{ "id": 1209217, "name": "In re MARRIAGE OF DEBRA ANN LINDSEY-ROBINSON, n/k/a Debra Ann Wakitsch, Petitioner-Appellee, and JON DOUGLAS LINDSEY- ROBINSON, Respondent-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "In re Marriage of Lindsey-Robinson", "decision_date": "2002-05-13", "docket_number": "No. 1\u201400\u20142763", "first_page": "261", "last_page": "269", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "331 Ill. App. 3d 261" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "197 Ill. 2d 88", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 259033 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "93", "parenthetical": "holding that the legislature's use of \"shall\" demonstrates its intent to create a mandatory, rather than directive, provision" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/197/0088-01" ] }, { "cite": "199 Ill. 2d 325", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 58932 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "335-36" }, { "page": "336" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/199/0325-01" ] }, { "cite": "312 Ill. App. 3d 441", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 411713 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "443-44" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/312/0441-01" ] }, { "cite": "149 Ill. 2d 568", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5599497 ], "year": 1992, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/149/0568-01" ] }, { "cite": "212 Ill. App. 3d 172", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2600157 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "183" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/212/0172-01" ] }, { "cite": "99 Ill. 2d 389", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3164374 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "392" }, { "page": "392" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/99/0389-01" ] }, { "cite": "78 Ill. App. 3d 653", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5602728 ], "year": 1979, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/78/0653-01" ] }, { "cite": "117 Ill. App. 3d 383", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3482923 ], "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "390-91" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/117/0383-01" ] }, { "cite": "292 Ill. App. 3d 148", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1725087 ], "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "156" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/292/0148-01" ] }, { "cite": "136 Ill. 2d 27", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3254843 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "38" }, { "page": "38" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/136/0027-01" ] }, { "cite": "316 Ill. App. 3d 1238", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1096548 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1242" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/316/1238-01" ] }, { "cite": "323 Ill. App. 3d 793", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 171733 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "796" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/323/0793-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 810, "char_count": 19276, "ocr_confidence": 0.784, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.0459570259444037e-07, "percentile": 0.5520609502716182 }, "sha256": "de0843de36683d1b464f7a86c90dab23035e87c05ef926eb96a7d1876becc161", "simhash": "1:c71e5555cc69d374", "word_count": 3141 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T14:37:46.779771+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "In re MARRIAGE OF DEBRA ANN LINDSEY-ROBINSON, n/k/a Debra Ann Wakitsch, Petitioner-Appellee, and JON DOUGLAS LINDSEY- ROBINSON, Respondent-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "PRESIDING JUSTICE COHEN\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nRespondent Jon Douglas Lindsey-Robinson appeals pro se from orders of the circuit court of Cook County awarding petitioner Debra Ann Lindsey-Robinson contributory attorney fees and granting Debra\u2019s motion for entry of an amended qualified domestic relations order (QDRO). On appeal, Jon alleges that the circuit court erred in: (1) accepting a stipulation entered into by the parties with respect to the valuation of Jon\u2019s pension plan; (2) approving Debra\u2019s proposed amended QDRO with respect to the distribution of the marital portion of Jon\u2019s pension plan; and (3) awarding Debra contributory attorney fees after judgment was entered. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm.