{ "id": 1209197, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. REGINALD KELLEY, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Kelley", "decision_date": "2002-05-13", "docket_number": "No. 1\u201400\u20140764", "first_page": "253", "last_page": "260", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "331 Ill. App. 3d 253" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "760 N.E.2d 496", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2001, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "325 Ill. App. 3d 987", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 570939 ], "year": 2001, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/325/0987-01" ] }, { "cite": "752 N.E.2d 511", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2001, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "323 Ill. App. 3d 451", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 171653 ], "weight": 8, "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "453" }, { "page": "459-60" }, { "page": "460" }, { "page": "461" }, { "page": "461" }, { "page": "461" }, { "page": "461" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/323/0451-01" ] }, { "cite": "720 N.E.2d 225", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1999, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "188 Ill. 2d 91", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 536114 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "98-99" }, { "page": "100" }, { "page": "100" }, { "page": "100" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/188/0091-01" ] }, { "cite": "752 N.E.2d 1137", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2001, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "196 Ill. 2d 518", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 351227 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "536" }, { "page": "536" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/196/0518-01" ] }, { "cite": "757 N.E.2d 589", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2001, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "325 Ill. App. 3d 354", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 570403 ], "weight": 5, "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "359" }, { "page": "360" }, { "page": "360" }, { "page": "360" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/325/0354-01" ] }, { "cite": "756 N.E.2d 261", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2001, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "324 Ill. App. 3d 749", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 256353 ], "weight": 7, "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "756-57" }, { "page": "760" }, { "page": "761" }, { "page": "761" }, { "page": "761" }, { "page": "761" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/324/0749-01" ] }, { "cite": "526 U.S. 227", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11133049 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "252" }, { "page": "332" }, { "page": "1228" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/526/0227-01" ] }, { "cite": "740 N.E.2d 389", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2000, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "317 Ill. App. 3d 693", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1026041 ], "weight": 5, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "695" }, { "page": "705-06" }, { "page": "708" }, { "page": "708" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/317/0693-01" ] }, { "cite": "194 Ill. 2d 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 1096297 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "23" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/194/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "530 U.S. 466", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 9413911 ], "weight": 9, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "469" }, { "page": "442" }, { "page": "2351" }, { "page": "490" }, { "page": "455" }, { "page": "2363" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/530/0466-01" ] }, { "cite": "710 N.E.2d 163", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1999, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "304 Ill. App. 3d 628", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 564573 ], "year": 1999, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/304/0628-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 759, "char_count": 19131, "ocr_confidence": 0.786, "pagerank": { "raw": 7.259244762335988e-08, "percentile": 0.43283855545246075 }, "sha256": "f633518d1cb06ef584397ce0fe6935b2153e563b2384567c9f4212cd4eff898c", "simhash": "1:3b7c3d4272eaded7", "word_count": 3254 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T14:37:46.779771+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. REGINALD KELLEY, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE COUSINS\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nFollowing a bench trial, defendant Reginald Kelley was convicted of first degree murder, attempted first