{ "id": 1209124, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. CHARLES JENKINS, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Jenkins", "decision_date": "2002-06-07", "docket_number": "No. 4\u201401\u20140483", "first_page": "181", "last_page": "187", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "331 Ill. App. 3d 181" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "737 N.E.2d 306", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "308" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "316 Ill. App. 3d 695", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1096555 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "697-98" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/316/0695-01" ] }, { "cite": "483 N.E.2d 1039", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1043" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "136 Ill. App. 3d 1047", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3565949 ], "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1052" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/136/1047-01" ] }, { "cite": "701 N.E.2d 1063", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1071" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "183 Ill. 2d 366", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 209962 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "380-81" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/183/0366-01" ] }, { "cite": "712 N.E.2d 363", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "367", "parenthetical": "unfamiliarity with controlling period of limitations does not show a lack of culpable negligence for purposes of section 122 - 1(c)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "305 Ill. App. 3d 333", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1208061 ], "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "337", "parenthetical": "unfamiliarity with controlling period of limitations does not show a lack of culpable negligence for purposes of section 122 - 1(c)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/305/0333-01" ] }, { "cite": "726 N.E.2d 1166", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1169" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "312 Ill. App. 3d 346", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 411640 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "348" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/312/0346-01" ] }, { "cite": "730 N.E.2d 628", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 4, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "634" }, { "page": "634-35" }, { "page": "634" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "313 Ill. App. 3d 1011", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 186564 ], "weight": 4, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1016" }, { "page": "1016" }, { "page": "1016" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/313/1011-01" ] }, { "cite": "739 N.E.2d 493", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "496" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "193 Ill. 2d 483", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 963709 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "489" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/193/0483-01" ] }, { "cite": "738 N.E.2d 932", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "table cite" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "191 Ill. 2d 547", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "table cite" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "448 N.E.2d 638", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "642" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "114 Ill. App. 3d 813", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3592556 ], "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "818" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/114/0813-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 577, "char_count": 13061, "ocr_confidence": 0.782, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.03580807328026e-08, "percentile": 0.04494644282350052 }, "sha256": "8db4fcf4b6210c3de14ec6574459eff375bc11f560f68f9e739fa2cbfa5435b7", "simhash": "1:0162f0e677d4bde5", "word_count": 2199 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T14:37:46.779771+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. CHARLES JENKINS, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE APPLETON\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nDefendant, Charles Jenkins, filed a petition for postconviction relief pursuant to section 122 \u2014 1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (725 ILCS 5/122 \u2014 1 (West 2000)), often referred to as the Post-Conviction Hearing Act (Act). Upon initial review, the trial court dismissed the petition as untimely. Defendant appeals, arguing that the trial court erred in so finding. We affirm.\nI. BACKGROUND\nOn January 7, 1998, pursuant to a plea agreement, defendant pleaded guilty to three counts of aggravated criminal sexual assault (720 ILCS 5/12 \u2014 14(b)(i) (West 1996)), and the trial court sentenced him to three concurrent 46-year prison terms, one for each count. Defendant moved to withdraw his guilty plea and vacate the conviction. See 145 Ill. 2d R. 604(d). On December 7, 1998, the trial court denied the motion, and defendant appealed. We affirmed (People v. Jenkins, No. 4\u201499\u20140025 (July 26, 2000) (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23)), and defendant filed a petition for leave to appeal to the supreme court. On October 4, 2000, the supreme court denied defendant\u2019s petition for leave to appeal. People v. Jenkins, 191 Ill. 2d 547, 738 N.E.2d 932 (2000) (table cite).\nOn February 8, 2001, defendant filed his petition for postconviction relief. Sua sponte, the trial court dismissed the petition, without prejudice, on the ground that the petition was untimely. Noting that a defendant may file a late petition for postconviction relief if the delay was not due to his or her culpable negligence, the trial court, in its order of dismissal, allowed defendant 30 days \u201cto file any factual allegations that would indicate that the delay in filing this petition was not due to his culpable negligence.