{
  "id": 1209202,
  "name": "In re BEN S., a Minor (The People of the State of Illinois, Petitioner-Appellee, v. Ben S., Respondent-Appellant)",
  "name_abbreviation": "People v. Ben S.",
  "decision_date": "2002-06-14",
  "docket_number": "No. 3\u201400\u20140708",
  "first_page": "471",
  "last_page": "474",
  "citations": [
    {
      "type": "official",
      "cite": "331 Ill. App. 3d 471"
    }
  ],
  "court": {
    "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.",
    "id": 8837,
    "name": "Illinois Appellate Court"
  },
  "jurisdiction": {
    "id": 29,
    "name_long": "Illinois",
    "name": "Ill."
  },
  "cites_to": [
    {
      "cite": "238 Ill. App. 3d 1086",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d",
      "case_ids": [
        5154973
      ],
      "year": 1992,
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/ill-app-3d/238/1086-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "326 Ill. App. 3d 497",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d",
      "case_ids": [
        1281459
      ],
      "weight": 2,
      "year": 2001,
      "pin_cites": [
        {
          "page": "500"
        }
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/ill-app-3d/326/0497-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "285 Ill. App. 3d 930",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d",
      "case_ids": [
        1295543
      ],
      "year": 1997,
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/ill-app-3d/285/0930-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "215 Ill. App. 3d 561",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d",
      "case_ids": [
        5292838
      ],
      "year": 1991,
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/ill-app-3d/215/0561-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "172 Ill. 2d 386",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ill. 2d",
      "case_ids": [
        55982
      ],
      "weight": 2,
      "year": 1996,
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/ill-2d/172/0386-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "326 Ill. App. 3d 497",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d",
      "case_ids": [
        1281459
      ],
      "year": 2001,
      "opinion_index": 1,
      "case_paths": [
        "/ill-app-3d/326/0497-01"
      ]
    }
  ],
  "analysis": {
    "cardinality": 429,
    "char_count": 7190,
    "ocr_confidence": 0.766,
    "pagerank": {
      "raw": 1.5705892086385042e-07,
      "percentile": 0.6786411099643261
    },
    "sha256": "031dc19ff46c67796a16f2782c7de139014a20d9d6ac48e767b6113d3a607aee",
    "simhash": "1:b06a3d38e32531cb",
    "word_count": 1174
  },
  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T14:37:46.779771+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
  },
  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "In re BEN S., a Minor (The People of the State of Illinois, Petitioner-Appellee, v. Ben S., Respondent-Appellant)."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "JUSTICE HOLDRIDGE\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThe State filed a juvenile petition alleging that Ben S., a minor, committed three acts of aggravated criminal sexual assault (720 ILCS 5/12 \u2014 14(b) (i) (West 1998)). He admitted to the allegations and was sentenced to five years of probation. The State sought to register Ben S. under the Sex Offender Registration Act (the Act) (730 ILCS 150/1 et seq. (West 2000)), but he filed a motion attacking the constitutionality of the Act. The motion was denied. He filed a motion to reconsider his sentence, again challenging the Act on constitutional grounds. That motion was also denied. He then filed this appeal claiming, as a matter of statutory construction, that minors are not required to register under the Act. We disagree.\nBefore July 1, 1999, section 3 of the Act provided that \u201c[a] sex offender *** shall *** register in person\u201d with a prescribed law enforcement official. 730 ILCS 150/3(a) (West 1998). The term \u201csex offender\u201d was defined in section 2 as, inter alia, \u201cany person\u201d who is charged with, and convicted of, a sex offense. 730 ILCS 150/2(A)(1)(a) (West 1998). Effective July 1, 1999, the legislature amended section 2 by adding the following definition:\n\u201c \u2018Juvenile sex offender\u2019 means any person who is adjudicated a juvenile delinquent as the result of the commission of or attempt to commit a violation set forth in item (B), (C), or (C \u2014 5) of this Section or a violation of any substantially similar federal, sister state, or foreign country law. For purposes of this Section, \u2018convicted\u2019 shall have the same meaning as \u2018adjudicated\u2019.\u201d 730 ILCS 150/ 2(A \u2014 5) (West 2000).\nThe amendment did not change the definition of a \u201csex offender\u201d or the requirement in section 3 that such offenders register under the Act.\nIn his original motion challenging the constitutionality of the Act, Ben S. acknowledged that the amendment \u201cinclud[ed] the definition of juvenile sex offender as a sex offender for application of the *** Act.\u201d He nevertheless averred that during his preadmission negotiations with the State, both parties believed he was not subject to registration because his offenses preceded the amendment\u2019s effective date. He said he did not want to withdraw his admissions or have his sentence vacated; he simply wanted \u201cto be free from the dictates of the new provisions of the *** Act as he bargained for during his plea negotiations.