degree murder and armed violence. Kelley was sentenced to an extended-term sentence of 80 years\u2019 imprisonment for the first degree murder conviction and 20 years\u2019 imprisonment for the attempted murder conviction, to be served consecutively. The aggravated battery with a firearm and aggravated battery counts merged with the attempted first degree murder conviction. On March 31, 1999, his convictions and sentences were affirmed on appeal. People v. Kelley, 304 Ill. App. 3d 628, 710 N.E.2d 163 (1999). On December 13, 1999, Kelley filed a pro se petition for postconviction relief. The petition was dismissed on January 31, 2000. Kelley now presents the following issue on appeal: whether his consecutive sentences should be modified to run concurrently in light of sections 5 \u2014 5\u20143.2(b)(4)(i) and 5 \u2014 8\u20144(a) of the Unified Code of Corrections (Code) (730 ILCS 5/5 \u2014 5\u20143.2(b)(4)(i), 5 \u2014 8\u20144(a) (West 1994)) being declared unconstitutional.\nWhile defendant frames the issue in his notice of appeal as whether his consecutive sentences should be modified to run concurrently in light of sections 5 \u2014 5\u20143.2(b)(4) (i) and 5 \u2014 8\u20144(a) of the Code being declared unconstitutional, the argument made in his brief is limited to an additional contention that the trial court\u2019s sentence abridged Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 147 L. Ed. 2d 435, 120 S. Ct. 2348 (2000). Apprendi was decided in June 2000. In defendant\u2019s brief, he argues that \u201c[bjecause the post-conviction hearing judge did not have the opportunity to consider the impact of Apprendi, this Court should modify Kelley\u2019s sentences to run concurrently and remand this case to the trial court for resentencing.\u201d\nBACKGROUND\nOn August 29, 1994, Kelley was charged with two counts of first degree murder, armed violence, attempted first degree murder, aggravated battery with a firearm, aggravated discharge of a firearm and three counts of aggravated battery.\nEbony Collins testified at Kelley\u2019s trial that on the evening of July 25, 1994, while sitting in her car at a stoplight with her three-year-old son, her father, Ronnie Cole, and her brother, Ronnie Jr., she saw Kelley and some of his friends near a grocery store on 79th Street and Yates. While she did not know Kelley\u2019s name at that time, she recalled that she had seen him several times before in the area. She noticed that he was \u201cconstantly\u201d looking at her car. Kelley and one of his friends, Jernel Brown, proceeded to cross the street. While they crossed the street, Collins observed Kelley \u201cfumbling\u201d with his shirt. Kelley reached the northwest corner of a gas station and was still fumbling with his shirt. Collins testified that Kelley was standing on the curb of the gas station and \u201cthrew gang signs\u201d at her. Collins just looked at Kelley and began driving through the intersection. Then Collins heard someone say, \u201cAin\u2019t that the motherfucking car right there?\u201d As she continued driving, Collins heard what she believed at the time to be a car backfiring. She later realized that the sounds were gunshots. She heard approximately three shots and her father said that he had been hit and she heard her three-year-old son \u201clet out a loud cry.\u201d She looked at her son and discovered that he had been shot in the back of the head. She stopped the car and her father told her to let her brother, Ronnie Jr., drive the vehicle. The three-year-old boy died that evening at Jackson Park Hospital. Collins\u2019 father, Ronnie Cole, was shot twice in the right arm and was hospitalized for three days.\nMore witnesses testified, and after the State rested its case, defendant moved for a directed verdict. That motion was denied. At the end of trial, defendant was found guilty of first degree murder and attempted first degree murder. Prior to sentencing, defendant submitted a motion for a new trial. That motion was denied.\nThe presentencing report provided that on January 20, 1994, defendant pled guilty to possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver and was sentenced to two years\u2019 felony probation. After hearing testimony in aggravation and mitigation at Kelley\u2019s sentencing hearing, the court noted that it considered the fact that defendant had been found guilty of possession of a controlled substance and was sentenced to probation, the age of the murder victim, the injury to Ronnie Cole, defendant\u2019s personal and criminal history, and the court\u2019s intent to deter defendant and others from \u201csuch senseless shootings, senseless acts that endanger and actually kill people.\u201d On February 10, 1997, the trial court imposed an extended-term sentence of 80 years\u2019 imprisonment for first degree murder and a consecutive sentence of 20 years\u2019 imprisonment for the attempted first degree murder.\nOn December 13, 1999, defendant filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief. The petition was dismissed on January 31, 2000, indicating that the issues sought to be raised were barred by res judicata or waived.