "page": "812" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "95 Ill. 2d 412", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3112352 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "419-20" }, { "page": "420" }, { "page": "419-20" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/95/0412-01" ] }, { "cite": "720 N.E.2d 348", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "351" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "308 Ill. App. 3d 501", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 261357 ], "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "504" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/308/0501-01" ] }, { "cite": "734 N.E.2d 1039", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1042" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "315 Ill. App. 3d 772", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 980721 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "776" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/315/0772-01" ] }, { "cite": "752 N.E.2d 576", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "580" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "322 Ill. App. 3d 832", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 126421 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "836" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/322/0832-01" ] }, { "cite": "718 N.E.2d 1", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "35" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "187 Ill. 2d 144", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 1131032 ], "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "204" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/187/0144-01" ] }, { "cite": "384 U.S. 436", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 12046400 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1966, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/384/0436-01" ] }, { "cite": "675 N.E.2d 604", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "606", "parenthetical": "parties stipulated to facts and asked court to rule as a matter of law" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "175 Ill. 2d 60", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 295758 ], "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "63", "parenthetical": "parties stipulated to facts and asked court to rule as a matter of law" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/175/0060-01" ] }, { "cite": "660 N.E.2d 235", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "238" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "277 Ill. App. 3d 80", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1172370 ], "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "84" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/277/0080-01" ] }, { "cite": "665 N.E.2d 1260", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1274" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "172 Ill. 2d 213", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 55976 ], "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "241" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/172/0213-01" ] }, { "cite": "706 N.E.2d 460", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "463" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "185 Ill. 2d 418", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 121970 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "424" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/185/0418-01" ] }, { "cite": "761 N.E.2d 1188", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1191" }, { "page": "1191" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "198 Ill. 2d 194", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 29957 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "200-01" }, { "page": "201" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/198/0194-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 888, "char_count": 21594, "ocr_confidence": 0.762, "pagerank": { "raw": 6.953181076708474e-08, "percentile": 0.42153056027590796 }, "sha256": "731a11ebba775d26b7e5b17fdb433bc06e88a87a8cad32227c074460ebf14e59", "simhash": "1:7b20461a714f85a2", "word_count": 3473 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T14:37:46.779771+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. ANTHONY L. JACKSON, Defendant-Appellee." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE KNECHT\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nFollowing a routine traffic stop, defendant, Anthony L. Jackson, was charged with manufacture/delivery of a controlled substance (720 ILCS 570/401(a)(2)(A) (West 2000)) and obstructing justice (720 ILCS 5/31 \u2014 4(a) (West 2000)). Following defendant\u2019s arrest, the police officer searched the engine compartment of defendant\u2019s car, where he found a plastic bag containing 48.7 grams of cocaine. The trial court granted defendant\u2019s motion to suppress any evidence obtained during the officer\u2019s search of the engine compartment because the search was not proper as a search incident to arrest and because the facts were insufficient to support a finding of probable cause to justify the officer\u2019s warrantless search of the entire vehicle. The State appeals. We reverse.