\u201d\nThe fundamental canon of statutory construction is to ascertain and effectuate the legislature\u2019s intent. Nottage v. Jeka, 172 Ill. 2d 386 (1996). The best indicator of such intent is the language the legislature used in the statute. Nottage, 172 Ill. 2d 386. Courts cannot use construction as a guise for supplying omissions, remedying defects, adding limitations, or otherwise departing from the plain meaning of a statute\u2019s language. Toys \u201cR\u201d Us, Inc. v. Adelman, 215 Ill. App. 3d 561 (1991). Questions of statutory construction invoke de novo review. In re Application for Tax Deed, 285 Ill. App. 3d 930 (1997).\nThe Appellate Court, Second District, addressed the instant issue in In re Nicholas K., 326 Ill. App. 3d 497 (2001), and held that juveniles are not required to register under the Act. The court\u2019s reasoning was as follows:\n\u201cBy creating a separate category of \u2018juvenile sex offenders,\u2019 the legislature must have intended those in this category to be treated differently. Section 3 of the Act plainly provides that only \u2018sex offenders\u2019 are required to register. It says nothing about \u2018juvenile sex offenders.\u2019 If the legislature wanted to provide that juveniles who were adjudicated delinquent for having committed sex crimes had to register as sex offenders on the same basis as adults convicted of sex crimes, it could simply have amended the definition of \u2018sex offender\u2019 to include juveniles who were adjudicated delinquent.\u201d Nicholas K., 326 Ill. App. 3d at 500.\nWe disagree with the Second District\u2019s holding. Indeed, section 3 of the Act only requires \u201csex offenders\u201d to register. But the applicable definition of a \u201csex offender\u201d is \u201cany person\u201d who is charged with, and convicted of, a sex offense. (Emphasis added.) 730 ILCS 150/ 2(A)(1)(a) (West 2000). The plain meaning of that language encompasses juveniles without any need for the missing amendment noted by the Second District. In light of such plainness, we refuse to add an adult limitation under the guise of statutory construction.\nBen S. argues that when the legislature uses certain words in one context and different words in another context, it intends the words to have different meanings. See In re Marriage of Walters, 238 Ill. App. 3d 1086 (1992). This argument misses the point that \u201cjuvenile sex offenders\u201d are encompassed by the definition of \u201csex offenders\u201d and thus do not occupy a different context for purposes of registration under the Act. In addition to the plain language discussed above, the relevant legislative history on this point is telling.\nThe amendment that added \u201cjuvenile sex offender\u201d to the Act\u2019s list of defined terms appeared before the legislature in House Bill 2721 (91st Ill. Gen. Assem., House Bill 2721, 1999 Sess.). In the House of Representatives, Representative Klingler explained that the bill \u201crequires juveniles who are adjudicated delinquent to register.\u201d 91st Ill. Gen. Assem., House Proceedings, March 10, 1999, at 143. The bill then passed by a vote of 116 yeas to 0 noes. 91st Ill. Gen. Assem., House Proceedings, March 10, 1999, at 143. In the Senate, Senator Klemm explained that the bill added definitions of certain persons (including a \u201cjuvenile sex offender\u201d) to the Act \u201cand impose[d] registration requirements of those persons.\u201d 91st Ill. Gen. Assem., Senate Proceedings, April 26, 1999, at 52 (statements of Senator Klemm). The bill then passed by a vote of 57 yeas to 0 noes. 91st Ill. Gen. Assem., Senate Proceedings, April 26, 1999, at 53.\nBen S. himself acknowledged the juvenile registration requirement in his original postadmission motion, where he stated that the amendment \u201cinclud[ed] the definition of juvenile sex offender as a sex offender for application of the *** Act.\u201d His position has since changed, but the legislature\u2019s intent has not. He must register as a sex offender.\nThe judgment of the Will County circuit court is affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nHOMER, J., concurs.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "JUSTICE HOLDRIDGE"
      },
      {
        "text": "JUSTICE SLATER,\ndissenting:\nI agree with the reasoning of the Second District\u2019s decision in In re Nicholas K., 326 Ill. App. 3d 497 (2001). In amending the Act and creating a separate category of \u201cjuvenile sex offender,\u201d the legislature indicated its intent to treat such offenders differently. Accordingly, I would hold that the respondent is not required to register as a sex offender.",
        "type": "dissent",
        "author": "JUSTICE SLATER,"
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Jeremy B. Harris (argued), of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Ottawa, for appellant.",
      "Jeff Tomczak, State\u2019s Attorney, of Joliet (John X. Breslin and Dawn D. Duffy (argued), both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "In re BEN S., a Minor (The People of the State of Illinois, Petitioner-Appellee, v. Ben S., Respondent-Appellant).\nThird District\nNo. 3\u201400\u20140708\nOpinion filed June 14, 2002.\nSLATER, J., dissenting.\nJeremy B. Harris (argued), of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Ottawa, for appellant.\nJeff Tomczak, State\u2019s Attorney, of Joliet (John X. Breslin and Dawn D. Duffy (argued), both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People."
  },
  "file_name": "0471-01",
  "first_page_order": 489,
  "last_page_order": 492
}