\nANALYSIS\nDefendant\u2019s primary issue on appeal is, based on the ruling in Apprendi, whether this court should modify his sentences to run concurrently and remand for resentencing because he received an 80-year extended-term sentence under section 5 \u2014 5\u20143.2(b)(4)(i) and a consecutive 20-year sentence under section 5 \u2014 8\u20144(a) of the Code. The State initially responds that defendant\u2019s argument is waived. In the alternative, the State asserts that Apprendi does not apply to the instant case because the trial court imposed mandatory consecutive sentences pursuant to section 5 \u2014 8\u20144(h) of the Code (730 ILCS 5/5\u2014 8 \u2014 4(h) (West 1994)).\nSection 5 \u2014 8\u20144(h) of the Code provides that if a person charged with a felony commits a separate felony while on pretrial release or in pretrial detention, the sentences imposed upon conviction of these felonies shall be served consecutively regardless of the order in which the judgments of conviction are entered. 730 ILCS 5/5 \u2014 8\u20144(h) (West 1994). The State\u2019s reliance on this section is misplaced. The trial court did not state that it was sentencing Kelley on the possession of a controlled substance conviction to run consecutively with his first degree murder, attempted first degree murder, and armed violence convictions.\nWe also note that Kelley\u2019s argument is not waived. A party may challenge the constitutionality of a statute at any time. People v. Wright, 194 Ill. 2d 1, 23 (2000).\nAt the time of defendant\u2019s offense, first degree murder was punishable by a term of not less than 20 years\u2019 imprisonment and not more than 60 years\u2019 imprisonment. 730 ILCS 5/5 \u2014 8\u20141(a)(1)(a) (West 1994). However, under the Code at that time, the trial court could sentence a defendant to an extended-term sentence if the defendant was convicted of a felony committed against a person under 12 years of age at the time of the offense. 730 ILCS 5/5 \u2014 5\u20143.2(b)(4)(i) (West 1994). The range for an extended-term sentence was not less than 60 years\u2019 and not more than 100 years\u2019 imprisonment. 730 ILCS 5/5 \u2014 8\u2014 2(a)(1) (West 1994).\nIn the instant case, the trial judge stated that he took into consideration, among other things, the fact that at the time of the offense defendant had been on probation for possession of a controlled substance since January 1994 and the age of the murder victim. Kelley contends that the victim\u2019s age was an extended-term factor never submitted to a jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Defendant relies on Apprendi and People v. Beachem, 317 Ill. App. 3d 693, 740 N.E.2d 389 (2000), to support his contention that this court should vacate his 80-year extended-term sentence for first degree murder and remand for resentencing.\nIn Apprendi, the issue before the United States Supreme Court was \u201cwhether the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires that a factual determination authorizing an increase in the maximum prison sentence for an offense from 10 to 20 years be made by a jury on the basis of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.\u201d Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 469, 147 L. Ed. 2d at 442, 120 S. Ct. at 2351. Apprendi applies only where the assessment of facts that increase the \u201c \u2018prescribed range of penalties to which a criminal defendant is exposed\u2019 \u201d are removed from the jury. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490, 147 L. Ed. 2d at 455, 120 S. Ct. at 2363, quoting Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 252, 143 L. Ed. 2d 311, 332, 119 S. Ct. 1215, 1228 (1999).\nThe Beachem case is not instructive in deciding the instant case. The critical issue before the Beachem court was whether Apprendi reaches beyond a direct appeal to an appeal of the dismissal of a timely filed postconviction petition. Beachem, 317 Ill. App. 3d at 695. The court held that it did apply. Beachem, 317 Ill. App. 3d at 705-06. The court reasoned that the trial court\u2019s \u201cexceptionally brutal or heinous\u201d finding in that case clearly offended Apprendi. Beachem, 317 Ill. App. 3d at 708. The court elected not to decide the issue of the victim\u2019s age as support for the extended-term sentence. Beachem, 317 Ill. App. 3d at 708.\nWe find People v. Peacock, 324 Ill. App. 3d 749, 756 N.E.2d 261 (2001), and People v. Blackwell, 325 Ill. App. 3d 354, 757 N.E.2d 589 (2001), instructive. In Peacock, Taki Peacock was sentenced to an 80-year extended-term sentence based on the age of his 60-year-old murder victim and a finding that his actions were accompanied by brutal and heinous conduct indicative of wanton cruelty.