\nI. BACKGROUND\nThe State and defendant stipulated to the facts as stated in the arresting officer\u2019s written report of the incident. According to the report, on March 18, 2000, at approximately 12:20 a.m., Illinois State Police Sergeant Eric Biswell was patrolling Interstate 55 near Springfield. Biswell viewed an \u201capplied for\u201d vehicle registration sticker on defendant\u2019s car. Biswell followed defendant\u2019s car to get a closer look at the temporary registration sticker, and as Biswell approached defendant\u2019s car, defendant reduced his speed to 50 miles per hour. Defendant\u2019s vehicle then twice drove onto the right shoulder of the roadway, crossing the solid lane line by approximately one foot. Bis-well stopped the vehicle for improper lane usage.\nWhen Biswell approached defendant, he smelled an \u201codor of an alcoholic beverage\u201d coming from the vehicle. He asked defendant for his driver\u2019s license, proof of insurance, and documentation of registration. Defendant told Biswell he recently purchased the vehicle and did not have insurance yet. Defendant was also unable to present any identification. Defendant told Biswell his name was Aaron B. Jackson and his date of birth was May 11, 1976. Defendant was able to produce paperwork for the purchase of the vehicle. When defendant was searching his pockets for identification, a small, clear plastic bag fell out of his pants. Defendant said the bag was empty and he smoked cannabis every now and then. Biswell also observed a large sum of money inside defendant\u2019s pocket.\nAs defendant opened the glove box to retrieve the paperwork for the purchase of the vehicle, Biswell observed a box of clear plastic sandwich bags. The paperwork stated the name of the person who purchased the vehicle was Anthony Jackson. Defendant told Biswell that Anthony was his cousin. Biswell then asked defendant for his address. Defendant hesitated for a moment, but then stated he lived in Belleville, Illinois. Defendant hesitated again when asked for his street address, but finally stated he lived at 1516 N. 47th Street in Washington Park, Illinois. Biswell noted the paperwork for the purchase of the vehicle showed the vehicle was purchased on March 15, 2000, in Springfield. Defendant stated his cousin, Anthony, gave him the car to use.\nBiswell performed a computer inquiry on Aaron B. Jackson, which revealed no driver\u2019s license information. However, the inquiry did reveal several alias names and numerous criminal charges. A computer inquiry on Anthony Jackson also returned several alias names and criminal charges. At this time, master sergeant Eric Echols arrived on the scene. Biswell then informed defendant the information he provided did not indicate he possessed a valid driver\u2019s license. Bis-well asked defendant how old he was and he stated \u201c24.\u201d Biswell again asked for his date of birth and defendant replied, \u201cMay 11, 1974, no[,] 76.\u201d\nAt this point, Biswell handcuffed defendant and informed him he (Biswell) did not believe he was providing his true identity. Biswell told defendant neither date of birth would make him 24 years old. Defendant then stated, \u201cI\u2019m Anthony and my license is revoked.\u201d Bis-well then asked defendant if he had been drinking and defendant stated he had some gin a long time ago.\nBiswell searched defendant\u2019s car and felt a wet area on the floor that \u201csmelled of an alcoholic beverage.\u201d Biswell also observed a \u201cburnt suspected cannabis cigarette\u201d in the ashtray. As Biswell continued his search, he asked defendant if he \u201csold it all.\u201d Defendant said, \u201cOh, you mean the bags. Someone left those in there.\u201d Biswell asked defendant how much money he had on him and defendant said \u201caround $1,300.\u201d Defendant stated he was not employed, but he received the money from a settlement from a car crash.\nBiswell then opened the hood of the vehicle and noticed a clear plastic bag containing a white powdery substance behind the windshield washer fluid reservoir and the left side firewall. Biswell walked back to defendant and asked, \u201cCoke, heroin, or meth?\u201d Defendant dropped his head and stated, \u201cCoke.\u201d At this point, Biswell read defendant the Miranda warnings see (Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694, 86 S. Ct. 1602 (1966)) and defendant said he understood.\nBiswell placed defendant in the front seat of his squad car, at which point defendant stated, \u201cThis won\u2019t go federal because it\u2019s not crack.\u201d Defendant continued to say he \u201cknew how things worked\u201d and \u201ccoke\u201d was not as bad as \u201ccrack.\u201d The white powdery substance field tested positive for cocaine. Biswell searched defendant and found $1,483 in his right front pants pocket.\nDefendant was charged with manufacture/delivery of a controlled substance (720 ILCS 570/401(a)(2)(A) (West 2000)) and obstructing justice (720 ILCS 5/31 \u2014 4(a) (West 2000)). On September 27, 2000, the trial court granted defendant\u2019s motion to suppress. The trial court ruled Biswell\u2019s search of the hood area of the vehicle, the only area where drugs were fo\u00fand, was impermissible as a search incident to arrest. Further, the trial court found the probable cause exception to the warrant requirement did not apply to the facts of this case. The trial court\u2019s order noted the \u201csuspected cannabis cigarette\u201d was not recovered, inventoried, or analyzed by the Illinois State Police, nor was it field tested. Based on the totality of the circumstances, the trial court found probable cause did not exist to perform a warrantless search of the hood compartment of defendant\u2019s vehicle.