\nBACKGROUND\nJon and Debra were married on May 5, 1989, in Honolulu, Hawaii. In 1990, Jon legally adopted Debra\u2019s minor children: April, born August 29, 1976, and Cody, born May 17, 1978. Debra and Jon lived together in Iowa City, Iowa, until June of 1993, when Debra left the marital home and moved to Illinois with the children. Jon remained in Iowa.\nOn December 21, 1993, Debra filed a petition for dissolution of marriage in the circuit court of Cook County claiming irreconcilable differences. Over a period of three years, Debra\u2019s petition was dismissed for want of prosecution and subsequently reinstated no fewer than three times. During this time period, Jon also filed a petition for dissolution of marriage in the district court of Polk County, Iowa. On March 4, 1996, the Iowa district court entered a default decree of dissolution of marriage on behalf of Jon. On April 3, 1996, Debra filed a motion to vacate the default order, which was granted on May 16, 1996. Jon then appealed to the Iowa appellate court. On September 24, 1997, the Iowa appellate court issued its decision affirming the district court\u2019s order vacating the default judgment. Jon then appealed to the Iowa Supreme Court, which declined to hear his case. Debra\u2019s cause was once again reinstated in the circuit court of Cook County and finally, after years of procedural turmoil, trial began on April 13, 1998.\nAt trial, the parties stipulated as to the valuation of Jon\u2019s interest in his Iowa Public Employee\u2019s Retirement System (IPERS) defined benefit pension plan. The valuation was based on an April 9, 1998, report drafted by Louis A. Epstein. Mr. Epstein, a certified public accountant, was hired by Jon\u2019s attorney to calculate the present value of Jon\u2019s pension plan. Mr. Epstein determined that the present value of the pension plan was $159,171. Mr. Epstein divided this total amount into nonmarital and marital portions. Mr. Epstein opined that $66,853 represented Jon\u2019s nonmarital portion and $92,318 represented the marital portion.\nOn May 27, 1998, the circuit court entered a judgment of dissolution of marriage incorporating the stipulated value of Jon\u2019s pension plan. The judgment stated that the stipulated marital portion of the pension plan ($92,318) \u201cshall be equally divided between the parties pursuant to an appropriate Qualified Domestic Relations Order.\u201d On August 12, 1998, after entry of judgment, the circuit court conducted a hearing on a petition for attorney fees filed on behalf of Debra. The court granted the petition and ordered Jon to contribute to Debra\u2019s attorney fees in the amount of $4,250.\nOn February 8, 1999, Debra\u2019s attorney filed a motion to enter a proposed QDRO. It appears that Jon filed a counterpetition to enter his own proposed QDRO. We state \u201cappears\u201d because although Jon\u2019s counterpetition is not in the record, it is referenced in a hearing conducted on June 14, 1999, and in a court order dated April 14, 1999. At the June 14, 1999, hearing, the circuit court noted that at an April 14, 1999, hearing Jon argued that the circuit court erred in accepting the parties\u2019 stipulation with respect to the valuation of Jon\u2019s pension plan. The court also noted that Jon subsequently withdrew his argument regarding the court\u2019s erring in accepting the valuation. Nevertheless, the court chose to rule on the issue rejecting Jon\u2019s argument and entering Debra\u2019s proposed QDRO.\nOn July 7, 1999, Jon filed a motion to reconsider and modify the judgment. Jon argued, inter alia, that Mr. Epstein \u201cerroneously applied an Illinois based immediate offset approach\u201d to determine the present value of Jon\u2019s pension plan resulting in Debra obtaining a share of the plan in excess of the circuit court\u2019s judgment. Jon subsequently filed a motion to dismiss his prior motion to reconsider and modify the judgment, which was granted on September 10, 1999. Meanwhile, on July 12, 1999, Charlotte Schipper, QDRO administrator of IPERS, informed the parties that the QDRO submitted on June 22, 1999, was rejected because it did not comply with the provisions of the IPERS plan.\nOn March 20, 2000, Debra\u2019s attorney filed a motion to enter an amended QDRO. The amended QDRO contained the following formula for IPERS to implement in distributing to Debra her half of the marital portion of Jon\u2019s pension plan: \u201c50% of the gross monthly or lump sum benefit payable at the date of distribution to the Member multiplied by the \u2018service factor.\u2019 The numerator of the service factor is 66.48 (quarters); and the denominator is the Member\u2019s total quarters of service covered by IPERS.\u201d On April 10, 2000, Jon filed a \u201cMotion to Deny Motion to Enter QDRO,\u201d arguing that the amended QDRO \u201cmay be fruit from a poisonous tree,\u201d \u201clacks integrity\u201d and \u201ccontains segments that do not comply with 735 ILCS 5/503 and ordinary common sense.