{ "id": 1209146, "name": "JUDITH R. MYERS et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. MUNDELEIN COLLEGE, Defendant-Appellee", "name_abbreviation": "Myers v. Mundelein College", "decision_date": "2002-06-11", "docket_number": "Nos. 1\u201499\u20143190, 1\u201499\u20144129 cons.", "first_page": "710", "last_page": "716", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "331 Ill. App. 3d 710" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "738 N.E.2d 524", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2000, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "316 Ill. App. 3d 998", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1096560 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1009" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/316/0998-01" ] }, { "cite": "775 F. Supp. 1181", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F. Supp.", "case_ids": [ 5873087 ], "year": 1991, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f-supp/775/1181-01" ] }, { "cite": "653 N.E.2d 809", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "damages may not be speculative, remote or uncertain" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "274 Ill. App. 3d 59", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 291657 ], "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "64", "parenthetical": "damages may not be speculative, remote or uncertain" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/274/0059-01" ] }, { "cite": "443 N.E.2d 36", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1982, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "110 Ill. App. 3d 800", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2995781 ], "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "808" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/110/0800-01" ] }, { "cite": "60 N.E.2d 236", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1945, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "325 Ill. App. 442", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App.", "case_ids": [ 4948187 ], "weight": 5, "year": 1945, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "445-46" }, { "page": "455" }, { "page": "457" }, { "page": "457" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app/325/0442-01" ] }, { "cite": "95 N.E. 74", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.", "year": 1911, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "250 Ill. 128", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 3430844 ], "year": 1911, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/250/0128-01" ] }, { "cite": "28 N.E. 834", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.", "year": 1891, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "139 Ill. 67", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 3007697 ], "year": 1891, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/139/0067-01" ] }, { "cite": "78 Ill. 422", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 824066 ], "year": 1875, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/78/0422-01" ] }, { "cite": "201 N.E.2d 119", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1964, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "31 Ill. 2d 174", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2835263 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1964, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "175" }, { "page": "178" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/31/0174-01" ] }, { "cite": "623 N.E.2d 310", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1993, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "157 Ill. 2d 162", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 778585 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "170" }, { "page": "170-71" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/157/0162-01" ] }, { "cite": "872 F.2d 424", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "year": 1989, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "87 C 6329", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Cow.", "year": 1988, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "233 N.E.2d 85", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1967, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "89 Ill. App. 2d 383", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2546710 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1967, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "390" }, { "page": "391" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/89/0383-01" ] }, { "cite": "695 N.E.2d 1379", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "Gray II" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "296 Ill. App. 3d 795", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 222677 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "Gray II" }, { "page": "809-10" }, { "page": "809-10" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/296/0795-01" ] }, { "cite": "652 