\nThe Peacock court noted that \u201c[b]ecause a trial court need find only a single statutory factor in aggravation to impose an extended sentence,\u201d the victim\u2019s age, standing alone, was a sufficient basis upon which to impose an extended-term sentence. Peacock, 324 Ill. App. 3d at 756-57. Based on the court\u2019s reading of Apprendi and other related cases, the court wrote that even assuming an Apprendi violation occurred, it found it to be \u201charmless error.\u201d Peacock, 324 Ill. App. 3d at 760. The Peacock court reasoned that the finding of the victim\u2019s age did not involve the weighing of evidence or an examination of the defendant\u2019s mental state. Peacock, 324 Ill. App. 3d at 761. Indeed, the victim\u2019s wife testified to the victim\u2019s age, the parties stipulated at trial that if the medical examiner had been called to testify, he would have testified that the victim was the stated age of 60 years of age, and defendant, in his original brief on appeal, conceded that the victim was 60 years old at the time of the offense. Peacock, 324 Ill. App. 3d at 761. Importantly, the court held that had the issue of age been pled in the indictment and submitted to a jury, \u201cthere is no question a jury still would have found defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.\u201d Peacock, 324 Ill. App. 3d at 761. Peacock\u2019s sentence of 80 years was affirmed. Peacock, 324 Ill. App. 3d at 761.\nIn Blackwell, Marcus Blackwell was sentenced to an extended-term sentence based on at least one aggravating factor: the victim was 60 years of age or older. Blackwell, 325 Ill. App. 3d at 359. While the age of the murder victim was not at issue during trial, trial testimony indicated that the victim was 71 years old at the time of her death. The Blackwell court reasoned that had the issue of the victim\u2019s age been submitted to a jury, a jury still would have found defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Blackwell, 325 Ill. App. 3d at 360. The court concluded that although an Apprendi violation may have occurred where the age of the victim was not, submitted to a jury, such a violation amounted to harmless error. Blackwell, 325 Ill. App. 3d at 360. Blackwell\u2019s extended-term sentence for first degree murder was affirmed. Blackwell, 325 Ill. App. 3d at 360.\nIn the instant case, assuming that the failure to submit the fact that the murder victim was three years old to a jury could violate Apprendi, it was harmless error in the instant case. The age of the victim was never in dispute. In fact, the victim\u2019s father testified to his son\u2019s age at the time of the murder. Moreover, defendant has conceded the boy\u2019s age in his brief on appeal. Based on a review of the record, even if the victim\u2019s age had been submitted to the jury, the jury still would have found Kelley guilty of first degree murder beyond a reasonable doubt. Accordingly, although a violation of Apprendi may have occurred here where the age of the victim was not submitted to the jury or included in the charging instrument, any violation that did occur was harmless error. Kelley\u2019s extended-term sentence of 80 years is affirmed.\nII\nKelley next contends that his 20-year sentence for attempted first degree murder should be modified to run concurrently with his sentence for first degree murder. Defendant asserts that section 5 \u2014 8\u20144 did not contain a provision affording the option to elect a jury to make the factual findings provided in that section. The Illinois Supreme Court has held that consecutive sentences imposed under section 5 \u2014 8\u20144(a) of the Code do not violate the due process rights of defendants and that the Supreme Court\u2019s Apprendi decision does not apply to such sentences. People v. Carney, 196 Ill. 2d 518, 536, 752 N.E.2d 1137 (2001). The court reasoned that \u201c[cjonsecutive sentences do not expose a defendant to punishment exceeding the statutory maximum for each conviction.\u201d Carney, 196 Ill. 2d at 536.\nDefendant also states: \u201c[T]he record suggests that the trial judge imposed the consecutive sentence because the offenses were committed as a part of a single course of conduct, and Cole [the three-year-old\u2019s grandfather] suffered severe bodily injury.\u201d During the sentencing hearing, while the State requested that the judge impose consecutive sentencing \u201cunder Chapter 730,\u201d the judge did not articulate the basis of the 20-year consecutive sentence for defendant\u2019s attempted first degree murder conviction.\nAt the time of the offense, section 5 \u2014 8\u20144(a) of the Code provided:\n\u201cThe court shall not impose consecutive sentences for offenses which were committed as part of a single course of conduct during which there was no substantial change in the nature of the criminal objective, unless, one of the offenses for which defendant was convicted was a Class X or Class 1 felony and the defendant inflicted severe bodily injury *** in which event the court shall enter sentences to run consecutively.\u201d (Emphasis added.) 730 ILCS 5/5\u2014 8 \u2014 4(a) (West 1994).