{ "id": 1209221, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. SIDNEY McLAURIN, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. McLaurin", "decision_date": "2002-06-14", "docket_number": "No. 3\u201401\u20140255", "first_page": "498", "last_page": "503", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "331 Ill. App. 3d 498" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "478 N.E.2d 267", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "106 Ill. 2d 237", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3138930 ], "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/106/0237-01" ] }, { "cite": "636 N.E.2d 86", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1994, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "263 Ill. App. 3d 348", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5368598 ], "year": 1994, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/263/0348-01" ] }, { "cite": "740 N.E.2d 775", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2000, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "194 Ill. 2d 75", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 1096303 ], "year": 2000, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/194/0075-01" ] }, { "cite": "641 N.E.2d 514", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1994, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "161 Ill. 2d 333", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 783175 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1994, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/161/0333-01" ] }, { "cite": "703 N.E.2d 912", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1998, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "301 Ill. App. 3d 574", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 257198 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1998, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/301/0574-01" ] }, { "cite": "762 N.E.2d 1127", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2002, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "327 Ill. App. 3d 300", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 79567 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2002, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/327/0300-01" ] }, { "cite": "741 N.E.2d 302", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "defendant had reasonable expectation of privacy in family barbeque grill on porch of apartment building where defendant lived with his mother" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "317 Ill. App. 3d 909", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1026062 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "defendant had reasonable expectation of privacy in family barbeque grill on porch of apartment building where defendant lived with his mother" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/317/0909-01" ] }, { "cite": "685 N.E.2d 393", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "defendant's possession of rental car in violation of lease agreement did not confer standing to protest search" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "291 Ill. App. 3d 1077", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 456179 ], "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "defendant's possession of rental car in violation of lease agreement did not confer standing to protest search" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/291/1077-01" ] }, { "cite": "392 U.S. 1", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6167798 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1968, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/392/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "596 N.E.2d 149", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1992, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "231 Ill. App. 3d 117", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5203160 ], "year": 1992, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/231/0117-01" ] }, { "cite": "439 U.S. 128", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11329017 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1978, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/439/0128-01" ] }, { "cite": "388 N.E.2d 414", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1979, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "75 Ill. 2d 291", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2990887 ], "year": 1979, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/75/0291-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 631, "char_count": 11468, "ocr_confidence": 0.782, "pagerank": { "raw": 7.824990012779477e-08, "percentile": 0.45799040793497997 }, "sha256": "4a20d0c72af237635ce31a4e3ffa5289454706233b44df21c904aa2ec95a7e62", "simhash": "1:187e38dd6e6db4c6", "word_count": 1870 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T14:37:46.779771+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. SIDNEY McLAURIN, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "PRESIDING JUSTICE LYTTON\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nFollowing a jury trial, defendant Sidney McLaurin was convicted of unlawful possession of a controlled substance (cocaine) with intent to deliver (720 ILCS 570/401(a)(l)(A) (West 1998)). Defendant appeals, arguing that (1) the court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence; and (2) the State\u2019s evidence of possession was insufficient. We affirm.