\u201d Defendant responded with a motion to reconsider, alleging only that his petition for postconviction relief was timely because he had filed it within six months after the supreme court issued a mandate on its denial of his petition for leave to appeal. The trial court denied the motion to reconsider. This appeal followed.\nII. ANALYSIS\nSection 122 \u2014 1(c) states:\n\u201cNo proceedings under this [ajrticle shall be commenced more than 6 months after the denial of a petition for leave to appeal or the date for filing such a petition if none is filed or more than 45 days after the defendant files his or her brief in the appeal of the sentence before the Illinois Supreme Court (or more than 45 days after the deadline for the fifing of the defendant\u2019s brief with the Illinois Supreme Court if no brief is filed) or 3 years from the date of conviction, whichever is sooner, unless the petitioner alleges facts showing that the delay was not due to his or her culpable negligence.\u201d 725 ILCS 5/122\u20141(c) (West 2000).\nThus, a defendant must file his or her petition for postconviction relief by the earliest of the following three deadlines: (1) six months after \u201cthe denial of a petition for leave to appeal\u201d to the supreme court \u201cor the date for fifing such a petition,\u201d (2) 45 days after the defendant files his or her brief in an appeal before the supreme court (or 45 days after the brief is due, if none is filed), or (3) three years after the date of conviction. 725 ILCS 5/122 \u2014 1(c) (West 2000). If the petition is untimely, the defendant must allege \u201cfacts showing that the delay was not due to his or her culpable negligence.\u201d 725 ILCS 5/122\u2014 1(c) (West 2000).\nBecause the present case does not involve an appeal to the supreme court, the 45-day period is inapplicable. Therefore, we must ascertain which of the remaining two periods expired earlier: the six-month period or the three-year period. Defendant agrees that the six-month period ended on April 4, 2001 (six months after the supreme court denied his petition for leave to appeal on October 4, 2000). Now we must count three years from \u201cthe date of conviction.\u201d See 725 ILCS 5/122\u2014 1(c) (West 2000).\nIn People v. Woods, 193 Ill. 2d 483, 489, 739 N.E.2d 493, 496 (2000), the supreme court held that the words \u201cdate of conviction,\u201d in section 122 \u2014 1(c) of the Act, meant \u201cthe date that final judgment[,] including sentence!,] was entered.\u201d In the present case, that date was January 7, 1998, when the trial court adjudged defendant guilty and imposed the sentence. That defendant filed a motion to withdraw his plea and vacate the sentence did not make the judgment any less final. Supreme Court Rule 606(b) (188 Ill. 2d R. 606(b)) draws a distinction between a final judgment and the ruling on a motion directed against the final judgment. Three years after January 7, 1998, was January 7, 2001.\nDefendant argues that the date of his conviction was July 26, 2001, when we affirmed the trial court\u2019s judgment on direct appeal. He also contends, elsewhere in his brief, that \u201cthe date of conviction\u201d was December 7, 1998, when the trial court denied his motion to withdraw his guilty plea. According to defendant, we held, in People v. Ivy, 313 Ill. App. 3d 1011, 730 N.E.2d 628 (2000), \u201cthat the date of conviction begins running from the date the appellate court affirms the convictions and sentences on appeal.\u201d He purports to derive that holding from the following language in the decision: \u201cThis sentence was not final until the trial court denied defendant\u2019s amended motion to reconsider sentence and that denial was affirmed on appeal.\u201d Ivy, 313 Ill. App. 3d at 1016, 730 N.E.2d at 634.\nIn Ivy, the initial appeal resulted in a remand, and after the reimposition of sentence, a second appeal. The language redefining the term \u201cconviction\u201d to extend the date of conviction to the resolution of any appeal was improvident at best and contrary to both the definition the supreme court gave to the term in Woods and the obvious intent of the legislature in the Act.\nThis court in Ivy was faced with preserving a defendant\u2019s rights under the Act when a lengthy appellate process had extended beyond the statutory deadline for filing a petition. We recognized the need to provide for such an eventuality and said:\n\u201cWe are not prepared to require a defendant to file a postconviction petition while the decision of this court on direct appeal is pending in order to be within the three-year limitations period from the original imposition of sentence. An otherwise diligent defendant should not be penalized in the filing of a postconviction petition for the length of time it takes his attorneys, the State, and this court to process a direct appeal.\u201d Ivy, 313 Ill. App. 3d at 1016, 730 N.E.2d at 634-35.\nAn \u201cotherwise diligent defendant\u201d is one who is not culpably negligent. The defendant in Ivy was not culpably negligent in filing his petition for postconviction relief during the six-month period, because appellate proceedings were still pending when the three-year period expired. We said:\n\u201cDefendant exhausted his appellate remedies prior to filing a post-conviction petition. He did not sit back and do nothing after his conviction while three years went by ***. He obtained a final determination on his amended motion to reconsider sentence on October 28, 1996 [the date we affirmed], and filed his postconviction petition within six months of that date.\u201d Ivy, 313 Ill. App. 3d at 1016, 730 N.E.2d at 634.\nWe, therefore, hold that the correct rationale of Ivy is as set forth above. As the conceptual structure of the Act is to provide additional process to a defendant after a resolution of issues raised by the defendant on appeal, the failure to file a petition for postconviction relief beyond the time provided by the Act because the appellate process was not concluded can and should be found to be delay not caused by a defendant\u2019s culpable negligence.