\nSection 5 \u2014 8\u20144(a) requires consecutive sentencing \u201cwhere the defendant has been convicted of either a Class X or Class 1 felony and where he had inflicted severe bodily injury during the commission of that felony.\u201d People v. Whitney, 188 Ill. 2d 91, 98-99, 720 N.E.2d 225 (1999). The Whitney court explained that in committing the Class 1 or Class X felony, it must result in severe bodily injury to the victim of that felony. Whitney, 188 Ill. 2d at 100.\nWe find People v. Jones, 323 Ill. App. 3d 451, 752 N.E.2d 511 (2001), instructive. In Jones, Isaac Jones was found guilty of first degree murder, attempted first degree murder, and aggravated battery with a firearm following a bench trial. He was sentenced to consecutive prison terms of 26 years for the first degree murder of Maxine Parker and 6 years for the attempted first degree murder of Larry Thompson. On appeal, Jones asserted that the trial court erred in imposing consecutive sentences predicated on the attempted first degree murder count. Jones, 323 Ill. App. 3d at 453.\nIn its analysis, the Jones court reviewed People v. Whitney, 188 Ill. 2d 91, 100, 720 N.E.2d 225 (1999), and examined section 5 \u2014 8\u20144(a) of the Code. Jones, 323 Ill. App. 3d at 459-60. The court determined that while first degree murder was not a Class X or Class 1 felony, the offense of attempted murder was a Class X felony and could be the basis for consecutive sentences in that case. Jones, 323 Ill. App. 3d at 460. The Jones court then reasoned that prior to invoking a consecutive sentence in that case, the requirement of \u201csevere bodily injury\u201d also must be met. Jones, 323 Ill. App. 3d at 461. The victim of the attempted first degree murder in Jones suffered a \u201cgrazed-type\u201d gunshot wound to his right cheekbone. He did not receive medical treatment for the injury and a doctor gave him a band aid for the wound and told him that it was \u201cokay.\u201d Jones, 323 Ill. App. 3d at 461. In the Jones court\u2019s view, the wound did not constitute severe bodily injury and, therefore, the imposition of consecutive sentences was improper. Jones, 323 Ill. App. 3d at 461. Accordingly, Jones\u2019 sentences were modified to run concurrently. Jones, 323 Ill. App. 3d at 461.\nWe also note that in People v. Wilder, 325 Ill. App. 3d 987, 760 N.E.2d 496 (2001), in instructing the trial court upon remand, the appellate court stated:\n\u201cWe stress, however, that if the court should determine that any of the offenses were carried out in a single course of conduct, it may only use section 5 \u2014 8\u20144(a) to impose consecutive sentences for those offenses. If the court applies that subsection, it must then also decide: (1) whether any of the crimes found to have been committed in a single course of conduct are a Class X or Class 1 felony; (2) whether the defendant inflicted a severe bodily injury; and (3) whether that severe bodily injury was inflicted during the commission of any of *** those felonies. The court may impose consecutive sentencing under section 5 \u2014 8\u20144(a) only if all three components are met.\u201d (Emphasis in original.) Wilder, 325 Ill. App. 3d at 1002.\nHere, defendant was convicted of first degree murder, attempted first degree murder, and armed violence. First degree murder is not a Class X or Class 1 felony; rather, it is its own class of felony. Whitney, 188 Ill. 2d at 100. Attempted first degree murder is a Class X felony. 720 ILCS 5/8 \u2014 4(c)(1) (West 1994). In addition to being found guilty of first degree murder of the three-year-old, defendant in the instant case was found guilty of attempted first degree murder of Ronnie Cole, a Class X felony. Ronnie Cole was shot twice in the right arm and was hospitalized for three days. We believe that this constitutes severe bodily injury for purposes of consecutive sentencing under section 5 \u2014 8\u20144(a) of the Code.\nFor the foregoing reasons, we affirm defendant\u2019s extended-term sentence of 80 years\u2019 imprisonment and defendant\u2019s consecutive sentence of 20 years\u2019 imprisonment for attempted first degree murder. We also grant the State\u2019s request for $100 in costs for defending this appeal. 55 ILCS 5/4 \u2014 2002.1 (West 1998).\nAffirmed.\nCOHEN, EJ., and TULLY, J., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE COUSINS" } ], "attorneys": [ "Rita A. Fry, Public Defender, of Chicago (Karen M. Florek, Assistant Public Defender, of counsel), for appellant.", "Richard A. Devine, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Renee Goldfarb, Alan J. Spellberg, and Susan M. Caraher, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. REGINALD KELLEY, Defendant-Appellant.\nFirst District (1st Division)\nNo. 1\u201400\u20140764\nOpinion filed May 13, 2002.\nRita A. Fry, Public Defender, of Chicago (Karen M. Florek, Assistant Public Defender, of counsel), for appellant.\nRichard A. Devine, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Renee Goldfarb, Alan J. Spellberg, and Susan M. Caraher, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0253-01", "first_page_order": 271, "last_page_order": 278 }