\u201d\nOn July 18, 2000, the circuit court granted Debra\u2019s motion for entry of the amended QDRO. The court also granted Debra\u2019s motion for postjudgment attorney fees and ordered Jon to pay $1,046.20 to Debra\u2019s trial attorney. This appeal followed.\nANALYSIS\nInitially, we address Debra\u2019s motion to strike Jon\u2019s brief and dismiss his appeal pursuant to Supreme Court Rules 341 (177 Ill. 2d R. 341) and 342 (155 Ill. 2d R. 342). Jon filed an objection and we ordered the motion be taken with the case. We note that most of the deficiencies in respondent\u2019s brief of which Debra complains were remedied on February 19, 2002, when Jon filed a supplemental record containing missing trial transcripts. We do agree with Debra, however, that some of the commentary in Jon\u2019s \u201cstatement of facts\u201d section is argumentative and unsupported by the record in violation of Supreme Court Rule 341(e)(6). 177 Ill. 2d R. 341(e)(6). Nevertheless, we deny Debra\u2019s motion to strike Jon\u2019s brief and dismiss his appeal. Suffice it to say, that although we are denying Debra\u2019s motion, we will consider only those parts of Jon\u2019s \u201cstatement of facts\u201d that are proper. The parts that are improper will not impact our decision in this case. See People v. Tolbert, 323 Ill. App. 3d 793, 796 (2001); Goodwin v. McHenry County Sheriff\u2019s Department Merit Comm\u2019n, 316 Ill. App. 3d 1238, 1242 (2000).\n1. Stipulation\nJon first argues that the circuit court erred in accepting the stipulation entered into by the parties with respect to Mr. Epstein\u2019s valuation of Jon\u2019s IPERS pension plan. Jon asserts for the first time on appeal that the stipulation improperly classified his pension plan as both marital and nonmarital. According to Jon, the existence of his pension plan for 20 years prior to the marriage supports his assertion that the pension should be classified as nonmarital property and be awarded solely to him. Jon also asserts that Mr. Epstein\u2019s calculation contains mathematical errors, both contrary to general accounting principles and Illinois law, which resulted in an \u201coverly large\u201d marital portion. Jon claims that these errors combined render the entire stipulation unconscionable.\nAn issue is waived on appeal unless a timely objection is made at trial and is specifically raised in a written posttrial motion. People v. Reid, 136 Ill. 2d 27, 38 (1990). Our supreme court has outlined two purposes behind the waiver rule. \u201cFirst, timely objections allow the circuit court to promptly correct any error. [Citation.] Second, a party who fails to object cannot obtain the advantage of receiving a reversal by fading to act.\u201d Reid, 136 Ill. 2d at 38.\nThe record reveals that Jon was present in court when his attorney entered into the stipulation with respect to the value of his IPERS pension plan. Jon never voiced an objection to the stipulation, nor did he ever inform the circuit court that he misunderstood or questioned any part of the stipulation. On July 7, 1999, Jon filed a motion to reconsider and modify the judgment arguing, among other things, that Mr. Epstein \u201cerroneously applied an Illinois based immediate offset approach\u201d in determining the present value of Jon\u2019s pension plan. No argument was made concerning the classification of the pension plan as both marital and nonmarital. Moreover, Jon\u2019s post-trial motion was subsequently dismissed on Jon\u2019s own motion on September 10, 1999, and never addressed by the circuit court. Thus, Jon has failed to properly preserve these issues and they are waived for purposes of our review. See Hubbard v. Sherman Hospital, 292 Ill. App. 3d 148, 156 (1997); Parson v. City of Chicago, 117 Ill. App. 3d 383, 390-91 (1983).\n2. QDRO\nJon asserts that the circuit court, in its June 14, 1999, oral ruling, misapplied In re Marriage of Hunt, 78 Ill. App. 3d 653 (1979), as authority for accepting Debra\u2019s proposed QDRO. Although the circuit court cited Hunt with respect to Debra\u2019s first proposed QDRO, that QDRO was subsequently rejected by IPERS. Consequently, Debra offered a proposed amended QDRO on March 20, 2000, which was accepted and entered by the circuit court on July 18, 2000. Unfortunately, the circuit court\u2019s order does not state its reasons for approving Debra\u2019s amended QDRO. Jon has failed to provide us with a transcript of the circuit court\u2019s oral ruling, indeed if there was such an oral ruling, on Debra\u2019s motion to enter the amended QDRO. Without any record, we are unable to determine whether the circuit court relied on the Hunt decision at all, let alone erroneously, when accepting Debra\u2019s amended QDRO. \u201cAny doubts which may arise from the incompleteness of the record will be resolved against the appellant.