\nThe State appeals the trial court\u2019s ruling and presents two issues for review: (1) whether it is proper for a police officer to search the engine compartment of a vehicle without a search warrant as part of a search incident to arrest after the driver was lawfully arrested; and (2) whether probable cause existed to search the engine compartment of the vehicle under the totality of the circumstances in this case. We reverse.\nII. ANALYSIS\nBecause we reverse the trial court\u2019s ruling on the issue of probable cause, we need not address whether the warrantless search was proper as a search incident to arrest.\nThe State contends the totality of the circumstances established probable cause to believe the vehicle contained contraband, thereby excusing Biswell from obtaining a search warrant to search the entire vehicle. Specifically, the State argues the following observations by the police officer were sufficient to establish probable cause: defendant\u2019s suspicious driving; the smell of alcohol inside the vehicle; defendant\u2019s lies about his name, age, and address; plastic bags inside the glove compartment; a suspected cannabis cigarette in the ashtray; defendant\u2019s admission that he uses drugs; defendant\u2019s possession of a large sum of money when he said he was unemployed; and a computer inquiry revealing defendant had several alias names and numerous criminal charges.\nGenerally, when a trial court\u2019s ruling on a motion to suppress involves factual determinations or credibility assessments, the ruling will only be reversed if it is manifestly erroneous. People v. Buss, 187 Ill. 2d 144, 204, 718 N.E.2d 1, 35 (1999). However, absent factual or credibility issues, when the only issue is the application of the law to undisputed facts, our review is de novo. People v. Rockey, 322 Ill. App. 3d 832, 836, 752 N.E.2d 576, 580 (2001). In this case, the parties stipulated Officer Biswell\u2019s written report of the incident was an accurate representation of the facts. At the hearing on the motion to suppress, the trial court heard no testimony. Because the facts are not in dispute and credibility of witnesses is not an issue, our review is de novo.\nA warrantless search of a vehicle is proper where police have probable cause to believe it . contains contraband. People v. Smith, 315 Ill. App. 3d 772, 776, 734 N.E.2d 1039, 1042 (2000). To determine whether probable cause exists, we look to the totality of the circumstances known to the officer at the time. People v. Brannon, 308 Ill. App. 3d 501, 504, 720 N.E.2d 348, 351 (1999). The officer\u2019s factual knowledge, based on law-enforcement experience, is relevant. People v. Smith, 95 Ill. 2d 412, 419-20, 447 N.E.2d 809, 812 (1983). The existence of probable cause is a commonsense determination which hinges upon what a reasonable person would believe. People v. Lawrence, 174 Ill. App. 3d 818, 822, 529 N.E.2d 63, 66 (1988).\nInitially, we note the trial court\u2019s finding that the \u201csuspected\u201d burnt cannabis cigarette was not \u201crecovered, inventoried]],] or analyzed by the [Illinois] State Police\u201d is irrelevant to a determination of whether probable cause existed to search the vehicle. As mentioned above, we look to the totality of the circumstances as they existed at the time of the search. Whether the Illinois State Police determined the cigarette did or did not contain cannabis after the search of the vehicle is irrelevant in this case. Therefore, we reject defendant\u2019s argument insofar as it relies on the fact the suspected cannabis cigarette was never recovered or analyzed to determine its contents.\nDefendant argues the facts available were insufficient to support a finding of probable cause for Biswell to reasonably believe defendant was transporting contraband. Defendant points to each fact separately and offers innocent explanations. For example, defendant argues his misrepresentations about his name, date of birth, and address reflected his desire to avoid arrest for driving on a revoked license and were, therefore, insufficient to support a finding of probable cause. Defendant also argues there are countless uses for plastic sandwich bags, including safe storage for spare change and the transportation of goldfish. Defendant further argues his explanation for carrying over $1,400 in cash in his pocket (he stated he received it in a settlement from a car crash) was completely logical given the fact he was driving a recently purchased vehicle.\nWe agree with defendant none of these facts, when considered independently, amount to probable cause. However, we must consider the totality of the circumstances known to the officer at the time. We conclude the totality of the circumstances in this case is sufficient to establish probable cause. We note the trial court\u2019s written order granting defendant\u2019s motion to suppress summarizes the facts of the incident. However, the order does not mention the most incriminating fact in this case: defendant\u2019s admitted drug usage. Defendant\u2019s admission is a fink that turns otherwise innocuous facts into highly suspicious facts which, given the totality of the circumstances, support a finding of probable cause.