N.E.2d 1306", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "Gray I" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "274 Ill. App. 3d 259", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 291595 ], "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "264", "parenthetical": "Gray I" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/274/0259-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 626, "char_count": 12920, "ocr_confidence": 0.759, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.7817273071113374e-08, "percentile": 0.2998201825666284 }, "sha256": "ce2ce4616b707cc2abe86d7930ae1ef0f1470a24129b32f6155d1b8f48739b03", "simhash": "1:9ffa75d5d51facab", "word_count": 2158 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T14:37:46.779771+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "JUDITH R. MYERS et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. MUNDELEIN COLLEGE, Defendant-Appellee." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE CAHILL\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThis is the third appeal arising from breach of contract claims brought by three plaintiffs against defendant Mundelein College. The facts that underlie this present appeal are set out in Gray v. Loyola University of Chicago, 274 Ill. App. 3d 259, 264, 652 N.E.2d 1306 (1995) (Gray I), and Gray v. Mundelein College, 296 Ill. App. 3d 795, 695 N.E.2d 1379 (1998) (Gray II). A final order conforming to the two appellate opinions was filed on January 11, 1999. No one appealed the order, which finally determined that Mundelein was liable for contract damages through 1996 in the case of plaintiffs Gray and Hasty, and that Mundelein had breached its contract with Myers. Myers had never sought damages.\nSubsequently, on June 23, 1999, Gray and Hasty filed a motion asking for damages for the years 1997 and 1998. Myers field a motion under section 2 \u2014 701(c) of the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure (Code) (735 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 701(c) (West 2000)), asking for damages dating back to 1996. The chancery division judge who heard these motions denied them, finding that he no longer had jurisdiction. Gray and Hasty did not appeal this order. Myers moved for reconsideration and, after denial, filed an appeal.\nGray and Hasty meanwhile filed a new complaint in chancery. This complaint alleged that Gray and Hasty were tenured faculty members entitled to lifetime employment by Mundelein, an obligation Mundelein breached. Copies of the chancery court\u2019s order and our decision in Gray II were attached as exhibits. The complaint alleged that damages incurred through December 31, 1996, had been awarded. The complaint sought a declaration that Gray and Hasty were entitled to damages for lost earnings from January 1, 1997, to the present. Mundelein moved to dismiss the complaint under section 2 \u2014 615 of the Code. 735 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 615 (West 2000). Mundelein argued that the complaint failed to state a claim amenable to declaratory judgment relief but, rather, was an action at law. The trial court dismissed the complaint under section 2 \u2014 615. The trial court concluded that \u201cplaintiffs have an action at law for further damages incurred due to the breach which is only proper in the Law Division.\u201d\nGray and Hasty argue on appeal that the dismissal of their declaratory judgment action was in error because there is an actual controversy between the parties arising from Mundelein\u2019s refusal to concede liability for future lost earnings caused by its breach of contract.\nMyers\u2019 appeal challenges the denial of her motion in the original chancery action for additional relief under section 2 \u2014 701(c) of the Code. Myers claims that the trial court has the power and the duty to grant monetary relief under section 2 \u2014 701(c) of the Code.\nMundelein responds that Gray and Hasty\u2019s future damage claims are not cognizable under the declaratory judgment act because only legal, not equitable, relief is sought. Mundelein contends with respect to Myers that her claim for damages is barred by our decision in Goldberg v. Valve Corp. of America, 89 Ill. App. 2d 383, 233 N.E.2d 85 (1967). Mundelein alternatively argues that Myers\u2019 claim for damages is barred by the law of the case, based on our statement in Gray II that Myers was entitled only to declaratory and injunctive relief. Gray II, 296 Ill. App. 3d at 809-10.\nWe entered an order consolidating the appeals. As to Gray and Hasty, we must determine whether the claim may proceed in the chancery division as a declaratory judgment action or must be pursued in the law division as a complaint for damages arising out of a breach of contract. As to Myers, we must determine whether section 2 \u2014 701(c) entitled her to make a present claim for money damages where she failed to seek them in the original action.