\u201d Foutch v. O\u2019Bryant, 99 Ill. 2d 389, 392 (1984). \u201c[I]n the absence of such a record on appeal, it will be presumed that the order entered by the trial court was in conformity with law and had a sufficient factual basis.\u201d O\u2019Bryant, 99 Ill. 2d at 392.\nJon next argues that the circuit court erred in accepting Debra\u2019s proposed amended QDRO with respect to the distribution of the marital portion of Jon\u2019s pension plan. According to Jon, the formula provided in paragraphs 5 and 6 of the amended QDRO contains a mathematical error resulting in \u201cunconscionable privileges to the Debra.\u201d Specifically, Jon disputes the use of 16.62 as the \u201cyear factor\u201d where the parties were only married for a total of 9 years.\nThe circuit court\u2019s judgment for dissolution of marriage ordered that the stipulated marital portion of Jon\u2019s pension plan ($92,318) be \u201cdivided equally between the parties pursuant to an appropriate Qualified Domestic Relations Order.\u201d After the initial QDRO was rejected by IPERS, Debra\u2019s attorney filed a motion to enter an amended QDRO. Paragraph 5 of the amended QDRO contained the following formula for IPERS to implement in distributing to Debra her marital portion of Jon\u2019s pension plan: \u201c50% of the gross monthly or lump sum benefit payable at the date of distribution to the Member multiplied by the \u2018service factor.\u2019 The numerator of the service factor is 66.48 (quarters); and the denominator is the Member\u2019s total quarters of service covered by IPERS.\u201d Paragraph 6 consists of the formula used to determine the \u201cservice factor.\u201d\nThe stipulated marital portion of Jon\u2019s pension plan is $92,318. The circuit court ordered the stipulated marital portion to be divided equally between the parties. Thus, Jon should receive $46,159 of the stipulated marital portion of the pension plan and likewise Debra should receive $46,159 of the stipulated marital portion of the pension plan. Paragraph 5 of the amended QDRO directs IPERS to pay Debra half of the stipulated marital portion of Jon\u2019s pension plan, or $46,151. This represents an $8 difference from the circuit court\u2019s judgment in Jon\u2019s favor. We find this difference to be de minimis and remand on this basis to be unnecessary.\nJon makes two additional contentions with respect to Debra\u2019s proposed amended QDRO: (1) \u201cthe QDRO sets a frozen compensation rate based upon an erroneous stipulation\u201d; and (2) \u201cthe QDRO does not consider improvements to the pension not attributable to the marriage.\u201d We agree with Debra that Jon\u2019s general reference to the issues above, unsupported by citation to authority, fails to merit our consideration on appeal. See Hutchings v. Bauer, 212 Ill. App. 3d 172, 183 (1991), rev\u2019d on other grounds, 149 Ill. 2d 568 (1992).\n3. Attorney Fees\nLastly, Jon argues that the circuit court erred in awarding Debra contributory attorney fees after judgment was entered. Jon also contests the circuit court\u2019s award of postjudgment attorney fees to Debra, but states in his brief that he disputes this issue only \u201cif the dismissal [of Jon\u2019s motion to reconsider and modify judgment] with prejudice impacts this appeal.\u201d Jon asserts that if the order dismissing his motion to reconsider and modify judgment with prejudice \u201cdoes not affect this appeal,\u201d then his argument is moot. Because we find no error in the circuit court\u2019s dismissal, at Jon\u2019s own request (of Jon\u2019s motion to reconsider and modify judgment), we address only Jon\u2019s argument as to the circuit court\u2019s August 12, 1998, order granting Debra $4,250 in contributory attorney fees.\nJon claims that any award of contributory attorney fees should have been made, pursuant to section 503(j) of the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act (Act) (750 ILCS 5/503(j) (West 1998)), prior to entry of judgment. More artfully framed, Jon argues that because Debra\u2019s petition was untimely filed, the circuit court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to grant the petition, thus rendering its order void. Section 503(j), added to the Act in 1997, states in part:\n\u201cAfter proofs have closed in the final hearing on all other issues between the parties (or in conjunction with the final hearing, if all parties so stipulate) and before judgment is entered, a party\u2019s petition for contribution to fees and costs incurred in the proceeding shall be heard and decided ***.\u201d (Emphasis added.) 750 ILCS 5/503\u00ae (West 1998).