\nFACTS\nAt the hearing on the suppression motion, Joliet police officer Marc Reid testified that on the evening of July 27, 1999, while Reid and his partner, Kevin O\u2019Boyle, were on street patrol, Reid observed defendant driving a gray van along Iowa Street. Having arrested defendant on prior occasions, the officers believed defendant\u2019s driver\u2019s license was suspended. The officers verified defendant\u2019s license suspension and circled the block to position themselves for a traffic stop. When they returned to Iowa Street, the van was \"gone. The officers then proceeded to a house on Boulder Street, where they had arrested defendant on a prior occasion. O\u2019Boyle testified that the house was rented to Elwana Williams, who lived there with her sister and children. Williams told O\u2019Boyle that no males were permitted on the property.\nThe officers arrived at the Boulder Street address within five minutes of having seen defendant on Iowa Street. Defendant\u2019s van was parked in front of the house with the motor running, the driver\u2019s door open and loud music playing. Defendant was not in the van. The officers saw Curtis Smith standing nearby. Smith was yelling, \u201cSidney, police are coming!\u201d\nO\u2019Boyle testified that he saw defendant crouched by the back corner of the house. As O\u2019Boyle ran toward him, defendant jumped up and met O\u2019Boyle on the driveway. Defendant said, \u201cWhat\u2019s up, O\u2019Boyle?\u201d O\u2019Boyle asked defendant what he was doing, and defendant said he was \u201ctaking a piss.\u201d O\u2019Boyle sent defendant to the front of the house with Reid to wait with back-up officers who had gathered at the scene. Then, he and Reid went back to investigate the area where defendant had been crouched.\nBased on the foregoing evidence, defense counsel argued that the police lacked probable cause to arrest defendant and that the drugs subsequently discovered during the search of the rear of the house were the tainted fruit of an unlawful arrest. The trial court denied the motion, ruling that defendant was lawfully detained based on the officers\u2019 reasonable suspicion that defendant had been driving on a suspended license.\nAt trial, O\u2019Boyle testified that during the ensuing search at the back of the house on Boulder Street, he heard defendant commenting that the police had no business on the property; they needed a search warrant. Nevertheless, O\u2019Boyle and Reid searched the area where defendant had been crouched for evidence of urine and found none. Both the side of the house and the ground were dry. Reid said he saw clear plastic protruding from under the siding in the corner of the house where defendant had been crouched. The siding was loose, and he removed a sandwich bag containing 17 small packages of a white rock-like substance resembling crack cocaine. On the other side of a bush in the same area, Reid found another sandwich bag with 16 more small packages of suspected cocaine. After placing the evidence in his squad car, Reid told defendant he was under arrest for possession of cocaine. The material in the sandwich bags subsequently tested positive for cocaine and weighed 79.4 grams.\nPolice sergeant John Perona testified that he responded to a call to conduct a canine search of the Boulder Street property on the evening of July 27, 1999. Perona said his canine partner was trained to find controlled substances, including cocaine. The cocaine under the house siding had been removed when Perona arrived, and the dog did not alert. Perona explained that if drugs are left in a location for a period of time, the odor will permeate the surrounding surface and the dog will alert even after the drugs have been removed. However, if the drugs were left in an area for only a few minutes, the odor may not have transferred to the surrounding area sufficient for the dog to detect it after the drugs are removed.\nExpert testimony established that the crack cocaine found in this case had a street value of approximately $8,000 and was packaged for sale to street-level drug dealers. Forensic testimony established that the plastic bags containing the crack cocaine were tested, but no identifiable fingerprints were recovered from them.\nAt the close of the State\u2019s case, defendant moved for a directed verdict. The motion was denied, and both parties rested. The jury subsequently found defendant guilty, and the court sentenced him to 16 years\u2019 imprisonment.\nISSUES AND ANALYSIS\nI\nOn appeal, defendant first argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence. Specifically, defendant claims that he was not arrested until after the cocaine was found; the search was not justified as a search incident to arrest; and no other exception to the warrant requirement applies. In so arguing, defendant has abandoned the position assumed in the trial court, which was that the police lacked probable cause to arrest.\nHaving failed to challenge the search as unreasonable in the trial court, defendant has waived the argument on review. People v. Knight, 75 Ill. 2d 291, 388 N.E.2d 414 (1979). Moreover, it is well settled that an accused contesting a search bears the burden of proving standing, i.e., that he had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the premises or property searched. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 58 L. Ed. 2d 387, 99 S. Ct. 421 (1978). A defendant\u2019s transitory presence on the premises at the time of the search or immediately prior to the search is insufficient to establish a legitimate expectation of privacy. People v. Delgado, 231 Ill. App. 3d 117, 596 N.E.2d 149 (1992).\nDefendant posits that he has a reasonable subjective expectation of privacy in material he has hidden. However, defendant has not shown that such an expectation was legitimate in this case. In his statement to O\u2019Boyle, defendant claimed that he was merely using the property for urinating, conduct which in itself justified a reasonable suspicion of criminal trespass and further investigation. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889, 88 S. Ct. 1868 (1968). The evidence indicated that defendant was an intruder with no arguably legitimate interest in the premises or the loose siding used to conceal the drugs. See People v. Bower, 291 Ill. App. 3d 1077, 685 N.E.2d 393 (1997) (defendant\u2019s possession of rental car in violation of lease agreement did not confer standing to protest search); cf. People v. Payton, 317 Ill. App. 3d 909, 741 N.E.2d 302 (2000) (defendant had reasonable expectation of privacy in family barbeque grill on porch of apartment building where defendant lived with his mother). Accordingly, we hold that defendant has failed to establish that he had standing to contest the search, and we affirm the trial court\u2019s denial of defendant\u2019s motion to suppress evidence.\nII\nNext, defendant argues that the State\u2019s evidence of knowing possession of the cocaine was insufficient to sustain a conviction, and the trial court erred in denying his motion to direct a verdict in his favor.\nPossession may be actual or constructive. Actual possession need not be demonstrated if constructive possession can be inferred. People v. Neylon, 327 Ill. App. 3d 300, 762 N.E.2d 1127 (2002). Constructive possession exists where intent and capability to maintain control and dominion over the substance exist. Neylon, 327 Ill. App. 3d 300, 762 N.E.2d 1127. Evidence establishing constructive possession is often entirely circumstantial. People v. Minniweather, 301 Ill. App. 3d 574, 703 N.E.2d 912 (1998). Where narcotics are found on the premises rather than on a defendant, constructive possession may be inferred from facts showing that he once had physical control with intent to exercise control in his own behalf, he has not abandoned the drugs and no other person has obtained possession. People v. Adams, 161 Ill. 2d 333, 641 N.E.2d 514 (1994).\nTo sustain a conviction based on unlawful possession of a controlled substance, the State must also prove that the defendant had knowledge of the presence of the substance. People v. Schmalz, 194 Ill. 2d 75, 740 N.E.2d 775 (2000). Knowledge can rarely be proved directly but may be inferred from surrounding circumstances, including the defendant\u2019s actions, declarations, or other conduct. People v. Roberts, 263 Ill. App. 3d 348, 636 N.E.2d 86 (1994). In considering the sufficiency of evidence on review, this court must determine whether all of the evidence, viewed most favorably to the prosecution, is sufficient to convince any rational trier of fact that the elements of the offense have been proved beyond a reasonable doubt. People v. Collins, 106 Ill. 2d 237, 478 N.E.2d 267 (1985).\nIn this case, the State introduced ample circumstantial evidence of defendant\u2019s constructive possession of the cocaine secreted in the siding of the house on Boulder Street. Defendant arrived at the residence approximately five minutes ahead of the police and was crouched in the immediate area where the drugs were found. The evidence indicated that the cocaine had been placed under the siding so recently that the drug-sniffing dog could not detect its odor. And, there was no indication that any other person was in that area during the period between when the cocaine would have been placed there and when the police found it. This evidence was sufficient to give rise to a reasonable inference that defendant once had physical control of the cocaine.\nIn addition, defendant\u2019s knowledge of the presence of the drugs and his intent to maintain exclusive control of them were established by circumstantial evidence, including defendant\u2019s conduct and comments at the scene. Hiding drugs to avoid detection indicates an intent to exercise control over them. Adams, 161 Ill. 2d 333, 641 N.E.2d 514. Upon hearing that the police were on the premises, defendant quickly moved away from where the cocaine was hidden. A permissible inference was that defendant knew of the presence of contraband and sought to physically distance himself from it. Defendant then lied to the police about his activity at the rear of the house and advised them that they could not search the area without a warrant, indicating that he intended to maintain exclusive control of the drugs.\nBased on the foregoing evidence, a rational trier of fact could conclude that defendant knowingly possessed the cocaine under the siding. See Minniweather, 301 Ill. App. 3d 574, 703 N.E.2d 912. Accordingly, the evidence was sufficient to support defendant\u2019s conviction, and the trial court did not err in denying defendant\u2019s motion for a directed verdict.\nCONCLUSION\nThe judgment of the circuit court of Will County is affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nHOLDRIDGE and HOMER, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "PRESIDING JUSTICE LYTTON" } ], "attorneys": [ "Kerry J. Bryson, of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, and Brad Federow, both of Ottawa, for appellant.", "Jeff Tomczak, State\u2019s Attorney, of Joliet (John X. Breslin and Terry A. Mertel, both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. SIDNEY McLAURIN, Defendant-Appellant.\nThird District\nNo. 3\u201401\u20140255\nOpinion filed June 14, 2002.\nKerry J. Bryson, of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, and Brad Federow, both of Ottawa, for appellant.\nJeff Tomczak, State\u2019s Attorney, of Joliet (John X. Breslin and Terry A. Mertel, both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0498-01", "first_page_order": 516, "last_page_order": 521 }