\nGray and Hasty argue that whether they are entitled to future damages is uncertain under Illinois law, giving rise to an actual controversy that \u201ccan only be solved through a declaratory judgment.\u201d We disagree.\nGray and Hasty claim that a federal district case, Lewis v. Loyola University of Chicago, No. 87 C 6329 (N.D. Ill. 1988), aff\u2019d, Lewis v. Loyola University of Chicago, 872 F.2d 424 (7th Cir. 1989), interpreted Illinois law to bar a second claim for damages from a breach of contract for which damages had already been awarded. Gray and Hasty contend that, if they had filed an action at law seeking damages, Mundelein would have made the same arguments as those in Lewis and that \u201cthese arguments, and the dispute about [Gray and Hasty\u2019s] entitlement to posttrial damages, present an \u2018actual controversy\u2019 that is appropriately resolved in a declaratory judgment action.\u201d The contention overlooks a well-settled rule that a declaratory judgment action should not be used to secure advisory opinions or legal advice with respect to future litigation. Messenger v. Edgar, 157 Ill. 2d 162, 170, 623 N.E.2d 310 (1993). The \u201cactual controversy\u201d requirement ensures that a court will not pass judgment on abstract propositions of law. Messenger, 157 Ill. 2d at 170-71. We find Slack v. City of Salem, 31 Ill. 2d 174, 201 N.E.2d 119 (1964), analogous.\nIn Slack, the plaintiff filed a complaint to restrain the holding of a referendum to approve or disapprove the issuance of revenue bonds. The plaintiff also sought a declaration that the statute authorizing the referendum was unconstitutional. Slack, 31 Ill. 2d at 175. Our supreme court found that, until the voters approved the referendum to issue the bonds, \u201cthere is no controversy that is ripe for a declaratory judgment.\u201d Slack, 31 Ill. 2d at 178. Similarly here, a court cannot make a finding on the effect of the Lewis case on Gray and Hasty\u2019s claim for damages unless and until the issue is raised by Mundelein.\nWe note that whether Gray and Hasty are entitled to posttrial damages arising from Mundelein\u2019s breach of contract does not turn solely on an interpretation of Lewis, but on an analysis of a rule first established in Hamlin, Hale & Co. v. Race, 78 Ill. 422 (1875), that damages for breach of contract beyond the date of trial are barred as speculative. This rule was reaffirmed in Mount Hope Cemetery Ass\u2019n v. Weidenmann, 139 Ill. 67, 28 N.E. 834 (1891), and later modified in Doherty v. Schipper & Block, 250 Ill. 128, 95 N.E. 74 (1911), when our supreme court held that all damages for breach of contract must be recovered in a single action, barring future actions for damages. A subsequent appellate case, Corby v. Seventy-One Hundred Jeffery Avenue Building Corp., 325 Ill. App. 442, 60 N.E.2d 236 (1945), did not follow Doherty.\nIn Corby, the plaintiff entered into an employment contract with the defendant that began on December 15, 1938, and ended on July 15, 1948. The plaintiff sued for breach when he was terminated on September 19, 1940, two years into the 10-year term of employment. Corby, 325 Ill. App. at 445-46. After a December 31, 1942, bench trial, the plaintiff was awarded damages from September 19, 1940, the date of termination to July 15, 1948, the date of expiration of the contract. Corby, 325 Ill. App. at 455. The damage award was reversed on appeal. The Corby court found that, because the employment might be properly terminated at any time between the date of trial and the expiration date, damages after the date of trial \u201cwould be largely speculative.\u201d Corby, 325 Ill. App. at 457. In limiting the plaintiff to accrued damages as of the date of trial, the Corby court, citing to Mount Hope, said that the plaintiff could institute future proceedings \u201cfrom time to time *** for damages that he may have sustained, or he may wait until the expiration of the contract and recover for such damages, if any.\u201d Corby, 325 Ill. App. at 457.\nThese cases make clear that there is a difference between damages for events that have not yet occurred (and may never occur) and a new action for damages that have accrued since the original action was terminated. Illinois law clearly proscribes claims for damages that have not yet occurred, so-called \u201cfuture damages.