\nIt is undisputed defendant admitted to Biswell, as a plastic bag fell from his pants pocket, that the bag was empty but he sometimes smoked marijuana. Defendant\u2019s comment was unsolicited, and it established defendant was involved in drugs and he knew plastic bags were used as storage containers for drugs. Defendant also acknowledged the bags were associated with the sale of drugs after Biswell asked him if he \u201csold it all.\u201d Defendant\u2019s reply, \u201cOh, you mean the baggies [sic],\u201d clearly shows his knowledge of a connection between the bags and drugs.\nIn light of defendant\u2019s admission, when Biswell saw the box of plastic sandwich bags in the glove box of defendant\u2019s vehicle, it was reasonable for him to believe the bags were likely drug paraphernalia related to the storage and transportation of drugs rather than plastic bags used for the transportation of goldfish. Likewise, when Biswell saw a \u201csuspected\u201d burnt cannabis cigarette in the ashtray, it was reasonable for him to believe the cigarette contained cannabis and not tobacco. Defendant\u2019s admission, when coupled with the presence of a suspected cannabis cigarette and a box of plastic bags, would lead a reasonable person to believe defendant\u2019s vehicle contained additional contraband.\nIn addition to defendant\u2019s admitted drug usage and the presence of a suspected burnt cannabis cigarette and drug paraphernalia, other facts also support a finding of probable cause. Defendant\u2019s actions in lying about his identity, date of birth, and address, while not necessarily indicative of illegal drug activity, raised Biswell\u2019s suspicions and served to strengthen his belief defendant was involved in some illegal activity. See, e.g., People v. Hardaway, 307 Ill. App. 3d 592, 604, 718 N.E.2d 682, 692 (1999) (false or inconsistent statements increase the strength of probable cause to arrest). Defendant\u2019s possession of a large sum of money while admittedly being unemployed also strengthened Biswell\u2019s belief defendant was not only involved in illegal activity, but illegal drug activity. See People v. Chapple, 291 Ill. App. 3d 574, 582, 683 N.E.2d 1001, 1007 (1997) (factors supportive of an inference of intent to deliver include the possession of a large amount of cash).\nWhile no case law is factually similar to the present case, we conclude our finding is consistent with other cases where facts were sufficient to support a finding of probable cause. See, e.g., People v. Hilt, 298 Ill. App. 3d 121, 126, 698 N.E.2d 233, 236 (1998) (presence of a single, empty, torn and knotted bag provided officer with probable cause to search entire vehicle because officer had knowledge of drug packaging and knew area was known for drug dealing); Smith, 95 Ill. 2d at 420, 447 N.E.2d at 812 (presence of a \u201cone-hitter box\u201d and hypodermic syringe gave officer probable cause to search entire vehicle).\nWe note defendant argues Biswell\u2019s identification of a \u201csuspected\u201d burnt cannabis cigarette was unreliable because Biswell did not testify at the suppression hearing and no evidence in the record shows he had sufficient knowledge to identify a cannabis cigarette as opposed to a hand-rolled tobacco cigarette. Therefore, defendant suggests Bis-well\u2019s belief the burnt cigarette contained cannabis cannot support a finding of probable cause.\nIt is widely accepted an officer\u2019s factual knowledge based on law-enforcement experience is relevant in a determination of whether the officer had probable cause to perform a search. Smith, 95 Ill. 2d at 419-20, 447 N.E.2d at 812. However, our research reveals no authority which states the absence of an officer\u2019s testimony regarding his law-enforcement experience is fatal to his determination of probable cause. We believe an officer\u2019s experience is a relevant factor to consider along with the totality of the circumstances in each case.\nWhile Officer Biswell is a sergeant, the record does not specifically show his law-enforcement experience. We conclude this omission is far outweighed by the strength of the other evidence supporting a finding of probable cause. If the only fact supporting probable cause in this case was Biswell\u2019s observance of what he thought was a burnt cannabis cigarette, his training and law-enforcement experience would be highly relevant. However, when we consider defendant\u2019s actions in providing false information to Biswell, his admission he smoked marijuana at the same instant a bag fell out of his pocket, the presence of a box of bags in the glove box, and the presence of a large sum of cash in defendant\u2019s pocket, the determination of whether a reasonable person would believe the vehicle contained further contraband becomes a commonsense decision and not a decision hinged on specialized training or knowledge.\nIII. CONCLUSION\nIn sum, when the totality of the circumstances is considered, we find there was probable cause to justify Biswell\u2019s warrantless search of the engine compartment of defendant\u2019s vehicle. Biswell did not expand the scope of his search beyond the passenger compartment until he became aware of sufficient facts to support a finding of probable cause to believe defendant\u2019s vehicle contained further contraband. Accordingly, we find the trial court erred in granting defendant\u2019s motion to suppress, and we remand for proceedings not inconsistent with this disposition.