\nIn the present case, the appellate proceedings concluded some four months before the three-year period expired. After the supreme court denied his petition for leave to appeal, defendant did nothing for four months. Unlike the defendant in Ivy, defendant in the present case appears to have no valid excuse for missing the three-year deadline.\nDefendant contends that interpreting \u201cthe date of conviction\u201d as the date of sentencing could lead to an absurd result. He posits a hypothetical case in which the trial court granted a motion to withdraw a guilty plea and discovery thereafter took more than three years. If the initial sentence set the three-year \u201cclock\u201d to ticking, the time for filing a petition for postconviction relief would run before the defendant had a trial. We do not agree that under those circumstances the three years would start running from the date of the original sentence. Supreme Court Rule 604(d) (188 Ill. 2d R. 604(d)) provides that after allowing a motion to withdraw a guilty plea, the trial court will \u201cvacate the judgment.\u201d One cannot logically petition for relief from a vacated judgment. When the supreme court held that the \u201cdate of conviction\u201d meant the date of the judgment, the court meant a judgment in force.\nThe judgment of January 7, 1998, remains in force. The three-year period expired on January 7, 2001. The six-month period expired on March 1, 2001. The former period was the first to expire, and therefore it was the governing period of limitation. See 725 ILCS 5/122 \u2014 1(c) (West 2000). Section 122 \u2014 1(c) required defendant to file his petition for postconviction relief no later than January 7, 2001. Because he filed it on February 6, 2001, the petition was untimely, and he had to \u201cmake a \u2018substantial showing\u2019 \u201d that the untimeliness was not due to his culpable negligence \u201cby alleging facts supporting such a claim.\u201d People v. Boclair, 312 Ill. App. 3d 346, 348, 726 N.E.2d 1166, 1169 (2000). He failed to fulfill that pleading requirement, although the trial court gave him an express opportunity to do so. He merely alleged his assumption \u2014 a mistaken assumption \u2014 that the six-month period governed his case. See People v. Van Hee, 305 Ill. App. 3d 333, 337, 712 N.E.2d 363, 367 (1999) (unfamiliarity with controlling period of limitations does not show a lack of culpable negligence for purposes of section 122 \u2014 1(c)).\nDefendant next argues that the trial court erred in summarily deciding that his petition was untimely. In defendant\u2019s view, the trial court should have confined itself to deciding whether he had pleaded the gist of a constitutional claim for relief. According to defendant, the trial court could not have found his petition untimely without making a finding of fact, and findings of fact are forbidden at the preliminary stage of the postconviction proceeding (see People v. Coleman, 183 Ill. 2d 366, 380-81, 701 N.E.2d 1063, 1071 (1998)).\nDefendant must allege not only a constitutional violation, but, if he filed the petition late, he also must allege \u201cfacts showing that the delay was not due to his *** culpable negligence.\u201d 725 ILCS 5/122\u2014 1(c) (West 2000). When deciding, at the initial stage, whether the petition is nonfrivolous, the trial court can consider the information in its own files. People v. Alexander, 136 Ill. App. 3d 1047, 1052, 483 N.E.2d 1039, 1043 (1985). If, in light of court documents, the petition appears to be untimely, the defendant has the burden of pleading, on pain of dismissal, a lack of culpable negligence. In People v. Harden, 316 Ill. App. 3d 695, 697-98, 737 N.E.2d 306, 308 (2000), we held that \u201cthe trial court may dismiss a postconviction petition as untimely during its initial review, at least where *** the defendant has not alleged that the untimeliness is not due to his culpable negligence. Furthermore, no motion by the State is necessary.\u201d\nAlthough the trial court gave him ample opportunity, defendant alleged no facts showing that the untimeliness of his petition was not due to his own culpable negligence. The trial court did not err in dismissing the petition.\nIII. CONCLUSION\nFor the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court\u2019s judgment.\nAffirmed.\nKNECHT, J., concurs.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE APPLETON" }, { "text": "JUSTICE COOK,\ndissenting:\nI respectfuUy dissent.\nI disagree that the date of conviction, the date that final judgment was entered, is the same whether or not a posttrial motion is filed. A final judgment can be appealed, but the timely filing of a posttrial motion prevents the appeal of a judgment until the motion is resolved. 134 Ill. 2d R. 606(b). During the pendency of a posttrial motion, the judgment is interlocutory; the trial court has complete power to vacate or modify it during that time. See People v. Talach, 114 Ill. App. 3d 813, 818, 448 N.E.2d 638, 642 (1983). There is no final judgment until the posttrial motion is resolved.", "type": "dissent", "author": "JUSTICE COOK," } ], "attorneys": [ "Daniel D. Yuhas and Jenifer L. Johnson, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Springfield, for appellant.", "Charles G. Reynard, State\u2019s Attorney, of Bloomington (Norbert J. Goetten, Robert J. Biderman, and Thomas R. Dodegge, all of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. CHARLES JENKINS, Defendant-Appellant.\nFourth District\nNo. 4\u201401\u20140483\nOpinion filed June 7, 2002.\nCOOK, J., dissenting.\nDaniel D. Yuhas and Jenifer L. Johnson, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Springfield, for appellant.\nCharles G. Reynard, State\u2019s Attorney, of Bloomington (Norbert J. Goetten, Robert J. Biderman, and Thomas R. Dodegge, all of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0181-01", "first_page_order": 199, "last_page_order": 205 }