\u201d See Schoeneweis v. Herrin, 110 Ill. App. 3d 800, 808, 443 N.E.2d 36 (1982); Jackson v. Hammer, 274 Ill. App. 3d 59, 64, 653 N.E.2d 809 (1995) (damages may not be speculative, remote or uncertain). But the term \u201cfuture\u201d damages here is imprecise as to Gray and Hasty, who seek to recover damages that accrued after the first case was decided \u2014 subsequent lost income as a result of Mundelein\u2019s breach of a tenure contract. The facts are not unlike those in Corby, where the subject matter of the dispute was an employment contract that extended beyond the date of the trial determining the breach. Allowing such subsequent actions for accrued damages squares the Mount Hope rule against the award of speculative damages for breach of contract beyond the date of trial with the Corby court\u2019s recognition of a plaintiffs right to recover damages \u201cfrom time to time\u201d as they accrue, under a contract that has been held to be enforceable for its entire term. We note, in passing, that at least one court disagrees. See Munoz v. Expedited Freights System, Inc., 775 F. Supp. 1181, 1187 n.6 (N.D. Ill. 1991). Corby, on the other hand, stands for the proposition that new actions may be brought to recover damages that accrue after the original action is terminated. The remedy is appropriate where, as here, a long-term employment contract is implicated. Gray and Hasty\u2019s claims for damages are actions at law properly brought in the law division. We reverse dismissal of their complaint and remand with directions that the complaint be transferred to the law division.\nWe now consider Myers\u2019 appeal. Myers contends that section 2 \u2014 701(c) of the Code empowers the trial court to assess money damages based on the trial court\u2019s earlier declaration that defendant breached the tenure contract. Mundelein disagrees, claiming that Goldberg v. Valve Corp. of America, 89 Ill. App. 2d 383, 233 N.E.2d 85 (1967), bars Myers\u2019 claim. We disagree.\nGoldberg did not address the scope of section 2 \u2014 701(c) but, rather, considered whether the plaintiffs complaint stated a claim for declaratory relief. Goldberg, 89 Ill. App. 2d at 390. We found that the plaintiffs complaint alleged a breach of contract that \u201cis compensable in a traditional action at law,\u201d which action the plaintiff was not \u201cforeclosed from asserting.\u201d Goldberg, 89 Ill. App. 2d at 391. Applying Goldberg\u2019s reasoning here, we conclude that Myers\u2019 motion for additional relief under section 2 \u2014 701(c) is also \u201ccompensable in a traditional action at law.\u201d\nMundelein argues that Myers is foreclosed from asserting an action for damages based on the law of the case doctrine. In Gray II we said:\n\u201cBut Myers is entitled only to a declaration that Mundelein breached its contract. In defendant Mundelein\u2019s petition for rehearing, Mundelein notes that Myers did not seek damages or prove damages before the trial court. Myers sought only a declaratory judgment and injunctive relief in her complaint.\nWe remand with directions to enter judgment for plaintiff Myers.\u201d Gray II, 296 Ill. App. 3d at 809-10.\nMundelein\u2019s contention that this directive bars Myers\u2019 claim for money damages arising from the breach of contract overlooks that Myers\u2019 entitlement to damages was not at issue in Gray II. All that Myers asked for in the case was a declaration that she be allowed to enforce her right to employment under a tenure agreement. The directive only clarified the instructions to the trial court on remand in this consolidated case. Nor can Myers\u2019 option to seek equitable relief be deemed an election of remedies. If a party has more than one remedy, selecting one of them is not a bar to another remedy unless the remedies are inconsistent and the other party materially changes his position in reliance on the manifestation. Restatement (Second) of Contracts \u00a7 378 (1981); Kel-Keef Enterprises, Inc. v. Quality Components Corp., 316 Ill. App. 3d 998, 1009, 738 N.E.2d 524 (2000). The remedies sought here \u2014 declaratory relief and money damages \u2014 are not inconsistent. We reverse the trial court\u2019s order denying Myers\u2019 motion for additional relief and direct that the matter be transferred to the law division.\nWe reverse the dismissal of Gray and Hasty\u2019s complaint for declaratory judgment and direct that the case be transferred to the law division. The order denying Myers\u2019 motion for additional relief is reversed, and we direct that the case be transferred to the law division.\nReversed; cause remanded with directions.\nCOUSINS and McBRIDE, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE CAHILL" } ], "attorneys": [ "Arthur J. O\u2019Donnell and Kenneth N. Flaxman, both of Chicago, for appellants.", "Ellen M. Babbitt and Bruce W. Melton, both of Babbitt & Melton, of Chicago, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "JUDITH R. MYERS et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. MUNDELEIN COLLEGE, Defendant-Appellee.\nFirst District (2nd Division)\nNos. 1\u201499\u20143190, 1\u201499\u20144129 cons.\nOpinion filed June 11, 2002.\nArthur J. O\u2019Donnell and Kenneth N. Flaxman, both of Chicago, for appellants.\nEllen M. Babbitt and Bruce W. Melton, both of Babbitt & Melton, of Chicago, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0710-01", "first_page_order": 728, "last_page_order": 734 }