\nHere, judgment was entered on May 27, 1998; however, it was not until August 12, 1998, that the circuit court conducted a hearing on a petition for attorney fees filed on behalf of Debra. The court ultimately granted the petition and ordered Jon to contribute to Debra\u2019s attorney fees in the amount of $4,250, but not without reservation. During its oral ruling, the circuit court stated the following:\n\u201cTHE COURT: *** Since we are talking about the statute, I might further add that in the future both myself and the lawyers need to make sure that we do these contribution hearings before I enter judgment. The statute is extremely clear this hearing should have been done prior to my entering the judgment.\nThere is no remedy provided for that. I will hold that any objection is waived, since nobody objected to it. Nevertheless, that is a specific statute. I have ruled on the issues.\u201d (Emphasis added.)\nWe agree with both the trial judge and Jon that \u201cunder section 503\u00ae of the Act, a petition for attorney fees must be heard and decided before the final judgment is entered.\u201d In re Marriage of Ronchar, 312 Ill. App. 3d 441, 443-44 (2000). Under the Act, a judgment for dissolution of marriage becomes final \u201cwhen entered.\u201d 750 ILCS 5/413(a) (West 2000). Because Debra did not file her petition for attorney fees until after the judgment for dissolution was entered in this matter, her petition was clearly untimely pursuant to section 503\u00ae of the Act.\nFinding Debra\u2019s petition untimely pursuant to section 503\u00ae does not, however, end our analysis of the issue. Despite the untimeliness of Debra\u2019s petition for contributory attorney fees, the circuit court granted the petition, stating that because no objection had been made, the issue of untimeliness was waived. Thus, the narrower issue for our review is whether the timing requirement in section 503\u00ae of the Act may be waived.\nRecently, our supreme court rejected a long line of precedent, including its own, holding that \u201cthe legislature, in defining a justiciable matter, may impose \u2018conditions precedent\u2019 to the court\u2019s exercise of jurisdiction that cannot be waived. [Citations.]\u201d Belleville Toyota, Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 199 Ill. 2d 325, 335-36 (2002). The court found such precedent contrary to article VI of the Illinois Constitution and reasoned:\n\u201cCharacterizing the requirements of a statutory cause of action as nonwaivable conditions precedent to a court\u2019s exercise of jurisdiction is merely another way of saying that the circuit court may only exercise that jurisdiction which the legislature allows. We reiterate, however, that the jurisdiction of the circuit court is conferred by the constitution, not the legislature. Only in the area of administrative review is the court\u2019s power to adjudicate controlled by the legislature. [Citations.]\u201d Belleville Toyota, 199 Ill. 2d at 336.\nFollowing Belleville Toyota, we must find that the timing provision of section 503(j) of the Act, although mandatory (see People v. O\u2019Brien, 197 Ill. 2d 88, 93 (2001) (holding that the legislature\u2019s use of \u201cshall\u201d demonstrates its intent to create a mandatory, rather than directive, provision)), is not a jurisdictional prerequisite and thus may be waived. Here, not only did Jon fail to object to the untimeliness of Debra\u2019s petition for contributory attorney fees, he also substantively argued the merits of the petition before the circuit court. Jon has waived the issue of contributory attorney fees on appeal.\nFor the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nMcNULTY and COUSINS, JJ., concur.\nJon was represented by counsel at trial. On June 15, 1998, Jon\u2019s attorney filed a motion to withdraw, which was granted on July 2, 1998. Jon did not file his pro se appearance until April 14, 1999.\nDebra\u2019s attorney calculated the \u201cservice factor\u201d by implementing the following formula: marital portion + nonmarital portion = total pension value ($92,318 + $66,853) = $159,171); marital portion / total pension value = marital percent ($92,318 / $159,171 = .58); total years of service x marital percent = year factor (28.66 x .58 = 16.62); year factor x 4 = quarterly service factor (16.62 x 4 = 66.48).\n.50 x $159,171 x 66.48/114.64 = $46,151", "type": "majority", "author": "PRESIDING JUSTICE COHEN" } ], "attorneys": [ "Jon Douglas Lindsey-Robinson, of Des Moines, Iowa, appellant pro se.", "Paulette M. Gray, of Riffner, Barber, Scott & Stefanowicz, PC., of Schaumburg, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "In re MARRIAGE OF DEBRA ANN LINDSEY-ROBINSON, n/k/a Debra Ann Wakitsch, Petitioner-Appellee, and JON DOUGLAS LINDSEY- ROBINSON, Respondent-Appellant.\nFirst District (1st Division)\nNo. 1\u201400\u20142763\nOpinion filed May 13, 2002.\nRehearing denied June 13, 2002.\nJon Douglas Lindsey-Robinson, of Des Moines, Iowa, appellant pro se.\nPaulette M. Gray, of Riffner, Barber, Scott & Stefanowicz, PC., of Schaumburg, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0261-01", "first_page_order": 279, "last_page_order": 287 }