\nReversed and remanded.\nSTEIGMANN, J., concurs.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE KNECHT" }, { "text": "JUSTICE COOK,\ndissenting:\nA cynic might say that we defer to the trier of fact when the trier of fact rules in favor of the State, but when the trier of fact rules in favor of the defendant we consider the issue de novo.\nWhen a motion to suppress evidence involves factual determinations or credibility assessments, we will reverse the trial court\u2019s ruling only if it is manifestly erroneous. People v. Anthony, 198 Ill. 2d 194, 200-01, 761 N.E.2d 1188, 1191 (2001). De novo review is only appropriate when neither the facts nor the credibility of witnesses is disputed. Anthony, 198 Ill. 2d at 201, 761 N.E.2d at 1191. Even when the facts are undisputed, where reasonable persons could draw divergent inferences from those facts, any question of fact should be resolved by the trier of fact. Jackson v. TLC Associates, Inc., 185 Ill. 2d 418, 424, 706 N.E.2d 460, 463 (1998); Rhodes v. Illinois Central Gulf R.R., 172 Ill. 2d 213, 241, 665 N.E.2d 1260, 1274 (1996). The inquiry is whether only one conclusion may be drawn from the undisputed facts. Reynolds v. Decatur Memorial Hospital, 277 Ill. App. 3d 80, 84, 660 N.E.2d 235, 238 (1996).\nThe parties in this case stipulated that Biswell would testify in accordance with his written report. I do not understand the stipulation to be that everything that Biswell said in his report was accurate or that this case could be decided as a matter of law. Cf. People v. Krueger, 175 Ill. 2d 60, 63, 675 N.E.2d 604, 606 (1996) (parties stipulated to facts and asked court to rule as a matter of law). A stipulation that Biswell would testify that he believed a cigarette to contain cannabis requires the court to assess Biswell\u2019s credibility. There is a difference between stipulated facts and stipulated testimony.\nThe majority weighs the evidence differently than did the trial court. The majority agrees that none of the facts, considered independently, amount to probable cause, but \u201cWe conclude the totality of the circumstances in this case is sufficient to establish probable cause.\u201d 331 Ill. App. 3d at 163. Unlike the trial court, the majority sees defendant\u2019s admitted drug usage as \u201cthe most incriminating fact in this case.\u201d 331 Ill. App. 3d at 163. According to the majority, it was reasonable to believe the bags \u201cwere likely drug paraphernalia,\u201d the cigarette contained cannabis, and all this \u201cwould lead a reasonable person to believe defendant\u2019s vehicle contained additional contraband.\u201d 331 Ill. App. 3d at 163. Although there was no testimony of Biswell\u2019s experience in identifying cannabis, and such testimony would be highly relevant, the majority tells us the trial court erred in considering its absence. 331 Ill. App. 3d at 164. \u201cWe conclude this omission is far outweighed by the strength of the other evidence.\u201d 331 Ill. App. 3d at 164. If there is evidence to be weighed, that evidence should be weighed by the trial court, not by this court on de novo review.\nThe majority faults the trial court\u2019s finding that the \u201c \u2018suspected\u2019 burnt cannabis cigarette was not \u2018recovered, inventoried!,] or analyzed by the [Illinois] State Police.\u2019 \u201d 331 Ill. App. 3d at 162. The majority concludes such evidence is irrelevant because we look to the circumstances as they existed at the time of the search. 331 Ill. App. 3d at 162. It is true that a subsequent test showing the cigarette not to be cannabis would not necessarily be fatal to a showing of probable cause; what is important is what the officer reasonably believed the cigarette to be, not what it actually was. What happened to the cigarette is certainly relevant, however. If the cigarette contained cannabis, we would expect the Illinois State Police to retain it and test it in support of its theory of the case. If the cigarette really did not look much like a cannabis cigarette, we might expect the Illinois State Police to discard it. The trial court did not err in considering the disposition of the cigarette in weighing the credibility of Biswell\u2019s testimony.\nI cannot agree that we may employ de novo review to overturn the decision of the trial court in this case. The majority concerns itself with the weight of the evidence, not with some question of law. I would affirm the decision of the trial court.", "type": "dissent", "author": "JUSTICE COOK," } ], "attorneys": [ "John E Schmidt, State\u2019s Attorney, of Springfield (Norbert J. Goetten, Robert J. Biderman, and Steven D. Weinhoeft, all of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People.", "Daniel D. Yuhas and Keleigh L. Biggins, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Springfield, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. ANTHONY L. JACKSON, Defendant-Appellee.\nFourth District\nNo. 4\u201400\u20140910\nOpinion filed June 7, 2002.\nCOOK, J., dissenting.\nJohn E Schmidt, State\u2019s Attorney, of Springfield (Norbert J. Goetten, Robert J. Biderman, and Steven D. Weinhoeft, all of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People.\nDaniel D. Yuhas and Keleigh L. Biggins, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Springfield, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0158-01", "first_page_order": 176, "last_page_order": 185 }